Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
January 26, 2005, Wednesday
LOOKING FOR A SECURITY MODEL
SOURCE: Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kuryer, No. 2, January 19-25, 2005, pp.
1, 10
by Alexander Orlov
(…) The former Soviet republics have been trying to create their
armies for over 14 years.
(…)
The shield of the states, which was created on the fragments of the
former Soviet Army, bears the mark of the Soviet system. The military
infrastructure of the former USSR and material resources stored in
ammunition depots let the post-Soviet states ensure their fragile
military security. However, the armies of the post-Soviet republics
have not been rearmed, they continue using Soviet weapons. At the
same time, the post-Soviet republics receive weapons from NATO and
China, which testifies to the importance of competing for this market
and influence in this region. Military analysts state that the CIS
market of weapons amounts to around $30 billion. The airspace council
of the Duma committee for industry, construction and science
intensive technologies reports that this includes the market of
warplanes and combat helicopters, it amounts to $5-$7 billion or 70%
of the Russian military budget.
What are the peculiarities of military construction in the
post-Soviet armies in 2004? What are the differences between the
reforms carried out in the CIS armies? What is the possibility of
interior and exterior conflicts in the former USSR?
Let’s try to answer these and some other questions linked with the
military factor in the post-Soviet republics.
(…)
Military construction in the CIS
Despite military-economic differences, the armies of the CIS nations
have a range of similar traits. For instance, several trends are
common for practically all armies of the CIS.
Military spending increased along with optimization of the armies.
(…) It would not be a mistake to state that practically all CIS
nations reorganized their control structures in 2004. This
reorganization will continue in 2005. The main changes took place in
the Russian Army within the framework of the administrative reform in
2004. At present Russia has the Defense Ministry, the General Staff,
three new federal services (for military-technical co-operation, the
state defense order and the technological and export control) and one
federal agency (the Special construction department). Russia
established a three-branch structure of military control: ground –
air – sea.
Similar reforms began in Ukraine. For instance, military-technical
co-operation bodies work independently in Ukraine. Ukraine does not
have building units. At the same time, the Russian and Ukrainian
armies have much in common. For instance, Russia created a
three-branch structure of its army in 1998, Ukraine initiated such
changes not long ago. At present it merges anti-aircraft and air
units.
Practically all CIS nations, except for Russia and Kazakhstan, use
the territorial principle of recruitment. However, draftees must
serve at least 50 kilometers from their native towns in Armenia. The
republics, which have superfluous call-up resources (Uzbekistan,
Belarus) established military service in reserve. Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan call-up young people to an alternative civilian service
(so-called labor armies). These people work in cotton fields and at
plants. Uzbekistan was the first country in the CIS to legalize
evasion of military service. Draftees pay $150 for the right to avoid
military service.
In the meantime, people who have not served in the Army cannot work
in public structures in Uzbekistan, which is why military service is
popular in the republic.
Practically all countries have professional units. Armenia and
Karabakh have the most skilled units. The share of such units is 18%,
and it is intended to use them during first minutes of armed
conflicts in order to be able to deploy territorial defense units in
Armenia and Nagorny Karabakh. The share of professional servicemen in
Kazakhstan is 65%. It should be noted that Russia plans to increase
the share of contract service to 50% by 2008.
Practically all CIS nations plan to cut the strength of their armies.
Ukraine plans to dismiss 50,000 servicemen in 2005, Uzbekistan will
dismiss 15,000 people, Tajikistan will dismiss 3,000 servicemen.
(…)
The legislative foundation of the military construction process
improved too. Practically all countries have passed military
doctrines and national security conceptions. In addition, all
republics have laws, which regulate military service.
(…)
The place of armies in the political system
One of the peculiarities of the development of the Armed Forces of
the post-Soviet republics is linked with the fact that the military
does influence the interior and foreign policy. The armies have not
managed to restore territorial integrity to the countries where the
separatist feelings are strong (the Trans-Dniester territory in
Moldavia, Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia in Georgia, Nagorny Karabakh
in Azerbaijan). At the same time, the armies have not managed to
become an independent political force, and the threat of coups
organized by the military is insubstantial in the CIS.
Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma replaced pro-Western Defense
Minister Yevgeny Marchuk with neutral and tolerant General Alexander
Kuzmuk on the eve of the first round of the presidential election in
September 2004. Kuzmuk ensured the Army’s neutrality during the
election. Military experts did not hide the fact that the majority of
officers and ensigns voted for Yanukovich because they remembered
that Yushchenko had cancelled all benefits when he was prime
minister. Yanukovich increased servicemen’s money allowances
substantially.
Staff reshuffles of the security ministers in Georgia in December
2004, and the appointment of the new defense minister in Moldavia had
political reasons. As is known, Tbilisi and Kishinev established the
GUAM bloc (it also included Azerbaijan and Ukraine), which was an
alternative to the pro-Russian Organization of the collective
security treaty. Uzbekistan joined GUAM in 1999. To all appearances,
Georgia and Moldavia decided to ensure NATO’s and the OSCE’s support
in order to reform their security ministries because they are tired
of the separatism.
(…)
“Muslim” armies of the Central Asian republic and Azerbaijan deserve
special attention. The military help the authoritarian regimes of
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan retain power. The attempted assault on
President Saparmurat Niyazov of Turkmenistan in 2002, and permanent
terrorist acts in Tashkent, Bukhara and other Uzbek towns testify to
the presence of terrorist organizations and irreconcilable opposition
in these republics.
It is hard to say who supports this opposition. It is not Russia
because the replacement of the leaders of these countries would mean
economic and political disadvantages. It should be noted that Niyazov
and Karimov banned Western remedial organizations, including the
Soros foundation, after “the revolution of roses” in Georgia. In
addition, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan increased servicemen’s money
allowances in 2004, despite serious economic problems. (…)
The armies play a stabilizing role in so-called “semi-democratic”
countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan.
Nazarbayev’s clan is creating elite units in Kazakhstan, fearing
coups in the republic. The leadership of the Kazakh Army and the
Interior Ministry consists of people originally from Kazakhstan. As
is known, almost 50% of the population of this republic are
representatives of Slavonic nations, Tatars, Uzbeks and more. In the
meantime, Kazakhstan’s economic successes minimize the possibility of
political activity of this group of the population.
The situation in Tajikistan is somewhat different. Fearing mutinies,
President Imomali Rakhmonov abolished elite units of the National
Guard and dismissed former field commanders, who helped him come to
power, in early 2004. A bit earlier, he dismissed representatives of
the Uzbek lobby from the security ministries. Tajikistan has managed
to stabilize the situation in the republic thanks to Russia’s
support. The presence of Russian military advisors, Russian-Tajik
border guards and representatives of the religious opposition in the
Army increased servicemen’s indifference towards politics. Meanwhile,
economic problems and weakening of Russia’s control over the
Tajik-Afghan border may encourage some military units to
unconstitutional activities. However, such revolts would have social
reasons, not political. At the same time, it is very likely that the
Tajik Army (the republic spends around 3% of GDP on its maintenance)
and the 201st motorized infantry division will be able to support
Rakhmonov’s course aimed at the revival of the economy for a long
time.
(…)
In other words, the armies of the post-Soviet republics present an
important tool of their interior and foreign policy. At the same
time, it is an alarming fact that the Trans-Caucasian nations, which
have uncontrolled territories, have increased their military budgets.
(…)