Ekho, Baku, in Russian
10 Aug 04

Results of Iranian president’s Baku trip “very modest” – Azeri paper

Iranian President Mohammad Khatami’s recent visit to Azerbaijan has
little to show for it, with no agreement on the status of the Caspian
Sea, a commentary in a Baku-based newspaper has said. “There is a
definite gap between statements by Iranian officials on eternal
friendship with Azerbaijan and the real policy pursued by Tehran,”
the commentary said, citing Iranian cooperation with Armenia and its
attitude towards the large Azeri ethnic minority in Iran as evidence.
The fact that Khatami’s long-awaited visit has taken place may be a
factor in a reorientation of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, according
to the commentary. The following is the text of Nurani’s commentary
in Azerbaijani newspaper Ekho on 10 August headlined “Lame ducks”;
subheadings inserted editorially:

Iranian President Mohammad Khatami’s visit to Azerbaijan is over.
Even before the visit started, the press had been full of
commentaries, saying that the negotiations in Baku are of great
importance for the Iranian authorities. Firstly, Iran has long been
troubled by the strengthening of the USA’s position in our country
and it was not opposed to “getting closer” to Azerbaijan. And
secondly, today, when the international community is already openly
discussing measures to pressurize Tehran into giving up its nuclear
programme, which in no way can be viewed as “peaceful”, and the USA
is openly implying that Iran could be next after Iraq, Tehran would
like to improve relations with its neighbours for clear reasons.
Furthermore, this visit had been cancelled and postponed innumerable
times. In a word, the public had every reason to expect a “diplomatic
breakthrough”.

Little to show for visit

But the results of the visit have turned out to be very modest: the
Iranian president did not bring “in his briefcase” either an
agreement on the Caspian status, or a decision on opening
Azerbaijan’s consulate in Tabriz. It looks as though in Iran they
considered any curtsies towards Baku to be unnecessary. What is more,
for several months before the visit, the Iranian army located close
to the Azerbaijani border carried out threatening and large-scale
manoeuvres, ignoring the reaction of official Baku.

Tehran fears strong Azerbaijan will boost Azeri national movement in
Iran

However, we have already had plenty of opportunity to be convinced
that there is a definite gap between statements by Iranian officials
on eternal friendship with Azerbaijan and the real policy pursued by
Tehran. It is enough just to mention Iran’s cooperation with Armenia.
People in Baku prefer to pretend, especially during the run-up to
talks with Iran, that the South Azerbaijani factor does not exist at
all. However, it does not mean that Iran forgets about it. The
authorities of this country understand very well: the stronger
independent Azerbaijan is in the north the Azerbaijani Republic , the
more noticeable the national movement in the south northwestern Iran
will become. Of course, an open anti-Azerbaijani policy causes only
an outburst of indignation in Tabriz, Ardabil, Orumiyeh, Maragheh,
which is why Iran has been pledging eternal love for our country for
over 10 years now, but has in reality been pursuing a contrary
policy. On the eve of the visit, there was nothing to point to a
change in Iran’s foreign policy towards Azerbaijan.

Iranian media deliberately fanned tension ahead of Khatami’s visit

In Tehran Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov, who went to
Iran to prepare for Khatami’s visit, was accused of all mortal sins.
In a press conference in Tehran Mammadyarov recalled the Iranian
Azerbaijanis. As one can infer from the explanations of the
Azerbaijani deputy foreign minister, Xalaf Xalafov, there was nothing
to criticize in the quotations the Iranian media took from
Mammadyarov. The minister noted that Azerbaijanis are a minority in
Iran and that they maintain good relations with Iranians. However,
even this was enough for Allahuddin Burujerdi, head of the National
Security and Foreign Policy Committee at the Iranian parliament, to
see in these words a “distortion of history” and threat to the “unity
of Iran” in his interview with the newspaper Baztab.

Against the background of the arrests of participants in the peaceful
march to Fort Bazz, all this might seem natural and fully in line
with Iran’s official policy, which gives “model” minority status to
Armenians, with rights to schools, but not to Azerbaijanis.

The dubious honour of releasing the next “duck” rumour falls to the
Tehran Times, which on the eve of Khatami’s visit to Azerbaijan
reported that the American military will be located on the
Iranian-Azerbaijani border. Baku denied this sensational report.

Taking into consideration the extent to which Iran’s ruling clerical
elite controls everybody and everything from parliament to the press,
it is very hard to believe that it is a matter of Burujerdi’s extra
emotions or lack of professionalism in Tehran Times staff. It is more
logical to suppose that the appropriate “information background” for
Khatami’s Baku visit was set up in Iran by means of such a festival
of “lame ducks” play on words, in Russian the word for “duck” has the
secondary meaning “rumour” .

Khatami a “lame-duck” president

However, in the political slang the term “lame duck” implies not only
“sensation” which is refuted before it can draw attention. It also
implies a president who has no hope of re-election and the only thing
he can do is see his term out quietly.

In fact, soon after his election as Iranian president, Khatami was
openly dubbed “Iran’s Gorbachev”, he was calling for reforms and
“dialogue among civilizations” and enlisted colossal support from
Iranian voters, but now the situation is principally different.
Following the latest parliamentary elections in Iran, in which almost
all the candidates from the reformist bloc were simply barred from
running because of insufficient religious devotion, Khatami’s
positions in the ruling bodies are not stable. For the ruling clerics
he is not going to be “their man”. But, recent student protests in
Tehran illustrated that Khatami is also losing the support of his
natural allies – supporters of liberal reforms who accuse him of
indecisiveness and half-measures.

In a word, if several years ago drawing parallels with Gorbachev
sounded flattering enough for Khatami, now it is assuming a different
meaning.

Azerbaijan may be about to change foreign policy

In the end, the heightened tension around Iran logically required
known caution from Baku. Against a background of increasing US
criticism of the actions of the Azeri authorities and large-scale
consultations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Khatami’s visit to
Azerbaijan that has already materialized may prove to be a serious
argument in favour of the fact that Azerbaijan is on the threshold of
another “re-orientation” of its foreign policy. It remains open to
question if the country’s foreign policy will indeed be reconsidered,
but our Western partners are more likely to exercise a certain
caution with regard to Azerbaijan. And it is not by chance that they
are cautious in Iran about “tough measures” by the USA and its
allies. In the best case scenario bright economic projects will fall
victim to international sanctions. In the worst we will be reminded
about all the smiles and handshakes, although without documents
signed, when bombs rain down on Tehran.

Of course, if negotiations with Khatami promised Azerbaijan great
success, it would be possible to take a risk for the sake of national
interests, but what is to be done if in the negotiations portfolio
there is nothing but less impressive quasi-economic documents, which
are signed by a president with a rather gloomy political future? To
be frank, can we generally live up to our state and national
interests?

Perhaps, the answer to this question lies in such delicate spheres as
the mentality and psychology that we inherited from the times of
Azerbaijan being Moscow’s colony. People who passed through the
school of “apparat games” and behind-the-scenes struggle in those
corridors and rooms where a potential candidate would win after
eliminating all conflicting groupings inevitably bring the same
principle to the foreign policy of a state. Maybe, they cordially
believe in pursuing a “balanced policy”, trying to be “white and
fluffy” in the eyes of the USA and Iran, Russia and Turkey, Arab
nations and Israel and transfer the accumulated experience to the
politicians of the ensuing generation without even thinking that the
policy of an independent state is built on principles entirely
different from an “apparat game” in the next “plenary session” or
“congress”. And it seems that these delusions may cost us so much.