Global Politician, NY
Dec 13 2004
Turkey’s Self-Emasculation
12/14/2004
By Antero Leitzinger
Under the new Islamist government, Turkey’s foreign policy has been a
complete disaster, unrivalled in the country’s long and proud
history. Few other countries in the world have ever managed to depart
from their traditional foreign policies so rapidly while voluntarily
missing so obvious chances for achieving great victories. Instead of
participating in the liberation of Iraq, to which Turkey was invited
by the USA, its closest ally, Turkey prostrated to France – to the
very same country that just recently condemned Turkey for the
Armenian genocide, and opposed NATO guarantees for Turkey’s security.
Instead of having the Turkish Army parading in Kirkuk as the
protector of Iraqi Turks and Kurds, Turkey not only choose to side
with the Arab Socialist Baath Party dictatorship of Saddam Hussein,
but even went on expressing publicly concerns on Kirkuk’s security on
April 10th, the very day its inhabitants were celebrating their
liberation by Kurdish freedom-fighters.
Turkey’s disastrous choices and perverted image campaign in order to
appeal to traditionally anti-Turkish left-wing peace activists and
Arabic radicals, can no more be explained by the lack of experience
of its new government, leading AK Party, and foreign minister
Abdullah Gül. The only rational explanation must lie in Turkey’s
political self-emasculation. Apparently, it will present its
application for EU membership as a political eunuch for Europe – as a
harmless country without real military capabilities (not even a show
of force beyond Cyprus, for over 80 years), and without an
independent agenda to integrate its Kurdish minority. Instead of
having a grateful Kurdish protectorate, or a friendly Iraqi
government as its south-eastern neighbour, Turkey will be bordered by
independent-minded Kurds who will have a leading role in shaping the
foreign policy of Free Iraq.
The consequences of Turkish total failure in spring 2003 will be
studied and regretted by scholars of military strategy and diplomacy
for decades to come. The frustration felt in the Turkish Army and
intelligence services, will boil for a long time. When the media will
realize, that Turkey lost a unique chance to secure a role in forming
future Iraqi policy, and to present its military force as the
guarantor of peace and prosperity for the whole Kurdish people, added
with the realization of being betrayed by the French and the
disappointment of being left outside the EU anyway, the popularity of
the current AK Party administration will fall to low bottom. How much
humiliation can a government take? Since the party has a majority in
the parliament, a crisis of Turkish democracy will be inevitable. A
military coup would not be the worst possible result.
Just when Turkey was on the brink of becoming the leading country of
the region, and a trusted pillar of the Free World, Turkish
politicians and journalists failed to follow the example of Kemal
Atatürk, who had led his country with convincing strength and vision.
Instead of winning the top prize in the three weeks. war, Turkey
became the worst casualty of the whole process, irresponsibly
degenerating into a third-class power, and a destabilizing factor in
the Middle East. The contrast can not be exaggerated. Consequences
will be felt also in the Caucasus and Cyprus, where Turkey lost
critical credibility and authority.
Imagine the Turkish Army having returned from a glorious march
through Mosul and Kirkuk to Baghdad. There would have been many
military decorations and promotions, valuable experience, some
martyrs to be commemorated, and plenty of deserved self-assurance.
The Turkish people as a whole would have felt a new sense of unity
and pride. Turkey as the main Muslim member of the international
coalition would have been remembered and loved in the USA, in
Britain, and in several other courageous EU member states. The
economy would have gained both through immediate US aid and Iraqi
contracts. The Greek, Armenians, Syrians, and Iranians, would have
respected Turkish concerns and taken Turkey’s requests into account.
But this all did not materialize. The sole responsibility lies on the
Turkish government, and all attempts to make any late recovery by
attempts to bully the Kurds, to occupy Northern Iraq, or to act as an
interested party to the reconstruction of Iraq, are vain, will be
ridiculed, and only serve to emphasize Turkish confusion. It is sad,
but the heavy work of generations of skilled Turkish diplomats,
analysts, public relations officers, and private friends of Turkey,
was wasted in a few weeks. Honour is hard to earn, shame even harder
to loose.
Some years ago, foreign policy analysts wondered “Who lost Russia”.
Today, the question is, “How did Turkey lose itself?”
The article was originally written in April 2003.
Antero Leitzinger is a political historian and a researcher for the
Finnish Directorate of Immigration. He wrote several books on Turkey,
the Middle East and the Caucasus.