PRESENT AND FUTURE OF AZERBAIJANI POLICY FOR KARABAKH

Azat Artsakh – Nagorno Karabakh Republic (NKR)
07 Feb 05

The question of withdrawing the peaceful regulation of the Karabakh
conflict from the deadlock disturbs all the interested parties
except for Azerbaijan, perhaps. We entitled us to such a brusque
statement basing on the logic of perception of the negotiation process
by official Baku since the signing of armistice with Yerevan and
Stepanakert in May 1994. This logic derives from the very perception
of the final aim of the settlement by the Azerbaijani authorities,
which supposes keeping Nagorni Karabakh within Azerbaijan as well
as creating political, legal, social and economic conditions and
necessity for changing the demographic balance of NK in favour of the
Azerbaijani population (in the shortest possible period). The present
authorities of Azerbaijan reject any other models of peaceful political
settlement. A more than vivid example of this is the February 24, 2001
meeting of the Azerbaijani parliament which discussed the situation of
the negotiations in the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group countries
(Russia, USA, France). It is notable that the meeting took place in
the capital of France with the support of Jacques Chirac on the eve
of the meeting of the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia Heidar
Aliev and Robert Kocharian. It might have been expected that the
results of the meeting of Milli Mejlis with the participation of
ambassadors of a number of foreign countries in Baku would create a
favourable atmosphere for the meeting in Paris. However, everything
turned the opposite. In his address Heidar Aliev stated that the
Azerbaijani party refused all the former suggestions of the Minsk
Group, including those which Baku had accepted as basis for talks not
long ago. Thereby Heidar Aliev created a quite new situation in the
peaceful process and violated the arrangement of confidentiality in
the negotiation process. Vafa Guluzadeh, the former state adviser on
foreign policy, who had most probably received a special invitation
from Heidar Aliev to participate in the meeting, fully formulated
the intentions of Baku in the peaceful process during the meeting of
Milli Mejlis. In his address the former state adviser mentioned with
pity that the OSCE Minsk Group and the international community wanted
a settlement which would allow the Armenian population to continue
living in Nagorni Karabakh. â~@~ Nagorni Karabakh must not be given
a status. Granting Azerbaijani citizenship to Armenians would be a
crime,â~@~] stated Vafa Guluzadeh then. He explained his standpoint
in the following way: the Armenians of Karabakh would â~@~flood
Bakuâ~@~], buy real estate, shares, and they would have the same
rights as the Azerbaijanis. It is notable that all the members of
the Azerbaijani parliament, as well as the president of the country,
agreed to the open racist statements of Vafa Guluzadeh who used to
be the adviser to Heidar Aliev, as well the two former presidents
of Azerbaijan Abulfaz Elchibey and Ayaz Mutalibov. It is clear that
with such a standpoint in reference to the talks for the settlement
of the conflict either with Armenia or Nagorni Karabakh Azerbaijan
has nothing to do as the settlement of the Karabakh issue by way
of negotiations presupposes compromise which is denied by official
Baku. Then how are the Baku authorities going to achieve the goal
they have set? The analysis of the political steps of the Azerbaijani
government shows that Baku has decided to act in several directions
at the same time. The main direction is gradual retirement from
the negotiation process which, indeed, supposes coming in touch
with Armenia and perhaps again with Nagorni Karabakh. The second
direction is taking steps for hindering the negotiations allegedly by
Armeniaâ~@~Ys fault. This direction also supposes the maximum possible
amount of political and legal documents of international organizations
where Armenia will be displayed as â~@~guiltyâ~@~] and Azerbaijan
as â~@~its victimâ~@~], showing that Armenia and even the Armenian
nation is not recognized by Azerbaijan as the direct consequence of
â~@~occupationâ~@~] of Azerbaijani territories, including Nagorni
Karabakh, kindling anti-Armenian hysteria through the mass media of
Azerbaijan, intensifying revenge-seeking rhetoric on the part of the
Azerbaijani authorities as if the consequence of the abstention of
the international community to put military, political and economic
pressure on Armenia in the question of Karabakh, pursuing with the
policy of international isolation of Armenia through conjuring up
the factor of oil and later the factor of gas, organizing different
political provocations aiming to show the world the impossibility of
peaceful co-existence in the region with the presence of the Armenian
factor, and taking a number of steps to discredit Armenia and Nagorni
Karabakh internationally. Thus, the entire foreign political arsenal
of the Azerbaijani government is not directed at the reasonable and
mutually acceptable compromises for the settlement of the Karabakh
conflict but at the unreal aim of recognizing Armenia (and the Armenian
nation) by the international community as a hindering factor for the
realization of the interests of the world and regional powers in South
Caucasus. This kind of policy, according to Bakuâ~@~Y s estimates,
will finally cause general military-political and economic pressure
on Armenia making it cede Nagorni Karabakh. Otherwise, Baku thinks,
the international community may apply sanctions against Armenia,
which will satisfy Azerbaijan even more. This kind of attitude
towards the problem of Nagorni Karabakh supposes that Baku will
torpedo all the positive that may outline the future acceptable
settlement. This very circumstance became the reason for Heidar
Aliev to reject the so-called principles of Paris (Key West),
principles which were discussed in those cities in the first half
of 2001 by the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Jacques Chirac
and George Bush Jr., as well as in the framework of the OSCE Minsk
Group. Presently the political line of Heidar Aliev in the problem
of Karabakh is carried on by his son Ilham Aliev. Thus, during the
first meeting in the history of the country of the president with
the heads of the diplomatic missions of Azerbaijan abroad took
place at the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 27,
2004. During this meeting Ilham Aliev announced that the strategic
direction in the foreign political line of the Azerbaijani state is
to expose the truth about the Karabakh problem and the standpoint of
the country to the international community. â~@~The international law
is on our side,â~@~] mentioned the president of Azerbaijan, â~@~our
lands were occupied, justice is on our side. The economic potential
and other questions also favour us. I do not even doubt that the
problem [i.e. the problem of Karabakh â~@~S A.G.] will have a fair
solution.â~@~] The recent attempts of Baku to provoke the UN to adopt
a resolution on the so-called occupied territories of Azerbaijan were
again targeted at obstructing the negotiation process and later blaming
Armenia for this. The adoption of such a document by the UN would
mean recognizing Armenia as â~@~an aggressor countryâ~@~] with all
the consequences for Yerevan and Stepanakert. It should be mentioned
that the reaction of Yerevan to the discussion of the above mentioned
document in the UN in the period of its undertaking by Azerbaijan
nearly lived up to the expectations of Baku. The foreign minister of
Armenia Vardan Oskanian directly announced that the adoption of the
openly pro-Azerbaijani resolution in the UN would put an end to the
participation of Armenia in the negotiations. However, this time the
plans of the Baku authorities did not come true because of the steady
position of the mediating states which did not allow canceling the
negotiations by the fault of the â~@~ Armenian partyâ~@~]. It must
not be forgot that openly resorting to such provocation Azerbaijan at
the same time officially states its commitment to the ne gotiations
in the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group. Summing up it should be
supposed that in the future Azerbaijan will not give up its tactical
and strategic line in reference to the Karabakh problem because not
recognizing the right of the people of Karabakh for self-determination,
i.e. the fundamental issue, presupposes such a behaviour on their part.

ALEXANDER GRIGORIAN. 07-02-2005

–Boundary_(ID_CaJTmBwnVuurhB5NII5RAg)–