Agency WPS
What the Papers Say. Part A (Russia)
December 13, 2004, Monday
WHY WE NEED UKRAINE
SOURCE: Ekspert, No. 46 (446), December 6, 2004, pp. 17-20
by: Pavel Bykov, Olga Vlasova
Russia has an interest in seeing Ukraine become an integral, strong,
democratic state with its own independent policies. This is entirely
self-evident: Russia needs effective partners, not more problem zones
along its borders. Moscow doesn’t need yet another burden around its
neck; it already has enough problems in the CIS and within Russia
itself.
Russia’s authorities are only just starting to restore order in the
administration of Russia’s regions. The situation in the North
Caucasus remains explosive. The problem of the Kaliningrad region’s
future still hasn’t been resolved. Relations with “friendly Belarus”
are fairly tense. The Trans-Caucasus conflicts are frozen, but not
resolved. Moscow accepts the military presence of Washington in
Central Asia as a good thing. These are the realities. So how can
anyone talk of Russia exerting real, direct control over Ukraine, a
nation with 50 million people and considerable problems of its own?
The fewer problems Kiev has, the easier things will be for Moscow.
The stronger Ukraine becomes, the more opportunities there will be
for mutually beneficial cooperation. Russia needs an ally that would
take on part of the responsibility for military and political
stability in our region of the world: a suitable partner for
implementing large-scale international business projects in the CIS,
the Black Sea region, the Balkans, and Europe.
Thus, the break-up of Ukraine would not be to Russia’s advantage.
After all, that scenario would not only deprive us of a potentially
very strong partner, but also create a giant conflict zone along our
borders – one that would make the break-up of Yugoslavia and the
Trans-Dniester war seem minor. It would put all of Russia’s border
cities – from Rostov-on-Don to Bryansk – at risk of finding
themselves on the front line.
There would be another risk if Ukraine split into Western Ukraine and
South-Eastern Ukraine: the risk of a border revision process starting
throughout the post-Soviet states. Following the break-up of the
USSR, Russia had a very narrow escape from finding itself enmeshed in
series of regional wars, similar to those in Yugoslavia. Nothern
Kazakhstan, Eastern Ukraine, the Crimea, the Trans-Dniester region,
ethnic Russians in the Baltic states: there would have been more than
enough pretexts for intervention on the grounds of defending the
interests of Russian minorities. At least as many pretexts as the
Serbs had.
And now, in the event that Ukraine does break up, the general public
in Russia would find it very hard to reject the idea of supporting
the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine in a confrontation with
the West. There is no harm in support, as such, but it contains a
hidden danger: should the West suddenly decide that this is “a matter
of principle,” this could lead to a simultaneous deterioration in
Russia’s relations with the United States and the European Union, and
thus a more hard-line regime in Russia itself. And then it would be
only one small step to a direct confrontation over Kaliningrad
(following the Berlin crisis pattern), and an exacerbated situation
throughout the Baltic region. Control over the Trans-Dniester region
would be part of the plan for supporting South-Eastern Ukraine. The
logic behind developments is such that by starting with Ukraine,
Russia would very soon find itself in a confrontation with NATO
across the entire Western front.
What’s more, even if Ukraine breaks up rapidly and painlessly, it is
by no means certain that part of it would join Russia. Becoming the
president of an independent, industrially-developed country close to
the Black Sea is a far more enviable destiny than that of a
semi-appointed regional leader within Russia. In that event, we would
probably end up with another Belarus on our borders: a country held
back from real integration with Russia by a leader who is hostile to
the West, regardless of mutual attachments between the peoples and
pro-Moscow rhetoric.
In short, “break-up of Ukraine” scenarios don’t promise any benefits
for Moscow.
Neither would Russia stand to gain from the prospect of an
economically weak Ukraine, not self-sufficient, becoming part of the
periphery of the European Union. Practically all of Europe’s
politicians and analysts are now saying that the EU has had nothing
to do with the events in Ukraine. According to them, the West didn’t
favor either presidential candidate, initially; it was only after
Russia’s unseemly role became apparent – its determination to secure
a win for pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovich – that the West
started condemning these events and supporting opposition candidate
Viktor Yushchenko. That may be a fair statement for some EU
countries, but not all of them. For example, a number of the EU’s
newest member states were overtly pro-Yushchenko even before they
joined the EU. Above all, this applies to Poland.
Poland has never been known to have any great liking for the
brother-people of Ukraine, though it has attempted to extend its
influence into Ukraine on more than one occasion. Yet now the Poles,
most of whom used to be skeptical about their neighbor-state, are
simply overflowing with inexplicable love for Ukraine. Even the
Ukrainians admit that only Poland’s active support helped draw the
European Parliament’s special attention to the situation in Ukraine
and prompt it to refuse to recognize Yanukovich as the winner.
Poland’s love for the freedom-loving people of Ukraine did not arise
suddenly. Long before Ukraine’s election, Polish politicians were
starting to glance in the direction of their south-eastern neighbor.
The Poles claim that the EU absolutely must declare that EU
membership for Ukraine is a possibility. At the latest East-West
Economic Forum, held in Poland this autumn, President Alexander
Kwasniewski stated openly that Poland considers EU membership for
Ukraine to be its own mission, and will do all it can to achieve that
goal.
Poland’s persistence is by no means altruistic. Poland actually hopes
to resolve many of its own problems by pushing for Ukraine to be
accepted into the European Union. For example, despite Poland’s
recently-acquired EU member status, the development of its economy
has stalled. Compared to Poland, Ukraine seems a far more attractive
prospect for many investors: Ukraine is free of the bureaucratic
obstacles created by endless EU regulations, and it has a skilled
labor force prepared to work for relatively low wages. Ukraine’s
economig growth has been in the double digits this year: and this is
causing bitterness in neighboring Poland, where the economy has been
in stagnation for some years. The Poles would much prefer to see a
“velvet revolution” scenario in which factories stand idle, banks
stop functioning, and investors start seeing the political situation
in Ukraine as extremely unstable.
Poland – a weak state on the periphery of Western Europe, with a
semi-agrarian economy – is striving to move towards the center of
Europe by shifting its own current role as “the periphery” onto its
eastern neighbor. Even the negotiation process for EU membership for
Ukraine actually strengthens Poland: it brings Ukraine within the
jurisdiction of EU regulations, thus making it pointless for
investors to go into Ukraine, since its legal status is
indeterminate. Essentially, Poland gains complete control over the
situation: by becoming the mediator between the EU and Ukraine, it
can directly influence the decision-making process for Ukraine’s most
important political and economic issues.
Ukraine will have to be forced to accept that scenario. By summer
2004, the prevalent attitude in Ukraine was that EU membership is not
worth pursuing. President Leonid Kuchma called on his fellow citizens
to heed the negative experience of integration into the EU among the
states of Eastern Europe, and not to be over-hasty in seeking to
integrate Ukraine into the EU with the status of “younger sister.”
The Ukrainian government was intent on developing relations with
Brussels in the areas where this would be to Ukraine’s advantage,
without making any unnecessary commitments. Ukraine’s business
community was preparing to skim some cream: as soon as the nations of
Eastern Europe joined the EU, consumer prices for essential goods
rose sharply, and people from Eastern Europe flooded into Ukraine to
buy up everthing they could. Ukraine’s border regions started
building new supermarkets, aiming to attract consumers from among the
new citizens of the EU. But now these obvious economic advantages for
Ukraine are suddenly in doubt. Viktor Yushchenko has stated
repeatedly that he is in favor of closer relations with the EU. If
the mandate of Ukraine’s new president is determined by EU support
more than by the Ukrainians themselves, he will have to be more
accommodating.
In any event, we should bear in mind that Ukraine’s economy is
stronger than that of Poland. Potentially, it could be stronger than
the combined economies of all Ukraine’s EU-member neighbors. Poland
will find it very difficult to impose the “economic periphery” role
on Ukraine; this plan could only succeed if it’s possible to disrupt
the trend of establishing Ukraine as an independent power which is
bound to play a key role in the region.
A strong, independent Ukraine would generate a fundamentally
different situation throughout Europe. The cornerstone concept in the
EU’s strategy regarding the countries of the East is that they all
wish to become EU members. So Brussels can pick and choose the
candidates, imposing its own terms on them. The EU has a strategy for
dealing with weak neighbors, but it lacks one for dealing with strong
neighbors. That is precisely why relations between Moscow and
Brussels deteriorated in early 2004: the EU’s strategy designed for a
weak Russia wasn’t working (gradually integrating Russia into the
EU’s sphere of influence, piece by piece, on the EU’s own terms), and
the EU had no other strategy. The same situation applies to Ukraine.
If even the slightest doubts arise about whether it’s really
worthwhile for Ukraine to join the EU, this makes all the
pressure-applying procedures of the Eurobureaucrats pointless. The EU
would no longer be viewed as a desirable “heaven on earth”; rather
than making demands, it woould have to seek attention – and that’s an
entirely different ball-game.
If Ukraine can manage to break out of the relations strategy now
being imposed on it by the EU, this would be to Russia’s advantage.
There has been a lot of mud-slinging directed at Russia by the
Europeans this year, and this is largely due to the EU being at a
loss. Its script, designed for a weak Russia, has been in place for a
long time; the entire colossal bureaucracy of the EU is following it.
The fact that Russia has suddenly started to rise just doesn’t fit
into the EU’s plans – and it’s so very reluctant to change those
convenient plans and concepts. It’s far easier to try to persuade
everyone that Russia remains weak and desperately in need of the EU’s
support – while any attempts by Russia to defend its own interests
are only vestiges of the past or imperialist ambitions.
If Ukraine chooses the path of a strong and independent European
power, this would force the EU to admit that its old strategy no
longer works: not because of any “imperialist ambitions,” but due to
the objective process of development among former Soviet countries.
The interests of Ukraine itself, as well as the interests of Russia,
would be served if events develop along these lines.
Events would develop differently if the revolution wins in Ukraine.
The laws by which revolutions develop are such that the leader who
wins is forced to become a dictator – otherwise he is unable to hold
on to power, and would be replaced by a more radical leader. The most
recent and obvious example of this implacable principle in action is
Georgia’s “revolution of roses,” from which the leaders of the Kiev
demonstrators are copying their plans. Mikhail Saakashvili, the “rose
revolutionary,” is being forced to keep on with revolutionary
policies, relying on direct support of the masses and his own
popularity. Saakashvili’s cult of personality has practically been
established in Georgia already – even though the costs of state
administration are covered solely through donations from abroad, and
the economic situation is deteriorating.
There is one fundamental difference between the “revolution of
roses,” for example, and the revolution of 1968, which many observers
are currently citing. In 1968, the revolution failed to win in any
country; but the ideas and movements that drove it were accepted by
the elites and integrating into the existing order. The participants
in that protest movement called for change, but set themselves the
goal of taking power. That was why the revolution of 1968 succeeded.
But if the students of Paris had actually taken power back then, what
would France be like today? The memory of 1968 probably wouldn’t seem
nearly as romantic.
And this is precisely why it’s important now that the “chestnut
revolution” in Ukraine should not win. It would be acceptable for
some opposition leaders to take up government office. There can and
should be some political reforms, and the interests of the protesters
should be taken into account. But all this should take place solely
on the basis of existing laws, and a system of compromises with the
ruling elites. A total victory for the “orange opposition” – a
victory for the power of the streets – would be a Pyrrhic victory for
Ukraine. If that happens, Ukraine would be a source of instability on
post-Soviet territory for a long time to come. The priorities of any
and all victorious revolutionaries are to radically purge the field
of domestic politics and export the revolution – not to ensure the
necessary conditions for the nation’s economic and social development
(and we are already seeing some disastrous consequences of the
revolution for Ukraine’s economy).
A second success for “velvet revolutions” within the CIS will lead to
further attempts to stir up revolutionary uprisings everywhere:
Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Central Asian nations. To put it
plainly, this would not be about democratization; it would be yet
another phase of regime change in former Soviet countries. There is
probably no need to spell out where this can lead. And Ukraine would
undoubtedly be the center of this revolutionary movement; it has
already become a testing-ground where revolutionaries from all over
the CIS are gathering experience.
Those in the West who have inspired Ukraine’s current revolution –
the likes of Zbigniew Brzezinski – do not conceal that in the event
of success in Ukraine, the main target of the international
revolutionary-democratic movement will be Russia. Brzezinski recently
said: “There is no doubt that if democracy is established in Ukraine,
this will provide great momentum for democratic forces in Russia.”
Indeed, the momentum would be great. The opposition within Russia
would become more radical, inspired by the achievements of its
neighbors. We should also expect a threat to come from the
redistribution of influence among Ukraine’s economic elites; the
finance channels of Ukraine and Russia are intertwined, so a
redistribution in Ukraine would destabilize the situation within
Russia’s elites as well. And there’s another destabilizing factor:
Ukraine could become a refuge for critics of the Kremlin’s policy in
the Caucasus. Not only theoretician critics, but practical critics:
the Russian-Ukrainian border is virtually open (so far), and close to
the Caucasus. And finally, the “loss” of Ukraine – which is precisely
how many interest groups in Russia and abroad would view an
unequivocal win for Yushchenko – may weaken the domestic and foreign
policy positions of President Vladimir Putin. At the very least, he
would be sure to face increased pressure.
It would certainly be foolish to oppose the development of democracy
in Russia. Yet the version of it currently being proposed to us by
our Western partners does seem odd: an “orange” victory at any cost,
with no consideration whatsoever of the opinions and interests of the
other side. Zero tolerance for the opposing point of view: is this
democracy?
The track record of how the current crisis in Ukraine is being
resolved, as well as analogous crises in Serbia and Georgia over
recent years, indicates one important point. The West does not have a
complete collection of the tools required to resolve such situations
to its own advantage. And Russia doesn’t even need to obstruct the
West’s revolution-managers in order to stymie them; all Russia has to
do is refrain from helping them. In one case after another, the
intervention of Russian mediators during the final stages of
conflicts has been the only factor that prevented situations from
getting out of control.
In this regard, it is very instructive to note the outcome of the
latest South Ossetia crisis. Moscow did not permit Saakashvili to
provoke it into using force; but neither did it give in to
Saakashvili’s blackmail – Moscow did not start putting pressure on
South Ossetia to agree to terms that South Ossetia considered
unacceptable. What cooled the fervor of Georgia’s leader was a
principled stand by Moscow: if Georgia wants to regain full control
over South Ossetia, it ought to reach agreement with the South
Ossetians themselves, rather than with Washington or Moscow. This
approach by Moscow proved sufficient.
Moscow has now adopted a similar stance with regard to Ukraine. It is
not in the Kremlin’s power to persuade Ukraine’s political elite or
the Ukrainian people to act in one way or another. Is the West
capable of doing so? The Western media have been full of discussion
about the importance of separating Ukraine from Russia and preventing
Russia from gaining control over Ukraine. Thus, allegedly, Ukraine
will make a conclusive choice in favor of freedom and democracy. We
have no wish to argue with commentators who say so. Ukraine should
indeed choose freedom.
Translated by Pavel Pushkin