Civil Georgia, Georgia
Aug 31 2004
Pulling Back Troops, Georgia Calls for European Help
by Jaba Devdariani / 2004-08-31 18:25:46
Reposted from Central Asia – Caucasus Analyst
President Mikheil Saakashvili’s decision to pull back his troops from
South Ossetia is almost desperate cry for the political assistance from
the European powers. Georgia is ready to accept suboptimal solutions
with regards to peacekeeping, but return to the pre-July status quo
is no longer acceptable. If no definitive answer is received within
a month, resumption of hostilities becomes likely.
Background: On August 19, in a first offensive military operation
since the resumption of fire in South Ossetia, Georgian special
forces captured the strategic heights from which Georgian villages
were pounded during almost two weeks. Despite popular calls for a
continued offensive, Georgian authorities decided to hand over the
heights to the tripartite peacekeeping troops and withdraw the police
and military detachments from South Ossetia.
Simultaneously, President Saakashvili called upon the international
community to assist in elaborating a new format of the peace process,
which would allow for international presence during the political
negotiations, and for increased international military monitoring on
the ground. The Georgian government has reiterated that the format
of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) established in accordance with
the 1992 peace accords is no longer acceptable, as it allows South
Ossetia, backed by two other members – North Ossetia and Russia –
to stonewall all Georgian proposals. Top Georgian officials also
repeated offers of substantial autonomy for South Ossetia.
Before Saakashvili’s decision became known on August 19, Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said there was no need for an
international conference or any new peace process in South Ossetia,
as the JCC format already provided for a political mechanism. The
U.S. State Department also accepted the language of using “existing
political mechanisms” for defusing the crisis.
However, after the decision on troop pullout, the OSCE’s ambassador to
Georgia hinted optimism on a potential expansion of OSCE monitoring
in South Ossetia. EU special ambassador Heikki Talvitie was visiting
Georgia on August 23, OSCE Permanent Council members are invited
to visit Georgia on September 5 and the president of the European
Commission Romano Prodi is to visit Tbilisi in mid-September.
Implications: The armed clashes in August confirmed the presence of
armed volunteers or mercenaries that have infiltrated South Ossetia
from Russia to fight against Georgian authorities. Following the
most fierce exchanges of August 17-18, independent military analysts
tend to conclude that specific night vision and sniper equipment used
against Georgian detachments indicates either that the Russian special
forces are participating in the clashes directly, or that they have
been training and equipping the Ossetian military for a substantial
period of time.
Saakashvili is determined to engage South Ossetian de facto authorities
in a dialogue over the political status of South Ossetia. However,
Russia’s military backing gives no incentive for the South Ossetian
president, Eduard Kokoity, to launch such a dialogue. Simultaneously,
Georgia has no confidence in a Russia-dominated JCC format.
On August 18, Georgian foreign minister Salome Zourabichvili formulated
the Georgian vision of the peace process at the OSCE Permanent Council
session in Vienna: “demilitarization, ceasefire and direct dialogue
[with South Ossetian authorities].” To achieve these aims, Georgia
calls for an expanded OSCE monitoring, which should include the South
Ossetian section of the Russo-Georgian border (Roki tunnel). Georgia
also calls for an international conference under a OSCE/UN aegis to
discuss the proposals for a political settlement.
So far, the OSCE’s reaction has been cautious, and the support of
the EU and the U.S. rather lukewarm. The Russian foreign ministry
characterized the Georgian requests to increase the OSCE role on July
31 as “obviously unattainable” and accused OSCE monitors of siding
with Georgians in South Ossetia. This is an interesting twist, as
on July 8 the OSCE was accused by CIS countries (except Georgia and
Azerbaijan) of focusing “exclusively on monitoring human rights and
democratic institutions” in the CIS.
The statement argued for an increased security role of the organization
to “correct the imbalance.” Strengthening the security arm of
the OSCE (where Russia has an effective veto right) in Europe to
counterweigh NATO is a familiar goal of Russian diplomacy since
the mid-1990s. Still, Russia consistently objects to even OSCE
participation in South Ossetia, apparently unwilling to dilute it
own direct influence even to a slight extent.
Recently, some Russian politicians commented positively on using the
“Minsk group” format, applied to Nagorno Karabakh conflict since
1992. The “Minsk Group” – a consultative political forum of selected
members of the OSCE – has failed to deliver results in Nagorno
Karabakh, not least because its mandate was blurred, its participants
had no clear commitments, and the initiatives were at times blocked
or ignored by Russia. Involvement of Western powers would still be
a positive outcome for official Tbilisi, but a “Minsk Group” format
can be one, but by no means the only new mechanism for South Ossetia.
For Georgia, expanded OSCE involvement is a suboptimal option.
Certainly, Tbilisi would like to see NATO or EU peacekeepers replace
the Russian ones. Nonetheless, Saakashvili is pragmatic about
available options. U.S. troops are tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan
and Washington is consumed by the upcoming presidential elections.
The EU recently took over an operation in Afghanistan and plans to
do the same in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Thus Georgia’s requests to the international community are rather
minimal: to give an international backing to the political dialogue
by the means of a conference (Bulgaria already offered Sofia as a
venue) and to significantly increase monitoring of South Ossetia as
a confidence-building measure. The Russian-dominated multipartite
peacekeeping forces are allowed to remain in South Ossetia.
If Saakashvili fails to secure this minimal support, Tbilisi would
not be able to restore the situation to pre-escalation status quo.
This would mean a re-opening of the gushing smuggling from South
Ossetia, and a major loss of face with the electorate by backtracking
on key election commitments. There would be a strong public support
for a military operation in South Ossetia, possibly endorsed by
the security establishment in the government and the parliament.
Sustained clashes will undoubtedly damage Georgia’s economic reforms
that the European powers have staked on through a Euro 1 billion
support package. While Saakashvili-Zhvania’s government is genuinely
committed to these reforms, the issues of national security are bound
to prevail.
Conclusions: It would be an illusion to assume that the JCC framework
is capable of addressing the current situation in South Ossetia.
Georgian authorities have acted to solve the key economic (smuggling)
and political (territorial integrity) issues by “de-frosting” the
South Ossetian conflict and it is impossible to reset the clock to
the situation of Spring 2004. Georgian authorities have indicated
willingness to compromise and accept suboptimal security arrangements
to the extent that they ensure minimal security of its citizens and
a progress at the negotiating table.
If the EU and OSCE shuttle diplomacy fails to deliver results within
the coming month, resumption of hostilities could be real in mid-
to late October.
Jaba Devdariani is the founder of Civil Georgia (Civil.Ge), currently
works for the OSCE mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.