While Russia tries to manipulate information, local civil society is teaching

Chmshkian Vicken Leave a comment
Nov 13, 2026

While Russia tries to manipulate information, local civil society is teaching Armenians media literacy 

A group of journalists and activists created ‘Verify This,’ a platform where users can find reliable information
Written byDaria Dergacheva

This interview is part of a series of spotlights on the work of some of the grantees of the Digital Spark granting scheme, as part of the Regional Support Mechanism EECA project, implemented by the Metamorphosis Foundation and TechSoup, in partnership with CIVICUS and under the Digital Democracy Initiative (DDI) that covers the Global South. It is being published on Global Voices as part of a content-sharing agreement. 

Armenia is a small, landlocked country that has, for years, relied on Russian support in its long-term conflict with the neighboring oil-rich and authoritarian country, Azerbaijan. However, Armenia received a blow from Russia in 2022–2023, when it was not supported by Russian military forces during its conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a large-scale military offensive, expelled the entire Armenian population from Nagorno-Karabakh, dissolved the government of the region, and incorporated the territory into Azerbaijan. 

After this incident, when Russia did not support Armenia with its peacekeeping troops, likely because Vladimir Putin was already engaged in a full-scale invasion and war with Ukraine, Armenia visibly changed its attitude toward Russia.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan started to work in earnest towards the goal of European Union ⁠membership for his South Caucasus country and increased diplomatic communication with the US. 

He was re-elected on June 7, 2026. The election took place amid reports of Russian interference. Reuters, citing anonymous Western intelligence officials and documents, reported covert Russian efforts to undermine Pashinyan and support pro-Russian candidates, including through disinformation campaigns. 

These elections showed how information warfare has expanded beyond social media. It now included fake news websites, AI-generated videos and material presented as reporting by reputable international media outlets. 

According to the US-based disinformation monitoring organization NewsGuard, a Russia-linked campaign circulated 31 fabricated stories about Pashinyan in just one week. The stories accused him of election fraud and of trying to drag Armenia into a war with Russia.

Some of this material imitated international media outlets such as France 24 and Politico. Other stories impersonated Armenian news outlets, including Armenpress and CivilNet.

With the proliferation of generative AI, disinformation and propaganda campaigns have become increasingly sophisticated. Armenia’s experience shows how these campaigns operate in a country moving away from its longstanding reliance on Russia. At the same time, Armenian journalists and civil society are working hard to build media literacy to counter disinformation campaigns. This Digital Spark Spotlight interview is about one of these projects — “Verify First,” a platform where users can find reliable information.

Global Voices interviewed Armin Asryan, a member of the group of journalists, editors, and activists behind the media literacy project “Verify First,” which tackles Russian information manipulation and propaganda. 

Global Voices (GV): Please tell us about your organization and why you chose to get involved with the Digital Spark project. 

Armin Asryan (AA): We are a group of enthusiasts, operating through the ‘Socio Club’ — Social and Information NGO — and dedicated to driving positive change in Armenia’s information landscape.

We chose to get involved with the Digital Spark project because we were thrilled to see an opportunity to actively contribute to a healthier, more reliable information space on social networks. In response to the growing challenges of online misinformation, we developed a targeted initiative to produce six educational video reels focused on practical fact-checking techniques and media literacy, designed to equip everyday social media users with the tools to spot and counter misleading content.

 GV: What issue/challenge in your community prompted you to undertake this project? 

AA: The Armenian social media space is heavily impacted by disinformation, low-quality content, and online hostility. Every day, social media feeds reveal content that not only disappoints users but also generates widespread panic and fear.

These unreliable narratives actively erode public trust in vital institutions. Recognizing that this negative information environment harms societal well-being, we felt compelled to act. This critical challenge prompted us to undertake our project, aiming to equip users with the critical thinking and fact-checking tools needed to counter misleading content and foster a healthier digital community.

GV: What are the key changes/activities that your organization implemented during your participation in the project? 

AA: Our primary challenge was translating complex fact-checking concepts, such as lateral reading and AI artifact identification, into engaging, accessible content for ordinary social media users.

To achieve this, we focused on breaking down advanced media literacy techniques into simple, highly intuitive video reels. We designed our activities to ensure that even technologically non-advanced audiences could easily grasp and apply these verification tools. By stripping away heavy jargon and demonstrating practical, step-by-step digital hygiene habits, we empowered everyday viewers to independently spot disinformation, assess online sources critically, and navigate social media feeds with greater confidence and discernment.

GV: How did your participation in the project impact your organization’s beneficiaries and the community that you serve? Please provide examples.

AA: This project was a mutual learning experience for our team and our community. Our target beneficiaries included adults aged 18 and older, with a strong focus on reaching audiences in regional villages. Witnessing their growth as they mastered practical fact-checking tools was deeply rewarding.

A key highlight of our impact was making this educational content fully accessible: we provided sign language translation for viewers with hearing impairments, ensuring that marginalized community members could benefit from our media literacy campaign. By bridging the digital and accessibility gaps, we helped foster a more informed, inclusive, and resilient public space across Armenia.

GV: How has your own knowledge, awareness, and experience with digital democracy and civic space changed, thanks to your participation in the project?

AA: We learned. We learned about fact-checking. We learned to be a group. It was a rewarding process. And we became aware that even little actions can have a big effect. We are very excited.

GV: What are the most valuable lessons and experiences you are taking away from this project?

AA: It was interesting. Two groups of content creators worked on the project. One team was composed of professional journalists over 60 years old. Another team was composed of young and inspired professionals in content creation in their early 20s and 30s. It was fascinating to see how experience could go hand in hand with young minds and innovation. The combination of older-age experience with the enthusiasm of the young was the lesson we learned from this project. 

GV: What comes next? How will you apply the learning and digital capacity you have built in your future work and within your community?

AA: The video reels we created are not a one-time event. We are going to use them during training and also share them with other civic actors. But we also think that we should build on this. Right now, we have some inspiring ideas that we want to bring to life. Let’s see what the future brings.

https://globalvoices.org/2026/11/13/while-russia-tries-to-manipulate-information-local-civil-society-is-teaching-armenians-media-literacy/

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CSTO Without Armenia: What Keeps Yerevan From Leaving and What the Summit Mean

Liana Toganian Leave a comment
The Times of Central Asia
Nov 13, 2026

Armenia has effectively stopped participating in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) but has not formally withdrawn from the military alliance. At the November 11, 2026, summit in Moscow, Armenia lost its voting rights because of unpaid membership dues, while the CSTO’s five other members — Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus — agreed to develop collective aviation forces and mobile air defense units. Kazakh political analyst Maksim Kaznacheyev explained to The Times of Central Asia why Armenia’s leadership is reluctant to sever ties with the CSTO and what the new military agreements could mean for Central Asian countries.

Why Armenia Has Not Left the CSTO

Yerevan froze its participation in the organization in February 2024, accusing its allies of failing to ensure Armenia’s security during armed clashes with Azerbaijan. Armenia stopped paying membership dues and sending representatives to CSTO bodies.

At the November 11 summit, CSTO members decided that Armenia would lose its voting rights and the ability to nominate candidates for senior positions because of unpaid contributions. CSTO Secretary-General Taalatbek Masadykov said, however, that the organization was not considering expelling Armenia.

Kaznacheyev attributes Yerevan’s reluctance to sever ties with the CSTO to Armenia’s domestic political situation.

“If Armenia leaves the CSTO or the EAEU, pro-Western actions could trigger an internal crisis and destabilize the country,” Kaznacheyev said. He believes Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is seeking to avoid deepening divisions within Armenia as his government pursues closer ties with the European Union.

Yerevan, however, has pursued different policies toward the two organizations. Armenia has suspended its participation in the CSTO but continues to operate within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). On November 5, Pashinyan said the country was not preparing to leave the EAEU.

The CSTO has experienced the departure of member states before. Uzbekistan signed the Collective Security Treaty in 1992, declined to renew it in 1999, rejoined the CSTO in 2006, and suspended its membership again in 2012. Kaznacheyev believes Armenia’s situation is substantially different.

“Uzbekistan’s experience does not apply to Armenia because Uzbekistan had a unified political elite when it left the CSTO,” Kaznacheyev said. He noted that Tashkent also had a bilateral security agreement with Russia, allowing it to maintain military cooperation outside the CSTO.

For Kazakhstan, Armenia’s dispute with the CSTO does not create an immediate security threat. Kaznacheyev said Astana’s restrained position reflects its limited direct interests in Armenia and its growing transport links through Azerbaijan and Georgia toward Turkey. “That is why Kazakhstan maintains a restrained, neutral position,” he said.

What the New Air Defense Agreements Mean for Central Asia

At the Moscow summit, CSTO members agreed to develop the organization’s Collective Aviation Forces and approved plans for mobile air defense units to protect joint military formations. Plans call for incorporating combat aviation units alongside transport and special-purpose aircraft.

Kaznacheyev believes the agreements could expand Russian military-technical assistance to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

He argues that Russia could help other CSTO members modernize their air forces and air defenses, particularly in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, whose capabilities are more limited than Kazakhstan’s. Such assistance could include additional military equipment and aviation technology, he said.

CSTO allies have long had the opportunity to purchase Russian weapons and military equipment on preferential terms. The new agreements do not, in themselves, mean that deliveries of missile systems or transfers of aviation technologies have begun.

Kaznacheyev believes Russia’s military role determines the nature of relations within the CSTO.

“It is Russia’s geopolitical project,” he said, arguing that other members depend heavily on Moscow for military assistance. He cited the CSTO’s intervention in Kazakhstan in January 2022 as an example.

During the mass protests and unrest in Kazakhstan, the CSTO deployed approximately 2,000 troops to guard strategic facilities. Russia provided the largest share of the contingent. It was the organization’s first deployment of collective forces in response to an internal crisis in a member state.

For Kazakhstan, the January operation remains an example of the CSTO’s security mechanisms being put into practice. Armenia’s experience has been the opposite: Yerevan did not receive the military assistance it requested following clashes with Azerbaijan on Armenian territory in 2022.

The Caspian Sea: Does the CSTO Need Additional Forces?

In the final declaration of the Moscow summit, CSTO members expressed concern about attacks on commercial vessels and port infrastructure involving uncrewed systems, including in the Caspian Sea.

For Kazakhstan, security in the Caspian has direct economic implications. The country’s seaports handle freight moving along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, which connects Central Asia with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and European markets. The Caspian route also plays a role in Kazakhstan’s efforts to diversify its oil exports.

Kaznacheyev sees no need to establish separate CSTO forces to protect the sea. In his view, the Caspian littoral states can address the main security challenges through existing cooperation arrangements.

The analyst acknowledges potential risks from the war in Iran and the possibility of strikes against its Caspian coastline. He believes, however, that Tehran has an interest in maintaining good relations with its Caspian neighbors, which provide important trade routes.

“There may be isolated incidents, such as drones accidentally entering neighboring airspace,” Kaznacheyev said, but he does not believe these warrant deploying additional CSTO forces in the Caspian.

Yulia Smolina

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Explainer | The controversy over the re-opening of Armenia’s Amulsar mine

Kajoyan Gevork Leave a comment
OC Media
Nov 14, 2026

The mine finally reopened in October, bringing both the promise of hundreds of millions of dollars in profits and the risk of environmental damage.

After a decade of protests, assessment reports, lawsuits, and a change in the state narrative, Armenia’s Amulsar mine produced its first piece of gold on 10 October.

Amulsar is a gold deposit on the border of the Vayots Dzor and Syunik provinces in southern Armenia. It is the country’s second-largest gold deposit, after Sotk in the east.

The mine’s re-opening is expected to provide 1,000 ‘well-paid’ jobs, according to experts, with production worth approximately $860-$900 million in subsequent years, depending on the global price of gold. Despite the economic benefits presented by both the government and the company, the mine’s environmental impact remains unresolved.

The project involves open-pit mining and cyanide heap leaching — a mining method used to extract precious metals like gold from low-grade crushed ore. The company claims they have an environmental and cyanide management plan to mitigate risks.

Yet, activists have long warned that cyanide could contaminate Armenia’s freshwater reserves, which would harm the tourism industry in Jermuk. The town, just 13 kilometres from the mine, is famous for its mineral springs and sanatoria, and relies heavily on tourism and the production of bottled water.

Environmental expert Ayser Ghazaryan says the government ignored the warnings and pushed the project forward, prioritising short-term economic gains over its long-term environmental and social effects, including damage to the water resources, public health, and the sustainability of tourism in the area.

A short history of Amulsar

Geological exploration of the site started in the 2000s, but construction did not begin until 2016 under Lydian International, a Jersey-registered company backed by Western investors. Work stopped in June 2018 when protesters from Jermuk and the surrounding towns blocked access to the site. The blockade lasted over two years and ended during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020.

Meanwhile, Armenia’s 2018 Velvet Revolution brought now Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to power. Several leading anti-Amulsar activists won seats in parliament and government, and many expected the mine to be shut down.

At first, Pashinyan’s government seemed attentive to environmental concerns. In particular, distrusting Lydian’s own assessment, they commissioned a fresh one. The $450 million review by the Lebanese firm ELARD in 2019 found Lydian’s environmental assessment data-poor and its modelling too unreliable to predict the mine’s water impacts. It concluded that groundwater contamination was a real possibility and that treatment systems might fail.

Opinion | The irony of COP17 host Armenia celebrating gold before biodiversity

Another investor was the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which  invested €13 million ($14.6 million) in Lydian between 2009 and 2020. Central and Eastern European (CEE) Bankwatch Network, which monitors public money and the financing of projects by large European banks in Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, argued that the the EBRD enabled a project marked by flawed public consultation, alleged corrupt land deals in Gndevaz — a village in Vayots Dzor, 1.2 kilometres from the mine — and defamation lawsuits against critics.

In 2020, Lydian went through insolvency proceedings in Jersey. According to Hetq, Lydian Armenia is now a 100% subsidiary of Lydian Canada Ventures, owned by the US firm Orion Mine Finance and the Canadian company Osisko Gold Royalties. As a result of the proceedings, the EBRD also exited the project.

The government changes course

In 2021, Pashinyan said there was a possibility the mine would open. Namely, in the event of a conflict, he explained, revenues from a mine would be more stable than often-flighty tourist income.

Podcast | The Amulsar mine returns

In February 2023, the government, Lydian Armenia, and the Kazakhstan-based Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) signed a memorandum envisaging a $100 million loan from the bank, but that framework later fell through. In 2024, the government accepted a 12.5% stake in Lydian Armenia and became a formal loan guarantor. Officials presented state co-ownership as a safeguard, alongside the economic opportunities that should not be missed.

The government’s promises include about 210,000 ounces of gold a year, roughly $130 million annually in taxes, duties and royalties, a GDP boost of 1.5% to 2%, and $7-9 million a year for the neighbouring towns of Jermuk, Vayk, and Sisian, plus $5 million toward the Jermuk National Park. The community payments depend on gold prices and are split by population and distance from the mine.

Beyond economics, however, environmental expert Ghazaryan highlights that the concerns raised in assessment reports, reviews, and by activists were never resolved. Instead, he argues, the government found ways around them, for instance, moving a plant listed in Armenia’s Red Book that was found in the area.

By becoming a shareholder in the mine and the guarantor of its main loan, Ghazaryan says, the government has created a conflict of interest. As a party with a financial stake, it can no longer be an impartial evaluator, which makes a fair assessment of the situation harder.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan attending the opening of the Amlusar gold mine on 10 October 2026. Official photo.

While the government claims there is currently no major resistance against the mine, the backlash over the government’s change of course shows that opposition to the project has not completely disappeared.

The mine has also suffered legal setbacks. In December 2024, Armenia’s Administrative Court partly upheld a 2015 lawsuit by eleven residents and two NGOs challenging the legal acts approving the mine. Separately, the Bern Convention Secretariat, responding to a 2020 complaint from Armenian groups and CEE Bankwatch, recommended halting developments that could harm protected habitats and species, and in 2023, urged Armenia to revise the impact assessment. None of this stopped the mine from opening in October 2026.

Opening day

On launch day, 10 October, Pashinyan arrived by helicopter, accompanied by high ranking officials. Speaking at the opening ceremony, he described the event as a ‘success story’, pointing to the absence of protests. In turn, Lydian Armenia highlighted that it has applied strict international environmental safeguards, while Economy Minister Gevorg Papoyan called the project a story about mining standards, not just money.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan attending the opening of the Amlusar gold mine on 10 October 2026. Official photo.

Pashinyan’s claim that the ceremony took place without protests prompted backlash from those who had campaigned against the opening. They argued that the government had ignored their warnings, and that they had been silenced through court cases. Others said the ceremony had not been publicly announced. According to one activist, the low turnout was due to the loss of public activists as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war, as well as the overall pressure that Jermuk residents have been under for years.

Protesters demand closure of Amulsar gold mine as COP17 opens

Civil society groups also condemned the launch, demanding a halt to operations, a new environmental impact assessment, and a review of state support. The timing was hard to miss, as the mine opened less than two weeks before Yerevan hosted COP17, the UN biodiversity conference.

Ghazaryan says that by opening the mine around the time of COP17 and inviting mining companies to the conference’s Green Zone venue, the government was trying to send a message to both domestic and international audiences about ‘green mining’ and environmentally responsible mining.

The conference was accompanied by protests and other resistance initiatives, which police kept outside the main event venues, out of sight of international guests.

Pashinyan did not explain why this moment was chosen to open a mine that had been in the approval process for 10 years. One theory is that it was meant to signal confidence in the mine’s environmental safety.

What does the future hold?

In early 2025, the government approved a budget guarantee for up to $150 million in loans to Lydian Armenia from Armenian banks. A budget guarantee means the state would cover the debt if Lydian cannot repay. Hayk Aloyan, the CEO of Lydian Armenia, said the company would raise the sum from several local banks, but an amended government document later named Ameriabank as the lender. Environmental groups have challenged the guarantee in court. Officials say total investment is around $750 million, but they have not published a breakdown of what has been spent and what remains to be paid. Aloyan earlier said about $250 million was needed to finish construction.

Meanwhile, activists have submitted legislative proposals urging the government to adopt anti-SLAPP protections in line with EU and Council of Europe standards. SLAPP stands for ‘strategic lawsuit against public participation,’ a legal action meant to wear critics down through cost and delay. By 2020, Lydian had filed around 20 defamation suits against activists, independent experts, lawyers, media outlets, and MPs, and some cases are still running. In February 2026, Lydian Armenia filednew lawsuits against lawyer Nazeli Vardanyan and journalist Tehmine Yenokyan, each seeking ֏6 million ($17,000) and public retractions of their statements regarding the mine.

At the same time, the water risks identified in the 2019 review have yet to be put to the test. And while some of the activists who opposed the mine for years say they no longer have the energy to keep protesting, new initiative groups are forming to present the environmental concerns.

Having only been open for a month, it remains to be seen how the mine’s operations will affect Armenia’s finances and the environment in the long-run.

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‘Armenia is replacing one dependency with another’: Former Security Council S

Ani Basmajian Leave a comment
JAM News
Nov 13, 2026
  • JAMnews
  • Yerevan

“Armenia is replacing one dependency with another”: Former Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan’s view

“The idea of Armenia joining the European Union seems attractive at first glance. But we often confuse what we want with what is possible,” says Armen Grigoryan, a former secretary of Armenia’s Security Council.

He published an article arguing that EU membership is an unrealistic prospect and contradicts the formula Armenia’s authorities have declared. That formula calls for “replacing dependence on a few with dependence on many”.

“This is not a genuine alternative or a diversification of foreign policy. It is simply a way to replace one dependency with another, one that offers fewer prospects and ignores regional realities,” he writes about Armenia’s prospects for European integration.

In Grigoryan’s view, the EU membership agenda once again leads Armenia into a dead end. It forces the country back towards forms of dependence that “have proved unsustainable”.

“Just as we once believed that Russia would solve our security problems, we now mistakenly expect the EU to solve the economic problems that will arise on the path to EU membership,” he argues.

Discussing potential risks, the former official said Armenia could once again face the harsh reality it has experienced since 2020. That was when the 44-day war in Nagorno-Karabakh began. He argues that “an external partner may not take responsibility for solving the problems we expect it to address”.

Grigoryan also raises the question of “how to reduce dependence on Russia without deepening that very dependence even further”. However, he does not offer a direct answer under this subheading. Instead, he speaks of the need for independent decision-making and closer cooperation with the EU, the US and other countries.

Below, we publish an abridged version of the article by the former Security Council secretary, which has sparked considerable debate in Armenia’s political circles.

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Historical overview

“If we look at Armenia’s recent history, a very clear and harsh pattern emerges. Every time Yerevan has tried to move closer to the West, it has faced mounting pressure from Russia and ultimately ended up even more firmly in Moscow’s ‘embrace’.

In the 1990s, under Levon Ter-Petrosyan, attempts to build closer ties with European and Euro-Atlantic institutions ended with Armenia joining the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and signing a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with Russia in 1997. This strengthened Armenia’s military and political ties with Moscow.

In the 2010s, under Serzh Sargsyan, an attempt to sign an Association Agreement with the EU ended with the decision on 3 September 2013 to join the Customs Union. Armenia subsequently joined the Eurasian Economic Union.

Today, this history appears to be repeating itself, but under a much more dangerous scenario.

“While Armenia continues negotiations and takes steps towards EU membership, I see a growing risk that the country could become involved in the Russia-Belarus Union State.”

Armenia takes a step closer to EU with launch of biometric passport system

This marks the biggest reform under Armenia’s EU visa liberalisation process. European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos described it as a choice in favour of closer ties with Europe.

Armenia has no immunity against pressure from Moscow

“Statements and steps towards EU membership are sharply worsening relations between Armenia and Russia.

Faced with Russia’s harsh and aggressive countermeasures, Armenia’s state immune system simply cannot withstand Moscow’s economic, political and hybrid pressure.

As a result, without real security guarantees from the West, Armenia cannot reduce its dependence on Russia. Instead, it becomes even more vulnerable to Russian pressure.”

The European integration agenda contradicts regionalisation

“An unrealistic EU membership agenda runs counter to the natural process of regionalisation. Armenia lies at the crossroads of three major regional powers: Russia, Iran and Turkey. Yerevan’s relations with each of them are closely interconnected and require a delicate balance.

Iran has repeatedly outlined its ‘red lines’, opposing any expansion of Western military and political presence in the region. Given its strained relations with the West, Tehran views the EU as part of the collective West.

Armenia’s attempts to join the EU could jeopardise its friendly relations with Iran. And Iran is not just a neighbour for Armenia, but a vital ‘lifeline’.

Although Turkey is a NATO member, it pursues an independent regional policy. Together with Azerbaijan, Ankara seeks to resolve regional issues with the participation of countries in the region. The ‘3+3’ format is one example of this approach.

Yerevan’s attempts to expand the West’s presence in the region could create further tensions in its relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan.

Russia views Armenia’s EU membership agenda as a threat to its interests in the region and responds with strong opposition.”

‘Certain circles in Russia and Eurasian Economic Union back secret plan by Armenian opposition’ – Pashinyan

The leader of the opposition Strong Armenia party announced a secret plan to change the government in Armenia. The prime minister said that “specific individuals” had been sent to Armenia to carry it out.

Armenia risks losing the foundations of its economic stability

“In spaceflight, a rocket must reach the second cosmic velocity of 11.2 km per second to escape Earth’s gravitational field. If it fails to reach the required speed, it cannot remain in orbit and falls back under the force of gravity.

Armenia lacks the ‘speed’ it needs to escape the economic gravitational pull of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Russia itself.

If Armenia finds itself in an ‘intermediate’ position during a prolonged and drawn-out EU accession process, it risks losing the foundations of its current economic stability: cheap energy supplies and access to the Russian market. It could then fall back even more painfully into complete dependence on Russia.”

Will Yerevan consider imposing sanctions on Russia and Iran?

“On its path towards EU membership, Armenia will also face the question of whether to join sanctions against Russia and Iran. This could seriously damage relations with these two countries, which are vital to Armenia’s security and economy.

Amid discussions about possible increases in the price of Russian gas, and even supply cuts in some cases, Armenia is increasingly exploring ways to import more gas from Iran. However, this raises an important contradiction.

Under the sanctions imposed on Iran, the European Union prohibits the purchase, import and exchange of Iranian natural gas. At some point on its path towards EU membership, Armenia will have to align its legislation and foreign policy with EU requirements.

This means Armenia will have to stop importing gas from Iran. The future of the Armenian-Iranian ‘gas-for-electricity’ programme will also come into question.

This creates a contradiction. Armenia needs alternative suppliers to reduce its dependence on Russian gas. Yet, on its path towards EU membership, it may have to limit its access to Iranian gas as well.”

‘Who could be closer friend to us than Armenia?’ – Key takeaways from Iran’s vice-president’s visit to Yerevan

Iranian Vice-President Seyed Hamid Pourmohammadi said that Iran would be willing to increase gas supplies to Armenia if it had the capacity to do so. Full details of the visit.

Cooperation should extend beyond the EU and US

“Armenia can develop political, economic and security cooperation with European partners without making EU membership a foreign policy goal.

Our task is not to replace dependence on Russia with dependence on another power centre, but to strengthen Armenia’s independence.

We can deepen cooperation not only with the EU and the US, but also with India, China, Central Asian states, the Gulf countries, Japan, South Korea and other partners, each through its own agenda.

Armenia’s foreign policy options are not limited to choosing between two geopolitical centres.

The more diverse our economic, political and security ties become, the more opportunities we will have to balance external dependencies.”

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Armenia loses voting rights in Russia-led CSTO, responds with poetry

Chakrian Hovsep Leave a comment
OC Media
Nov 13, 2026
by Arshaluys Barseghyan

13 November 2026 

Armenian Security Council Secretary Alen Simonyan has responded to the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)’s decision to strip Armenia of its voting rights by publishing poems in Russian. Moscow sarcastically drafted a line in response.

On Wednesday, Armenia was stripped of its voting rights in Russia-led CSTO, as well as the right to appoint representatives to senior positions within the bloc, over its failure to pay membership fees.

The decision was not unexpected for the Armenian leadership, which effectively ‘froze’ its participation in the military alliance in February 2024. Yerevan cited the bloc’s failure to fulfil its security obligations towards Armenia during Azerbaijani attacks in 2021 and 2022, resulting in over 200 Armenian military deaths and occupation of Armenian land.

Armenia stripped of voting rights in Russia-led CSTO as Moscow relations continue to deteriorate

Yerevan then said that the CSTO’s refusal to come to its aid ‘could not have gone without consequences’. It subsequently announced it would stop making the required financial contributions. By the time of the freeze in 2024, Yerevan had already been absent from major CSTO meetings and military exercises for around a year.

Simonyan responded to the decision on Thursday with a short poem in Russian:

‘They deprived us of our voice there,
where everyone remained very loudly silent
while we were all being killed together’.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova subsequently said with apparent sarcasm that the poem actually had a fourth line.

‘The last line goes: “Simonyan made up the tale” ’, Zakharova said.

In response, Simonyan published another poem in Russian.

‘The response to the little poem was swift, what a pity [the response] was not so swift when they were shooting at us point-blank!’, he wrote, referring to the Azerbaijani attacks on Armenia in 2021 and 2022.

The poem continued:

‘Don’t confuse it with Simonyan’s tales — she plays whatever tune you order,
don’t confuse it with the mirror I gave you.
With love, Alen Simonyan’.

The reference to ‘Simonyan’ was directed at Margarita Simonyan, a well known Kremlin propagandist of Armenian origin who frequently criticises Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government.

Moscow ‘distorts’ facts

Moscow rejects Yerevan’s explanations for why it has effectively stopped participating in CSTO.

Armenia stopped contributing to the military alliance after Russian officials, including President Vladimir Putin repeatedly claimed that the CSTO could not intervene in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, Armenian officials have constantly stressed that Yerevan’s appeals for help from CSTO concerned Azerbaijani attacks on Armenian territory, not in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Outrage in Armenia over Putin’s controversial statement on CSTO

Parliamentary Speaker Ruben Rubinyan claimed that the account of why Armenia had suspended participation in the bloc had been distorted. ‘It is true that we are no longer interested in the CSTO, but historical events must be presented accurately’, Rubinyan said, in an introduction to a Facebook video statement published in the wake of Armenia’s voting rights being stripped on Thursday.

He stressed that Armenia had never appealed to the CSTO over Nagorno-Karabakh, but had turned to the bloc following attacks on its internationally recognised territory in 2021 and 2022. ‘That was when Armenia appealed to the CSTO and expected its treaty obligations to be fulfilled, when an attack takes place on the sovereign territory of a CSTO member state.’

‘This was not done. And all attempts to justify this are doomed to fail, because it is impossible to justify the inaction of an organisation whose entire purpose is to protect the sovereign territory of its member states, which it failed to do, violating its own treaty’, Rubinyan said.

Separately, Belarusian Foreign Minister Maksim Ryzhankou suggested  Armenia should be denied access to classified CSTO documents.

‘Why should we give such a pseudo-ally full access to documentation that is fairly confidential in nature?’, he said, according to Belarusian state media.

Ryzhankou also raised the possibility that access to such documents could be exploited in ways contrary to the interests of countries seeking to deepen integration within the bloc.

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Iran threatens Armenia as US-run Trump Route clears Yerevan’s parliament

Garnik Tadevosian Leave a comment
Iran International
Nov 13, 2026
Maryam Sinaiee

Armenia’s parliamentary approval of the Trump Route, a US-run transit corridor running along Iran’s northern border, has set off alarm in Tehran, with officials and state media warning that it would bring a US presence to the frontier.

Armenia’s parliament approved the agreement on October 28. Since then, an adviser to Iran’s supreme leader has threatened Yerevan, and state-run media have urged Tehran to stop the project.

The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) is designed to link Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhchivan through Armenia’s southern Syunik province. Syunik borders Iran’s East Azarbaijan province and carries Iran’s only direct land connection to Armenia, and through it to the rest of the Caucasus.

The route was announced at the White House in August 2025, when President Donald Trump hosted Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev and Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to sign a framework for peace between the two countries after decades of conflict.

Azerbaijan had long called the route the Zangezur corridor, and Tehran had opposed it for years, warning that it could cut Iran off from Armenia.

Under the agreement, Washington and Yerevan will set up a joint company, TRIPP Development, with the US side holding 74 percent and Armenia 26 percent. The initial term is 49 years, with an option to extend it by 50 years, during which Armenia’s stake would rise to 49 percent.

Iranian officials and analysts say TRIPP could cut Iran’s transit revenue and weaken its position as a regional transport hub. They also see a US presence near Iran’s northern border as a serious security threat.

The state-run Mehr News Agency, in a November 9 article titled “The Caucasus on the Path to US Influence: Tehran Must Prevent Implementation of the TRIPP Corridor,” said Iran should rethink its approach to the Caucasus in light of what it called the country’s “new position in regional equations” after the war with the United States and Israel.

“A different approach centered on power,” Mehr said, could stop activities that threaten Iran’s national security from spreading in the South Caucasus.

Velayati threatens Armenia

Ali Akbar Velayati, an adviser to Iran’s supreme leader on international affairs and a former foreign minister, attacked Pashinyan over the agreement in an article in the Ettela’at newspaper on November 5.

Velayati said he had told Armenia’s deputy foreign minister and its ambassador in Tehran that Russia’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine should not lead Armenia into a “miscalculation.” Iran, he said, considered itself responsible for security in the South Caucasus, “with or without Russia.”

Iranian military commanders later traveled to the region and held a large exercise to show Iran’s “power and determination,” Velayati said. He said he had warned Armenia’s ambassador directly: “If Trump and his allies seek to cross this red line of Iran, we will break their legs.”

Armenia’s Security Council secretary, Armen Grigoryan, said in response that the project did not involve the presence of a single armed soldier, and that none of Armenia’s neighbors, Iran included, should see an economic project as a threat.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, Esmaeil Baghaei, said on Monday that Tehran had raised its concerns with Armenia immediately after Armenia, Azerbaijan and the United States issued their joint statement on the project.

Armenia had assured Iran that the route would not change international borders or the region’s geopolitical arrangements, and that no US military forces would be stationed there, he said.

‘Yerevan’s gamble with Trump’s card’

Hardline media have kept up their attacks despite Armenia’s assurances.

On November 9, Jam-e Jam, a newspaper published by the state broadcaster, ran an article titled “Yerevan’s Gamble with Trump’s Card.”

“From the perspective of Iran’s national security doctrine, the emergence of an economic and administrative structure under US control in Syunik province, even if initially presented under the guise of transit and trade, is unacceptable,” the paper wrote.

Security threats do not have to begin with military bases, Jam-e Jam said. Strategic infrastructure and networks tied to hostile powers can lay the ground for long-term influence.

Mehdi Seif-Tabrizi, an analyst of Russian affairs, made a similar case in the Farhikhtegan newspaper on November 7.

“Tehran’s concern is fundamentally not limited to the possible deployment of US military forces. The issue is the formation of permanent infrastructure for influence in the vicinity of Iran’s borders, which could serve purposes beyond its initial economic objectives in times of crisis,” he wrote.

Iran’s concerns had grown more serious since its war with the United States, he added.

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Armenia’s Nare Isakhanyan takes silver at European Youth Chess Championship

Emil Lazarian Leave a comment
Panorama, Armenia
Nov 13, 2026

Armenia’s Nare Isakhanyan takes silver at European Youth Chess Championship

Armenian chess player Nare Isakhanyan has won silver in the U12 girls’ category of the 2026 European Youth Chess Championship, the Armenian Chess Federation said.

Isakhanyan scored 7.5 points out of 9, finishing in a tie for second and third place before securing the runner-up position on tiebreaks on Thursday.

The federation congratulated Isakhanyan and her coach, Sargis Manukyan, on the achievement, wishing them continued success.

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Railway construction continues on Armenia-Turkey border

Jalatian Sonya Leave a comment
News.am, Armenia
Nov 13, 2026

Ismail Demirtas, the governor of Akyaka District in Kars Province of Turkey, visited the railway section on the Armenia-Turkey border and got familiarized with the work being carried out on site, Ermenihaber.am reports.

Demirtas received information from the representative of the company implementing the railway construction about the current status of the construction, the work being carried out, and the progress of the project.

Also, Demirtas followed the ongoing work on site and spoke with those in charge.

Local residents are closely following the work towards reopening of the Akyaka border crossing, which has been closed for years, and the railway.

The commissioning of the aforementioned railway line is expected to significantly contribute to the development of trade, economy, and transport communications in Akyaka, Ermenihaber.am notes.

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The EU and European partners reinforce Armenia’s pro-European direction in th

Talar Tumanian Leave a comment
Democrata, Spain
Nov 12, 2026

The EU and several European countries reaffirm their support for Armenia’s pro-European shift and its sovereignty in the face of growing political and economic pressure from Russia.

The European Union and several European states have reiterated this Thursday their support for Armenia’s European aspirations and have promised to maintain backing for its political and economic rapprochement with the community bloc, in a scenario marked by the increase in Russia’s pressure on Yerevan to hinder its approach to Europe.

This message is included in a joint statement issued after a meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinián, held on the sidelines of the European Political Community summit in Dublin, and which has the support of the EU, the United Kingdom, Norway, Estonia, France, Lithuania, Germany and Poland.

“We recognize the European aspirations of the Armenian people and will continue to support Armenia’s efforts to build a prosperous and resilient democracy and a thriving economy, fully integrated into regional connectivity networks and international trade flows,” the document argues.

The signatories have also reiterated their support for “the sovereignty, territorial integrity, stability, independence and resilience of the Republic of Armenia,” stressing that the parliamentary elections held in the country five months ago allowed Armenian citizens to express “a clear decision in favor of peace, democracy and closer ties with Europe, despite Russia’s multifaceted interference.”

Since then, they have said, “Russia’s direct political and economic pressure on Armenia has only increased.” As an example, they have mentioned that Moscow has imposed unprecedented restrictions on Armenian exports and now “threatens to use” energy supplies “as a means of intimidation.”

In reaction to this scenario, they have assured that they are pushing measures so that Armenia can safeguard its sovereignty and “freely choose its own destiny,” and that they will continue to support Armenia “in diversifying its economic alliances,” in particular in the commercial and energy fields, taking advantage of the European Union’s decision to suspend tariffs on 80% of Armenia’s exports to the EU.

They have also reaffirmed the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as “the important advances achieved” since the Washington meeting in August 2025 and the process of normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey. “We encourage further efforts in this direction for the benefit of the peoples of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and of the entire region,” they concluded.

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‘The ball is in Armenia’s court’: Yerevan voices on Armenia losing its voting

Emil Lazarian Leave a comment
JAM news
Nov 12, 2026
  • JAMnews
  • Yerevan

The Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) has stripped Armenia of its voting rights. The country has also officially lost the right to appoint representatives to key positions, a right it had effectively stopped exercising long ago. The CSTO member states’ leaders made these decisions on 11 November at a meeting of the Collective Security Council. Armenia’s prime minister did not attend.

The CSTO officially has six member states: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Armenia.

Armenia froze its participation in the CSTO in February 2024. The country no longer takes part in the organisation’s activities or pays membership fees. Yerevan made the decision because the CSTO failed to fulfil its obligations under its charter. The organisation did not respond when Azerbaijani forces entered Armenia’s sovereign territory in 2021–2022, despite the Armenian authorities’ appeals for help.

The CSTO allies explained their inaction by saying it was “impossible” to confirm the incursions because Armenia and Azerbaijan had not delimited their border. Armenia’s prime minister responded: “If we say there is no border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, then there is no CSTO. The CSTO has an area of responsibility defined by borders. If there is no border, there is no area of responsibility. And if there is no area of responsibility, there is no organisation.”

Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the leaders had taken into account Armenia’s failure to meet its obligations for several years. He was referring in particular to the country’s unpaid membership fees.

Under the organisation’s charter, Armenia can regain its rights in the CSTO once it clears its outstanding debt.

Yerevan has not yet officially responded to the CSTO’s decision. Perhaps the Armenian authorities saw no need to repeat their position, which they have stated many times before. A week ago, during a press briefing, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said, among other things: “I want us to make this clear once and for all: our interest in the CSTO has been exhausted.”

But Security Secretary Alen Simonyan had commented on the decision by the time this article went to publication. On his personal Facebook page, he wrote: “They stripped us of our voice in a place where everyone remained very loudly silent while they were collectively killing us.”

The CSTO member states’ leaders did not surprise experts or the public with their decision. Moreover, they believe Yerevan should not have waited for the organisation to strip it of its voting rights. Many argue that Armenia should have left the CSTO long ago.

Babken Harutyunyan, a politician and former member of the Hayrenik (Homeland) party, described the CSTO as a “pro-Azerbaijani organisation”. He explained his view by saying that Armenia’s allies treat their own member state and Azerbaijan, which they call a “friendly country”, as equals.

“The organisation is leaving the final step [leaving the CSTO] and the last word to Armenia itself. Or perhaps it hopes that forces it finds acceptable [pro-Russian forces] will come to power and once again bring Armenia back under the CSTO’s feet. After Azerbaijan’s years-long occupation of Jermuk and other Armenian territories, Armenia should leave the CSTO,” he said.

CSTO secretary-general: ‘Armenia’s expulsion from the organisation was not on the agenda at the Moscow summit’

CSTO Secretary-General Taalatbek Masadykov stressed that the organisation had not discussed expelling Armenia.

“For the past three years, Armenia has not paid its membership fees or sent staff to the CSTO Secretariat or the CSTO Joint Staff. In other words, although Armenia has formally remained a member, […] it has not taken part in discussions. If Armenia pays its membership fees, it will be able to regain its voting rights in the organisation. The decision is up to the Armenian leadership.”

Masadykov had previously said that Armenia had effectively already left the organisation:

“They listen to weekly reports, but do not take part in our main events, exercises and so on. So I think Article 25 [of the CSTO Charter] applies here. Essentially, they have already left of their own accord.”

Under Article 25 of the CSTO Charter, a member state loses its voting rights if it fails to pay its contributions or fill positions allocated to it under the organisation’s quotas.

‘Not concerned’: Pashinyan on possible expulsion of Armenia from Russian-led military bloc

‘If member states decide to expel Armenia, we will have to take note of that decision,’ says Armenian PM. Key takeaways from Pashinyan’s first post-election briefing.

‘A sign of deepening political and diplomatic tensions’

Vahan Babayan, chairman of the Reformist Party, said the CSTO’s decision to strip Yerevan of its voting rights was not merely a “technical or financial matter”.

“This is another sign of deepening political and diplomatic tensions between Armenia and the CSTO.”

He believes such decisions have the following implications:

  • “Armenia is losing its ability to influence the organisation’s decision-making process;
  • distrust between Armenia and Russia is growing in security and political matters.”

Babayan also warned that Armenia’s institutional standing within the organisation was weakening, even though the country formally remains a member of the military bloc. The politician said he expected the authorities to go beyond statements and provide serious, considered assessments in the interests of national security:

“We need real security guarantees, clear alliance relations and a foreign policy guided by national interests.”

Social media reactions

“Since the CSTO was founded, Armenia has been the only country that dared to speak up — and that is why it was stripped of its voting rights. Just like in an ancient Greek tragedy: you don’t know whether to laugh or cry.”

“They are still hoping that ‘Samvel from Kaluga’ [Russian businessman Samvel Karapetyan, who is under arrest and heads the opposition Strong Armenia party] or someone like him will come to power. Then they will restore Armenia’s voting rights. Otherwise, they would have kicked it out long ago.”

“Armenia should have left these stupid organisations, the CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Union [a Russia-led economic bloc], a long time ago. The only guarantee of Armenia’s security in the future is membership of the European Union and NATO.”

“Armenia decided to leave on its own. Nobody stripped it of any rights. Don’t delude yourselves.”

“And we didn’t need the right to vote anyway. They helped us in our time of need, and now they are taking away our rights? How hard this will be to bear. They don’t even recognise our state border.”

“And what even is the CSTO? A useless, unnecessary Putin-run organisation [a play on the Armenian abbreviation for the CSTO, ՀԱՊԿ, using different Armenian words]? The pointless ‘Putin office’ demands membership fees from Armenia but turned a blind eye to Azerbaijan’s invasion.”

“We have been stripped of our voting rights in a dead organisation.”

“Is it even worth worrying? What has this treacherous organisation ever done apart from betray us?”

“Thank God! I can’t wait for the day when Armenia has nothing in common with this rotten remnant of the Soviet Union.”

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