RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
_________________________________________ ____________________
RFE/RL Iran Report
Vol. 7, No. 31, 13 September 2004

A Review of Developments in Iran Prepared by the Regional Specialists
of RFE/RL’s Newsline Team

************************************************************
HEADLINES:
* BAHA’IS SOUND THE ALARM ON ABUSES IN IRAN
* IS THE HOJJATIEH SOCIETY MAKING A COMEBACK?
* POLL SUGGESTS IRANIANS NOT INTERESTED IN NEWS
* IRAN TO LAUNCH WEATHER SATELLITE
* SYRIA’S LEBANESE OCCUPATION GETS IRANIAN THUMBS-UP
* INTELLIGENCE MINISTER DEFENDS LEBANESE HIZBALLAH
* IRAQIS LOOK AT THEIR EASTERN NEIGHBOR
* AL-SADR’S IRANIAN CONNECTION QUESTIONED
* RUMSFELD SAYS IRAN ‘NOT PART OF THE CIVILIZED WORLD’
* KHATAMI SIGNS SEVEN AGREEMENTS IN ARMENIA…
* …AND HEADS TO BELARUS
* SOME IRANIAN OFFICIALS QUESTION VALUE OF NUCLEAR AGREEMENTS
* ISRAEL CALLS FOR PRESSURE ON IRAN
* SKEPTICAL REACTION TO TEHRAN’S NEW NUCLEAR PROMISES
************************************************************

BAHA’IS SOUND THE ALARM ON ABUSES IN IRAN. The National Spiritual
Assembly of the Baha’is of the United States asserts, in an
advertisement in “The New York Times” of 12 September, that the
Iranian government has persecuted the 300,000 members of the
religious minority for the last quarter century, the Baha’i World
News Service reported (; see
the advertisement at ). The
advertisement compares the Iranian theocracy’s actions with those
of the Taliban when it destroyed the ancient rock statues of Buddha
at Bamian, Afghanistan.
The Iranian government’s most recent attack on the
Baha’i faith is the destruction in June of the Tehran house of
Mirza Abbas Nuri, father of Baha’i founder Mirza Hussein Ali Nuri
(also known as Bahaullah). A 13 September press release from the
Baha’i community notes that, earlier in the year, Iranian
authorities destroyed the gravesite in Babol of Mullah Mohammad-Ali
Barfurushi, a prominent Baha’i known as Quddus. Bani Dugal, a
Baha’i representative, described these developments as “part of a
concerted plan on the part of the Iranian government to gradually
extinguish the Baha’i Faith as a cultural force and cohesive
entity.” (Bill Samii)

IS THE HOJJATIEH SOCIETY MAKING A COMEBACK? Friday Prayer leaders
throughout Iran warned their congregations in early July of renewed
activities on the part of the Hojjatieh Society — a strongly
anti-Baha’i movement that has long been regarded as a potent, if
secretive threat to the ruling elites (both imperial and clerical)
that have run Iran since the Hojjatieh Society was created in the
middle of the last century. In Shahrud, Ayatollah Abbas Amini said
that Hojjatieh activists are recruiting new members in the city’s
mosques, Radio Farda reported on 11 July.
The Hojjatieh Mahdavieh Society was established in 1953 by a
preacher from Mashhad, Sheikh Mahmud Halabi, who supported Prime
Minister Mohammad Mussadiq. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi allowed the
society to pursue its anti-Baha’i activities after Mussadiq’s
August 1953 ouster, in exchange for the clerical community’s
support for his renewed reign. Society member Mohammad Taqi
Falsafi’s anti-Baha’i sermons were broadcast by state radio,
for example, and Tehran’s Military-Governor Teimour Bakhtiar took
a pick-ax to the Baha’i temple in Tehran in May 1955. Around that
time, Halabi persuaded the Marja-yi Taqlid (source of emulation)
Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Tabatabai Borujerdi to issue a fatwa
banning transactions with Baha’is, according to Baqer Moin’s
“Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah” (1999).
After that, the Hojjatieh Society entered a period of
relative inactivity, although the same cannot be said of Falsafi. The
shah’s court minister, Assadollah Alam, wrote in his diaries that
in 1963 Falsafi preached against the shah’s reform program and,
after a June 1963 riot, Alam had Falsafi imprisoned (Assadollah Alam,
“The Shah and I,” Alinaghi Alikhani, ed. [1991]).
There is more to the Hojjatieh Society than its
anti-Baha’i beliefs, however, although the depths of those
beliefs say a great deal about the society. While Baha’i leader
Mirza Hussein Ali Nuri (1817-1892) — who declared himself a prophet
known as Bahaullah (most Muslims view Muhammad as the final prophet
in Islam) — disputed the existence of a hidden imam, Hojjatieh
members believe that true Islamic government must await the return of
the hidden imam, or Mahdi, who is currently in occultation. For much
the same reasons, the Hojjatieh Society opposed Ayatollah
Khomeini’s theory of Islamic government and Vilayat-i Faqih (rule
of the supreme jurisconsult). It favors collective leadership of the
religious community, and opposes religious involvement in political
affairs.
The Hojjatieh Society enjoyed a revival after the 1978-1979
Islamic revolution; fearing a communist takeover, Sheikh Mahmud
Halabi urged his followers to vote in favor of Vilayat-i Faqih in the
December 1979 referendum on the country’s form of government.
Moin writes that the society was well organized at the time and its
members had “impeccable religious credentials,” so they were able to
fill administrative gaps left by revolutionary purges, as was
particularly the case in the educational sector. Some cabinet members
allegedly had Hojjatieh links as well.
Prominent clerics of the revolutionary era who were Hojjatieh
members or sympathizers included Ahmad Azari-Qomi, Ali-Akbar
Parvaresh, Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani, Abolqasem Khazali, and Ali
Akbar Nateq-Nuri, according to Mehdi Moslem’s “Factional Politics
in Post-Khomeini Iran” (2002). None of them acknowledged their
relationship with the society, however, maintaining more open ties
with the Islamic Coalition Association (now the Islamic Coalition
Party) and with the bazaar sector.
Within a few years this situation changed. Concern arose
about the society’s secretiveness, as did resentment of its
members’ success. An increasingly intolerant Khomeini, Moin
writes, attacked the society and what it stood for. He said in a 12
July 1983 speech: “Those who believe we should allow sins to increase
until the Twelfth Imam reappears should modify and reconsider their
position…. If you believe in your country [then] get rid of this
factionalism and join the wave that is carrying the nation forward,
otherwise it will break you.” The Hojjatieh Society announced its
dissolution on the same day, according to Moin.
The formal end of the Hojjatieh Society did not necessarily
mean the end to its role in politics. Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri, for
example, became the speaker of the fifth parliament and currently
serves on the Expediency Council and as an adviser to Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Ali-Akbar Parvaresh served as deputy speaker
of parliament and education minister. Ayatollah Ahmad
Azari-Qomi-Bigdeli served as public prosecutor, represented Khomeini
during a parliamentary review of the constitution, represented Qom in
the legislature, served on the Assembly of Experts, and headed the
Resalat Foundation (the regime eventually put him under house arrest
for questioning the system of Vilayat-i Faqih and questioning the
qualifications of Supreme Leader Khamenei; he died in 1999).
Warnings of renewed Hojjatieh Society activism appeared again
in 2002. Minister of Intelligence and Security Hojatoleslam Ali
Yunesi told a press conference that a group of people in Qom was
arrested on charges of supporting the society and trying to fuel
religious discord, and their books and pamphlets were confiscated,
“Toseh” reported on 27 August 2002. Rudsar and Amlash parliamentary
representative Davud Hasanzadegan-Rudsari said a little later that
the revived Hojjatieh Society is “exacerbating the Shi’a-Sunni
conflict,” “Aftab-i Yazd” reported on 1 September 2002. Hasanzadegan
described the society as “the embodiment of obscurantism.”
An editorial in the 1 September 2002 issue of the
conservative “Kayhan” newspaper took a very different tack when
discussing reports of renewed political activity by the Hojjatieh
Society. It claimed there are many similarities between the reformist
2nd of Khordad grouping and the Hojjatieh Society. Both advocate the
separation of politics and religion; just as the society opposes
creation of an Islamic government, the reformists are “trying to
separate the Islamic from the republic and then gradually turn the
Islamic system into a secular system of government.” Society members
and reformists enjoy luxury and wealth, according to the editorial,
and they both opposed Vilayat-i Faqih.
The editorial went on to claim that both groups accept all
sorts of sin and social corruption. “The only difference is that
association members say we should not fight vice so that it spreads
and the Mahdi will emerge, while certain reformers say that the
democratic principle demands that the people be left alone to do as
they please, even if it means loose morals and social corruption.”
The Hojjatieh Society, mainly because it opposes Marxism, is
pro-Western, according to the editorial, as is the 2nd of Khordad
grouping.
The Hojjatieh Society was also mentioned occasionally in
2003. Government spokesman Abdullah Ramezanzadeh said on 8 January
that Hojjatieh Society members who infiltrate the government would be
dealt with in the same way as other citizens, “Iran Daily” reported
the next day. Assembly of Experts member Hojatoleslam Hashem
Hashemzadeh-Harisi said in the same newspaper that the infiltration
of the government by such “radicals” threatens the Islamic system and
undermines national solidarity. On the sidelines of the 9 March
legislative session, Tehran representative Ali Shakuri-Rad allegedly
said that the Hojjatieh Society should be licensed as a political
party, “Resalat” reported on 10 March (“Towseh” put this into context
on 10 March, when it reported that Shakuri-Rad was comparing his
political opponents to the Hojjatieh Society).
“Aftab-i Yazd” on 7 October 2003 criticized an unnamed cleric
for defending the Hojjatieh Society. This cleric reportedly claimed
that Ayatollah Khomeini was deceived into criticizing the Hojjatieh
Society.
Sectarian conflicts reemerged in spring 2004 (see “RFE/RL
Iran Report,” 6 September 2004), which some sources linked to the
Hojjatieh Society. Rasul Montajabnia wrote in a commentary for
“Nasim-i Saba” on 4 May that members or supporters of the society
have stopped their fight against the Baha’i faith and have turned
their attention to creating divisions between Shi’a and Sunni
Muslims. Montajabnia repeated this concern in the 12 May
“Hambastegi.”
Hussein Shariatmadari, director of the “Kayhan” newspaper,
said, “The Hojjatieh Society has always been active as a creeping
current,” “Aftab-i Yazd” reported on 31 May 2004. Turning to its
renewed activism, Shariatmadari warned, “In these days all the
currents that suggest a secular establishment are the supporters of
this society.”
Ayatollah Abolqasem Khazali, who served on the Guardians
Council, defended the Hojjatieh Society in the 18 May 2004 “Aftab-i
Yazd.” He said that stories of its renewed activism are “completely a
lie.” “I know these people [society members] very well. They are not
working. They would have worked if they had known it was good for
Islam. Therefore it is a complete lie when they say they have become
active again.”
It is difficult to verify if the Hojjatieh Society really has
become more active as an organization or if recent warnings about it
relate to something completely different and this is another case of
governmental scapegoating.
Members of the Hojjatieh Society, according to Radio Farda,
are followers of the Iranian-born but Al-Najaf-based Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani
;dd=11&yy04#top. Such a
claim has not been reported elsewhere, but it is not impossible and
goes some way in explaining official Iranian concern. The Iranian
regime bases much of its legitimacy on its religious credentials and
connection with Qom. The Qom howzeh would fear the transfer of
prominence to the Al-Najaf howzeh. As suggested by an editorial in
the 8 June “Farhang-i Ashti,” Al-Najaf is the “new Islamic Vatican”
and it rivals Qom. Mashhad — birthplace of the Hojjatieh Society —
also rivals Qom, especially because, according to the editorial, it
views Islamic rule with “deep suspicion.” The editorial explains:
“Qom looks to merge religion and politics, while Mashhad thinks of
separating the two.”
A potential link to the Hojjatieh Society is not the only
cause of concern on the part of the Iranian government about
Ayatollah al-Sistani. Like the Hojjatieh Society, al-Sistani does not
advocate Vilayat-i Faqih. The government’s concern about a
religio-political organization that questions the basis of its
theocratic system is therefore understandable. The society’s
anti-Baha’i message may not find much of an audience in modern
Iran, and the right-wing tendencies of prominent members may not jibe
with overall public sentiment. Its opposition to the system, however,
may very well strike a chord with an unhappy public. (Bill Samii)

POLL SUGGESTS IRANIANS NOT INTERESTED IN NEWS. A recent nationwide
poll by the Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA) suggests that the
majority of Iranians do not follow the news very closely. In an ISNA
report on the poll’s results on 8 September, 82 percent of those
surveyed listen to less than one hour of radio daily and 59.9 percent
watch only one hour of television daily, while 12.2 percent watch
less than 30 minutes of satellite television daily and 25.5 percent
watch up to one hour of satellite television a day. Concerning
newspaper readership, 38.8 percent of respondents said that they do
not read newspapers at all, while 24.7 percent read a newspaper for
less than 30 minutes a day. Internet use is also remarkably low, with
81 percent not having any access at all to the Internet and 74
percent not having a computer at home. Of those who do have Internet
access, according to the poll, 42.1 percent use it less than 30
minutes a day. (Bill Samii)

IRAN TO LAUNCH WEATHER SATELLITE. Scientific and Industrial Research
Center chief Mohammad Fathi said on 2 September that Iran will launch
its first satellite by May 2005, Reuters reported, citing Iranian
state television. Fathi said the domestically made Mesbah satellite
would be used for meteorology and geology.
A few days later, an Israeli satellite intended to provide
real-time information on Iran’s missile program crashed just
minutes after its launch. The Israeli Defense Ministry announced on 6
September that the launch of its Ofek-6 satellite failed,
Jerusalem’s Channel 2 television and the website run by “Yediot
Aharonot” () reported. One of its four
directional engines malfunctioned and the rocket and payload crashed
into the Mediterranean Sea. Ofek-6 was intended to replace Ofek-5,
according to “Ha’aretz.” Ofek-5 will function for a few more
years, and an anonymous source close to the project estimates that
another replacement satellite can be put in place in time if the
necessary funds are available. The failure of the Ofek-6 cost
approximately $50 million.
Iranian Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics
Admiral Ali Shamkhani said on 7 September that Iran is willing to
demonstrate its Shihab-3 missile “in the presence of observers,” IRNA
reported. Iran test-fired the missile on 11 August (see “RFE/RL Iran
Report,” 17 August 2004). Shamkhani went on to say that Iran
continuously upgrades its defensive capabilities as part of its
policy of deterrence. “Being powerful does not necessarily mean
war-mongering, neither do the roads of peace lead to concession,”
Shamkhani said (Bill Samii).

SYRIA’S LEBANESE OCCUPATION GETS IRANIAN THUMBS-UP. President
Hojatoleslam Mohammad Khatami telephoned his Lebanese counterpart,
Emile Lahud, on 7 September to congratulate him on the extension of
his presidency for another three years, the Lebanese National News
Agency (LNNA) reported. The previous day, a Hizballah delegation that
included the chief of Hizballah’s Political Council, Al-Sayyid
Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid, Mustafa al-Hajj Ali, Khadir Nur-al-Din,
Hassan Hadraj, Ghalib Abu-Zaynab, Muhammad Salih, Mustafa al-Dirani,
Hassan Izz-al-Din, Mahmud Qamati and Wafiq Safa, visited Lahud to
convey Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah’s congratulations, LNNA
reported.
These sentiments are not universal, as the extension of
Lahud’s six-year presidential term is the result of a
constitutional amendment pushed by Syria. The Lebanese parliament
voted by 96 to 29 for the amendment on 3 September.
Four cabinet members resigned in protest on 7 September, news
agencies reported.
The UN Security Council adopted on 2 September a resolution
that called for free elections in Lebanon “conducted according to
Lebanese constitutional rules devised without foreign interference or
influence;” in other words, calling for an end to Syrian interference
in Lebanese affairs. The UN resolution also calls for the withdrawal
of foreign forces from the country and the disarmament of militias,
in what is seen as a reference to Hizballah. Syria’s ambassador
to the UN, Fayssal Mekdad, retorted, “Syria is not a foreign force in
Lebanon, it is there at the request of the Lebanese government.”
There are 15,000-20,000 Syrian troops in Lebanon. (Bill Samii)

INTELLIGENCE MINISTER DEFENDS LEBANESE HIZBALLAH. While Tehran
continues to deny involvement with international terrorism, observers
in Israel suggest the opposite may be the case.
Iran’s Minister of Intelligence and Security Hojatoleslam
Ali Yunesi reiterated, in a 31 August press conference, the official
Iranian position that Lebanese Hizballah is a liberation movement,
IRNA and ISNA reported. The U.S. State Department classifies
Hizballah as a foreign terrorist organization. Responding to a
question about U.S. claims that Iran supports terrorism, Yunesi said,
“If they mean Iran’s support for Hizballah, they should know that
the Hizballah is a legal group which was created to fight Israel. It
is a defense organization which was established in order to defend
the Lebanese people and land,” ISNA reported. Yunesi added that this
is why many states in the region support Hizballah.
The State Department also asserts that Iran supports the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas, two other groups labeled as
foreign terrorist organizations that are active in Israel. According
to Yunesi, however, “We do not consider the Intifada [uprising] of
the Palestinian people as a terrorist movement,” IRNA reported. “It
is the very right of the Palestinians people to defend themselves and
all Muslim countries support them.”
Hizballah Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qasim appeared to
confirm the importance of Iran to his organization during a late-July
ceremony in the town of Tulin, when he said “We must stand side by
side against the Israeli enemy, because Lebanon’s strength is
part of Syria’s strength, and Iran’s support and
[Hizballah’s] support for Palestine are an honor for us,”
“Al-Mustaqbal” reported on 26 July.
Anonymous sources in the Israeli defense establishment said
that Iranian involvement in terrorism in the occupied territories has
increased, Voice of Israel reported on 1 August. These activities
mostly are run through Hizballah in Lebanon and, according to the
Voice of Israel reporter, “During the past two years Hizballah has
tripled or even quadrupled the scope of its operations in the
territories.”
A commentary in the 27 July issue of “The Jerusalem Post”
stated that the threat to Israel from rockets provided to Hizballah
by Iran and Syria has grown, both in range and quantity. Iran is
supplying an array of rockets by air and sea and overland from Syria,
while both countries are providing logistical support and training as
well.
Israeli Defense Forces intelligence chief Major-General
Aharon Ze’evi-Farkash said on 2 September, “we are dealing with a
threat on the northern front. That also means Hizballah and Iran, as
well as Syria,” “Maariv” reported on 3 September. He continued, “I
call this [threat] a bag of mixed sanctions — economic, political.
and military.”
Israel’s ability to directly target Hizballah is limited,
according to “Yediot Aharonot” on 3 September. “However, Israel can
influence Hizballah by exerting pressure on the organization’s
patrons,” which were identified earlier as Iran and Syria. The
Israel-Palestinian conflict benefits Iran because it diverts the Arab
world’s attention and permits Iranian activism in the Persian
Gulf and Iraq. Because Israel’s ability to influence Iran is
limited, it should target Syria. (Bill Samii)

IRAQIS LOOK AT THEIR EASTERN NEIGHBOR. Interim Iraqi Deputy Prime
Minister Barham Salih, during a visit to Tehran, said on 31 August
that Iran and Iraq agree that the two countries’ political
decision to have good relations should be “converted into a working
plan,” Al-Arabiyah television reported. He added, “Instability in
Iraq will have adverse consequences for the entire region.”
Salih, Interior Minister Falah al-Naqib, and Minister of
State for Provinces Wail Abd al-Latif met with Supreme National
Security Council Secretary Hojatoleslam Hassan Rohani on 30 August,
IRNA reported. Rohani noted that the security of Iran and of Iraq is
linked, and Iraq’s security has a regional impact. Salih
reassured his host, “We will not allow any threat to be posed against
Iran,” and he added that coalition forces would not be allowed to
stay in Iraq any longer than necessary.
The Iraqis met with Interior Minister Abdolvahed Musavi-Lari
on 29 August, IRNA reported the next day. Citing an Interior Ministry
press release, IRNA reported, “The officials of both sides should
notice that the enemies are frightened with [sic] the close ties
between the two neighboring countries and their peaceful
coexistence.” Their discussions reportedly addressed pilgrimage
traffic, the establishment of border markets, trade fairs, investment
in border provinces, and cooperation in counternarcotics.
Salih said afterwards that the discussions in Iran were frank
and cordial, “Al-Shira” reported on 4 September. Allegations of
Iranian involvement in Iraqi unrest continue to trouble the two
countries’ budding relationship. Salih told “Al-Shira,” “We will
not allow the country to turn into an arena for settling accounts
between Iran and the United States, for example.” He added, in what
could be a reassurance to Iran, “We will not allow our country to
turn into a launching pad for strikes at the interests of our
neighbors.” He said coalition forces are in Iraq to help establish
security and stability, and those who want the coalition to leave
must help the Iraqi government maintain security.
Interim Iraqi Vice President Ibrahim al-Ja’fari is said
to have addressed this issue during his late-August trip to Iran. He
was reportedly very forthright in a meeting with an unnamed Supreme
National Security Council official and an unnamed adviser to the
supreme leader, and he criticized Iranian military and security
units’ “blatant interference,” Alireza Nurizadeh writes in the 4
September “Al-Sharq al-Awsat.” Al-Ja’fari added that the charge
d’affaires, Hassan Kazemi-Qomi, is being watched closely by Iraqi
security services, as was Qods Corps officer Khalil Naimi. Shot dead
in Baghdad on 15 April by unknown assailants, Naimi was identified
officially as the cultural and press attache at the Iranian embassy
(see “RFE/RL Iran Report,” 19 April 2004). Al-Ja’fari told the
Iranians that Qomi should avoid doing things that would get him
expelled.
Interim Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi discussed these
allegations on 29 August, Italy’s “Corriere della Sera” reported
on 30 August. He said, “We ask that they respect our sovereignty and
do not interfere in our internal affairs.” Allawi said that although
Iraq is weak now, it has the potential to be rich and strong, so calm
is in everybody’s interest. Addressing the possibility of his
visiting Iran, a subject referred to frequently in the Iranian media,
Allawi said, “If the conditions were there, I myself could soon go to
Tehran.”
Salah al-Shaikhly, the Iraqi ambassador to the United
Kingdom, said on 2 September that Baghdad has good relations with the
governments in Tehran and Riyadh, “Haaretz” reported on 3 September.
Al-Shaikhly made his assertion in response to questions about his
colleagues’ accusations of Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs.
The problem relates to autonomous actors in these countries, he said.
“The problem is that these structures [central governments] do not
have control over the fanatical zealots that send forces across the
border to Iraq,” al-Shaikhly said. He explained that Baghdad has
asked the central governments in Saudi Arabia and Iran to take
action. He said, “We approached the two governments and asked them to
deal with this, as they are better equipped than we are to do so.”
Iraqi Defense Minister Hazim Sha’lan al-Khuza’i said
on 3 September that some of Iraq’s neighbors are fueling unrest
there and, when pressed, he said, “Yes, it is Iran. I have said it
before…. and I say Iran, Iran, Iran,” AP reported. He said Iran is
promoting violence in his country as a way to “settle its scores”
with the United States, AP reported. (Bill Samii)

AL-SADR’S IRANIAN CONNECTION QUESTIONED. Two recent reports
suggest that some of the Iranian support for Iraqi cleric Muqtada
al-Sadr may be drying up.
Ansar al-Sunnah leader Abu Abdallah al-Hassan bin Mahmud
criticized Iran in an interview published in the 21-27 August issue
of the Beirut political weekly “Al-Muharrir” (for a description of
the Ansar al-Sunnah Army, see “RFE/RL Iraq Report,” 4 June 2004). He
said bombings that target Iraqi citizens are carried out by
organizations representing Iran, because the Persians bear a grudge
dating from the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. Abu al-Hassan accused the
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, al-Da’wah
al-Islamiya, and the Islamic Action Organization of being Iranian
products. Abu al-Hassan claimed that Iranian intelligence operatives
killed Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)
leader Muhammad Baqer al-Hakim because he turned against his Iranian
patrons by promoting a democratic federal Iraq rather than a
Shi’a theocracy.
The Iranians, furthermore, want the “fatwa headquarters”
transferred from Al-Najaf to Qom, Abu al-Hassan said. Iran’s
objective in Iraq is to spread Shi’a Islam, create an Islamic
government, have the Shi’a rule the country, buy land, and
“obliterate the Iraqi identity.” He added that Iran wants to control
the shrines, introduce prostitution networks, sell drugs, and create
sectarian strife.
Abu al-Hassan added, in his interview in “Al-Muharrir,” that
his organization works with Muqtada al-Sadr’s Imam Al-Mahdi Army.
This cooperation is based on a note from al-Sadr’s father,
Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr, that said if he is martyred his sons should
“follow the fatwas of Al-Sayyid [Kazem] al-Haeri and Sheikh Dr. Ahmad
al-Kubaisi. You must unite with the Sunnis.” Subsequently, the Ansar
al-Sunnah and the Imam Al-Mahdi Army exchanged personnel. “Therefore,
the relationship can be described as intimate,” Abu al-Hassan said.
Al-Haeri is an Iraqi cleric based in Qom who issued a fatwa
in April 2003 declaring that al-Sadr is his deputy in Iraq (see
“RFE/RL Iran Report,” 28 April 2003).
Since then, the 68-year-old al-Haeri has renounced his
relationship with al-Sadr. “Mr. al-Sadr used to be our
representative…but that was on condition of obedience to and
coordination with our office in Al-Najaf,” al-Haeri said in comments
posted on his website, AP reported on 5 September. Al-Sadr “does not
coordinate with our office, so his agency became void,” according to
the website, which added that al-Sadr “does not seek our advice in
his stances, so we cannot endorse what he does.” According to a 5
September report in “The New York Times,” al-Haeri withdrew his
support for al-Sadr after Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani informed senior
clerics in Qom that the Imam al-Mahdi Army caused some of the battle
damage at the Imam Ali shrine in Al-Najaf. (Bill Samii)

RUMSFELD SAYS IRAN ‘NOT PART OF THE CIVILIZED WORLD.’ “Iran
is a country that is not part of the civilized world in terms of its
behavior,” U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said in a 7
September interview that was published in “The Washington Times” one
day later. Rumsfeld was discussing the provision of money and
personnel from Iran to the continuing insurgency in Iraq, although he
conceded that it is not clear who in Iran is behind this. Rumsfeld
said, “By ‘they,’ I’m not going to say which element of
the government or whether it’s even known to the government.” He
continued, “But money has come in from Iran. People have come in from
Iran. And it’s a very difficult thing to stop.” Rumsfeld also
criticized the international community’s lax approach towards
Iran. He said, “And when you have countries of the world that are not
willing to participate in an organized effort to try to persuade a
country to behave in a civilized way, it encourages them simply to
continue on its merry way.” (Bill Samii)

KHATAMI SIGNS SEVEN AGREEMENTS IN ARMENIA… President Hojatoleslam
Mohammad Khatami arrived in Yerevan on 8 September for a two-day
visit, news agencies reported. Khatami was accompanied by Foreign
Minister Kamal Kharrazi, Energy Minister Habibullah Bitaraf, Economic
Affairs and Finance Minister Safdar Husseini, and Commerce Minister
Mohammad Shariatmadari. The two sides signed agreements on bilateral
cooperation, and on cooperation in the energy, culture, and customs
fields, Armenian public television and Arminfo reported.
The energy agreements include one on financing a gas pipeline
from Megri to Kadzharan in southern Armenia, and another on
construction of the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline. The formal agreement
on the pipeline was signed in May (see “RFE/RL Newsline,” 14 May
2004), and Armenia’s ambassador to Tehran, Gegham Gharibjanian,
told RFE/RL in early September that work on the Iranian section of
the pipeline is already underway. Work on the Armenia section will
begin by the end of October, Gharibjanian told Interfax on 9
September.
Khatami and his Armenian counterpart, Robert Kocharian,
issued a joint statement emphasizing their belief that the
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute should be settled peacefully and that they
had agreed on counterterrorism and counternarcotics issues. Khatami
visited the Blue Mosque in Yerevan and addressed the Armenian
legislature.
During a 9 September meeting with students and staff at
Yerevan State University, Khatami dismissed the possibility of his
country’s East Azerbaijan Province merging with the Republic of
Azerbaijan, Mediamax reported. Khatami said that Iranian-Azeris are
active in Iranian economic and political affairs, as well as culture
and science. Irredentist groups in Azerbaijan cite suppression of
co-ethnics in Iran and call for unification.
On the same day, Khatami met with Iranians who live in
Armenia, IRNA reported. Khatami noted Armenians’ ability to
protect their ethnic identity through 70 years of Soviet rule and
added that ethnic Armenians are active in many aspects of Iranian
life. (Bill Samii)

…AND HEADS TO BELARUS. President Alyaksandr Lukashenka of Belarus
officially greeted President Mohammad Khatami on 10 September, IRNA
reported. Khatami arrived in Minsk on 9 September. On the same day,
he told Iranians living in Belarus that trade is an important means
of communication, adding that trade exhibitions can strengthen
Iran-Belarus bilateral ties, IRNA reported.
Iranian Ambassador to Minsk Mohammad Musa Hashemi-Golpayegani
said on 9 September that the two sides signed agreements on
agriculture, trade, bilateral relations, culture, sports, and
customs, ITAR-TASS and Interfax reported. Khatami is scheduled to
leave for Dushanbe on 11 September. (Bill Samii)

SOME IRANIAN OFFICIALS QUESTION VALUE OF NUCLEAR AGREEMENTS. While
top Iranian officials voice Tehran’s support for and commitment
to the country’s nuclear-treaty obligations, they also stress the
related advantage of a dialogue with Europe. There are, however,
occasional voices of dissent.
Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Assefi said on 5
September that Iran remains committed to its suspension of uranium
enrichment, IRNA reported. The Europeans should understand that
manufacturing parts for use in uranium enrichment centrifuges is a
completely different matter, he said.
Iranian government spokesman Abdullah Ramezanzadeh said on 6
September that Tehran is committed to discussing its nuclear program
with the EU, Radio Farda reported. Ramezanzadeh said Iran expects the
Europeans to fulfill commitments they made when the British, French,
and German foreign ministers visited Tehran in October 2003 (see
“RFE/RL Iran Report,” 27 October 2003; for the full text of the
agreement, see

2003.shtml). Ramezanzadeh said Iran is committed to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty’s Additional Protocol, and it expects
other countries to fulfill their commitments. The International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors is scheduled to meet
on 13 September, and the most recent IAEA report indicates that
Iranian cooperation with the agency has improved (see “RFE/RL Iran
Report,” 6 September 2004).
Supreme National Security Council Secretary Hojatoleslam
Hassan Rohani discussed the nuclear issue and bilateral trade matters
with Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende and Foreign Minister
Bernard Bot on 6 September, Radio Farda reported. The Netherlands
currently holds the EU’s rotating presidency. Rohani told Iranian
state television afterwards that the two sides discussed 10 topics,
including Iran-EU relations and the nuclear program. Rohani stressed
that Iran will not forsake its right to pursue peaceful nuclear
activities, and he emphasized that questions on this subject can be
resolved through dialogue. Rohani added that Iran expects the
Europeans to fulfill their October 2003 commitments (see above), IRNA
reported.
Some Iranian officials, on the other hand, question the
benefit of Iran’s stated commitment to the NPT and the additional
protocol. Dr. Rezai, identified by ISNA as an “international affairs
expert at our country’s Atomic Energy Organization,” said on 6
September that any obligations imposed by the NPT and the additional
protocol limit state sovereignty. For that reason, Rezai continued,
“we cannot, generally speaking, argue that our country will derive
any benefits from accepting international treaties such as the NPT or
the protocol.”
Iran’s difficulties with the IAEA, Rezai continued, are
political rather than technical or scientific. For that reason, he
said, Iranian officials must find a political solution to the
problem. Rezai went on to say that some Iranians believe the country
should adhere to its revolutionary principles in addressing the
issue, but “a rather expansive definition of our foreign policy
principles” has “limited the freedom of action of our country’s
diplomats.”
Tehran parliamentary representative Elham Aminzadeh and
Islamabad-i Gharb representative Heshmatollah Falahat-Pisheh said in
the 5 September “Kayhan” that Iran cannot be forced to sign an
agreement. Rashid Jalali from Karaj and Hussein Nejabat from Tehran
said the legislature would approve accession to the additional
protocol if doing so does not undermine Iran’s national
interests. Nejabat added, “If joining the additional protocol is to
be accompanied with international pressure and force and if our
interests are ignored and if it is used as a lever of pressure to
keep us away from our real interests, there is no reason why we
should approve it.” (Bill Samii)

ISRAEL CALLS FOR PRESSURE ON IRAN. Radio Farda reports that Israeli
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon said in a 7 September interview with “The
Jerusalem Post” that the international community’s efforts to
keep nuclear weapons out of Iranian hands are inadequate. It is not
too late to stop Iran, he said, but the issue should be referred to
the United Nations Security Council.
“There is no doubt” that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons
capability, Sharon said. “That is their intention, and they are doing
it by deception and subterfuge, using this cover or that. This is
completely clear.” Sharon said the danger is that Israel can be
reached by Iran’s 1,300-kilometer range Shihab-3 missile, and
Iran is working on another missile with a 2,500-kilometer range.
(Bill Samii)

SKEPTICAL REACTION TO TEHRAN’S NEW NUCLEAR PROMISES. During talks
in Vienna with International Atomic Energy Agency director-general
Muhammad el-Baradei, Iranian Supreme National Security Council
Secretary Hojatoleslam Hassan Rohani pledged to suspend all uranium
enrichment activities, the “Financial Times” reported on 8 September.
This pledge includes a freeze on producing, testing, and assembling
uranium enrichment centrifuges.
Iran first pledged to suspend enrichment activities in
October 2003 but, according to the most recent IAEA report, had
intended to convert 37 tons of nearly raw uranium (yellowcake) into
uranium hexafluoride, which can be enriched in centrifuges (see
“RFE/RL Iran Report,” 27 October 2003 and 6 September 2004). The
latest Iranian offer is reportedly dependent on the Europeans’
commitment to an earlier pledge of an economic payoff for Iran. An
anonymous “European diplomat,” however, told the “Financial Times”
that Europe wants Tehran to extend its pledge to include suspension
of the preparation of materials that could be enriched in
centrifuges.
U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher seemed to be
skeptical about Iran’s offer to the IAEA, according to a
transcript of the State Department’s Daily Press Briefing for 7
September (). Boucher
told the press, “You don’t have to look back too far to find
Iranian officials saying that they were going to suspend production
of centrifuge and use of centrifuges, and then to find them saying
that no, they were going to go ahead anyway.”
Boucher went on to connect the Iranian actions with the IAEA
meeting planned for 13 September. He said, “One might conclude that
some of these cycles (of unfulfilled promises) have to do with the
imminence of IAEA board meetings — that we hear that they’re
going to do this, that, or the other before a board meeting and then,
somewhat afterwards, not necessarily too long, we find out that they
either did not or would not or will not do those things.”
Bush administration officials said on 8 September that some
of its allies are resisting the U.S. campaign to get Iran to abandon
its nuclear weapons pursuits, “The New York Times” reported on 9
September. The White House has tried to have the matter referred to
the Security Council five times already, U.S. Undersecretary of State
for Arms Control John Bolton said, and it will try again at the 13
September IAEA meeting.
Europe seems increasingly frustrated with Iran, but it is
willing to keep waiting. An anonymous British official said on 8
September that France, Germany, and the United Kingdom decided during
a meeting in the Netherlands that Iran must suspend all its
nuclear-weapon related activities by November or face sanctions, “The
Guardian” reported on 9 September. The official said, “Iran needs to
meet its commitments. We would like it to meet its commitments before
then, but if it doesn’t, Iran needs to know and it needs to know
now, that there is going to be a decision point in November and at
that point a very serious option…is referral to the United Nations
Security Council.” The official added that negotiations with Iran
cannot go on “forever.” (Bill Samii)

*********************************************************
Copyright (c) 2004. RFE/RL, Inc. All rights reserved.

The “RFE/RL Iran Report” is a weekly prepared by A. William Samii on
the basis of materials from RFE/RL broadcast services, RFE/RL
Newsline, and other news services. It is distributed every Monday.

Direct comments to A. William Samii at samiia@rferl.org.
For information on reprints, see:

Back issues are online at