The Jamestown Foundation
Monday, December 13 — Volume 1, Issue 145
EURASIA DAILY MONITOR
IN THIS ISSUE:
*Moscow loses Georgia, Ukraine, who’s next?
*New EU members force reappraisal of Ukraine’s qualifications
*OSCE caves in to Moscow on CFE Treaty
*Saakashvili suggests personnel changes needed
————————————————————————
RUSSIAN ANALYSTS PONDER ORANGE REVOLUTION’S IMPLICATIONS FOR KREMLIN
DOMINANCE IN CIS
With democratic challenger Viktor Yushchenko all but set to win a
repeat presidential runoff in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir
Putin is facing his greatest foreign policy crisis. At stake is the
Kremlin leader’s dream of Russia’s greatness, which he perceives
primarily as Moscow’s ability to dominate the post-Soviet lands. The
Orange Revolution’s display of people power in Ukraine not only
thwarted Russia’s plans to push its favorite into the presidential
suite in Kyiv, but it will likely make it harder for the Kremlin to
influence political processes across the “near abroad,” including the
strategic regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia, Russian political
analysts contend.
Most Russian experts agree that Ukraine’s election crisis is a
watershed for Russia’s policies in post-Soviet Eurasia. The pundits
are divided, however, in their understanding of the nature of the
Orange Revolution and in suggestions as to how Moscow should respond
to the momentous events in Ukraine.
For Russian derzhavniki (champions of Russia’s great-power status), a
victory by Ukrainian democratic forces signifies a clear strategic win
for the West. In a number of articles and policy papers the statist
ideologues assert that since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991,
the presidential race in Ukraine represents “the biggest [geo-]
political war between the United States and European Union on the one
hand, and Russia on the other.” Although some of them concede that the
Ukrainian crisis does have a “democratic dimension,” the general view
is that the massive rallies in Kyiv are basically the result of
skillful manipulation from abroad. As one noted political analyst
argues, the Ukrainian “revolution, as the previous one in Georgia, has
very substantial propagandist, diplomatic, ideological, and
informational support of the Western countries.” In essence, he
continues, “it’s a great geopolitical game” aimed at tearing Ukraine
away from Russia. The alleged strategic objective of the West is to
build some sort of a cordon sanitaire around Russia (Ekspert, December
6).
But this is just one reason why “Russia cannot allow itself to lose in
Ukraine.” The Orange Revolution, the statists say, will likely cause a
dangerous chain reaction. If Moscow fails to reassert its position in
Ukraine, argues the veteran political analyst Vitaly Tretyakov,
“within the next two years velvet revolutions will take place —
according to the Kyiv scenario — in Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and, possibly, in Armenia.” As a result, Tretyakov warns,
the Kremlin might be completely deprived of “room for maneuver in the
post-Soviet space” (Rossiiskaya gazeta, December 2).
Other like-minded experts share Tretyakov’s strategic
worries. Vyacheslav Nikonov, head of the Politika Foundation think
tank, suggests that the repetition of Ukrainian events could occur in
all the post-Soviet countries, “whose regimes the West doesn’t like.”
Remarkably, “all the CIS countries, except Georgia, appear to fall
into this category,” Nikonov notes (Kreml.org, December 1).
It is no wonder, then, that some Kremlin political gurus urge the need
to elaborate an ideology of “preventive counter-revolution.” In a
wide-ranging interview with Nezavisimaya gazeta, leading spin doctor
Gleb Pavlovsky argues that the “Kyiv [events] are a very serious
signal for Russia,” adding that the political system in Russia and
other post-Soviet states is vulnerable to the “new revolutionary
technologies of the globalization era.” The government authorities in
Russia and allied countries should be prepared to protect themselves
from all sorts of revolutionary manipulations seeking a regime change,
Pavlovsky says. In his opinion, one of the antidotes against a
Western-sponsored velvet revolution is a set of measures aimed at
“developing ‘counter-revolutionary properties’ of our power structures
and our society” (Nezavisimaya gazeta, December 7).
Naturally, liberal political thinkers hold an opposite view of the
Ukrainian crisis, while agreeing with the “conservative
counter-revolutionaries” that it is of utmost importance for Russia
and its foreign policy ambitions. According to one prominent liberal
commentator, in Ukraine we are dealing with a “revolution of a new
type.” While the political conflicts in East Central Europe in the end
of the 1980s were revolutions against totalitarianism, the events in
Ukraine are a “revolution against phony democracy,” argues Lilia
Shevtsova of the Carnegie Moscow Center. It is a revolt of the
disgruntled society against a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime and
corrupt crony capitalism. Last year’s upheaval in Georgia demonstrated
the instability of such a regime, but back then Georgian events were
interpreted as a purely national phenomenon. However, Ukraine’s Orange
Revolution appears to prove that we are witnessing a certain political
trend, Shevtsova contends (Novaya gazeta, December 6).
Symptomatically, Georgia’s leadership was quick to state that events
in Kyiv are tremendously important for Tbilisi. In a recent interview
with Le Monde, Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Salome
Zourabichvili noted that until now her country was feeling quite
solitary in the post-Soviet space but with the beginning of mass
protests in Kyiv, “there emerged yet another democratic country with a
population of 50 million.” According to Tbilisi’s top diplomat, the
unfolding political process in Ukraine will likely change the entire
situation in the post-Soviet space. Two positive developments stand
out, Zourabichvili noted, “The Black Sea area will become a region of
democracy,” and “Russia will not be able to dominate the post-Soviet
space” (Politcom.ru, December 9).
Confirmation of the Kremlin’s seriously dented prestige in the “near
abroad” came also from Uzbekistan. President Islam Karimov permitted
himself to chastise his Russian counterpart for what he called a
“shortsighted policy” of open support for one candidate in the
Ukrainian election. The Kremlin’s miscalculation was “one of the
reasons that led to the events in Ukraine,” Karimov contended. In the
opinion of the regional analyst Arkady Dubnov, criticism from the wily
Uzbek strongman is yet another bad sign for Moscow’s long-term
ambitions in post-Soviet Eurasia (Vremya novostei, December 8).
–Igor Torbakov
“ORANGE REVOLUTION” EXPOSES EU’s DEFICIENT UKRAINE POLICY
One of the biggest ironies of Ukraine’s democratic “Orange Revolution”
is that it will cause difficulties in the European Union, an
organization that claims to embody “European values.” Had former Prime
Minister Viktor Yanukovych won the presidential election, it would
have resolved the EU’s dilemma: Brussels and Strasbourg could still
use the excuse given earlier to Presidential Leonid Kuchma, namely
that Ukraine has shown itself to not be part of “Europe.”
The EU’s dilemma over Ukraine may dominate the EU’s Brussels summit on
December 16-17, less than two weeks before Ukraine repeats the second
round of the disputed presidential election.
Challenger Viktor Yushchenko, who is set to win the new runoff, told
his supporters, “I am convinced that the world will recognize us as a
civilized European nation. I am deeply convinced that after the events
of the last 17 days Ukraine will never be the world’s backwater”
(Channel 5, December 8).
Yushchenko is being too optimistic, as the EU is unable and unwilling
to accept how the Orange Revolution represents a break with the Kuchma
era. Ukraine’s democratic revolution, the likely Yushchenko victory,
and constitutional reforms that will transform Ukraine into a
parliamentary republic all testify to the need for the EU to
re-formulate a clear policy toward Ukraine.
The post-communist states that joined the EU this year are not
accepting the EU’s continued complacency over Ukraine. Poland and
Lithuania encouraged the apathetic EU to host round-table negotiations
between the authorities and Yushchenko to break the political
deadlock. Former Czech President Vaclav Havel sent two statements of
support to Yushchenko and former Solidarity leader and Polish
President Lech Walesa traveled to Kyiv and addressed the orange-clad
crowds.
The crisis has caused post-communist EU members to take a harsher
attitude toward Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has confirmed
their suspicion that Russian imperialism and neo-Soviet attitudes
remain alive and well. They are also dismayed at the continued
Russophilia expressed by “old Europe,” namely France, Germany,
Belgium, and Luxembourg.
Yet it would be an over-simplification to state that the EU’s
unwillingness to treat Ukraine as a “European” state lies solely with
its “old European” members. Both British Prime Minister Tony Blair and
U.S. President George W. Bush have forged close personal relations
with Putin.
But Ukraine’s future could pose problems for the four “old European”
EU members. French and German leaders have built up personal
relationships with Putin that are now coming under strain. France, in
particular, seeks a closer alliance with Russia against the Bush
administration’s “unilateralism.”
The EU’s decision to dangle membership in front of the western Balkans
— and possibly Turkey — while denying it to Ukraine is now
untenable. Romania is set to join the EU in 2007 and yet its recent
presidential elections were also undemocratic. The difference lies in
the fact that only Ukrainians — not Romanians — launched a popular
revolution to overturn their election fraud.
Yushchenko has challenged the EU to embrace the new Ukraine that he is
set to lead. In Yushchenko’s eyes, the EU should take four concrete
steps. First, it should recognize Ukraine as a “market economy,” a
political step long over due after Russia’s status was upgraded in
2002. Second, the EU should support Ukraine’s membership in the WTO, a
step that would allow Ukraine to create a free trade zone with the
EU. Third, the EU should sign an associate member agreement with
Ukraine. Finally, Brussels should offer Ukraine EU membership sometime
in the future (Financial Times, December 10).
These four steps could be only undertaken if the EU moved towards
NATO’s “open door” position on membership, which depends on fulfilling
criteria. This would be the Copenhagen criteria for the EU and a
Membership Action Plan (MAP) for NATO.
Currently, Ukraine has only an Action Plan with NATO, not a MAP. NATO
refused to consider a MAP for Ukraine due to Kuchma’s poor reputation
after the Kolchuga radar scandal. But the grounds for this refusal
will evaporate under Yushchenko, and the post-communist members of
NATO will again be clamoring for NATO to offer Ukraine a MAP. Such a
step would strain the Bush administration’s delicate attempts to both
criticize Putin for interfering in Ukraine’s elections while
maintaining a cooperative relationship with Russia for the
international struggle against terrorism.
Washington’s attempts to not be too critical of Russia will only grow
after Condoleezza Rice replaces Colin Powell as Secretary of
State. Yet in reality, as Stanford’s Michael McFaul has pointed out,
“The Russian president is not much of an asset in fighting the global
war on terror” (The Weekly Standard, December 13).
The EU continues to only offer Ukraine a three year “Action Plan” as
part of its Neighborhood Policy, a “Plan” that does not depend on the
outcome of the Ukrainian elections. The inadequacy of these steps were
already evident when the policy was unveiled in 2003, as it placed
Ukraine on the same level as northern Africa and Israel, which are not
part of Europe and therefore have no right to join the EU, and Russia,
which has never declared its intention to seek EU membership.
Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, who takes up the EU’s
rotating presidency in January, said, “I can only warn against
offering Ukraine the prospect of full membership” (The Times, December
10). In reality, the EU has been doing its best to avoid the issue,
which will no longer be tenable if the EU allows in Turkey while
refusing to consider a Ukraine led by Yushchenko (Wall Street Journal,
December 8).
As the Polish Gazeta Wyborcza (December 9) pointed out, when Ukraine
is discussed in Paris they state, “And don’t forget about Russia’s
sensitivity.” Yet, ironically Putin is ahead of “old Europe” on this
question. Anticipating a Yushchenko victory as likely to lead to
Ukraine’s westward orientation, Putin has stated his lack of
opposition to Ukraine’s membership in the EU. For Putin the only
“nyet” is to Ukraine’s membership in NATO (Financial Times, December
10).
–Taras Kuzio
RUSSIA OFFICIALLY REPUDIATES TROOP-WITHDRAWAL OBLIGATIONS ON MOLDOVA
AND GEORGIA
At the OSCE’s year-end meeting in Sofia on December 6-7, Russia ruled
out any regional statement on Georgia or Moldova, and vetoed the
political declaration’s text that read: “Some of the commitments made
at the 1999 Istanbul Summit regarding Georgia and Moldova have not yet
been fulfilled. Their fulfillment without further delay would create
the conditions for . . . ratification of the adapted Treaty on
Conventional Forces in Europe.”
That appeasement-minded text had stopped short of mentioning Russia,
or Russian troops and bases; set no timeframe for compliance, and
failed even to recall just what those commitments were. Moreover, it
seemingly overestimates Russia’s actual (as distinct from rhetorical)
interest in Western ratification of the 1999-adapted CFE
Treaty. During the drafting process, Georgia and Moldova had insisted
that mention be made of “withdrawal of Russian forces,” “concern about
the lack of progress in this regard,” and OSCE desire to “achieve this
goal in the earliest possible timeframe.” Influential Western
delegations and the OSCE Chairmanship, however, turned down even this
mild language (itself a retreat from the 1999 Istanbul documents) for
fear of irritating Russia.
The OSCE’s timidity emboldened Russia to add, in its closing
statement: “Regarding the position taken by certain states on linking
the so-called Istanbul commitments to ratification of the adapted CFE
Treaty, the Russian Federation declares that it does not recognize
this [linkage] as legitimate.” It went on to insist that
troop-withdrawal issues are bilateral ones, between Russia and Georgia
and between Russia and Moldova, respectively, not brooking
international intercession. And it portrayed the Istanbul Commitments
as not binding: Russia may choose to fulfill them at some future time,
provided Georgia and Moldova fulfill their “conditions.”
The Istanbul Commitments had not attached any conditions to Russia’s
troop-withdrawal obligations and did set specific deadlines. The
OSCE’s 2002 Porto and 2003 Maastricht year-end conferences rephrased
the withdrawal obligations into intentions, introduced unspecified
“necessary conditions” (which Moscow can interpret at will), and
lifted the deadlines. The organization thus cooperated in the
evisceration of its own decisions.
In Sofia, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, noting that Russia’s
commitments to withdraw its forces from Moldova and Georgia remain
unfulfilled, reaffirmed the linkage between fulfillment of the
Istanbul Commitments and ratification of the CFE Treaty. Recalling, “A
core principle of that treaty is host country agreement with the
stationing of forces,” Powell confirmed the position that “The
U.S. will ratify the CFE Treaty only after all the Istanbul
commitments on Georgia and Moldova have been met.” NATO made a
collective declaration to the conference along these same lines.
For its part, the European Union’s joint statement “exhorted” (an
unusual term) Russia to withdraw its troops from Moldova and Georgia,
but failed to mention a link to CFE Treaty ratification. And, with
regard to Georgia, the EU went on to repeat the now-discredited
formula, according to which Russia and Georgia should agree among
themselves “on the duration and modalities of the functioning of the
Russian military bases.” The German and French ministers of foreign
affairs, Joschka Fischer and Michel Barnier, in their national
statements, failed to mention Russian troops, Moldova, and Georgia,
but did underscore the goal of ratifying the adapted CFE Treaty.
The OSCE’s Joint Consultative Group (JCG) is responsible for
discussing issues related to implementation and ratification of the
CFE Treaty and fulfillment of the Istanbul Commitments. The JCG’s
Chair, which rotates every two weeks among the Group’s 30-plus
members, is expected to send a letter to the OSCE’s Chairmanship at
each year-end meeting, reporting on JCG activities for that year. Last
year at Maastricht, Russia seemed set to veto the sending of that
letter, but did not need to resort to that step because Armenia
happened to chair the JCG that fortnight and it refrained from
initiating the letter.
This year, Luxemburg happened to chair the JCG just before and during
the year-end meeting. Without mentioning Moldova and Georgia, “Russian
troops,” “bases,” “withdrawal,” or lack of progress, the JCG Chair’s
one-page letter simply restated that fulfillment of the Istanbul
Commitments is a prerequisite for ratification of the adapted CFE
Treaty. It also mentioned concerns about unaccounted-for and
uncontrolled CFE Treaty-limited equipment, again without naming any
names. Russia vetoed the draft letter.
(Documents of the OSCE’s 2004 year-end ministerial conference, Vienna
and Sofia, December 1-7, 2004).
–Vladimir Socor
MEDIA SPECULATION RISES ABOUT GEORGIAN MINISTERIAL CHANGES
After two days of media speculation, there are signs that the rumored
imminent reshuffle of Georgia’s power ministries may contain a grain
of truth. On December 8 both Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili
and Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania made statements that pointed toward a
forthcoming reorganization. Symptomatically, the media leaks occurred
while Zhvania was in the United Stated and parliamentary chairwoman
Nino Burjanadze was in Germany.
Saakashvili convened a special briefing late in the evening on
December 8 to inform journalists that no immediate government
reshuffle was planned and, furthermore, he would not make any top
personnel changes without consulting with Zhvania and
Burjanadze. Saakashvili, however, clearly spoke about the need to
reorganize the power structures and “reinforce certain directions,”
which could be an oblique indication that some changes in the
government might occur in the near future.
In a telephone interview with Rustavi-2 television on December 8,
right after Saakashvili’s briefing, Prime Minister Zhvania was far
more specific. He said that during the two weeks leading up to his
departure for the United States, he had held discussions with
Saakashvili on issues related to government reorganization that, in
his words, might include some personal changes. Zhvania said that any
personnel changes would be based on many indicators, including
performance evaluations for the past year. Zhvania said he would
discuss details of the changes in the government with Saakashvili
around December 11-12 and then the general public would be informed
about it (TV Rustavi-2, December 8; Civil Georgia, December 9).
Media speculation has focused on the power ministers, although other
top officials might also be sacked. One scenario has Interior Minister
Irakli Okruashvili replacing Defense Minister Giorgi Baramidze, while
the latter becomes either Secretary of the National Security Council
or a substitute for Revaz Adamia, Georgian Ambassador to the UN. Gela
Bezhuashvili, currently Secretary of the National Security Council,
would move to the Ministry of Justice, whose current head, Giorgi
Papuashvili, would shift to the Central Electoral Commission. Finally,
Vano Merabishvili, Minister of State Security, would head the newly
merged ministries of security and internal affairs.
Speculation has Russian oligarch Kakha Bendukidze, Minister of
Economic Development, about to lose his job because of his failure to
accomplish mass privatization and bring $1.5 billion to the state
budget, as he promised to do when he took the office. Nick Gilauri,
Minister of Energy, is expected to be replaced by Irakli
Chubinishvili, head of Saakashvili’s administration.
So far, Bezhuashvili is the only official to concede the possibility
of cabinet changes, though he has denied information about his
imminent dismissal.
The first reshuffle in the power agencies took place in June. One
month later the power ministers merely rotated among themselves (see
EDM, June 10; July 1). The first media rumbling about another round
appeared in September, right after the failed military campaign in
South Ossetia this August (see EDM, September 2), and after stories
emerged about illegal arms sales and questionable recycling of used
weaponry (see EDM October 25). The whispers were particularly loud
around Defense Minister Giorgi Baramidze.
Local experts argue that the rumored personnel changes might indicate
backstage fighting between the Saakashvili and the Zhvania teams,
which have remained rivals despite their pompously announced
unification into one political party, the United National Movement, on
November 22 (TV-202, TV-Imedi, December 8).
According to parliament member Levan Berdzenishvili, Saakashvili
himself leaked the latest reshuffle story to the press. “The rumor
about changes in the government is coming from the very presidential
service and is distributed through [Security Minister] Merabishvili.”
Berdzenishvili argues that by disseminating this information,
Saakashvili has put the general public on notice that he is
dissatisfied with the performance of Baramidze, Papuashvili, and
Bezhuashvili, but fully relies on Okruashvili and
Merabishvili. Berdzenishvili sees this development as Saakashvili’s
open statement to Zhvania that he no longer trusts “his” defense
minister and other proteges (Resonance, Inter-Press, December
8-9). The personnel shuffle rumor has suspiciously coincided with a
reorganization in the Tbilisi city government, which mainly sacrificed
Zhvania’s followers.
If personnel changes indeed occur as rumored, it would only reaffirm
the belief held by many pundits that Saakashvili is acutely short of
qualified professional cadres and must grant high posts only to his
most trusted underlings.
–Zaal Anjaparidze
————————————————————————
The Eurasia Daily Monitor is a publication of the Jamestown
Foundation. The opinions expressed in it are those of the individual
authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Jamestown
Foundation. If you have any questions regarding the content of EDM, or
if you think that you have received this email in error, please
respond to pubs@jamestown.org.
Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of EDM is strictly
prohibited by law.
The Jamestown Foundation
4516 43rd Street, NW
Washington, DC 20016
202-483-8888 (phone)
202-483-8337 (fax)
Copyright (c) 1983-2004 The Jamestown Foundation.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress