Site says police, army may remain mainly neutral in Ukrainian election

Glavred, Kiev
16 Nov 04

It is by no means certain that the army, security service and police
force, (referred to collectively as the “armed services”) will actually
carry out the orders reportedly given to them to do everything
possible to secure the victory of the establishment candidate in
Sunday’s presidential election, a Ukrainian web site has said. It
said some senior officers want Yanukovych to win, while others are
not very concerned as they will be dismissed anyway. This indifference
extends downwards, resulting at best in a patchy response to partisan
orders, it said. The net result may be that the armed services will
prove to be largely neutral, it concluded. The following is the text
of the article by Viktor Shlynchak posted on the opposition-leaning
Ukrainian web site Glavred on 16 November under the title “Powerless?”;
subheadings have been inserted editorially:

The situation in the Ukrainian armed forces, the SBU Security
Service of Ukraine and the Interior Ministry shows that today the
lower subdivisions of the armed-service departments are minded to
“wait and see which way the wind blows” and to refrain from taking
radical action against the opposition – until the terrain has been
finally reconnoitred. In other words, until the winner has been
declared. Armed services’ loyalties are uncertain

We have reported on more than one occasion that something akin
to an internal revolt is simmering deep inside the armed-service
departments. We have also reported that each of the teams of the
presidential candidates has tried all means of gaining the support
of the armed services – both public means and those that are behind
the scenes. Opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko has read out appeals
to law-enforcement officers.

Prime Minister and establishment candidate Viktor Yanukovych has
promised district police inspectors a pay rise and a “topping up” of
their length of service. Yushchenko has had meetings with the heads
of the armed-service departments and appealed to their consciences.

Yanukovych has brought pressure to bear through administrative
methods, strengthening Kiev with military units. Neither Yushchenko
nor Yanukovych is convinced that, in a state of emergency, he will
have the support of the armed services, just as neither is convinced
that he will not be betrayed at the very last moment. Yushchenko has
nothing in particular to hope for, whereas for Yanukovych it may mean
unconditional surrender.

Defence minister’s indifference prompts army neutrality

At the moment, Yanukovych can only rely on the Defence
Ministry. Oleksandr Kuzmuk, a member of the establishment candidate’s
team who has just taken over the ministry after heading it previously,
has a pretty good idea of what is what in the institution entrusted to
him. However, sources inside the ministry say that Kuzmuk, appointed
two months ago, spends most of his time on preserving his influence
in the ministry after the election, whatever the final outcome
is. This process includes the gradual placing of “his own people”,
the formation of a balance among the generals and also the commonplace
accumulation of money in the accounts of commercial bodies that work
with the Defence Ministry.

We shall not represent this claim as being the truth, but rumours to
the effect that Kuzmuk is least of all concerned about the election
have long and persistently been in circulation. Kuzmuk’s closest
associates are not certain that, even if Yanukovych comes to power,
Gen Kuzmuk will remain in his post, since the post has reportedly
been promised to a USDPU United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine
protege. Hence his attitude towards his area of responsibility.
Kuzmuk’s mood inevitably affects not only the calculations
being made by the generals, but also the views of lower-ranking
officers. Campaigning for Yanukovych in the army boils down to a
reminder that Yushchenko “took benefits away”, while Yanukovych has
promised to restore them. However, even those for whom this argument
seemed previously to be the most convincing are not very sure that
the income part of family budgets in the army will increase. That
is why they still retain a relatively neutral attitude towards the
two candidates. Commanders of units are, of course, able to bypass
the law on elections and to control the course of the voting at the
polling stations within military units, yet the degree of loyalty
to the current authorities in the armed forces does not allow one to
say that it is very high.

Quite interesting processes are also taking place in the army itself,
and they are setting the other armed services against Kuzmuk. The
present defence minister’s attempts to attach to the Defence
Ministry the SBU’s department of military counterintelligence (the
DVKR), which has been resurrected, in the full sense of the term,
would seem to be prompted by dissatisfaction with the keenness of
the counterintelligence officers and by reluctance to contemplate
an independent body that has every opportunity to monitor the
army. Incidentally, so far, this body has already “dug up” a mass of
material on the abuses, intrigues and unscrupulousness of top officers
in the Defence Ministry. The “bargaining” over such matters is not
only becoming a stumbling block between the armed services, but is
also generating tension between individual subunits, including those
that are to ensure order on polling day, 21 November, and possibly
after the result has been announced.

SBU also standing on the sidelines

The SBU is also avoiding active participation in the elections in the
run-up to the second round. The available data suggest that the secret
service has withdrawn from playing an active role in the election,
and extensive reports from the “electoral fields” have stopped
thudding on to the desks of senior state officials. Operational
information from the regions, particularly those in the west, has
also dried up. Can these developments be logged as achievements by
the opposition candidate’s team? That is dubious. It is more likely
that SBU chief Ihor Smeshko stood up to the president and defended his
right to take no part in electoral games, regardless of the dismissal
looming over him, for which forces close to the Party of Regions led by
Yanukovych are pressing. After the election, Smeshko will, in any case,
have to collect his belongings and go. If Yanukovych comes to power,
Smeshko will probably be replaced by his former first deputy in the
SBU, Yuriy Zemlyanskyy, whom Smeshko himself fired not so long ago
on 20 August , incidentally. Zemlyanskyy not only hails from Donetsk
Region like Yanukovych , but he is also one of the people through whom
Yanukovych resolved the lion’s share of his affairs in Kiev while he
was still governor of Donetsk Region .

The fact, however, that Zemlyanskyy spent a lengthy period inside
the building in Volodymyrska Street, Kiev – SBU headquarters does
not mean that his authority is very strong and firm. He has far more
enemies than friends in the head office. Members of the secret service
themselves say that people in the building remember Volodymyr Radchenko
(now secretary of the National Security and Defence Council) more than
Gen Zemlyanskyy, even though Radchenko moved to other work before he
did. Volodymyr Satsyuk, the man in the SBU with responsibility for the
elections, has recently lost any special interest in these measures,
evidently because he has not found anything in a Yanukovych victory
that would be at all beneficial to himself.

Police also wobble

The only question now unanswered is how the police will behave if the
crunch comes. The obsessive determination of Interior Minister Mykola
Bilokon during the presidential campaign would be surprising if one
did not know what specifically Yanukovych had promised the general in
his office. He is said to have promised a great deal. Much depends,
however, not so much on Bilokon himself as on how he is perceived
by the actual Interior Ministry staff. There are constant whispers
in the central directorate about the blackmail and threats that are
levelled against the relatives of internal affairs officers who,
in the opinion of the minister’s associates, are lukewarm in helping
“Yanukovych’s headquarters carry out election work”. It is also known
that some of the ministry’s orders are given verbally, so as to avoid
liability if Yushchenko wins. A resolution to that effect was adopted
the week before last. Most orders are now conveyed using the secure
communications systems.

The fact that information leaks about the actions of senior police
officers surface in the media proves that there is a certain number
of staff in the law-enforcement agencies who are willing to engage in
dialogue with the opposition candidate’s headquarters. It is rumoured
that among such people is former Interior Minister Yuriy Kravchenko,
who occasionally meets representatives of Yushchenko’s headquarters
and offers them help. It is hard to judge how honest that desire is. It
should also be recalled that the text of an appeal to speaker Volodymyr
Lytvyn from law-enforcement officers in the Kharkiv area was published
not so long ago by Vecherniye Vesti on 10 November . The letter
referred to falsification of the election and how Interior Ministry
staff were involved in this. Admittedly, Deputy Interior Minister
Mykhaylo Korniyenko said later, in a Glavred interview, that “the
letter is an election stunt” and does not actually exist. According
to our information, the police “whistleblowers” immediately decided
to hold a news conference, but cancelled it at the last moment.
Another report appeared on Internet sites later, saying that Deputy
Minister Mykola Lyubar had instructed his subordinates in the office
of the governor of Cherkasy Region: “if Yanukovych doesn’t get 50 per
cent of votes, it is essential to put into effect the plan to disrupt
the election so that they are deemed to be invalid”. Can this statement
be regarded as a verbal order? In view of the minister’s directive,
it probably can.

Twilight of Kuchma era recalls Ceausescu scenario

However, the main question remains open: how are such initiatives seen
locally? Our information suggests that responses vary quite a lot. Even
the actual posing of the question means that the authorities, who
wanted to look “as strong as never before” and whose administrative
resources relied primarily on the armed services, are starting to
lose their power as the end of the election draws near.

The present situation in Ukraine reminds one of Romania in the
final hours of Ceausescu, when all the armed services turned against
him towards the end of the uprising. It reminds one of Russia, when
Yeltsin’s words were stronger than the tanks. It reminds one of Armenia
and the Georgia of recent times. And, even if, in some unexpected
circumstances, Kuzmuk, Smeshko and Bilokon repeat the words of the
Romanian general Vasile Milea the defence minister, who refused to
carry out Ceausescu’s orders: “I looked in all the service regulations
and could not find anywhere a paragraph that said that the people’s
army should fire on the people… ellipsis as published “, events
will not, we hope, lead to shooting in Ukraine. We very much hope not.