Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press
September 29, 2004
SOCHI COMPACT. — Russia Casts Its Vote for President of Abkhazia.
Kommersant, Aug. 31, 2004, p. 9. Condensed text of first and complete
text of second of two items:
(By Alla Barakhova in Sochi and Vladimir Novikov in Tbilisi). —
Moscow has made its choice for the presidential election in Abkhazia,
set for Oct. 3. On Sunday evening [Aug. 29], . . . Russian President
Vladimir Putin, who was vacationing in Sochi, met with Abkhaz Prime
Minister and presidential candidate Raul Khadzhimba. In Tbilisi,
officials saw the meeting as indicating that, for all practical
purposes, Moscow has recognized Abkhazia’s independence.
Mr. Putin’s visit to Sochi’s Dagomys Hotel, which is about a
30-minute drive from Bocharov Ruchei, the president’s Sochi
residence, was portrayed as an impromptu occurrence. The head of
state was accompanied by just a few bodyguards and a small group of
reporters. . . .
Vladimir Putin . . . sequestered himself with Raul Khadzhimba in
the Panorama Cafe, on the Dagomys Hotel’s 22nd floor.
Members of the Kremlin administration have declined to comment on
what the Russian president and Abkhaz premier discussed at the
meeting. According to the official account, the parties discussed
“matters relating to cooperation between Russian and Abkhaz veterans’
organizations.” Unofficially, however, Kremlin spokesmen have
acknowledged that the meeting was directly connected to recent
developments in Georgia. It may be recalled that, one week ago,
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili said in an interview in the
French newspaper Liberation that Georgia was “on the brink of war
with Russia.” At the same time, mass protests were being held in
Georgia in front of the Russian Embassy in Tbilisi. The Russian
leadership was particularly outraged by slogans that were projected
onto the building and that read, “Putin is a liar” and “The
double-headed eagle is a two-faced birdie.” In connection with these
actions, the Russian Foreign Ministry sent a protest note to the
Georgian leadership, and the Russian Embassy in Tbilisi was even
forced to suspend its operations for a time. . . .
A source in the Kremlin administration told Kommersant that the
meeting between Putin and the Abkhaz prime minister at the Dagomys
should serve as a “lesson in peaceableness” to the Georgian
president. The source added, “If we wanted to destroy Georgia, all we
would have to do is switch off the gas. End of story.”
Messrs. Putin and Khadzhimba left the Dagomys together around 8
p.m., to the sound of applause from vacationers [who had gathered in
front of the hotel]. . . . Kremlin officials conceded later that that
“lesson” might not find much favor with Mikhail Saakashvili, who has
repeatedly voiced his intention to reassert Georgian control over
Abkhazia. According to the Kremlin, however, technically he has no
grounds for complaint, since no political statements were made at the
meeting.
In Tbilisi, reports of the Sochi meeting between Putin and
Khadzhimba set off shock waves. Members of the Georgian Parliament
whom a Kommersant correspondent asked for comment were bewildered,
and even said initially that the reports were disinformation, “since
Vladimir Putin could not possibly have taken such a step.” Officials
at the Georgian Foreign Ministry told Kommersant they were studying
reports of the meeting between the Russian president and the Abkhaz
prime minister, and that an official response might come later. . . .
In the absence of Georgia’s president [who was away in Athens], the
chairwoman of the Georgian Parliament, Nino Burdzhanadze, commented
on the meeting between Putin and Khadzhimba. After expressing
puzzlement at the very fact the meeting took place, she posed a
question: Does this mean that Russia recognizes Abkhazia’s
independence and the legitimacy of a presidential election that will
be held “in the absence of two-thirds of Abkhazia’s population?”
[Burdzhanadze was alluding to the Georgian refugees who fled during
the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict in 1992-1993. — Trans.] She promptly
answered her own question: Russia would find itself the only country
in the world taking the Abkhaz election seriously. “Along, perhaps,
with Belarus,” Ms. Burdzhanadze added, correcting herself.
Our sources in Tbilisi confirm that during the Putin-Khadzhimba
meeting, one of the matters discussed was that of reestablishing rail
links. As long ago as last year, Putin and [former Georgian
President] Eduard Shevardnadze agreed on the need to open a
through-traffic rail line from Russia through Abkhazia and on to
Tbilisi and Armenia, but the Georgian side linked the issue to a
return of Georgian refugees to Abkhazia’s Gali District, which was
inhabited almost exclusively by Georgians prior to the war. Tbilisi
and Sukhumi have deep disagreements over this matter. And that is why
no decision on restoring full-scale rail connections has been reached
as yet. Nevertheless, all indications are that a Sukhumi-Moscow route
will start operating at full capacity in the near future, first for
freight trains and later for passenger service.
Overall, the meeting between the Russian president and the Abkhaz
prime minister indicates that the Kremlin has cast its lot with Mr.
Khadzhimba in the upcoming presidential election in the unrecognized
republic. The Abkhaz prime minister is supported not only by the
“party of power,” but also by the republic’s incumbent leader,
Vladislav Ardzinba, who will not be running in the election. Mr.
Ardzinba is seriously ill and is quitting the political arena,
although he remains a very respected figure in Abkhazia, since he
symbolizes Sukhumi’s victory in the Georgian-Abkhaz war of 1992-1993
and Abkhazia’s secession from Georgia. The Abkhaz leader’s top aides
believe that Raul Khadzhimba will continue Mr. Ardzinba’s policies.
As does Moscow, apparently.
* * *
What’s at Stake. (By commentator Gennady Sysoyev). — Russian
President Vladimir Putin’s meeting with the prime minister of
Abkhazia, a candidate for president of that unrecognized republic,
had nothing to do, of course, with discussion of the social welfare
of Great Patriotic War veterans, as the official protocol reads. The
meeting was immediately taken as a sign of Moscow’s direct support
for Mr. Khadzhimba’s candidacy in the coming election. Abkhazia is a
tiny republic, so the news that its premier had met with the
president of Russia would presumably spread to the whole population
in minutes, and everyone would know which candidate to support on
Oct. 3.
This is all undoubtedly true. But the real import of the meeting at
the Dagomys Hotel lies much deeper. By arranging the meeting, Moscow
clearly indicated that it views Abkhazia as, at the very least, a
zone in which it has special interests. And there are a great many
reasons for this.
Abkhazia is traversed by a road that connects Russia with Armenia,
Moscow’s chief ally in the Transcaucasus. Not far from the Abkhaz
city of Gudauta is a strategically important air base that
specialists describe as unique: Takeoffs of military aircraft from
this base are virtually undetectable by NATO radar installations in
Turkey. In addition, the Russian president’s southern residence,
Krasnaya Polyana, is situated on the Psou River within 10 kilometers
or so of the unrecognized republic’s border, and Abkhaz leaders
regularly remind Moscow that the moment Georgia regains political
power in Sukhumi, a NATO observation and listening post will go up in
that same area along the banks of the Psou. Finally, Moscow has
financial motives for keeping Abkhazia within its zone of influence
as well: Over the past few years, Russia has acquired a considerable
amount of real estate in the unrecognized republic, and the drumbeat
of statements from Georgian politicians about reviewing privatization
outcomes in Abkhazia once Tbilisi reestablishes its rule there is
compelling Moscow to do everything it can to prevent Tbilisi from
doing so.
But that’s still not all. Moscow would like to preserve its
influence with Georgia, since in view of its strategic partnership
with Armenia, this would give it control over the Transcaucasus as a
whole. And retaining its influence in Tbilisi is something Moscow
expects to do primarily through preserving its control over Abkhazia.
Formally, Moscow is unlikely to question the territorial integrity
of Georgia, which officially includes Abkhazia. And so Abkhazia is
unlikely to become part of the Russian Federation. But there is no
need for it to do so. From Moscow’s point of view, it is sufficient
that virtually all the residents of Abkhazia hold Russian
citizenship. This, Moscow considers, gives it the right — at the
very least — to keep Abkhazia under its special care.
Georgia could, of course, take umbrage at this and resume drawing
parallels between Abkhazia and Chechnya. It might ask, as Georgian
Defense Minister Georgy Baramidze did, why it is that when Russia
defends its borders, it’s entirely within its rights, but when
Georgia tries to do the same, it’s engaging in aggression. To all
such objections, it would appear that Moscow has a ready answer:
There are no Georgian citizens in Chechnya, and the Abkhaz aren’t
blowing up Georgian airliners.