RUSSIAN DEFENCE MINISTRY UPS SCALE OF COMBAT TRAINING – EXPERT
Strana.Ru web site, Moscow
28 Dec 04
The Russian Defence Ministry has increased the scale of international
and domestic combat training over 2004 against the backdrop of various
scandals, major administrative reshuffles in the ministry amidst growing
social and economic tension in the Armed Forces, argues a Russian
expert. Nikita Petrov recalls that President Vladimir Putin has
assessed the work of the military department in 2004 as “satisfactory”
and tries to present his view of what went on behind the stage. The
following is the excerpt of an article entitled “Defence Ministry:
Year of Scandals and Exercises” carried by Russian Strana.Ru web site
on 28 December; subheadings have been inserted editorially:
Scandals
The year 2004 began for the Defence Ministry with a scandal (the
Auditing Chamber accused the Defence Ministry of systematic financial
violations and nonspecific expenditure of funds – it was a matter of
almost R14bn) and is ending with a scandal, precedents for which in
the Russian Armed Forces don’t come to mind. The latest scandal was
about personnel: the head of RF Armed Forces Main Combat Training
Directorate, Col-Gen Aleksandr Skorodumov, submitted his
resignation. The Russian Armed Forces’ main “warrior” departed,
slamming the door loudly and clearly spoiling slightly the pre-holiday
mood of Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov and his closest entourage.
The general openly accused the department heads of the disintegration
of the Armed Forces and of such unpleasant things as, for example, the
procedure for appointments to high command positions “through good
connections”.
Commander-in-chief of the Ground Troops and Deputy Defence Minister
Army Gen Nikolay Kormiltsev departed with approximately the very same
words one and a half months before this (President and Supreme
Commander Putin appointed a new Commander-in-chief of the Ground
Troops on 5 November. The choice fell on Col-Gen Aleksey Maslov, who
previously held the posts of the chief of staff and first deputy
commander of the North Caucasus Military District. Reports appeared
alleging that until recently Hero of Russia, Commander-in-chief of the
Air Force Army Gen Vladimir Mikhaylov was also planning to leave his
command.
But of course, the scandal of the year in the Defence Ministry was the
removal of Army Gen Anatoliy Kvashnin from the post of chief of the RF
Armed Forces General Staff, which happened this summer. It ended the
many months of conflict between Ivanov and his former first deputy,
who had his own views, which he didn’t hide, on ways of organizational
development and on further prospects of the Russian Armed Forces.
The head of the Russian military department achieved Kvashnin’s
removal under the pretext of an urgent General Staff reform –
observers began speaking about a possible purge within the walls of
the “main military brain”. Kvashnin’s first deputy, Yuriy Baluyevskiy,
who for the most part had worked on RF Armed Forces international
cooperation, was appointed in his place.
Strictly speaking, the “purge” (as, by the way, also the General Staff
reform in the strictest terms) ended with this. Now observers are
saying that Ivanov simply got rid of Kvashnin, who was inconvenient
for him, and put in his place Baluyevskiy, who goes along with
everything (the scandalous nature of this decision also lies in the
fact that Baluyevskiy’s last command position in the troops was as a
company commander).
The year also proved rich in scandals for Commander-in-chief of the
Navy Fleet Adm Vladimir Kuroyedov. In particular, the Admiral
“expertly” set up RF President Putin during ballistic missile launches
from a submerged condition, which were executed in February during the
joint strategic command and staff drill of Leningrad, Moscow and
Volga-Ural Military Districts and Northern Fleet. The main objective
of these manoeuvres, which were called Bezopasnost-2004, was to check
combat readiness of the navy’s forces and its naval strategic nuclear
component.
Up to 10 surface ships and support vessels participated in the
exercise on the part of the fleet. They included the heavy
aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov,
heavy nuclear powered guided missile cruiser Petr Velikiy, six
strategic missile submarines and multipurpose nuclear submarines, ASW
aircraft, ship-based helicopters and fighter aviation of the Northern
Fleet Air Force, and around 5,000 servicemen.
According to the scenario of the manoeuvres, the crew of the strategic
missile submarine Novomoskovsk was to execute the firing of an RSM-54
intercontinental ballistic missile (Skiff by NATO classification)
against the Kura combat field on the Kamchatka Peninsula. Strictly
speaking, the commander-in-chief of the Navy was at fault not only for
the fact that it was his subordinates who were unable to launch the
missile with a nuclear warhead at the necessary moment, but also for
the fact that a specially invited RF President Putin with his entire
retinue was awaiting this launch directly at sea. And Admiral
Kuroyedov found nothing more suitable than to explain to the press and
public that the President had been freezing in the cold wind awaiting
specifically a “simulated launch”.
The commander-in-chief of the Navy thundered once more to the entire
world, declaring that the heavy nuclear powered guided missile cruiser
Petr Velikiy, the Northern Fleet flagship, could blow up at any moment
because of her “terrible condition”. The scandal turned out to be
grandiose and also moved to the international level – the
international public and particularly Scandinavian countries
neighbouring on Murmansk Region, was very concerned with the condition
of the nuclear powered cruiser and with the prospect of getting a
“second Chernobyl”.
But despite all these “mistakes”, Kuroyedov wasn’t dismissed. (Passage
omitted) Moreover, his contract was extended for a minimum of another
year after he already had reached the maximum age of 60 for military
service.
The arrest and conviction in Qatar of two Russians accused of
murdering Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, one of the leaders of the Chechen
separatists, was yet another weighty scandal, and again at the
international level. The foreign mass media wrote that these people
were officers of the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence
Directorate and were working in Qatar “by personal direction” of
Defence Minister Ivanov. Strictly speaking, it also was scandalous
that despite all of Russia’s requests and persuasions, on 30 June a
Qatar court sentenced the Russians to life imprisonment, which under
local laws meant 25 years. At the end of the year, however, Russian
diplomacy and special services achieved a clear success – the Russians
returned to Russia after having been sentenced in Qatar literally a
few days before.
We also will note on this list repeated statements by senior Russian
military leaders and by the defence minister himself about “the
possibilities of Russia’s delivery of preventive strikes” against
terrorist bases “no matter where they might be” (and such bases also
can be in the United States). Observers noted that such “words without
actions” only do harm to Russia’s image. And we will recall the
constant statements by official Moscow about the presence of
ultramodern models of arms in Russian Army and Navy arsenals for which
there are no analogues in the world or defence against them. At the
rates of the state’s deliveries of new equipment to the troops – this
year, for example, it is only four new tanks – such statements at the
very least generate incomprehension both in Russia as well as in the
West.
Administrative reform
Organizing the military department structure in accordance with
demands of the administrative reform conducted this year in Russia’s
system of executive authority also affected the generals. Under the
new structure, the head of the Defence Ministry was left with four
deputies in place of the nine which existed before this. Today this is
Chief of General Staff and First Deputy Defence Minister Col-Gen Yuriy
Baluyevskiy, First Deputy Col-Gen Aleksandr Belousov, Chief of Armed
Forces Armaments and Deputy Defence Minister Army Gen Aleksey
Moskovskiy and Chief of Armed Forces Rear Services and Deputy Defence
Minister Army Gen Vladimir Isakov.
In the military department itself there appeared a central apparatus,
the numerical strength of which was set at 10,000 persons; a defence
minister’s staff; as well as various services both within as well as
under the ministry itself. Also included in the senior leadership of
today’s Defence Ministry are chiefs of the services which were created
– Col-Gen Anatoliy Grebenyuk, chief of the troops billeting and
construction service; Army Gen Nikolay Pankov, personnel and education
service; Lyubov Kudelina, economics and finance service; and Andrey
Chobotov, chief of the defence minister’s staff.
Additionally accruing to the Defence Ministry in 2004 were the former
Federal Service of the Railway Troops, which in the military
department became simply the Railway Troops, and the former Federal
Service for Special Construction (now the Federal Agency for Special
Construction under the Defence Ministry). The military department
also received management and financial flows of federal services for
the state defence order, for military-technical cooperation, and for
technical and export control. Added to them as well was control over
the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy within the context of the nuclear
weapons complex.
Speaking at the traditional November RF Armed Forces leadership
conference, Ivanov declared that further optimization of the Armed
Forces composition, structure and numerical strength was named in
particular as one of the most important in determining missions for
the concluding year of 2004. This task, which involved the conduct of
table of organization measures, was fulfilled in practically all
military command and control entities, branches, combat arms, military
districts and fleets. According to the RF defence minister’s data, the
overall strength of the Armed Forces, counting the Railway Troops
integrated into their makeup, will be 1,207,000 servicemen and 876,000
civilian personnel as of 1 January 2005.
The missions and priorities of entities of operational command and
control of troops and of the client are being separated in the Defence
Ministry for the first time beginning this year. The first entities
concentrate efforts on planning and ensuring that the existing arms
and military equipment inventory is kept in a combat-ready condition,
and the unified entity for orders concentrates on planning and
supporting developments and deliveries of new and modernized
arms. Thus, the orders management system will be centralized and
removed from the sphere of activity of command elements of branches
and combat arms. This in turn should permit essentially realizing a
unified military-technical and pricing policy, reducing the number of
different types of arms and military equipment being developed,
conducting unified bidding, and creating conditions for the transition
to a unified system of technical support of the Armed Forces and other
troops – in general, saving money for the country.
One of the most important aspects of Defence Ministry work in 2004
(and this is presented this way by the military department itself) was
implementation of the federal targeted programme “Transition to
Manning a Number of Formations and Military Units with Servicemen
Performing Contract Military Service” for 2004-2007.
One of the results of this activity is to be the creation of
preconditions for reducing the term of conscripted military service to
one year as of 2008. Ivanov believes this “will have a positive
effect on the accumulation of militarily trained manpower mobilization
resources in the Armed Forces reserve”.
Within the scope of implementing the federal targeted “contract”
programme, the transition of the 42nd Motor-Rifle Division stationed
on the territory of Chechnya to a contract method of manning will be
completely finished already by the end of this year. This division
will be the second formation after the 76th Airborne Division manned
exclusively by contract servicemen (this year the airborne personnel
were inspected repeatedly at all levels – it’s believed that the
experiment with a fully contract division “succeeded”).
As a result, the Defence Ministry is completely giving up the practice
of sending servicemen performing conscripted service to
Chechnya. Without doubt, this indeed will increase the effectiveness
of operations of military units and subunits in the region and will
permit reducing losses among personnel taking part in eliminating the
illegal armed groups and task forces.
Specialists are placed on guard, however, by the fact that R17bn
(according to other data, R20.9bn) have been allocated for measures
for the transition to contract manning for 2005. If annual
expenditures per contract soldier are taken as R100,000, and this is
only on the order of R8,000-9,000 per month, then it’s possible to
hire 170,000 soldiers. This is approximately a fourth of the present
draft contingent, and not at all the planned 50 per cent, but for that
money you can’t even recruit a fourth of a fourth.
Against this background, hopes for entry into force of the Law “On
Alternative Civilian Service” as of 1 January 2005 weren’t borne out –
less than 500 persons will serve on an alternative basis in this
draft. In any case, it’s becoming more difficult to man the Armed
Forces from year to year. In the opinion of the military, the stable
trend towards a reduction in the proportion of citizens “really called
up for military service” especially exacerbates the situation. Today
military commissariats place only every ninth young lad of draft age
in formation (10 years ago this proportion was three times
higher). The rest either are exempted entirely from military service
on legal grounds or have the right to a deferment. Therefore the
Defence Ministry and power committees of both houses of Parliament
supporting it are developing a strategy for reducing the number of
grounds for deferment – today our country has 34 categories of
citizens who legally are not called up for military service.
Exercises
Against this background, the scale of combat training clearly is
growing in the Russian Armed Forces. The new wave of NATO enlargement
which occurred this year – NATO was joined in particular by the former
Soviet Baltic republics – was among the preconditions for this. Let’s
recall that Russia didn’t agree that there was a need for this
enlargement and considers it “erroneous”. Nevertheless, the Defence
Ministry is working actively with NATO, and specifically along the
combat training line – the sides are training to operate together.
The military department itself considers the following to be the most
important events carried out in the army and navy in 2004. They
include, for example, the conduct of a large number of large-scale
naval exercises, including in coordination with naval forces of NATO
member countries. Among them were those such as the Russian-Italian
exercise in the Ionian Sea involving a detachment of Black Sea Fleet
ships headed by the Guards guided missile cruiser Moskva, and the
Russian-French exercise in the North Atlantic (on its completion, the
nuclear submarine Vepr paid an unofficial call on the French Navy Base
of Brest, which was the first call by a Russian nuclear submarine on a
foreign port in history).
In addition, the Russian-American Northern Eagle-2004 manoeuvres also
stood out this year. The large ASW ships Severomorsk and Admiral
Levchenko took part in them on the Russian side. Detachments of
Russian combatant ships also took part in the NATO combat operation
Active Endeavour, aimed at strengthening the regime of
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
vehicles. The heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral Flota Sovetskogo
Soyuza Kuznetsov went out on combat patrol duty (before this our
aircraft carrier had performed missions only of one combat patrol duty
– in the winter of 1995-1996). Strategic missile submarines executed
ten launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles during 2004. In
the outgoing year RF Navy ships performed an overall total of more
than 50 deployments, within the scope of which there were 27 calls on
ports of 17 states.
Intensive combat training – large-scale exercises – also was conducted
this year in other branches and arms of the Armed Forces. For example,
operational-tactical exercise Mobilnost-2004 was conducted. It
rehearsed problems of the mobility of mixed forces and the
redeployment of permanent readiness subunits and units from the
European part of the country to the Far-Eastern region for performing
missions of ensuring Russia’s military security. A total of around 800
servicemen with arms and combat equipment from the makeup of permanent
readiness units were redeployed by air transport. Around 50 aircraft
of Air Force Military-Transport Aviation and of the Transport Ministry
and over 100 pieces of armoured and motor vehicles were in action in
the exercise.
The Defence Ministry considers the special tactical exercise
Avariya-2004 to be another important event of this year. It was
conducted jointly with the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy at one of
the military department’s facilities situated in Murmansk Oblast. The
objective of the manoeuvres was the practical rehearsal of problems of
organizing protection of nuclear weapons against attempts at
unsanctioned access and of mopping up in the aftermath of an accident
in case terrorist acts were committed. There were 2,000 servicemen and
over 500 pieces of special equipment in action in the exercise. One
feature of the exercise was the presence of 49 representatives from 17
NATO member states as observers. At the end of the exercise Ivanov
noted that despite statements being heard abroad from time to time
about problems allegedly existing in Russia with the security of
nuclear weapons, the NATO people were able to be convinced of the
opposite with their own eyes.
We also will note the August joint exercise Rubezh-2004 with permanent
working bodies of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and with
armed forces of the Collective Security Treaty Organization member
states. One version of a possible exacerbation of the
military-political situation in the Central Asiatic collective
security region was made the basis of its concept. It envisaged
coordinated actions of bandit force elements to conduct terrorist acts
and destabilize the situation on the territory of region states. A
total of over 1,000 servicemen, around 100 pieces of armoured
equipment and over 30 aircraft and helicopters were in action in the
joint exercise. We also will note that the 201st Motor-Rifle Division
stationed in Tajikistan and covering Russia’s southern borders was
reorganized as a Russian military base this year.
In 2004 there was a command and staff drill with command and control
entities and alert duty forces of the Joint Air Defence System of CIS
member states. This multilateral drill was conducted in accordance
with the plan of joint activities for 2004. In addition to the Russian
side, air defence command elements of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan and Ukraine and these states’ air defence forces assigned
to the joint system took part in the drill. The actions of drill
participants were coordinated from the Russian Air Force Central
Command Post.
Finances
But the most acute problem of today’s Russian Armed Forces remains the
socioeconomic situation of servicemen and their families. Based on
results of the outgoing year, it can be said that it only has
deteriorated. Ivanov cited the following data at the November RF Armed
Forces leadership conference. As of today over 34 per cent of
servicemen’s families have income per family member below the
subsistence level prevailing in the regions. Around 90,000 are not
provided with permanent housing and approximately 45,500 are not
provided with official housing (Chief of Defence Ministry Main
Billeting and Maintenance Directorate Col-Gen Vlasov recently declared
that the Armed Forces need on the order of 500,000 apartments for the
country). “Naturally, we can’t be reconciled with such a state of
affairs, and specific steps are being taken to improve the situation,”
declared the defence minister.
The following evidently should be included among such steps. The
federal law “On the Mortgage Savings System of Housing Support for
Servicemen” was adopted this year. It places an entirely new mechanism
in effect for providing servicemen with housing. Its chief merit is
that it is called upon simultaneously to motivate a serviceman’s
presence in Armed Forces ranks.
Thus, the state will open savings accounts for officers and contract
personnel beginning in 2005. The new system is intended for those who
enter officer service after 1 January 2005 and for contract privates
who have served at least three years – this is approximately 60,000
persons. A savings account will be opened for each one into which
money will be transferred annually. The bill’s authors figure that
after 20 years the accumulated amount should suffice to buy an
apartment with an overall area of 54 square meters. And servicemen are
motivated to accumulate, which means also to serve longer – developers
of the law presume that after 30 years the money then will suffice for
96 square meters. A serviceman will be able to receive the money only
after 20 years of service, or after 10 years if he is discharged for a
valid reason – for state of health, in connection with a reduction, or
because of family circumstances.
If an officer leaves the Armed Forces after having served less than 10
years, his savings simply “burn up” and are returned to the state. By
the way, if an officer doesn’t wish to wait, then in just three years
he receives the right to buy an apartment with the help of a mortgage,
and the state will pay the interest on the credit. The defence
minister asserted: “It’s understandable that the results of the effect
of the new system will tell only after a few years, but the increase
in waiting lists for obtaining housing nevertheless will be halted,
especially as in parallel with this servicemen will be provided as
before with housing certificates and with official apartments which
are being built”.
We also will note the strange “situation of the year” with pay and
allowances. On 4 November military department head Ivanov signed an
order according to which all generals, officers and warrant officers
in the Defence Ministry central apparatus will receive increased pay
(in addition to the pay, they will continue to receive an additional
payment for rank, seniority and subsistence allowance). In the troops
they already have begun calculating that “according to the new way” a
major general will receive approximately R15,000 instead of the
previous R12,000, a colonel will put R10,000 in his pocket instead of
the previous R7,000-8,000, and a lieutenant around R6,000 instead of
R3,000-4,000.
As it turned out, though, the Armed Forces had misheard. According to
the defence minister’s order, it was a matter of increasing pay and
allowances of servicemen only in the Defence Ministry central
apparatus. Let’s recall that this “circle of the chosen” numbers only
on the order of 10,000 persons. Under the new conditions Ivanov
himself (together with the other power ministers, we will note) will
earn R92,880 per month (instead of the previous R17,950). Everyone
who is lower will receive appreciably less than the minister, but
these amounts, too, are impressive against the background of military
officers’ paltry incomes (R4,000 for a platoon commander).
The Defence Ministry declared that it had been forced to undertake
that increase: the “brain of the Army” – the General Staff – and other
key structures of the military department are scattering because of
the small pay rates. But experts believe that Ivanov thereby is
creating “two armies – a staff army with good pay and a pauper,
trench, army.” We will note that criticism of actions taken by the
military department heads forced them to declare that a draft
regulatory legal instrument is being prepared envisaging a similar
increase in pay and allowances for servicemen performing contract
military service at the tactical level.
The year 2004 also will go down in Russian Armed Forces history as a
year of cancellation of practically all benefits for servicemen and
their families. Compensation is envisaged in place of what was taken
away, but one and one-half months before the innovations enter into
force no one is explaining to them what the amount of such
compensation will be.
And so from 1 January 2005 servicemen will begin to travel on public
transport on “their own hard-earned money”. Servicemen now have the
right to receive an interest-free loan of 12 pay rates once during
service for acquiring essential property – as of 1 January 2005 the
amount of and procedure for such payment will be determined by the
government. Rations or compensation amounting to their cost are issued
to the military today. As of January of next year rations will be
envisaged only for those serving in the Far North, and compensation is
envisaged for everyone “in an amount to be determined by the
government.” Servicemen’s rights to free financial assistance to
purchase housing (75 per cent of the cost of housing for those who
have served from 10 to 25 years, or 100 per cent for those who have
served over 25 years) and to priority entry into housing cooperatives
have been cancelled. Restrictions on time periods for mandatory
provision of housing to servicemen on arrival at the chosen place of
residence after discharge are removed as of 1 January – previously
this was legislatively prescribed to be done no later than within a
three-month period. Free treatment in military medical establishments
for servicemen’s wives and children and the provision of places in
kindergartens and schools for their children on a priority basis are
being cancelled.
All this of course hardly will increase the country’s defence
capability.