“Double Standards” Line Towards Russia Harmful
by Jaba Devdariani
Civil Georgia, Georgia
Oct 11 2004
On October 7, when discussing the Russo-Georgian relations at PACE,
the Georgian delegation has pushed its usual trump-card – that
Russia is using “double standards” when dealing with separatism
and terrorism. While easy to grasp at first, the “double standards”
line obscures the key question: what kind of policy Russia should,
in Georgia’s opinion, pursue. More than that – the intuitive response
suggested by repeated use of the “double standards” line is very
wrong and harmful for Georgia’s interests in Europe.
This concept widely referred to in Georgia as a line of “double
standards” has long been arming the Georgian politicians in various
skirmishes against Russia. It dates back to the Abkhazia conflict
and then President Eduard Shevardnadze’s concept of “two Russias”
– one democratic, willing to support Georgian independence, and one
totalitarian, neo-imperialist, arming and backing the secessionist
movements. The concept became so entrenched in the vocabulary and
thinking of the Georgian politicians that they accept and repeat it
almost automatically. But maybe the new Georgian authorities need to
take a closer look.
The key element of the “double standards” policy was aptly put
by Chairperson Nino Burjanadze at the Parliamentary Assembly,
“one can not suppress separatism in Grozny [capital of Chechnya]
and support it [separatism] a few kilometres away in Georgia.” Simply
put, Russia is acting inconsistently – punishing own secessionists,
whilst helping them in Georgia. The conclusion seems evident – Russia
is bullying Georgia for trying to unite own country, but clings to
its own territorial integrity. Supposedly, what Georgia wants to say,
is that it also has the right to territorial integrity.
But let’s take the analysis one step deeper. If Georgia says Russia
applying “double standards” is bad, then, logically, it should be
applying a “single standard” out of the present two. Hence, either
support secessionism in Chechnya (an impossibility) or doing the same
in Abkhazia/South Ossetia as in Chechnya. What has been the Russian
“standard” in Chechnya? Chronic disregard to the human life, systematic
abuse of human rights, levelling of the towns and heavy-handed handling
of the civilian population, as well as the election farce to appoint
puppet presidents. Russia got slammed for this very “standard” at
the Council of Europe. Does Georgian delegation claim the right to
the same treatment of its own secessionist provinces?
The Russian delegation sees this logical inconsistency. Russian MP
Konstantin Kosachev, opposite number to the Georgian spokesperson
said “we fear that by pushing this debate on the agenda, Georgia
prepares public opinion on the eve of [Georgia’s] attempts to repeat
measures similar to those that were undertaken this summer – attempts
to forcefully resolve the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts.”
The trouble is, the European MPs may start to see the picture the same
way, unless Georgia modifies and qualifies, its “double standards”
line or abandons it altogether.
The European MPs, apart from those intimately involved in Russian
affairs, do not know much about relations between Russia and Georgia.
The European mindset is very clear when it comes to use of force – it
is not tolerated under any pretext. This is echoed by the sociological
research: most US citizens think the country may use force to solve
the disputes if necessary, while most of the Europeans reject the idea.
So, if the Georgian policy was to become clearer and more honest,
the issues of Chechnya and Abkhazia/South Ossetia should once and
forever be divorced.
In an effort to pacify Russia, Georgia has muted criticism of the
Chechen policy. This may be in country’s pragmatic interest. But
the European position of the Georgian delegation should by no means
be interpreted as acquiescing with the human rights violations in
Chechnya.
Russia is wrong in its actions in Georgia’s rebel provinces because
this violates the principle of territorial integrity of Georgia
and supports rebels. There is no “double standard.” In fact,
Russia’s policy is rather consistent in supporting secessionism
in Transdniestria, in Nagorno Karabakh, in South Ossetia and in
Abkhazia. Only in Tajikistan Russia helped to root out an Islamic
movement, which was imported from Afghanistan.
True, Russia’s internal policies toward secessionism are not consistent
with its external ones. But this is a fact of life: the countries
are in habit of differentiating internal policies from external ones
on number of issues. Russia has the sovereign right to set Chechnya
policy, just as much as Georgia has the right to set the policy
towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
What Georgian politicians have to make clear is that Georgia fully
endorses the European principles of conflict settlement and vows to
affirm the principles of Human Rights in its conflict-settlement
efforts. At the same time Georgia should be against violation of
these European principles by Russia in Chechnya or elsewhere, if only
because they represent an immediate security threat to Georgia.
There should be a single standard Georgia advocates for: affirming
the territorial integrity of the states, and affirming the human
rights for each person within these states.
Jaba Devdariani is one of the founders of Civil Georgia, currently
serving as contributing editor.