How to free hostages: war, negotiation, or law-enforcement?
Mary Kaldor
=3D2&articleId=3D2127#
29 – 9 – 2004
The seizure, and sometimes killing, of civilian hostages is not random
violence but part of a deliberate strategy that is changing the
relationship between war and politics. Mary Kaldor asks: how should
citizens, and their governments, respond?
The eruption of hostage-taking onto the agenda of international
politics and the lives of ordinary citizens worldwide – both those
directly affected and those consuming the phenomenon via the media
spectacle – is not itself new.
But while past incidents like the 444-day United States embassy crisis
in Iran from 1979-80 and the seizure of westerners in Lebanon in the
_1980s_
()
could beunderstood as particular outgrowths of defined security
crises, hostage-taking in the era of `war on terror’ has acquired new
and more disturbing aspects that reflect the changing relationship
between war and politics.
Chechnya and Iraq reveal this new reality at its most brutal. The
siege at Beslan, _North Ossetia_
() was only
the latest in a tragic series (_Budyonnovsk 1995_
() , Moscow 2002), while
the proliferating kidnappings of foreign personnel (journalists, aid
workers, contract employees) in Iraq suggest a pattern of behaviour
that reflects not just the agency of individual radical groups but a
deeper political and even moral disorder in which all those who
witness it are at some level implicated.
To understand what is happening, and how we – citizens, governments,
families, NGOs, media observers – can best respond to
hostageâ=80`taking requires an assessment both of the difference
between `old’ and â=80=9Cnew’ wars and of the main existing strategies
used by states in the light of `best practice’ in the field.
A rose in the black garden I remember visiting Baku, Azerbaijan, as
part of a Helsinki Citizens Assembly delegation, in the middle of its
war with Armenia over the statusof the disputed territory of
_Nagorno-Karabakh_
() in 1992. A
Russian builder approached us and asked if we could help find his son
who had been taken hostage in Armenia. We travelled with him to the
border and spoke to the local authorities. They told us that the
builder’s son had been taken hostage by a family in Armenia, who
refused to release him until their own son – who had been taken
hostage in Azerbaijan – was released; indeed they described a long
chain of hostage-taking.
They suggested we talk to a former KGB agent on the other, Armenian
side of the border. We negotiated a temporary ceasefire so we could
cross the border; our Armenian and Azeri interlocutors knew each other
well from before the war and seemed bewildered by what was
happening. When we arrived on the other side we were greeted by the
KGB agent, wearing military fatigues and Rayban sunglasses with a
silver cross round his neck. We exchanged the names of the missing
young men.
This particular story had a happy ending. The Helsinki Citizens
Assembly _committees_ () in both
Azerbaijan and Armenia were able to use the information we had
collected to put pressure on the authorities on both sides; on 12 May
1994, hundreds of hostages were released in the border _area_
() where we had crossed.
But in other wars, the hostages are not lucky. At best, they are
ransomed for money, weapons or even dead bodies. But they are also
dragooned into fighting, raped or mutilated, kept in captivity for
years, or are killed in often macabre ways.
A third way of warâ=80¦ Contemporary wars are quite _different_
() both from the
classic wars of the past where soldiers fought against
fellow-soldiers, and even from the more recent `small wars’ where the
adversaries are at least recognisable combatants, like guerrillas or
paramilitary units. In this new form of warfare, battles are rare,
most violence is inflicted against civilians, and the distinction
between war itself, organised crime, and violations of human rights is
increasingly blurred.
These wars are transforming the relationship between politics and
violence: rather than politics being pursued through violent means,
violence becomes politics. It is not conflict that leads to war but
war itself that creates conflict. The insurgent or terrorist
combatants try to establish political control by killing or
intimidating those who are `differentâ=80=9D – politically,
ethnically, religiously. This generates fear and hatred among all the
social groups involved.
Population displacement, mass rape, the destruction of historic
buildings and symbols, are not side-effects of war – they are part of
a deliberate strategy. Actions of spectacular violence – beheading,
the chopping off of limbs, the destruction of 16th century mosques (as
in Banja Luka, _Bosnia_
() )
or of Buddhist statues (as in Bamiyan, _Afghanistan_
( esearch/bamiyan/buddha/statue.html)
)- are designed to highlight and give reality to the idea of holy war,
an epic struggle between good and evil.
These wars are usually fought in what have become known as `failing’
or ` failed’ _states_
() .
In the absence of tax revenue or state sponsors from abroad, finance
for these wars is raised through violence – looting, pillage,
â=80=9Ctaxation’ at checkpoints, illegal trading. Many commentators
argue that this abnormal political economy becomes a self-sustaining
system and a motive for continued violence.
Chechnya and Iraq offer current examples of how in practice, politics
and economics become blurred in these _new wars_
() . In Chechnya,
Russian generals buy oil drilled by Chechen warlords from backyard oil
wells, and sell their own higher-quality oil for a profit on the open
market. In Iraq (as in former Yugoslavia) hundreds of criminals
released from prison use the cover of war to continue criminal
activities which they can now justify in political terms.
At the same time, political militants, former regime officials or
religious fanatics, become involved in crime to finance their
activities. Failed states are often former authoritarian states, where
the shadowy activities of former political leaders and officials have
come to the light, but withouta political transition that allows the
society as a whole to establish security and come to terms with past
violations.
Hostage-taking is a typical expression of this blurring of the
political and economic. Much of it is undertaken for profit. Many
family members of the Iraqi elite have been taken hostage for
ransom. The Italian government reportedly paid $1 million for the
freeing of two Italian aid _workers_
() , Simona
Parretta andSimona Pari.
Sometimes hostage-taking is motivated by political instrumentality- to
get prisoners or other hostages freed. In the case of the French
_journalists_
() , Georges
Malbrunot and Christian Chesnot, it seems that the goal was better
media coverage for the insurgency. The status of the journalists has
reportedly been changed- in an echo of the experience of Jo Wilding in
Fallujah in April _2004_
() –
fromhostages to ` embedded reporters’ with the insurgency.
In other cases, hostage-taking is part of a wider strategy involving
spectacular violence that captures the attention of the media as well
as terrifying the local population. The killing of Wall Street Journal
reporter _Daniel Pearl_
()
in Pakistan, the mutilation of children in _Liberia_
( iew.jsp?id=3D1685) and Sierra
Leone, or the bizarre atrocities of the Lords Resistance Army in
_Uganda_ (;l=3D1)
seems expressly designed to invest shockingly horrific violence with a
non-human and therefore religious significance.
At the time of writing, it appears that the case of the British civil
engineer, Ken Bigley, belongs to the latter category. The head of the
group (Tawhid & Jahid) holding him, _Abu Musab al-Zarqawi_
() , is a religious
fanatic in the Osama bin Laden mould (indeed, one interpretation of
his actions is that he may be trying not simply to emulate but to
`succeed’ the al-Qaida _leader_
(,12239,1313021,00.html)
). He employs Qur’anic terms like ` raids’ or `plunder’ that
deliberately seek to place his actions in the context of a history of
jihad. Beheading – inflicted on Bigleyâ=80=99s two _American
colleagues_
()
, Eugene Armstrong and Jack Hensley – is propagated as the ritualised
slaughter that early Islamic warriors inflicted on infidels.
â=80¦needs a third strategy in response Hostage-taking, as well as
being the subject of a United Nations _convention_
() ,
is an international crime – something different from both war and
politics. In response, neither military pressure nor political
negotiations are appropriate tactics. Britain’s prime minister, Tony
Blair, is _using_ () the
hostage crisis to claim that everyone has to choose the side of
democracy against terrorism. The more shocking the behaviour of
al-Zarqawi and his cohorts, the more he can put on his concerned face
and explain why a the terrorist challenge demands a forceful reaction.
But this is exactly what _al-Zarqawi_
()
wants. He wants a war of the west against Islam, in which there is no
space for democrats who are critical of the west and no space for
Muslims who are horrified by violence, hostage- killing and
suicide-bombing. He may indeed hope that the Americanswill bomb
suspected places where he might be hiding and that many people will be
killed as ` collateral damage’.
But if polarising rhetoric from western leaders like Tony Blair plays
into the hostage-takers’ hands, nor should there be any political
negotiations.
Contacts with groups who can act as intermediaries (like the Council
of Muslim Clerics in Iraq) may be part of a necessary attempt to save
lives, but those who argue that conceding the hostage-takers’ demands
wouldstrengthen and legitimise the kidnappers are right.
What is needed is a third approach beyond militarism and concession:
one based on law-enforcement. Rather than defeat the hostage-takers in
war or negotiate with them, the police must make systematic efforts to
uncover their hideaways and arrest them. This approach requires a
political and moral strategy aimed not so much at the kidnappers
themselves but at the local population, especially those living in the
immediate neighbourhood where they operate.
The aim should be twofold: to deny the hostage-takers local support,
and to create a situation where local people both believe it is right
to give information to the authorities and feel safe in doing so.
This was the strategy of the Helsinki Citizens Assembly committees in
the south Caucasus during the Armenia-Azerbaijan war of the early
_1990s_ ()
. They tried to engender a political and moral atmosphere where
hostage-taking became less acceptable because local people themselves
refused to allow their local area to become a favourable environment
for hostage-taking.
This experience suggests that the approach adopted by Ken
Bigley’sfamily is probably the best in the circumstances: inviting
spokesmen of the Muslim _Council of Britain_
() to visit
Iraq, talk to local dignitiaries, and leaflet the area where he is
being held. But more needs to be done. The United States-led
coalition’s continued bombardment of urban areas and maltreatment of
Iraqi prisoners- both involving terrible suffering by innocent
civilians – make Iraqis less likely to condemn hostage-taking. The
kidnappers themselves make gleeful useof the argument that the west
itself holds `hostages’ in _Guantánamo_
() and _Abu
Ghraib_ ( ) .
Although _Ken Bigley_
( 3D10000087&sid=3Dax2Pbf7Aqusg&refer=3Dtop_ world_news)
may well be alive, it may prove impossible to save him; al-Zarqawi is
a fanatic who probably wants to prolong the media attention for as
long as possible. But the approach adopted to try to free him is the
best way to deal with the hostage phenomenon in general â=80` one that
combines police primacy in arresting criminals with a strategy aimed
at gaining the confidence and support of local Iraqi
people. Unfortunately, what Blair defines as a second conflict in Iraq
– understood as one between the forces of good (coalition troops and
the puppet Iraqi government of Iyad Allawi) and evil (Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi and his accomplices) – is just what the hostage-takers want
to legitimise their criminal activities.
_Mary Kaldor_
(;articleId=3D2127#) 2004. Published by openDemocracy Ltd