Global Politician, NY
Jan 24 2005

EXPERT INTERVIEW: Caucasus is No Longer the Source of Discord for
Russia and Turkey

By GP Interview Staff

Ruben Safrastyan, Ph.D. is a Professor of International Relations at
Acharyan University in Yerevan, Armenia. He’s also the Director of
the Department of Turkish Studies at the Armenian National Academy of
Sciences. In the past, he served as a Counselor of the Armenian
Embassy in Germany and was the Deputy Director of the Department of
Political Analysis for the Office of the President of Armenia.

Mr. Safrastyan, the results of the visit of Vladimir Putin to Ankara
and the following visit of Turkish Prime Minister R. T. Erdogan to
Moscow testify that Russian-Turkish relations have become closer.
Only the fact that 600 Turkish businessmen accompanied Erdogan
testifies much. How great is the potential of political rapprochement
of Turkey and Russia in your opinion? Or the observed processes come
to lobbying of the interests of Russian business in Turkey?

Well, as regards 600 Turkish businessmen, it is an absolute record.
Usually, prime ministers take with them some 200 people. Of course,
it testifies that the Turkish business circles are rather interested
in Russia. The volume of Turkish investments in Russia is rather
great, at present. The economic interests prevail on the part of
Russia as well. In general, Putin’s Administration has marked the
economic direction as a priority, as I understand. In this
connection, I’d like to mention the statement of Anatoliy Chubays
about the liberal empire, which, by the way, made enough fuss in
Armenia as well. Anyhow, it is evident that both Russia and Turkey
are interested in development and deepening of the economic component
of the cooperation in various spheres. It is the most important, but,
at the same time, just one side of the medal.

The second factor is that both Russia and Turkey are not enough
satisfied with their present positions in the world. These states are
dissatisfied with the fact that they are not the leading players in
the world arena, and this dissatisfaction makes them closer, to some
extent. The changes which took place in the foreign policy of Turkey
during the last years connected with worsening of its strategic
relations with the USA, and, which is the most important, worsening
of the Turkish-Israeli relations, testify to a new direction in the
Turkish policy. That is, aspiration for more independence. The same
concerns Russia. Moscow tries to use the privileges gained during the
last years due to high prices for oil not only in the economic
sphere, but also to make it a certain strategic unit. Thus, the two
super powers dissatisfied with their role in the world try to find
their new place, a new niche in the world policy. In this background,
rapprochement of Russia and Turkey is possible not only in economy,
but also at a strategic level. The declaration on the results of
Putin’s visit to Ankara contained such a concept as multilateral
cooperation for the first time. In the course of Erdogan’s last visit
to Moscow, the strategic cooperation was already in question, though
it was not put on paper. Meanwhile, the term `multilateral
cooperation’ was not only fixed, but also was perceived and presented
by the parties to the world as a new degree in the bilateral
relations. It is necessary to pay attention to another circumstance.
Putin stated in Astana that quite unexpectedly for him Turkey had
displayed an interest in Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(Kazakhstan, China, Kirgizistan, Russia and Uzbekistan are included
in SCO – ed.). The Shanghai six is known to try to lay a foundation
of a new union of states, which will play a considerable role in that
region in future, as SCO leaders think. Russia and China are mainly
in question. The fact that Turkey has displayed an interest in SCO is
an evidence of rather serious changes in the foreign policy of that
country. In this connection, it is necessary to mention the concept
presented by Erdogan’s adviser for foreign policy, Professor Ahmet
Davutoglu in his book entitled `Strategic Depth’ in 2000. The term
strategic depth itself belongs to military science and characterizes
an interest of a country that its strategic facilities are in the
depth inaccessible for a possible rival. However, during the last
decades, several states, in particular, Pakistan, Israel, applied the
given concept to general political and strategic issues. It was just
in this light that Professor Davutoglu tried to apply the given
concept to Turkey perceiving the strategic depth not only in the
spatial, but also historical expression. He speaks of Turkey like a
country having a historical depth and entering the 20th century
alongside with seven empires controlling over the big regions in the
world. At the same time, he draws a conclusion that Turkey must play
a great role in the world arena and it must not be treated as a small
European country. According to the concept, all the territories once
included in the Ottoman Empire are strategically important
territories for present day Turkey and it must play a special role
there. In the special expression, the strategic depth is interpreted
by Davutoglu as establishment of not only good-neighbored relations
with the direct neighbors of Turkey, but also an aspiration that
these states enclose the greatest part of their policy in Turkey. For
example, for Georgia and Bulgaria cooperate through Turkey. In this
connection, Davutoglu is perceived in Turkey as a supporter of
neo-Ottomanism.

Giving an analysis to the Party Justice and Development (PJD) ruling
in Turkey, we arrive to a conclusion that it tried to put the
aforementioned concept into practice. Today Turkey exerts great
efforts to improve the relations with its neighbors. For example, at
the end of the 20th century, Turkey was in disagreeable relations
almost with all its neighbors, both in the Arab world and in the
Caucasus and with Iran. The picture is different at present. One
should not ignore the Eurasian subject matter either. The program of
the PJD mentions the Eurasian subject matter as well. An agreement of
cooperation in Eurasia was signed between Turkey and Russia in New
York in 2001. According to this document, task groups at a high level
were formed, which would coordinate the policy of the two countries
in the Eurasian space. Despite the fact that these groups gathered
some three of four times in that period of time, the attempt to
coordinate geo-strategies between Turkey and Russia in the Eurasian
space testifies much.

As a result, if one studies the conceptual basis of the existing
Russian-Turkish relations, the following two concepts go into it:
strategic depth and Eurasian subjects. In this aspect, the existing
trends can be characterized as an aspiration of the two regional
super powers to deaden regional cooperation, which, of course, still
remains, to strengthen economic cooperation and gradually begin to
solve geo-strategic tasks.

Let us suppose that Russia and Turkey are dissatisfied with their
positions in the world arena and try to coordinate their acts to
increase their rating. How will the USA and Europe response to it? It
is right to consider the rapprochement with Russia an alternative for
Turkey in the issue of joining the EU, taking into account the
tension in the relations of Russia with the EU?

I shall start with the last question. In the course of his visit to
Ankara, Putin, in particular, said the following: you needn’t
admission to the European Union; you’d better deepen the cooperation
with us. If Turkey becomes a EU-member, it will be more difficult for
it to cooperate with Russia. It was in early December. By the way,
these words of Putin arouse a negative response of Turkey. However,
already on December 17, the situation changed. In the course of
Erdogan’s visit to Moscow, Putin made a cardinally opposite statement
coming to the following: it is very good that the EU has made a right
decision and Turkey will be admitted to the EU. As a result, our
cooperation will even more strengthen.

There are rather influential forces in Turkish elite, which thinks
about the following: Europe is a good think, indeed, and we should
become part of it, but to be respected, we must have a reliable and
influential rear. And the greater is the influence outside the EU,
the more influence we shall gain inside it. Thus, Turkey, of course,
will do everything to use the privileges gained during the last
two-three years in the aspect of the increase in its influence and
reputation in the eyes of Europeans, including though development of
relations with Russia. It is the meaning of a group.

These is also a pro-American group sure that Turkey should aspire for
maintenance of special relations with the USA, and that aspiration
for the EU and the relations with Russia are of secondary importance,
in the given case. At present, this group is ousted from big
politics, but it is still very strong. The Eurasian group, which is
marginal, belongs to the third wing. It is for the necessity of
deepening relations with Iran, as well as with Russia and China,
including, within the frameworks of SCO.

As regards the top ruling over Turkey at present, one should not
forget that these people belong to the traditional Turkish elite.
There is a very interesting opinion that today Turkey is coming back
to the very natural appearance it must be in. It is connected with
the fact that the ruling party expresses the aspirations and
interests of the greatest part of the population unlike all the other
Turkish rulers, starting from Young Turks, who implanted definite
concepts contradicting to the Turkish mentality. In this aspect, the
greatest part of the Turkish elite does not perceive seriously the
people who are in power at present. The first think that Turkey must
not exceed the frameworks of the traditional policy, as it is
stronger in an alliance with the USA. Thus, anti-Americanism in
Turkey cannot bring any considerable political dividends, though, at
the same time, the country itself is one of the most anti-American
ones, as to public sentiments, leaving behind the same Iran. It is
this public anti-Americanism that is used by the PJD ruling in
Turkey. They play on it and it is part of their very big internal
popularity.

What do you think of Moscow’s position on the Cyprus problem,
especially in the light of the failure of UN Secretary General’s
plan?

After the Turkish part of Cyprus voted for Kofi Annan’s plan,
Vladimir Putin stated that it is absolutely senseless and foul to
continue isolating the Turkish part of Cyprus. Of course, Turks were
pleasantly surprised with the words of the Russian President. Judging
by the official reaction of the Greek and Cyprian parties, they have
seen no real sign of a change in Moscow’s policy in this issue yet.
The EU is known to prepare for presentation of a new plan of
resolution to Cyprian problem, however, as I know, Russia is for
Annan’s plan and it will not support that of the EU. I think, the
fact that Turks provided Russia with an opportunity to occur in the
internal gas, oil and now energy markets of Turkey played a definite
role here. The privatization of Turkish energy distribution networks
is in process, with Russia displaying an interest in it. Besides, a
possibility of laying electricity transmission lines along the bottom
of Black Sea is currently under consideration. It is most probably
that Russia also gave its agreement on the construction and even
financing of the Trans-Thracian oil pipeline. Construction of a gas
terminal in the port Ceyhan is supposed to become the largest Russian
investment program abroad, though no official announcements have been
made in this connection.

It is necessary to assess as another factor that 40,000-strong
Turkish army is dislocated in Cyprus, which is favorable for the USA
as Cyprus is close to Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and, which is the most
important, to Ceyhan. Factually, in the strategic aspect, Cyprus
protects Ceyhan, i.e. the uninterrupted supply of oil from Ceyhan
terminal. Americans plan to construct a military base in Cyprus,
where they have a tracking base, which is the largest in the Middle
East controlling over the South Caucasus, Middle East and Arab
states. As regards Europe, it is also favorable for it that Cyprus be
restored as a united state. If Annan’s plan were accepted, Europe
would have to allocate over $20 billion for its implementation.

Still, how real is Turkey’s full membership at the EU? Whether
Europe’s response will be in favor of Ankara in this connection?

I do not think the prospect of a positive response so simple. Turkey
may receive a negative answer as well. In my opinion, the European
public is not satisfied with the decision to start talks for Turkey’s
admission to the EU adopted on December 17. In their turn, France and
Austria stated that they would announce a referendum on the given
issue. Meanwhile, it is a factual rejection to Ankara taking into
account the existing realities. Evidently, there is a great field for
bargaining here and the result will depend on Turkey’s state. Let’s
think of the issue seriously. Europe feels no need in Turkey. Just
one geo-political factor can be a clear answer to it – EU with Turkey
is one thing, while EU without Turkey is quite another. On the other
hand, I have grounds to suppose that Armenia will become a EU
member-state sooner than Turkey.

In the course of Russian-Turkish negotiations in Moscow, the issues
of the Armenian agenda, including Karabakh problem and the blockade
of the Armenian-Turkish boundary, were also in question. What do you
think, whether the rapprochement of Russia and Turkey is able to
influence the position of the Russian party on the Karabakh problem
or become a reason for an unfavorable shuffle of the Armenian cards?

Before answering the question, I’d like to draw your attention to
data of a survey carried out by the Russian Center for Public Opinion
Studies (VCIOM) on the attitude of Russians to Turkey. According to
these data, 71% of Russians display a positive attitude to Turkey,
51% consider it a reliable trade-and-economic partner, and 16% think
it a fraternal country. The Gallop International in Georgia asked a
similar question. The following data were fixed: only 7% of Georgians
consider Turkey a reliable partner, another 13% see some danger in
that country. To compare, only 3% of Russians think that Turkey is an
enemy country and a probable rival.

Deepening of political cooperation of Russia with Turkey is in the
background of a factual closure of Turkey’s approach to the South
Caucasus. I think the spring of 2002 a crucial point in this respect.
Then Americans made a decision to dispatch a limited contingent of
military instructors to Georgia. As I know, dispatch of Turkish
specialists to Georgia was considered initially. However, in future,
Washington refused from that idea. Probably, Turkey’s role as a
junior partner, assistance of the USA in its expansion to the South
Caucasus, is brought to the minimum at present. Though, we
mechanically keep considering Turkey the major guide of US policy. It
is not so. I think, establishment of new type mobile bases of the USA
in Georgia is a question of time, but probably it will happen in
Azerbaijan at first. So, in this respect, in the Caucasus, Turkey is
no longer dangerous for Russia. That is, the Caucasus, which was an
apple of discord for the two empires for centuries, is
no longer the same. It should be noted that at the beginning of the
last century, the Caucasus was divided between Soviet Russia and
Kemalist Turkey, in the first half of 90s when Russia’s withdrawal
resulted in vacuum in the Caucasus, Turkey tried to fill that vacuum.
Then Russia began returning and Turkey withdrawing again. But, then
occurred the USA, which neglected both Russia and Turkey in the same
way and acted as it thought fit. Hence, the geo-political rivalry of
Russia and Turkey in the Caucasus has been brought to the minimum,
which made their deeper cooperation possible, on the whole. In this
background, of course, the Turkish party each time raises an issue to
Moscow concerning the pressure on its ally, Armenia, to make it
release the territories. Turkey raised this issue in the course of
Putin’s visits to Ankara and to Moscow recently. However, to all
appearances, Russia each time rejects it. Speaking at a press
conference, Putin stated rather exactly that Russia had no intention
to exert pressure on any country; it would limit itself with the role
of a mediator and a guarantor of fulfillment of the agreements to be
signed by the parties. Sergey Ivanov stated almost the same in the
USA. That is, I do not share the concerns of definite political
circles of Armenia that Russia will expert pressure on us in the
issue of Karabakh in favor of Turkey. There are no real grounds for
it. Russia and Turkey have many other spheres to go on compromises.
But, I repeat, at the present level of Russia-Turkey and
Russia-Armenia relations a pressure on Yerevan on Karabakh problem is
ruled out.

Is it possible that Moscow exerts pressure both on Armenia and
Azerbaijan demanding resolution of the issue in the nearest future?

Turkey is not a country able to affect the process of Karabakh
conflict’s resolution within the framework of OSCE Minsk Group. It
can influence the process as it did one or two times torpedoing
almost ready agreements in 90s using all its influence on Azerbaijan.
At the given stage, Turkey is unable to influence Russia in order
that it, in its turn, influences Armenia. Moscow will not go on it.

A decision to start negotiations with Turkey for its admission to the
EU was made on December 17. Naturally, the process will last long.
What do you think, how heavy factor of pressure on Turkey by Europe
can become the Armenian Clause?

At first, Armenia does not perceive adequately what has happened. The
Armenian Clause is included into the agenda of the big European
politics. That is, it has happened what Armenians aspired for
decades. It is a fact, which Armenia is not fully aware of. By the
way, it does not mean that this issue cannot be in the same agenda.
Yet at the beginning of the last year, Chirac said although the fact
of the Genocide was adopted by the French Parliament, the issue of
recognition of the Armenian Genocide by Turkey must be solved by
Ankara and Yerevan; but, everything changed by the end of the year.
It was not only Chirac that pointed out the necessity of raising the
issue of recognition of the Armenian Genocide by Turkey, but also one
of the leading politicians N. Sarkozy and Foreign Minister M.
Barnier.

One should not forget that Armenia is a sovereign state, which is
able to play a definite role and does it. At the same time, for me
personally, dividends can be exclusively moral. Recognition of the
Genocide by Turkey is my duty to the annihilated generations. What is
the policy of the European Union? These are political decisions
adopted by bureaucratic structures of the EU and the EU
member-states. However, not only pragmatic calculations and political
interests, but also public opinion influence the adoption of these
decisions. It is a very strong resource of influence on the policy of
the EU in the Armenian Clause. I think Armenia does not use it fully.
I think diplomacy is diplomacy, but the public resource must be used.
Today Turkey exerts great efforts to protect its interests in the
issue of Genocide. At the end of December, the Foreign Minister of
Turkey, Abdullah Gul, met MPs and stated, in particular, the
following: the issue of admission to the EU comes to that of
recognition of the Armenian Genocide. That is, as to the remaining
issues, compromises can be found. Meanwhile, there is no compromise
in the issue of the Genocide, either Turkey recognizes it or not. I
think Europe will be adherent in this issue. Meanwhile, one should
not hope for Diaspora, but to express its position exactly and insist
on it.

What do you think, whether the crisis in the American-Turkish
relations is able to lead to recognition of the Armenian Genocide by
Turkey, taking into account Washington’s statements that Turkey
should not forget about the events of the beginning of the last
century when raising the issue of Kirkuk? It is necessary to mention
that 30 States have recognized the Armenian Genocide.

The Armenian Diaspora of the USA has rather wide lobbying activities.
However, I think that it made a very big fault. In the course of the
last presidential election in the USA, it supported John Kerry only
and has practically broken its ties with Republicans unlike the first
elections. Definite attempts of diversifications are currently made,
however, the positions of the Armenian lobby in the USA have become
considerably weak. Even without taking it into account, I do not
think that the Republican Administration of the White House will go
on recognition of the Genocide. In my opinion, neo-conservatives just
dislike Armenians.

Today the Armenian public is concerned for the possibility of
Armenia’s being bypassed by the new project to build a railroad
connecting Turkey with Georgia and Azerbaijan. Do you see any good
grounds in the urges for abandoning the idea of the Armenian Genocide
recognition in order to avoid the lot of a deadlock country for
Armenia?

I don’t accept such a formulation. There can be no 100% benefit or
detriment from one or another decision. As for concerns, they are
inspired by Turkey and come to one single formula – cooperation or
deadlock. Meanwhile, Armenia has a big advantage over the other South
Caucasian states. We have preserved our territorial integrity unlike
Georgia and Azerbaijan, which, according to the well-known concept,
is the first feature of a full-fledged state. Armenia has been
controlling big (in regional dimensions) territories for ten years
already managing in the meantime to enhance its economic growth.

These two factors alone show that Armenia cannot be a deadlock
country. On the contrary, today we are the dominating center of this
geo-political area and being in the center both geographically and
geo-politically one cannot simply get in a deadlock. This is an
axiom. Of course, Turkey and Azerbaijan may want to bypass Armenia.
But I don’t think that Georgia might want the same. The real actors
on the global arena, such as the US and Russia, will nonetheless be
guided by geo-political ends in the first place. It’s not a
coincidence that Armenia has been officially included in the
`North-South’ international transport corridor. As for the
above-mentioned Kars (Turkey)-Akhalkaki (Georgia) railroad, this idea
was first expressed by Shevardnadze while Saakashvili signed the
agreement already. As you may know Saakashvili has an idée fix to
make Batumi a big transport center with an airport of international
importance. To have a free hand he needs to connect Batumi with Kars
– this project is part of his plan. In any case, I don’t see any big
threat for Armenia – if the South Caucasian borders are opened we
will be able to join this road at any moment.

The interview was originally conducted by the Regnum News Agency and
provided to the Global Politician by Prof. Safrastyan.