Agency WPS
What the Papers Say. Part A (Russia)
January 17, 2005, Monday

DIPLOMACY WITH THE BRAKES OFF

SOURCE: Newsweek Russia, No. 1, January 2005, pp. 28-32

by Alexander Baunov

All the diplomats we approached for comments agree that Russia’s
foreign policy has become less diplomatic over the past year; and
this change was not prompted by the Foreign Ministry or the new
minister, Sergei Lavrov, though he has a reputation for being bold
and decisive. Its origins should be sought higher: there are plenty
of bold people in the Kremlin too.

Diplomats name three reasons behind the Kremlin’s change of attitude.
Firstly, the state’s economic position has grown stronger.

Andrei Kozyrev, former foreign minister: “These days, foreign policy
is backed by an unprecedented sense of a strong financial position.
In my day, we were working in an entirely different situation. Of
course, the IMF didn’t dictate terms directly, but the borrowing
situation did have an impact.”

Russia’s Stabilization Fund, which already contains almost $20
billion, is viewed in the European Union as a foreign policy tool. A
European Commission official in Moscow shared these concerns: “All
Russia has to do is drop a hint about how it wishes to invest part of
this money – and it can cause a shift in global markets.”

The second reason is that although the West is “drawing closer” all
the time, physical proximity still isn’t translating into real
warmth. One career diplomat told us: “Having made substantial
concessions to the West on several occasions, we formed the
impression that we are entitled to some compensation: we refrained
from raising obstacles for them, and now we can do something for our
own benefit.” The number of concessions made to the Americans was
particularly high, from the “temporary” US military bases in Central
Asia to the UN resolution permitting a temporary occupation of Iraq.

Russia also made some concessions to Europe, agreeing to accept EU
expansion without extra compensation and ratify the Kyoto Protocol,
which was ineffective without Russia’s participation. In exchange we
got Europe’s permission to join the World Trade Organization, an
increase in metals export quotas, and some other pleasant trifles.
But since then, according to diplomats, relations with the European
Union have been deteriorating to the point of collapse: neither side
expected such a clash over Ukraine.

Yet everything was heading in that direction. One diplomat told us:
“In private meetings, this is how they talk to us: you’re a civilized
country, and we are civilized countries, but we’re surrounded by some
kind of savage tribes – the Trans-Dniester region, Nagorno-Karabakh,
Abkhazia, and so on – so let’s get together like cultured people and
regulate all of that. But it’s perfectly obvious to us that all they
want to do is gain access to our territory, while not allowing us any
access to their conflict zones.”

Many decision-makers in Russia grew bold enough to assume that the
West would now permit Russia to do something for its own benefit. So
when the West didn’t permit this after all, the Kremlin’s annoyance
knew no bounds. The European Union bore the brunt of it. The
embarrassed Greeks, for example, had to listen nervously to President
Putin’s words: “We have normal visa procedures with Turkey, and I’ve
used them myself: I got my passport stamped at the airport, and was
able to enter the country. But it’s extremely difficult to enter
Greece.” The Greeks didn’t like these words; until now, Russia had
spoken to them more diplomatically, avoiding any direct comparisons
with Turkey, their age-old enemy.

At his December press conference, Putin was entirely unrestrained.
Never before had he answered foreign policy questions in such
forthright, undiplomatic language. According to him, the leadership
of Georgia is in the pay of George Soros; and he accused the United
States of seeking to gain power “over equals.”

The third reason concerns Russia’s successful foreign policy
exercises in Asia. The Foreign Ministry views the “all-inclusive
regulation of relations with China” as its major diplomatic
achievement for 2004. Relations with China had appeared to be
irreparably damaged by the drawn-out negotiations over building a
huge oil pipeline from the promising oil-fields of Eastern Siberia.
Last spring, when rumors spread that the Siberian pipeline would run
to the port of Nakhodka, at Japan’s request, rather than to China,
the usually-dull pages of Chinese newspapers were suddenly swept with
more grievances against Russia than at any time since Khrushchev
recalled our specialists from China in the late 1950s.

Yet there was a fairy-tale ending to all this: China received some
islands on the Amur River, and the right to send 500,000
guest-workers into Russia, and a border treaty which had been
disputed for a century, and two dozen other long-term agreements. And
the West is now being given some undiplomatic hints to the effect
that Russia has a special relationship with China. That means a lot,
these days. Russia’s relations with India are also good; the new
Indian government is prepared to cooperate with us, just as the old
government was.

The Kremlin is also seeking access to some new “Asian markets.” It
has attempted to repeat the successful “China scenario” in relations
with Japan, by once again offering Japan half of the disputed South
Kurile Islands. The Japanese refused. When asked if this is an
embarrassment, a Foreign Ministry official replied: “Everything will
remain as it is: trade continues, we have the islands, and we have
the pipeline to be built to Nakhodka. It’s the Japanese who need to
think things over.”

For the Kremlin, 2004 ended on a positive note. German Chancellor
Gerhard Schroeder “forgave” Putin following Russia’s quarrel with the
European Union over Ukraine. None of the US State Department’s
comments about Ukraine and the YUKOS affair disrupted the friendship
between Schroeder and Putin.

Finally, the heroes of another of the Kremlin’s “special operations”
returned to Russia from a prison in Qatar: the two agents who killed
Zelimkhan Yandarbiev. Now, according to diplomats, Russia can demand
compensation from the West again; or at least ask the West to stop
interfering with Russia’s actions within the CIS.

Translated by Pavel Pushkin