In the Caucasus, another crisis threatens
Neal Ascherson IHT

International Herald Tribune, France
Sept 6 2004

Abkhazia

LONDON — While President Vladimir Putin of Russia struggles to deal
with the fallout from the school siege that killed hundreds last
week in Beslan, across the border, Georgia’s new president, Mikhail
Saakashvili, faces simmering conflicts that may flare up dangerously
if they are mishandled.

The most daunting of them all concerns Abkhazia, a fertile and
beautiful coastal strip between the Caucasus mountains and the Black
Sea whose existence the outside world has all but forgotten.

Since he took power in a bloodless revolution last November,
Saakashvili, 38, has successfully tackled large-scale corruption and
set Georgia on a course toward Western-style democracy. But he has
run into trouble as he tries to “reintegrate” Adzharia, South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, regions that either refused to join independent Georgia
in the 1990s or tried to break away more recently.

In May, Saakashvili overthrew the secessionist regime of Aslan
Abashidze in Adzharia, the Georgian province bordering Turkey. But
this summer he failed to re-establish Georgian authority over South
Ossetia. Troops were sent in, but there was armed resistance from the
Ossetians, leading to more than a dozen deaths and furious protests
from Russia.

The fiasco in South Ossetia has damaged prospects for any settlement
with Abkhazia, the most difficult territorial problem facing
Saakashvili. Abkhazia fought a ferocious war of independence against
Georgian forces in 1993 and 1994, in which atrocities were committed
by both sides. More than 200,000 Georgian civilians fled Abkhazia
and survive as homeless refugees in Georgia.

The Georgians maintain that Abkhaz identity is little more than
a fiction that Russia supports in order to undermine Georgia’s
own independence. The Abkhazians retort that they had never been
an integral part of Georgia, and that they went to war only when
independent Georgia threatened to annex them after the fall of the
Soviet Union.

During the Soviet period, massive settlement of Georgians in Abkhazia
had reduced the Abkhazians to a minority in their own country. On the
eve of the 1993-1994 war, ethnic Abkhazians numbered only 100,000 out
of a population of 500,000. (There were also about 100,000 Armenians,
most of whom supported the cause of Abkhazian independence.)

But independence brought no happy end for Abkhazia. With the best
vacation beaches on the Black Sea, it might have become prosperous.
Instead, it became an unrecognized microstate, blockaded by the
outside world. Road, rail and air links were cut off. Ten years later,
Abkhazia’s government is disillusioned and defensive. There is an
elected Parliament, but democratic reformers have to struggle against
a culture of authoritarian rule and spreading corruption.

Recently Russian tourists have returned to the beaches and a flow
of imports fills the shops. If they apply for Russian passports,
Abkhazians can now travel abroad. But even today, about a third of
buildings in Sukhumi, the capital, remain gutted by war.

Peacekeepers from the Confederation of Independent States – Russian
troops, in other words – occupy the region bordering Georgia, while a
small United Nations force observes the cease-fire zone. But 10 years
of meandering peace talks between Abkhazia and Georgia have produced
no solution.

Observers hoped that Saakashvili’s democratic “revolution” might reduce
tension between Abkhazia and Georgia. But when I visited Abkhazia early
this year, I found that Saakashvili was regarded there as an erratic
Georgian nationalist determined to crush Abkhaz independence. Recently,
Georgian patrol boats fired on a Turkish vessel off the Abkhaz coast,
and Saakashvili has hinted that Russian cruise ships might be prevented
from entering Abkhaz ports.

Saakashvili’s use of force in South Ossetia confirmed the worst
Abkhazian suspicions about him. And yet he is trapped by his own
rhetoric on Abkhazia. He has to do something about it or lose the
confidence of his followers.

On Oct. 3, there will be presidential elections in Abkhazia. The ailing
president, Vladislav Ardzinba, who led the independence war, favors
Raul Khajimba, currently prime minister, as his successor. So does
Putin, it seems; Khajimba, like Putin, has a KGB background. But if
Khajimba wins, he won’t necessarily push Abkhazia toward integration
with Russia. Many Abkhazians are almost as worried about Russian
absorption as they are about Georgian threats.

A deal between Georgia and Abkhazia may still be possible.
Saakashvili’s enormous popularity means that, in theory, he could
afford a compromise: some sort of fudged confederation in which
Abkhazia could associate with

Georgia and yet retain “sovereignty.”

But Saakashvili and the new Abkhaz president will face two obstacles.
One is how to let the refugees return without overbalancing
Abkhazia’s demography. The other is gaining Russian approval. That
is even harder. As American influence in the region grows, with
huge U.S. investments in Caspian oil and trans-Caucasus pipelines,
Russia’s instinct is to hold on to any lever in its grasp – including
the military presence in Abkhazia that gives Moscow a decisive grip
on Georgian policies.

In the end, it is not Georgians or Abkhazians who will solve this
dangerous standoff. Only a global agreement between Russia and the
United States on the future of the Caucasus will end Abkhazia’s
isolation and bring Georgia and Abkhazia to a lasting settlement.

Neal Ascherson, who reported on the collapse of the Soviet Union
for The Observer, is the author of “Black Sea” and, most recently,
“Stone Voices: The Search for Scotland.”

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress