The Yerevan initiative brings governments, international organisations and businesses together to advance biodiversity-friendly spending, with success hinging on fair reforms and measurable changes in national budgets.

Yerevan Call seeks to turn the global pledge to reduce harmful incentives by at least $500 billion annually by 2030 into national action.

Armenia’s COP17 presidency on Monday launched a voluntary initiative to reform subsidies that damage biodiversity and expand incentives for conservation, aiming to translate a global commitment adopted in 2022 into changes in national budgets.

The initiative seeks to advance Target 18 of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, which calls for reducing harmful incentives, including subsidies, by at least $500 billion annually by 2030.

The figure represents an existing reform commitment rather than new funding announced in Yerevan. The target calls for fair and equitable action, beginning with the most damaging incentives, alongside greater support for conservation and the sustainable use of biodiversity.

The launch is a presidency-led initiative rather than a negotiated agreement adopted by all COP17 parties.

The initiative’s impact will depend on whether countries convert political support into changes in national budgets and incentive programmes, delivering measurable gains for biodiversity while protecting the livelihoods of producers and communities affected by reform.

From global pledge to national budgets

The package has three connected components. The Yerevan Call sets out the political ambition, while Friends of Target 18 provides a voluntary platform for countries to exchange experience and sustain cooperation beyond the conference.

The third component, the Yerevan Biodiversity Finance Challenge, will help governments design incentives that benefit nature, strengthen biodiversity finance planning and integrate biodiversity into public budgets.

Partners include the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), the UN Development Programme and its Biodiversity Finance Initiative, the OECD and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) Secretariat.

COP17 President and Armenian Environment Minister Hambardzum Matevosyan said governments must turn international commitments into practical action. He acknowledged that subsidy reform was complex because public support is closely tied to economic and social priorities and can affect sectors and communities differently.

“I’ve already stated that biodiversity issues should extend beyond the purview of environment ministries,” he said.

“This initiative is designed to ensure cooperation between the ministries of finance, agriculture, economy and development.”

Matevosyan invited countries to support the Yerevan Call and consider joining Friends of Target 18.

Making public support work for nature

CBD Executive Secretary Astrid Schomaker said some subsidies undermined the natural resources on which the sectors receiving support depended.

“Governments, of course, want to support economic sectors. They often have to support these sectors because people’s well-being depends on them. The debate isn’t about whether subsidies are necessary, but about what results they produce,” she said.

Schomaker stressed that environment ministries could not deliver the changes alone. Many relevant decisions rested with finance, economy, agriculture and energy ministries, while financial institutions also needed to participate.

Diego Mesa Puyo, chief executive officer and chairperson of the Global Environment Facility, described reform as an opportunity to protect nature while easing pressure on government finances.

“Changing subsidies or disincentives is a way to promote environmental protection while simultaneously expanding fiscal space,” he said.

“All governments around the world must achieve more with less.”

Reform of harmful incentives remains among the least advanced targets in the global biodiversity framework, according to IISD.

IISD President and Chief Executive Patricia Fuller said countries needed sustained assistance to turn commitments into results.

“Target 18 provides a unique opportunity to ensure public resources support rather than undermine our environmental commitments. But success requires political leadership, sustained international collaboration and practical support for countries to deliver change,” she said.

Businesses link reform to resilient supply chains

In reactions welcoming the initiative, business, finance and conservation leaders linked reform to the resilience of farms, supply chains and investment. They also emphasised the importance of supporting producers through the transition.

Christopher Adamo, Danone’s head of global sustainability impact and B Corp, highlighted the pressures facing farmers.

“Farmers are our key stewards of soil and water; yet they face growing economic and environmental pressures,” he said.

“No company can drive this transition alone. The right incentives and policies can accelerate the transition while strengthening the competitiveness, resilience and long-term viability of agricultural systems.”

Raphaëlle Archambeaud-Sicot, chief sustainability officer at L’Occitane en Provence, said business resilience depended on healthy ecosystems.

“When nature is degraded, our supply chains are degraded too. Yet public money still too often rewards harmful practices rather than incentivizing sustainable ones,” she said.

Jacco Minnaar, chief commercial officer and a board member of Triodos Bank, called for public policy and financial institutions to work together to change investment patterns.

“Too much capital still flows towards activities that drive nature loss, while too little supports nature,” he said.

“Financial institutions have a responsibility to redirect capital, but governments also have a crucial role in changing the incentives that shape where capital flows.”

Anita de Horde, executive director of the Finance for Biodiversity Foundation, warned that contradictory public incentives could undermine efforts to mobilise private investment.

“We cannot ask financial institutions to align their activities and investments with nature while public incentives continue to pull capital in the opposite direction,” she said.

Arup’s global nature leader, Tom Butterworth, said investment decisions would have consequences lasting well beyond the conference.

“The decisions we make about places and infrastructure today will shape communities, economies and ecosystems for decades to come,” he said.

“Investment needs to restore nature, deliver local benefits and build resilience to a changing climate. Achieving that requires fiscal and financial incentives that make nature-positive outcomes the most attractive and competitive choice.”

Fair reforms and measurable results

Business for Nature chief executive Eva Zabey said more than 130 businesses and financial institutions had signalled support for the agenda.

“The focus now should be on fair, phased reforms that work for producers and help make sustainable production the competitive choice,” she said.

FAIRR Initiative Executive Director Abigail Herron urged governments to redirect agricultural support towards sustainable practices.

“Public money should work for nature, not against it,” she said.

“By accelerating subsidy repurposing, governments can redirect harmful support towards incentives that reward sustainable agriculture, while unlocking progress across the wider Global Biodiversity Framework.”

Conservation International Executive Director Patricia Zurita called for redesigning public support to reward sustainable practices.

“Reform means redesigning how that support is delivered: keep the goal, change the incentive,” she said.

“The message is simple: governments can and should spend better, not more.”

The 20 October 2026 initiative by Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Armenia’s legal response, and the consequences for the durability of Eurasian integration and Armenia’s European diversification.

Scope: This assessment examines Armenia, the four other Eurasian Economic Union members and the European Union, concentrating on developments through 27 October 2026 and their implications for the period 2026–2031.

Executive Summary — Bottom Line Up Front

Principal judgment: A negotiated confrontation without immediate suspension remains the more plausible near-term pathway. The four governments have put Armenia’s EAEU position in question but have not established, on the verified record, that a legally effective suspension has occurred.

The 20 October 2026 report represents a significant escalation: Armenia’s European trajectory is being evaluated not merely as a political divergence but as a possible basis for restricting its treaty rights. Russia’s government has published the report under the title On the Possible Consequences of Suspending the Application of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union in Respect of the Republic of Armenia. Report — Government of the Russian Federation — Oct 2026.

The central legal controversy concerns whether Armenia’s European integration measures amount to a sufficiently serious violation of existing EAEU obligations to justify suspension under international treaty law. Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan expressly disputes that premise.

The economic implications are material: the report’s publicly reported scenarios describe substantial disruption to trade, prices and economic activity. They are conditional estimates advanced by Armenia’s partners, not independently validated forecasts.

For Moscow, the immediate advantage is negotiating leverage. The longer-term risk is that economic pressure encourages Armenia to reduce the dependencies through which Russia retains influence.

For Yerevan, strategic autonomy depends on retaining economically important relationships while developing credible alternatives. European political engagement alone cannot eliminate the adjustment costs of an institutional rupture.

The decisive variable is Russia’s willingness to distinguish compliance with binding economic obligations from broader geopolitical alignment. If that distinction is maintained, accommodation remains possible; if it collapses, Eurasian integration risks becoming less attractive to states seeking diversified international relationships.

Russia’s attempt to condition Armenia’s Eurasian economic position on its European orientation exposes a deeper problem for Moscow: economic dependence can sustain influence, but using it as political leverage may accelerate the very diversification it is intended to prevent.

On 20 October 2026, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan presented a report examining the possible suspension of the Eurasian Economic Union Treaty’s application to Armenia. Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan rejected the legal justification, insisting that Yerevan had violated no treaty obligations. The confrontation places two competing principles on a collision course: the enforceability of regional economic integration and a member state’s right to determine its international orientation. For Russia, the stakes extend beyond commercial privileges to the credibility of its influence across the post-Soviet space. For Armenia, the danger lies in preserving indispensable economic relationships under conditions that could progressively restrict sovereign decision-making. The central contradiction is that Moscow can increase the immediate costs of Armenian diversification without necessarily strengthening Armenia’s willingness to remain within the Russian-led institutional order.

A treaty dispute that began as a question of political loyalty

The October report followed an initiative launched on 29 May 2026, when the presidents of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan called for an examination of the consequences of suspending the EAEU Treaty’s application to Armenia. The document was transmitted through the Eurasian Economic Commission for consideration by the Union’s highest political authorities. Its scope extended from European integration measures and regulatory compatibility to possible legal mechanisms and economic consequences. The institutional sequence matters: the four governments have moved beyond diplomatic objections to prepare an instrument capable of influencing Armenia’s future decisions, without establishing that suspension has already taken effect.

Armenia’s response has been carefully calibrated. On 21 October, Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan disputed the existence of an ordinary mechanism allowing the other members to exclude Armenia. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan reinforced that objection on 22 October. By 27 October, Mirzoyan had sharpened the argument: the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties contains provisions concerning suspension, but Armenia had committed no breach justifying their application. He maintained Yerevan’s willingness to negotiate, while refusing to accept that economic membership confers authority over the country’s broader foreign policy.

The distinction is consequential. The EAEU, established by the Treaty of 29 May 2014, is an economic organisation whose founding provisions recognise sovereign equality, national interests and binding common obligations. Armenia joined on 2 January 2015. Its membership imposes constraints in areas covered by Eurasian integration, particularly customs and commercial arrangements, but does not automatically establish a common foreign policy. Moscow’s political concern is understandable: Armenian participation in a competing customs framework could eventually undermine the Union’s common rules. Yet an anticipated incompatibility is not equivalent to an existing violation.

The economic figures reveal leverage, not an inevitable collapse

The four-government report attaches severe economic consequences to a hypothetical suspension. Its reported estimates envisage a 15.6% contraction in Armenian GDP, a 14.9-percentage-point increase in inflation, a 14.6% decline in consumption, a 48.8% reduction in imports and a 55.6% fall in Armenia’s trade with EAEU members. Exports of domestically produced goods could decline by 30–50%, while re-exports could contract by more than 90%. These are conditional projections advanced by interested governments, not independently validated forecasts. Their baseline assumptions and adjustment horizon are not sufficiently established in the available record.

Their political function is nevertheless clear. By quantifying the potential losses, the report seeks to make Armenia’s European trajectory economically expensive before any institutional rupture occurs. The message reaches beyond the Armenian cabinet to exporters, importers, investors and households dependent on established commercial relationships.

Yet Armenia’s trade structure is already changing. According to figures attributed to its Statistical Committee, merchandise turnover reached US$14.9534 billion in January–September 2026, an increase of 2.7% year on year. Exports declined 8.0% to US$5.1631 billion, while imports increased 9.5% to US$9.7903 billion, producing a merchandise trade deficit of US$4.6272 billion. These figures describe an economy with expanding import requirements and weaker export performance, not one insulated from external disruption.

Preliminary January–August 2026 partner statistics indicate that trade with EAEU members fell 17.2% to approximately US$3.8465 billion, while commerce with Russia declined 19.2% to US$3.591 billion. During the same period, trade with the European Union reportedly rose 53.9% to US$2.4298 billion. The geographical redistribution is substantial, although changes in gross turnover cannot establish that alternative suppliers and markets perform the same economic functions.

The World Bank identified the contraction of precious-metal and precious-stone re-exports as a major explanation for Armenia’s 36.1% decline in exports during 2025. Excluding those categories, exports increased 8.9%. This distinction matters when evaluating the four-government report: an abrupt fall in re-export turnover does not necessarily imply a proportionate collapse in domestic production or value added.

Economic pressure is therefore real, but its likely consequences cannot be inferred directly from the largest numbers in a politically consequential report.

Gas, labour and logistics make disengagement more costly than changing trade partners

The deepest constraints on Armenian autonomy are not captured by aggregate merchandise statistics. They concern commercial relationships whose economic value depends on infrastructure, contracts and administrative arrangements that cannot be replaced by diplomatic declarations.

The October report’s reported gas scenario illustrates the problem. An increase in the Russian supply price from US$177.50 to US$300 per 1,000 cubic metres would represent approximately 69%. But this is an illustrative scenario, not an implemented tariff, and the EAEU Treaty’s suspension would not necessarily amend bilateral energy contracts automatically. The legal mechanism matters as much as the price itself.

Labour mobility creates another exposure. The Eurasian framework provides arrangements governing employment across participating states, while the World Bank reported US$714 million in Armenian net non-commercial transfers during 2025, an increase of approximately 53.5% from the previous year. These flows cannot all be classified as workers’ remittances, but they demonstrate the importance of cross-border private financial relationships. Any disruption affecting employment or payment channels could reach households well beyond companies directly engaged in Eurasian trade.

Infrastructure imposes an additional constraint. Armenian producers may obtain preferential entry to European markets without possessing equivalent transport, certification or distribution capacity. Rail connectivity, border administration, logistics and dependable commercial finance determine whether tariff advantages become actual sales. The adjustment from one established market to another therefore involves physical and institutional costs that cannot be eliminated through a political decision.

For Yerevan, diversification is consequently not synonymous with breaking commercial relations with Russia. It means ensuring that indispensable goods, markets and income channels do not depend so heavily on one external relationship that economic cooperation becomes a permanent restriction on political choice.

Treaty law limits what economic power can legitimately enforce

The legal argument is narrower than the political confrontation surrounding it. Article 60 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides for the suspension of a multilateral treaty in circumstances involving material breach. Such a breach requires repudiation of the treaty or violation of a provision essential to its object or purpose. Article 65 establishes relevant notification and procedural requirements.

The EAEU’s common customs regime creates genuine obligations. Armenia cannot retain its benefits while disregarding binding external trade commitments. Full participation in the European Union’s customs and common commercial-policy framework would raise fundamental compatibility questions. But the Armenian law adopted in March 2025 initiating European integration is not equivalent to completed EU accession or the assumption of an incompatible customs tariff.

That difference is central to Mirzoyan’s position. Armenia argues that it remains compliant with existing treaty obligations, while its partners seek to address risks associated with its future institutional direction. The four governments may legitimately request clarification and examine potential incompatibilities. Their collective agreement, however, cannot substitute for the substantive conditions required to establish a material breach.

The dispute also concerns the proposed link between suspension and an Armenian referendum on international orientation. A referendum could clarify domestic political preferences, but it would not itself determine whether Armenia had breached an international treaty or resolve every conflict between future institutional commitments. Making economic participation conditional on such a vote would extend the controversy from customs governance into the organisation of sovereign political choice.

An EAEU capable of enforcing clearly established economic obligations would strengthen its institutional credibility. One that treats geopolitical divergence as sufficient grounds for restricting treaty rights would create a precedent potentially relevant to all its members.

Europe is becoming an alternative, but not yet an economic replacement

The European Union’s contribution to Armenia’s diversification has become more concrete. The Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement, fully effective since 1 March 2021, established a framework for sectoral and institutional cooperation. Armenia adopted legislation initiating European integration in March 2025, followed by the EU–Armenia Strategic Agenda of 2 December 2025 and the first EU–Armenia summit in May 2026.

The economic baseline remains limited. In 2025, the European Union accounted for 11.3% of Armenia’s merchandise trade, including 7.9% of exports and 13.5% of imports. European programmes include a €270 million Resilience and Growth Plan for 2024–2027, while expected investment mobilisation through Global Gateway has been described as reaching €2.5 billion. These figures represent programme commitments and investment expectations, not equivalent amounts of completed expenditure.

The European Council’s 24 September 2026 adoption of temporary trade-liberalisation measures is more immediately relevant. The arrangement suspends duties on specified Armenian products and covers categories representing approximately 80% of Armenian exports to the EU, subject to applicable requirements and safeguards. It offers commercial relief in response to Russian restrictions, but does not guarantee new customers or compensate automatically for the loss of Eurasian markets.

European engagement is also differentiated. French President Emmanuel Macron consolidated a strategic partnership with Armenia during his May 2026 visit, strengthening political and defence cooperation. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz supported an expanded bilateral agenda following the December 2025 German–Armenian strategic declaration, with emphasis on economic modernisation and investment. Italy, through Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Edmondo Cirielli, advanced commercial and infrastructure cooperation during consultations in January 2026 and announced an expanded development-cooperation presence in September. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer strengthened a separate bilateral relationship through the May 2026 UK–Armenia Strategic Partnership, covering security, economic development and institutional resilience.

These relationships increase Armenia’s diplomatic and commercial options, but their institutional effects differ. France, Germany and Italy participate in EU common trade policy; the United Kingdom operates outside it. None can independently guarantee Armenian EU accession or immediately replace established Russian energy, labour and commercial relationships.

Europe’s credibility will be measured not by the number of agreements signed, but by the export revenues, productive investment and operating infrastructure those agreements ultimately generate.

Moscow’s regional influence now depends on the credibility of its rules

Russia’s problem is larger than Armenia’s economic weight within the Eurasian Union. Moscow seeks to preserve a regional system in which economic interdependence reinforces political influence. Yet the October initiative raises a question about the institutional foundations of that system: whether common economic rules can accommodate foreign-policy diversity or whether access to their benefits is conditional on geopolitical alignment.

Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have joined Russia in examining Armenia’s position, but their interests cannot automatically be assumed identical. In 2025, Armenian merchandise turnover with Russia reached approximately US$7.661 billion, compared with about US$251.4 million with Belarus and US$115.9 million with Kazakhstan. Russia possesses the dominant direct commercial relationship, while the other members also have an interest in the legal precedent created by any suspension.

A Union whose rules can be invoked to penalise a member for an established material breach may become more credible. A Union whose economic rights are perceived as vulnerable to political disagreement may become less attractive, particularly for governments seeking diversified external partnerships.

That is the contradiction confronting Moscow. The more convincingly Russia demonstrates Armenia’s exposure to Eurasian economic decisions, the stronger Yerevan’s incentive may become to reduce that exposure. Economic dependence can compel caution, but political influence becomes less durable when the dependent state begins to regard the relationship itself as a source of uncertainty.

The next 24 months will reveal who bears the cost of institutional inflexibility

Between 27 October 2026 and October 2028, Armenia’s immediate challenge will be to protect economic continuity while building usable alternatives. Continued negotiations remain more plausible than an immediate institutional rupture, but this judgment depends on whether the four EAEU governments distinguish actual treaty violations from anticipated geopolitical divergence.

Three developments will determine the outcome: whether Armenian-produced exports gain sustainable access to additional markets; whether European financing and connectivity initiatives become functioning economic assets; and whether Moscow accepts continued Armenian treaty compliance without requiring broader foreign-policy subordination.

An actual suspension could impose substantial short-term costs on Armenian businesses and households, particularly those dependent on established trade, energy and labour arrangements. Yet a suspension based primarily on political orientation could also reduce confidence in the EAEU’s predictability, increasing the incentives for Armenia to seek alternatives.

For Brussels, inaction would expose the distance between institutional declarations and the commercial capacity required to support them. For Yerevan, failure to diversify would preserve economic vulnerabilities that constrain future decisions. For Moscow, the cost of treating integration principally as an instrument of discipline would be the possible erosion of the voluntary economic relationships sustaining Russian influence.

The choice facing Russia is not between permitting Armenian sovereignty and preserving Eurasian integration. It is whether Eurasian integration can remain economically valuable to a state whose political orientation is no longer exclusively aligned with Moscow. Over the next 12–24 months, the costs of failing to answer that question will fall first on Armenia’s economy, but the longer-term institutional consequences could be borne by Russia and the Eurasian system it seeks to preserve.

Navigational Index — Three Thematic Pillars

Pillar I — Treaty Legitimacy, Institutional Authority and the October 2026 Confrontation

• Chapter 1. Armenia’s European Orientation and the Evolution of Eurasian Economic Integration
• Chapter 2. The 20 October Report: Institutional Origin, Content and Strategic Purpose
• Chapter 3. The Legal Contest: EAEU Treaty Obligations, Vienna Convention and Armenian Sovereignty

Pillar II — Economic Dependence, Geopolitical Leverage and External Diversification

• Chapter 4. Armenia’s Eurasian Economic Exposure: Trade, Energy, Market Access and Labour Mobility
• Chapter 5. Russia’s Influence Mechanisms and the Strategic Interests of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
• Chapter 6. The European Alternative: EU Institutions, Commercial Integration and the Distinct Roles of France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom

Pillar III — Institutional Resilience, Negotiating Pathways and Strategic Outlook

• Chapter 7. Economic Pressure as a Negotiating Instrument: Coercive Effects and Counterproductive Outcomes
• Chapter 8. Near-Term Negotiations and the 2027–2031 Sustainability of Armenia’s Dual Orientation
• Chapter 9. Institutional Options, Decision Indicators and the Final Net Assessment of Russian Post-Soviet Influence

Michael Rubin’s October 11, 2026, article, “Will the Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Be the Latest to Come Undone?” portrays Azerbaijan as an obstacle to peace. Yet Armenia occupied Azerbaijani territories for nearly three decades, despite four U.N. Security Council resolutions demanding withdrawal. His dismissal of the Khojaly genocide disregards atrocities documented by international human rights organizations and its recognition by parliamentary bodies in numerous countries and international organizations.

Rubin interprets President Ilham Aliyev’s references to “Western Azerbaijan” as evidence that he is not genuinely committed to peace. Yet referring to places in present-day Armenia from which Azerbaijanis were forcibly displaced does not constitute a territorial claim. In a 1993 speech, Armenia’s former president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, described the removal of Azerbaijanis as resolving a 600-year-old problem.

In 2022, Azerbaijan proposed five principles for normalization, including recognition of territorial integrity and renunciation of territorial claims. At the August 8, 2025, Washington summit, both countries initialed a peace agreement. Azerbaijan subsequently lifted restrictions on cargo transit to Armenia, facilitated grain shipments and petroleum exports, and supported civil society exchanges. The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) offers further regional connectivity.

These practical achievements and confidence-building measures demonstrate Azerbaijan’s commitment to sustainable peace and constructive engagement with the United States.

Sultan Zahidov
Leading Adviser,
Center of Analysis of International Relations and Multiculturalism
Baku

I thank Mr. Zahidov for his reply, but he essentially recycles old Azerbaijani government talking points. He ignores the constitutional actions of Nagorno-Karabakh to assert its autonomy and the United Nations Security Council’s endorsement of the Minsk Group process to address disputes. As a mediated agreement approached and mediators dotted the I’s and crossed the T’s, Azerbaijani President Aliyev unilaterally turned to force—days after assuring diplomats he would not do so—and ethnically cleansed the entirety of Nagorno-Karabakh, much as it had in Nakhichevan. In both regions, Azerbaijan went farther and destroyed centuries and millennium-old cultural heritage.

Against this backdrop of the ethnic cleansing of more than 100,000 indigenous Christians in Nagorno-Karabakh, Zahidov’s complaints about a cherrypicked statement more than three decades old during the height of war ironically supports the premise of my article—that Azerbaijan appears unprepared and is undermining peace.

Zahidov makes other actual errors. Azerbaijan’s former president cast doubt on the Azerbaijani narrative regarding Khojaly that has grown more exaggerated with time.

While Mr. Zahidov describes some supposed “confidence-building measures,” he ignores the hostages that Azerbaijan continues to hold, the failure to prosecute Azerbaijani soldiers caught on video beheading Armenian captives, and Azerbaijan’s military occupation of Armenian territory across the demarcated border, which, in addition to the broader blockade and revanchist rhetoric about Armenia as “Western Azerbaijan,” suggest Aliyev is no more sincere now than when he broke the ceasefire, shredded previous agreements, and launched the largest ethnic cleansing in the broader region since the Bosnian War.

According to Freedom House, Azerbaijan runs one of the world’s most brutal police states, worse than China, the Taliban’s Afghanistan, Cuba, and Belarus. The world learned a lesson when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990 that revanchist rhetoric matters, especially when economic downturns force dictators to look for distraction. This is why the international community must take Aliyev’s continued threats seriously.

Michael Rubin

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