DIVIDE AND CONQUER? THE RUSSIAN PLAN FOR OWNERSHIP OF THE CASPIAN SEA
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
Winter, 2004
By Ben N. Dunlap (FNa1)
Abstract:
The search for alternative sources of oil has renewed U.S. interest in
the Caspian Sea. Bordered by Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and the Central
Asian states of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the Caspian Sea contains
up to thirty-three billion barrels of proven oil reserves. The legal
status of the Caspian has remained unresolved since the collapse of
the Soviet Union, however. In the early 1990s Russia joined with Iran
to argue for common ownership of the sea by all five states, aiming
for veto power over Western involvement in the region. Now, Russia
argues for dividing the seabed (and the oil and gas underneath it)
into national sectors, while leaving most of the surface waters for
common management and use. The Russian solution offers political and
economic benefits to both Russia and the United States in the short
run, but may be an unsound basis for long-term stability in the
Caspian region.
INTRODUCTION
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United
States, fears about U.S. dependence on Persian Gulf oil have
intensified. (FN1) With three-fifths of the world’s oil reserves
concentrated in the Persian Gulf, the United States and other Western
nations have increased efforts to ensure the continued availability of
oil elsewhere in the event of a catastrophic terrorist attack or a
destabilizing conflict in the region. (FN2) As a result, the search
for alternative sources of oil has renewed U.S. interest in the
potentially oil-rich Caspian Sea. (FN3) Bordered by Russia,
Azerbaijan, Iran, and the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan, the Caspian Sea contains an estimated seventeen to
thirty-three billion barrels of proven oil reserves. (FN4) In the
early 1990s, U.S. oil companies Amoco and Chevron pioneered the
development of Caspian oil reserves off the coasts of Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan. (FN5) The U.S. government championed the construction of
a new oil pipeline to bypass Russia and Iran by transporting Caspian
oil to Western markets via Azerbaijan and Turkey. (FN6) Uncertainty
about the Caspian’s legal status, however, has hindered development of
the sea’s oil reserves. (FN7) Soviet-Iranian treaties governed the
Caspian’s use in the Soviet era, but since the breakup of the Soviet
Union in 1991, the new Caspian states have failed to agree on how to
divide its vast resources. (FN8) In the early 1990s, Russia joined
with Iran to argue for common ownership of the sea by all five states,
aiming for veto power over Western involvement in the region. (FN9)
Now, Russia argues for dividing the seabed (and the oil and gas
underneath it) into national sectors, while leaving most of the
surface waters for common management and use. (FN10) More importantly,
Russia has signed bilateral treaties with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan,
effectively dividing the northern part of the seabed 7 into Russian,
Azerbaijani, and Kazakhstani national sectors. (FN11) Iran insists
that the old Soviet- Iranian treaties are still in force and refuses
to sign or recognize any bilateral treaties carving up the sea until a
new multilateral convention is concluded by all five Caspian
states. (FN12)
This Note examines Russia’s proposed solution for the Caspian’s legal
status and its implications for U.S. interests in the region. Part I
provides a brief history of Caspian oil and an overview of post-1991
attempts to resolve the Caspian’s legal status. Part II discusses
proposed legal solutions, with special attention to Russia’s proposal
and its legal validity. Part III analyzes the implications of
Russia’s proposed resolution for Russia, Iran, and the United
States. Part IV concludes that the Russian solution offers political
and economic benefits to both Russia and the United States in the
short run, but may be an unsound basis for long-term stability in the
Caspian region.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Short History of Caspian Oil
Caspian oil fields began producing oil near Baku, Azerbaijan in 1871
and accounted for half the world’s still limited production in
1900. (FN13) The Soviets expanded their extraction operations, but
never fully explored the 700- mile-long Caspian Sea for new oil
fields, in part because they lacked the technology to exploit
effectively the reserves they found. (FN14) Following the breakup of
the Soviet Union in 1991, discovery of significant oil reserves in the
Caspian basin cast the region in a new light. (FN15) Early estimates
were as high as 659 billion barrels, or two-thirds of the world’s
known reserves. (FN16) Most of the oil discovered is located off the
coasts of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. (FN17) Azerbaijan
8 and Kazakhstan, in particular, have concluded deals with foreign oil
companies to extract Caspian oil and transport it to world
markets. (FN18) Firms in the United States have acquired seventy-five
percent of Kazakhstan’s onshore Tengiz oil field, while a consortium
including Italy’s ENI, British Gas, ExxonMobil, France’s TotalFinaElf,
and Royal Dutch Shell is developing the newly discovered offshore
Kashagan field. (FN19) British Petroleum (BP) is leading the
Azerbaijan International Operating Company’s efforts to discover,
extract, and transport oil located off Azerbaijan’s coast. (FN20)
Chief among those efforts is the construction of a new pipeline from
Baku, Azerbaijan, through Tbilisi, Georgia, to Ceyhan, Turkey, which
U.S. policymakers hope will serve as the main export pipeline for
Caspian oil. (FN21)
In addition to U.S. and Western European firms, Russia’s largest oil
company, LUKoil, is currently a consortium member in Kazakh extraction
and transport projects and is negotiating a possible investment in the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. (FN22) Until recently, LUKoil also
held a stake in a sizable Azerbaijani oil field. (FN23)
B. Caspian Geopolitics
Drawn by cheap oil and the Caspian’s strategic location at the
crossroads of east and west, regional and world powers have converged
on the Caspian region to stake out and defend their political and
economic interests. (FN24) In particular, the United States, seeking
to diversify its energy supply and bolster the independence of the
former Soviet states in the region, has been adamant in its support
for multiple pipelines to transport Caspian oil to Western markets.
(FN25) U.S. policies for Caspian oil development benefit primarily
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and United States’ 9 NATO ally, Turkey, by
routing the BTC pipeline through those countries. (FN26) The BTC
pipeline will also benefit Kazakhstan if plans to export Kazakhstani
oil through it come to fruition. (FN27) As a result, throughout the
1990s, U.S. pipeline diplomacy alienated Russia and fueled Iran’s
fears of a long-term U.S. presence in the region that would exclude it
from any future development of Caspian oil. (FN28)
The strategic importance of the Caspian is underscored by security
concerns in the region. (FN29) To the northwest, Russian forces
continue to battle separatists in Chechnya. (FN30) To the west, an
uneasy peace holds in Nagorno-Karabagh, the predominantly Armenian
enclave in Azerbaijan that was the scene of horrific ethnic warfare in
the early 1990s. (FN31) To the east, Tajikistan suffered a protracted
civil war in the 1990s. (FN32) Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan both have
faced incursions by Islamic militant terrorists in recent
years. (FN33)
Since September 11, 2001, the United States has been particularly
concerned about nonstate actors and the threat of terrorism in the
Caucasus and Central Asia. (FN34) Proximity to the markets of Europe
and Iran and the porous borders of the former Soviet states make the
Caspian a convenient conduit for narcotics produced in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, and for weapons destined for sale to terrorists and
insurgents throughout Central Asia. (FN35) U.S. policymakers also fear
that the Caspian could become a smuggling route for weapons of mass
destruction. (FN36)
C. Legal Status of the Sea
1. UNCLOS and the Law of Inland Lakes Neither the international law of
the sea nor the law of inland lakes applies directly to the Caspian
Sea. (FN37) The Caspian is landlocked and has traditionally been used
only by the states that border it. (FN38) It is therefore unlike the
waters governed by the law of the sea, which are open to navigation by
all states. (FN39) Yet, its size, salt water, and hydrocarbon- rich
seabed also distinguish it from most lakes under international
law. (FN40) Both the law of the sea and the law of lakes have been
useful, however, in shaping the solutions that the littoral states
have advocated. (FN41)
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
essentially provides for the extension of a maritime state’s land
borders 200 miles into the sea. (FN42) The first twelve miles are
equivalent to a state’s sovereign territory on land, while the
remainder is the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), in which the state
enjoys exclusive fishing and mining rights. (FN43)
Application of UNCLOS to the Caspian Sea would be complicated by the
sea’s dimensions, since the EEZs of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, for
instance, which are situated less than 400 miles apart across the sea,
would overlap. (FN44) In such cases, boundaries are usually drawn at a
point halfway between the two coastlines. (FN45) Thus, UNCLOS would
provide for division of the water and seabed into national sectors
roughly proportional to the length of each maritime state’s
coastline. (FN46) According to one calculation for such a division,
Kazakhstan would 1 control 29.9% of the Caspian; Azerbaijan, 20.7%;
Turkmenistan, 19.2%; and Russia and Iran–only 15.6% and 14.6%,
respectively. (FN47)
Not surprisingly, in the 1990s Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan argued in
favor of applying UNCLOS to the Caspian Sea, aiming to push ahead with
big oil projects off their coasts. (FN48) In recent years, however,
they have come to support the Russian proposal, which incorporates the
UNCLOS concept most important for their interests–division of the
seabed into proportional national sectors. (FN49) If the Caspian were
treated as a lake, ownership of its mineral resources would not differ
substantially from an arrangement under UNCLOS. (FN50) Rather, the key
difference would lie in the use of its surface waters. (FN51) The
surface waters of international lakes, unlike those of seas, can be
used exclusively by the states bordering them. (FN52) Russia has
borrowed this principle for the “common waters” element of its
proposed solution. (FN53)
2. Soviet-Iranian Treaties and the “Condominium” Principle
Much of the current legal dispute regarding the Caspian focuses on
treaties signed in 1921 and 1940 by the Soviet Union and Iran. (FN54)
The treaties provide for exclusive use of the Sea by the Soviet Union
and Iran, but cover only fishing and navigation rights, not mining
rights. (FN55) The 1940 treaty further stipulates a ten-mile fishing
zone extending from each state’s shoreline. (FN56)
Iran argues that the Soviet era treaties provide for common management
of the seabed and waters outside the ten-mile zone, according 2 to the
“condominium” principle. (FN57) Under such an arrangement, any oil
exploration and drilling operations undertaken in the Caspian would
have to meet the approval of all the bordering states. (FN58) As a
result, Iran suggests that Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan
should suspend their oil and gas producing activities in the Caspian
until a new multilateral agreement is reached. (FN59) Russia also
argued for this approach in the early 1990s, but it has recently begun
supporting a division of the seabed and common management of the
surface waters. (FN60)
3. Recent Developments: Russia’s Proposed Solution In 1998, Russia
moved closer to the Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani positions by accepting
division of the seabed into proportional national sectors, but still
insisted on common management of the surface waters. (FN61) In the
spring and early fall of 2002, Russia signed agreements with
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan recognizing national sectors based on lines
drawn in the middle of the sea halfway between each state. (FN62)
Russian diplomats have also succeeded in persuading Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan to support Russia’s “divided bottom, common waters”
position in multilateral negotiations on the sea’s status among the
five states. (FN63) Thus, there is now general agreement among Russia,
Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan on both the principle and the method of
dividing rights to the seabed and the oil beneath it. (FN64) For
Russia, coming to advocate this position has meant dropping any
“Soviet” claims to the oil-rich areas off the coast of Kazakhstan and
Azerbaijan, and giving up its struggle to block the BTC oil
pipeline. (FN65) 3 Russia has made these concessions for several
reasons. (FN66) Most significantly, under President Vladimir Putin’s
leadership, Russia has become more engaged in the negotiation process
and sought to maximize Russia’s share of economic wealth and
diplomatic influence in the Caspian. (FN67) Also, Russia has repaired
its pipelines to Western markets, built a new pipeline that bypasses
the troubled republic of Chechnya, and completed a joint project with
Kazakhstan to transport oil through a new pipeline that crosses
Russia. (FN68) Furthermore, Russian oil companies, such as LUKoil,
have pushed the Russian Foreign Ministry to make a deal with Russia’s
neighbors so that they can proceed with their own extraction
activities in the Caspian. (FN69) LUKoil is already working in
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan and in new oil fields discovered off
Russia’s Caspian shores. (FN70) Russia has also proposed an oil
export deal with the United States and become a partner in the
U.S.-led “war on terror.” (FN71)
In contrast to Russia, Iran has shown little willingness to
compromise. (FN72) In addition to common management of the entire sea
and seabed, Iran’s negotiators have proposed an alternative solution:
division of the sea into five equal national sectors (twenty percent
each)–a position which none of the other states supports. (FN73)
Moreover, Iran has recently attempted to force concessions from the
other Caspian states by demonstrating its potential as a
spoiler. (FN74) In July 2001, an Iranian gunboat chased two BP survey
ships from a disputed oil field in the southern Caspian. (FN75) BP
immediately suspended all activity under its contract with Azerbaijan
in the disputed oil field. (FN76) Both the United States and Russia
protested the Iranian action. (FN77) The July 2001 incident
underscored Iran’s isolation, and events since then have demonstrated
the extent to which the other Caspian 4 states have aligned themselves
with Russia. (FN78) Following the unsuccessful April 2002 Caspian
Summit in Turkmenistan, at which Iran alone insisted on an equal
division of the sea, President Putin ordered large-scale military
exercises on the Caspian for August 2002. (FN79) Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan also took part in the exercises, but Iran was pointedly
excluded. (FN80)
II. DISCUSSION
A. Russia’s Legal Arguments
Russia’s current legal argument regarding the status of the Caspian
Sea can be described as a “divided bottom, common waters”
approach. (FN81) Russia advocates dividing the seabed into national
sectors corresponding roughly to the amount of shoreline controlled by
each state, but leaving the surface waters, outside a fifteen-mile
territorial band, to be managed by all the states in common. (FN82) To
resolve disputes arising over claims to overlapping oil fields, Russia
proposes developing sharing agreements on a bilateral basis. (FN83) To
codify this argument permanently, Russia has concluded bilateral
treaties with its neighbors, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. (FN84) These
treaties cover the northern part of the sea, effectively dividing it
into Russian, Azerbaijani, and Kazakhstani national sectors. (FN85)
The legal effect of these bilateral treaties in the absence of a new
multilateral convention is not entirely clear, since it hinges on
whether the old Soviet-Iranian treaties remain in force, as Iran
argues 5 they do. (FN86) If the Soviet era treaties dissolved along
with the Soviet Union in 1991, or if they never effectively governed
ownership of the Caspian, then the new bilateral treaties between
Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan should be governing law in the
Caspian. (FN87) If, however, the old Soviet era treaties are still in
force, then Iran may have a legal foothold for its argument that no
new bilateral treaties are valid in the absence of a new multilateral
agreement. (FN88)
B. Iran’s Legal Arguments
Iran contends that the 1921 and 1940 Soviet-Iranian treaties will
remain in force until a new multilateral convention is agreed upon by
all five littoral states. (FN89) Furthermore, Iran demands that any
new multilateral agreement provide for common management of both the
surface waters and the seabed, or, alternatively, for division of the
sea into equal national sectors–twenty percent each. (FN90)
Iran’s legal argument concerning the treaties has four main
weaknesses. (FN91) First, it gives great weight to general
Soviet-Iranian treaties that make little mention of the Caspian, and
are completely silent about division or ownership of the
seabed. (FN92) Second, it argues for a common ownership regime of the
Caspian’s resources when in fact such a regime is not explicit in the
treaties. (FN93) Such a common ownership regime would, therefore, have
to be inferred, but neither the Soviet Union nor Iran treated the
Caspian as joint property during the Soviet era. (FN94) Third, the
Soviets engaged in oil extraction activities outside the ten-mile
exclusive fishing zone stipulated in the treaty, with no objection
from Iran. (FN95) Some have suggested that Iran’s silence about de
facto divisions during the Soviet era should preclude it from raising
objections 6 to national divisions today. (FN96) Finally, Iran has
refused to recognize the continued validity of the 1921 and 1940
treaties in other areas they governed, such as security. (FN97)
III. ANALYSIS
A. Implications for Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan
If Russia’s proposed solution becomes codified as international law–
either as a system of bilateral agreements, or as the basis for a new
Caspian convention–Russia will likely be the biggest winner for
several reasons. (FN98) First, playing a visible role in securing a
legal regime will allow Russia to be seen as a stabilizing force in
the region. (FN99) Second, Russia’s close cooperation with Azerbaijan
and Kazakhstan on this narrow legal question will facilitate
reciprocal cooperation from those states on problems Russian leaders
care deeply about, such as the instability in Chechnya. (FN100) Third,
division of the seabed into national sectors helps influential Russian
oil companies to pursue development of recently discovered reserves in
the Russian sector, as well as to engage in joint activities with
Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani counterparts. (FN101) Finally, the “common
waters” approach will give Moscow a free hand to patrol the Caspian
and fight what it calls crime and terrorism as it deems
necessary. (FN102)
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have traditionally been cautious in their
bilateral relations with Russia regarding the Caspian. (FN103)
However, the chief advantages of the Russian solution for Azerbaijan
and Kazakhstan are the clarity of sovereign rights, and, at least in
the short 7 run, cooperative relations with their Russian
neighbor. (FN104) Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan would no doubt prefer a
multilateral legal regime codifying the seabed boundaries, which would
make abrogation by any one party more difficult. (FN105) Nonetheless,
given their interest in securing their rights sooner rather than
later, and Iran’s intransigence, a system of bilateral treaties may be
the best solution Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani leaders can hope for at
the present time. (FN106)
B. Implications for the United States
The “divided bottom, common waters” approach offers several benefits
for U.S. interests. (FN107) The chief priorities of U.S. policy toward
the Caspian region continue to be the security of energy transport
routes, independence of the former Soviet Caspian states, and
isolation of Iran. (FN108) A Caspian legal regime that creates
definite boundaries and gives each border state sovereign control over
the resources in its national sector will favor these
interests. (FN109) A multilateral agreement based on clear national
sectors for the seabed and common management of most of the surface
waters would also be an encouraging sign for U.S. investors in the
region. (FN110) The actual borders would have to be drawn, and
disputes resolved over overlapping claims to oil and gas fields lying
between two sectors, but the series of bilateral agreements already in
place would help demarcate borders. (FN111) The U.S. government has an
additional stake in the success of some Caspian investment projects,
having provided risk insurance to the corporations investing in the
BTC pipeline through U.S. government financial institutions, including
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the
Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank). (FN112)
The United States also has important security concerns in the Caspian
region with regard to its “war on terror.” (FN113) Russian
predominance in the Caspian region may have distinct advantages for
the United States in this respect. (FN114) Both the United States and
Russia, for instance, have strong interests in keeping terrorists away
from pipelines and oil-rigs, although they may disagree on the best
means for doing so. (FN115) Moreover, Russia’s security interests will
ensure its engagement in the region for the foreseeable future, while
Russia’s proximity to and familiarity with the region make it better
positioned than the United States to act on issues of mutual
concern. (FN116)
Nevertheless, for the long run, the United States should consider
carefully the implications of Moscow’s taking on a role as a
unilateral military and police power in the Caspian. (FN117) Such a
course may be expedient while U.S. and Russian interests overlap, but
it will be difficult to intervene if Russian leaders begin to act on
interests that conflict directly with those of their neighbors and
partners. (FN118)
C. Implications for Iran
For Iran, the Russian-backed, “divided bottom, common waters” approach
offers several disadvantages. (FN119) First, it will deny Iran key
economic opportunities. (FN120) The plan effectively excludes Iran
from any significant development of the Caspian’s oil and gas, since
the fourteen percent share that would be allocated to Iran contains
the least proven oil and gas reserves and the deepest water. (FN121)
Meanwhile, proactive treaty- making by Russia, Azerbaijan, and
Kazakhstan is rapidly closing off Iran’s ability to bargain for things
it desires most, such as securing support for a future oil export
route south through its territory. (FN122)
9 Second, Iran also fears instability in the region. (FN123)
Specifically, Iran has concerns that any strengthening of Azerbaijan
will embolden Iran’s significant ethnic Azerbaijani population,
possibly leading to political and social upheaval in the northern
parts of the country that border Azerbaijan. (FN124) Furthermore,
Iran’s feelings of insecurity may be exacerbated by tacit U.S. support
for Russia’s legal solution for the Caspian. (FN125) The possibility
of a large U.S. military presence on Iran’s border, depending on
future events in Iraq, will heighten feelings of insecurity in Tehran.
(FN126)
Iran may yet win some concessions in a final agreement on the
Caspian’s status, but given the current situation, that scenario looks
unlikely. (FN127) In the absence of a multilateral agreement involving
all five Caspian states, it is difficult to see how the bilateral
treaty system created by Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan will
prevent further conflict arising over the disputed oil fields in the
southern part of the sea. (FN128) If Iranian leaders decide they have
nothing to lose, they may seek to disrupt other states’ activities in
the Caspian. (FN129) Iran would not have to engage in actual
hostilities to have an impact on the economic activities of the
Caspian states. (FN130) As the BP incident proved in July 2001,
foreign oil executives have a low tolerance for political uncertainty
in the region. (FN131)
CONCLUSION
Russia’s proposal for resolving the Caspian’s legal status is likely
to emerge as the defining legal framework for the sea–either as part
of a new Caspian convention or as a system of bilateral treaties. As
such, Russia’s plan offers important benefits to both Russian and
U.S. economic and political interests in the short term. However, it
may be an unsound basis for long-term security and strategic
interests. In particular, future events in Iran and Russia may have a
profound impact on the viability of the Russian-proposed solution.
Developments in Iranian domestic politics could affect Iran’s
willingness to recognize a Caspian treaty regime that excludes its
interests. The power struggle between President Mohammed Khatami’s
moderate administration and the hard-line clerics who control Iran’s
foreign policy raises questions about the possibility of a leadership
change and its effect on Iran’s relations with its Caspian neighbors.
Another potential problem with Russia’s proposed legal regime is that
its success or failure is directly linked to the maintenance of good
relations among the Caspian states. Neither Russia’s rapprochement
with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, nor its antiterror partnership with
the United States is a significant departure from the country’s
Russia-first foreign policy. Rather, both developments indicate a
pragmatic approach to pursuing Russia’s national interests. As those
interests change in the coming years, they will likely diverge from
the interests of their neighbors and those of the United States.
The “divided bottom, common waters” approach is essentially a
political solution to a legal problem. In the next several years, it
will help foster cooperation and get the oil flowing. In the longer
run, however, a number of events, such as leadership changes in Russia
or Iran or new trouble in Chechnya, may undermine the political
foundation of any agreement based on the Russian plan.
(FNa1). Ben N. Dunlap is the Solicitations and Symposium Editor of the
Boston College International & Comparative Law Review.
(FN1). Addicted to Oil, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 15, 2001, at 9.
(FN2). Id.; A Dangerous Addiction, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 15, 2001, at
15.
(FN3). See Michael Lelyveld, Caspian: Presidents Launch Construction
of Oil Pipeline, RADIO FREE EUROPE — RADIO LIBERTY (Sept. 18, 2002),
at
(hereinafter Lelyveld, Presidents Launch Construction); Lucian
Pugliaresi, Energy Security: How Valuable is Caspian Oil?, Caspian
Studies Program (Jan. 2001),
(FN4). ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, COUNTRY ANALYSIS
BRIEFS: CASPIAN SEA REGION, at
(Aug. 2003)
(hereinafter D.O.E., CASPIAN SEA REGION).
(FN5). See Fiona Hill, Pipeline Dreams in the Caucasus, in CAUCASUS
AND THE CASPIAN SEMINAR TRANSCRIPTS (SDI Project ed., 1996),
(hereinafter Hill, Pipeline Dreams).
(FN6). Id.; ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, CASPIAN SEA
REGION: OIL EXPORT OPTIONS, at
(July 2002)
(hereinafter D.O.E., EXPORT OPTIONS); Lelyveld, Presidents Launch
Construction, supra note 3.
(FN7). See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, CASPIAN SEA
REGION: LEGAL ISSUES, at
(July 2002) (hereinafter D.O.E., LEGAL ISSUES).
(FN8). See id.; see also Geoffrey Kemp, U.S.-Iranian Relations:
Competition or Cooperation in the Caspian Sea Basin, in ENERGY AND
CONFLICT IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS 148-49 (Robert Ebel & Rajan
Menon eds., 2000) (hereinafter ENERGY AND CONFLICT); Peter Rutland,
Paradigms for Russian Policy in the Caspian Region, in ENERGY AND
CONFLICT, supra, at 177.
(FN9). See D.O.E., LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 7; see also Kemp, supra
note 8, at 148-49; Rutland, supra note 8, at 177.
(FN10). Vystuplenie Prezidenta Rossii V.V. Putina na vstreche glav
prikaspiiskikh gosudarstv (Russian President Vladimir Putin, Address
at the Summit of Caspian Heads of State), available at
(Apr. 23, 2002) (hereinafter Putin Address).
(FN11). See D.O.E., LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 7; Sergei Blagov,
Kazakhstan Pushes for Trilateral Caspian Deal, ASIA TIMES ONLINE,
Oct. 10, 2002, at
(hereinafter
Blagov, Kazakhstan).
(FN12). See D.O.E., LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 7.
(FN13). See Hill, Pipeline Dreams, supra note 5; Bruce R. Kuniholm,
The Geopolities of the Caspian Basin, 54 MIDDLE E. J. 546 (2002),
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Magazine File.
(FN14). D.O.E., CASPIAN SEA REGION, supra note 4.
(FN15). See Kuniholm, supra note 13.
(FN16). Id.
(FN17). D.O.E., CASPIAN SEA REGION, supra note 4; ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, CASPIAN SEA REGION: RESERVES AND PIPELINES
TABLES, at http:// (July
2002).
(FN18). D.O.E., CASPIAN SEA REGION, supra note 4.
(FN19). Jan H. Kalicki, Caspian Energy at the Crossroads, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, Sept.-Oct. 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Magazine File.
(FN20). Id.
(FN21). See id.; D.O.E., CASPIAN SEA REGION, supra note 4.
(FN22). ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, KAZAKHSTAN: MAJOR
OIL AND NATURAL GAS PROJECTS, at
(June 2002)
(hereinafter DEP’T OF ENERGY, KAZAKHSTAN); Michael Lelyveld,
Iran/Azerbaijan: U.S. Rejects Military Involvement in Caspian Dispute,
RADIO FREE EUROPE — RADIO LIBERTY (Mar. 15, 2002), at
(FN23). ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, AZERBAIJAN:
PRODUCTION- SHARING AGREEMENTS, at
(June 2002)
(hereinafter DEP’T OF ENERGY, AZERBAIJAN).
(FN24). See generally Kuniholm, supra note 13; Robert Ebel & Rajan
Menon, Introduction to ENERGY AND CONFLICT, supra note 8, at 4-10.
(FN25). Ebel & Menon, Introduction, supra note 24, at 5.
(FN26). See id. at 8-9.
(FN27). See id.
(FN28). See id.; Kemp, supra note 8, at 158.
(FN29). See Ebel & Menon, Introduction, supra note 24, at 7.
(FN30). The Lost Cause of the Caucasus, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 2, 2002,
at 25.
(FN31). Ebel & Menon, Introduction, supra note 24, at 7.
(FN32). Lena Jonson & Roy Allison, Central Asian Security: Internal
and External Dynamics, in CENTRAL ASIAN SECURITY: THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 13- 14 (Lena Jonson & Roy Allison eds., 2001).
(FN33). Id.
(FN34). See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, JOINT PRESS STATEMENT BY THE
U.S.-RUSSIAN WORKING GROUP ON COUNTERTERRORISM, http://
(July 26, 2002) (hereinafter
D.O.S., PRESS STATEMENT); B. Lynn Pascoe, Security, Stability,
Prosperity: Engaging the Eurasian Front-Line States, Remarks Delivered
at the International Conference on Central Asia and the Caucasus, Yale
Center for the Study of Globalization, at
(Sept. 20, 2002).
(FN35). Martha Brill Olcott, Drugs, Terrorism, and Regional Security:
The Risks from Afghanistan, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Judiciary
Committee,
(Mar. 13, 2002).
(FN36). See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FACT SHEET: U.S. ASSISTANCE TO
TURKMENISTAN–FISCAL YEAR 2002, at
(June 6, 2002); Kalicki,
supra note 19.
(FN37). See Brice M. Clagett, Ownership of Seabed and Subsoil
Resources in the Caspian Sea Under the Rules of International Law,
CASPIAN CROSSROADS MAG.,
(1995); Bernard H. Oxman, Caspain Sea or Lake: What Difference Does It
Make?, CASPIAN CROSSROADS MAG.,
(1996).
(FN 38). See Clagett, supra note 37; Oxman, supra note 37.
(FN39). See Clagett, supra note 37; Oxman, supra note 37.
(FN40). See Oxman, supra note 37.
(FN41). See id.
(FN42). See Clagett, supra note 37.
(FN43). Faraz Sanei, Note, The Caspian Sea Legal Regime, Pipeline
Diplomacy, and the Prospects for Iran’s Isolation from the Oil and Gas
Frenzy: Reconciling Tehran’s Legal Options with Its Geopolitical
Realities, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 681, 790 (2001).
(FN44). See Clagett, supra note 37.
(FN45). See id. The exact method of division was disputed even after
UNCLOS, however, particularly by states that were not parties to the
convention. See id.
(FN46). Sanei, supra note 43, at 790.
(FN47). Clagett, supra note 37.
(FN48). See Kamyar Mehdiyoun, Current Development, Ownership of Oil
and Gas Resources in the Caspian Sea, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 183, 187
(2000).
(FN49). See Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del Rossiiskoi Federatsii,
Departament Informatsii i Pechati, Interviu spetsialnogo
predstavitelia Prezidenta Rossii po uregulirovaniiu statusa
Kaspiiskogo moria, zamestitelia Ministra inostrannykh del V.I.
Kaliuzhnogo (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dep’t of Information
and Press, Interview of the Special Representative of the President of
Russia for Regulation of the Status of the Caspian Sea, Deputy Foreign
Minister Viktor I. Kalyuzhny), at (May 23, 2002)
(hereinafter Kalyuzhny Interview).
(FN50). See Clagett, supra note 37.
(FN51). See Oxman, supra note 37.
(FN52). See id.
(FN53). See id.; Lelyveld, Russia: Will a New Formula for Sharing
Caspian Riches Work?, RADIO FREE EUROPE–RADIO LIBERTY (Nov. 28,
2001), at http://
(hereinafter
Lelyveld, Sharing Caspian Riches).
(FN54). D.O.E., LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 7; see Sanei, supra note 43,
at 768-87.
(FN55). See Sanei, supra note 43, at 769-70.
(FN56). Id.
(FN57). See Abbas Maleki, Caspian Sea and Foreign Policy of Islamic
Republic of Iran, JOMHURI ESLAMI (Tehran), Oct. 23, 2001, at 3,
http:// Iran’s Share of the Caspian Sea
(Interview with Mehdi Safari), TEHRAN PERSIAN DAILY, Apr. 18, 2002, at
2, http:// (hereinafter Safari
Interview). See also generally Clagett, supra note 37; Oxman, supra
note 37 (describing the “condominium” principle in international law).
(FN58). See Sanei, supra note 43, at 786-87; Safari Interview, supra
note 57.
(FN59). See Sanei, supra note 43, at 786-87; Safari Interview, supra
note 57.
(FN60). See BRENDA SHAFFER, PARTNERS IN NEED: THE STRATEGIC
RELATIONSHIP OF RUSSIA AND IRAN 51 (2001).
(FN61). Mehdiyoun, supra note 48, at 187.
(FN62). Steven Lee Myers, Carving Up the Caspian, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 2002, at A13; Blagov, Kazakhstan, supra note 11.
(FN63). Lelyveld, Sharing Caspian Riches, supra note 53; Kalyuzhny
Interview, supra note 49. Turkmenistan favors division of the seabed
into national sectors, but is unwilling to commit to the method of
division proposed by Russia. See Kalyuzhny Interview, supra note 49.
(FN64). See Kalyuzhny Interview, supra note 49.
(FN65). See Carol Saivetz, Caspian Geopolitics: The View from Moscow,
7 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 53, 54-55 (2000).
(FN66). See Fiona Hill, Russia: The 21st Century’s Energy Superpower?,
20 BROOKINGS REV. 28 (2002) (hereinafter Hill, Superpower).
(FN67). See Saivetz, supra note 65, at 57-59.
(FN68). D.O.E., EXPORT OPTIONS, supra note 6; Kalicki, supra note 19.
(FN69). See Hill, Superpower, supra note 66.
(FN70). DEP’T OF ENERGY, AZERBAIJAN, supra note 23; DEP’T OF ENERGY,
KAZAKHSTAN, supra note 22; see Hill, Superpower, supra note 66.
(FN71). See Brenda Shaffer, The U.S. Needs Russia to Help Contain
Iran, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2002, at 13.
(FN72). See Maleki, supra note 57.
(FN73). See id.
(FN74). Michael Lelyveld, Caspian: A Delicate Balance Prevails, RADIO
FREE EUROPE–RADIO LIBERTY (July 16, 2002), at
(hereinafter Lelyveld, Delicate Balance).
(FN75). Id.
(FN76). Id.
(FN77). Id.
(FN78). Jean-Christophe Peuch, Caspian: ‘Militarization’ of the
Sea–Myth or Reality?, RADIO FREE EUROPE–RADIO LIBERTY (June 10,
2002), at
(FN79). Id.
(FN80). Michael Lelyveld, Russia: Are Moscow’s War Games in Caspian
Muscle Flexing?, RADIO FREE EUROPE–RADIO LIBERTY (Aug. 7, 2002), at
(FN81). Putin Address, supra note 10.
(FN82). Michael Lelyveld, Caspian: Russia Proposes Wider Offshore Zone
for Dividing the Sea, RADIO FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY (Aug. 28, 2002),
at
(FN83). See Kalyuzhny Interview, supra note 49.
(FN84). See Blagov, Kazakhstan, supra note 11; Michael Lelyveld,
Caspian: Azerbaijan, Iran Seek New Phase in Border Dispute, RADIO FREE
EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY (June 18, 2002), at
(hereinafter Lelyveld, New Phase).
(FN85). See Blagov, Kazakhstan, supra note 11; Lelyveld, New Phase,
supra note 84.
(FN86). See Sanei, supra note 43, at 777-80, 786-87.
(FN87). See id.
(FN88). See id.
(FN89). Maleki, supra note 57, at 3.
(FN90). Id.
(FN91). See Mehdiyoun, supra note 48, at 188-89; Clagett, supra note
37. But cf. Sanei, supra note 43, at 786-87.
(FN92). See Mehdiyoun, supra note 48, at 188-89; Clagett, supra note
37. But cf. Sanei, supra note 43, at 786-87.
(FN93). See Mehdiyoun, supra note 48, at 188-89; Clagett, supra note
37. But cf. Sanei, supra note 43, at 786-87.
(FN94). See Mehdiyoun, supra note 48, at 188-89; Clagett, supra note
37. But cf. Sanei, supra note 43, at 786-87.
(FN95). See Mehdiyoun, supra note 48, at 188-89; Clagett, supra note
37. But cf. Sanei, supra note 43, at 786-87.
(FN96). See Mehdiyoun, supra note 48, at 188-89; Clagett, supra note
37. But cf. Sanei, supra note 43, at 786-87.
(FN97). See SHAFFER, supra note 60, at 63 n.46.
(FN98). See Kalyuzhny Interview, supra note 49; Hill, Superpower,
supra note 66.
(FN99). See Saivetz, supra note 65, at 59.
(FN100). See Sergei Blagov, Russia’s Asian Policy Gains Momentum, ASIA
TIMES ONLINE, Nov. 14, 2002, at
Asia/DK14Ag01.html (discussing Kazakhstan’s cooperation with Russia in
counterterrorist operations); Daan van der Schriek, Moscow Hostage
Crisis Encourages Closer Russian-Azerbaijani Relations, at
(Oct. 30, 2002) (discussing Azerbaijan’s clamp-down on Chechen
activity in its territory and the recent Azerbaijani-Russian
rapprochement).
(FN101). See Hill, Superpower, supra note 66.
(FN102). See Peuch, supra note 78.
(FN103). See generally Hooman Peimani, Russia Navigates Another
Caspian Rapid, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Oct. 8, 2002, at
Asia/DJ08Df05.html.
(FN104). See Blagov, Kazakhstan, supra note 11.
(FN105). See, e.g., Peimani, supra note 103.
(FN106). See Blagov, Kazakhstan, supra note 11.
(FN107). See Michael Lelyveld, U.S.: Official Disputes Iranian Success
with Caspian Project, RADIO FREE EUROPE — RADIO LIBERTY (Oct. 18,
2002), at
(FN108). See Kuniholm, supra note 13.
(FN109). See id.
(FN110). See D.O.E., LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 7; Michael Lelyveld,
Iran/Azerbaijan: U.S. Rejects Military Involvement in Caspian Dispute,
RADIO FREE EUROPE–RADIO LIBERTY (Mar. 15, 2002), at
(hereinafter Lelyveld, Caspian Dispute).
(FN111). See D.O.E., LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 7; Lelyveld, Caspian
Dispute, supra note 110.
(FN112). See Kuniholm, supra note 13.
(FN113). See Assistant Secretary of State Beth Jones, U.S. Engagement
in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Staying Our Course Along the Silk
Road, Remarks at “Central Asia: Its Geopolitical Significance and
Future Impact” Conference, University of Montana, at
(Apr. 10, 2003).
(FN114). See D.O.S., PRESS STATEMENT, supra note 34; Lelyveld, Caspian
Dispute, supra note 110.
(FN115). See D.O.S., PRESS STATEMENT, supra note 34; Lelyveld, Caspian
Dispute, supra note 110.
(FN116). See, e.g., Saivetz, supra note 65, at 58-59.
(FN117). See generally Jonson & Allison, supra note 32; Kemp, supra
note 8, at 148-49.
(FN118). See Kuniholm, supra note 13.
(FN119). See Sanei, supra note 43, at 824; Maleki, supra note 57;
D.O.E., LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 7.
(FN120). See D.O.E., CASPIAN SEA REGION, supra note 4.
(FN121). Id.
(FN122). See Sanei, supra note 43, at 832.
(FN123). See BRENDA SHAFFER, BORDERS AND BRETHREN: IRAN AND THE
CHALLENGE OF AZERBAIJANI IDENTITY 1-7 (2002); Kuniholm, supra note 13.
(FN124). See SHAFFER, supra note 123, at 1-7; Kuniholm, supra note 13.
(FN125). See Kemp, supra note 8, at 158.
(FN126). See Sanei, supra note 43, at 824.
(FN127). See Mehdiyoun, supra note 48, at 188-89. But cf. Sanei, supra
note 43, at 786-87.
(FN128). See Peimani, supra note 103.
(FN129). See id.
(FN130). Lelyveld, Delicate Balance, supra note 74.
(FN131). See id.
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