The New Battleground: Central Asia and the Caucasus
By Ilan Berman

The Washington Quarterly
Vol. 28, No. 1 (Winter 2004-05), pp. 59-69.

Following his first meeting with President Vladimir Putin in June 2001,
President George W. Bush heaped praise on his Russian counterpart,
hailing a new era in relations between the two countries and claiming
he had gained a sense of the Russian leader’s soul. Just three and a
half years later, however, the strategic partnership forged between
the two leaders in the wake of the September 11 attacks faces a new
obstacle. Recent geopolitical developments, combined with expanding
strategic agendas in Moscow and Washington, are ushering in a new
era of competition in Russia’s near abroad of Central Asia and the
Caucasus.

At least three factors are fueling the unfolding tug of war between
Moscow and Washington. The first is the new strategic emphasis the
United States has placed on Central Asia and the Caucasus as part of
the global war against terrorism. This focus has propelled Washington
to expand its military and strategic foothold in both regions. The
second is Russia’s domestic economic priorities, which have prompted
Moscow to intensify its focus on acquiring a critical energy mass
among the fragile former Soviet republics. The third factor is Putin’s
assumption of sweeping policymaking authority and the concomitant
rise of an increasingly assertive, neo-imperial foreign policy in
the Kremlin.

For most of the last century, the Soviet Union dominated the political
landscape of what is today Central Asia and the Caucasus. The end
of the Cold War did little to alter this state of affairs. Although
prompting the Kremlin to disengage from much of the Middle East and
Latin America, it did not dim Moscow’s involvement in the newly
sovereign states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Nor did
the end of the Cold War extinguish the imperial aspirations of
many Russians, who continue to dream of a return of their country’s
former holdings. Yet, this wish has been called into question since
September 11. The global campaign against terrorism launched by
the United States following the attacks on New York and Washington
has expanded the U.S. military presence in Russia’s near abroad to
unprecedented proportions.

Moscow has watched these moves with growing trepidation. Putin
supported Washington’s initial plans, breaking with many in Moscow
to endorse a U.S. military presence in his country’s backyard. The
steady expansion of this presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia,
however, has lent credence to Russian fears that, despite assurances
that the United States will withdraw its forces once Afghanistan is
“stabilized,” Washington, in fact, plans a regional deployment of
indefinite duration. Over time, such perceptions, accompanied by a
fear of waning Russian influence, have sparked a series of geopolitical
contests in the countries that make up the post-Soviet space.

WASHINGTON LOOKS EAST

The current U.S. presence in the region is a relatively new
phenomenon. Throughout the 1990s, policymakers in Washington paid
only sporadic attention to Central Asia and the Caucasus. Notable
exceptions included the Clinton administration’s support for regional
energy projects such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the
U.S. military’s 1997 designation of Central Asia as an “area of
responsibility” under the purview of the U.S. Central Command. The
U.S. government’s interest in this part of the world, however,
has changed since September 11. Beginning in late 2001, as part of
its campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan, the United States
codified military basing agreements with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan,
hammered out a deal with Kazakhstan for overflight rights and materiel
transshipments, and acquired contingency use of the national airport
in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.[1] The Bush administration also dramatically
broadened economic assistance to the region, nearly tripling aid
to Uzbekistan alone (to some $300 million) since October 2001.[2] By
the official end of combat operations in Afghanistan on May 1, 2003,
the United States had established forward bases housing a combined
total of close to 3,000 troops in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and had
begun close cooperation on tactical and intelligence matters with
all Central Asian states except Turkmenistan.[3]

If Afghanistan prompted Washington’s initial interest in Central
Asia and the Caucasus, the Pentagon’s strategic transformation has
preserved its attention. Under the guidance of Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. military has commenced a sweeping overhaul
of strategic priorities. For much of the 1990s, the collapse of the
Soviet Union had by and large not been reflected in the strategic
posture of the United States, which chose simply to substitute the
Russian Federation for the USSR as its principal potential adversary,
albeit a smaller and poorer one. By contrast, the Bush administration,
drawing on the recommendations of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review,
shifted the government’s attention to developing capabilities designed
to assure allies; dissuade adversaries; deter aggression; and, if
necessary, decisively defeat undeterred enemies.[4]

These new priorities, in turn, have directed the military posture of
the United States away from the static, adversary-based model that
dominated much of the previous century toward a strategy designed to
achieve assurance, dissuasion, deterrence, and defense against any
potential adversary in any environment. This fundamental change was
enshrined in the National Security Strategy released by the White
House in September 2002, which boldly declared that “[a] military
structured to deter massive Cold War-era armies must be transformed
to focus more on how an adversary might fight rather than where or
when a war might occur.”[5]

The post-Soviet space has become a principal front for this
transformation. In his 2002 report to the president and Congress,
Rumsfeld pointed out that, “[a]long a broad arc of instability that
stretches from the Middle East to Northeast Asia, there exists a
volatile mix of rising and declining regional powers.”[6] In response,
the Pentagon has launched a global realignment of its defense posture
designed to gain strategic control of this arc through an expanded
military presence in those theaters.[7]

This shift in focus has prompted a broad U.S. diplomatic and military
initiative in Central Asia. In Uzbekistan, Washington’s primary ally
in Central Asia, a sweeping grant of authority for military operations
has solidified the Pentagon’s strategic presence, which now consists
of an estimated 1,500 U.S. troops, cooperation with the Uzbek military
on antiterrorism efforts and border security, and substantial joint
initiatives on counterproliferation.

Washington also has opened discussions regarding more permanent
basing arrangements and deeper military-to-military cooperation with
Kyrgyzstan, where the Pentagon currently houses some 1,300 service
members supporting ongoing operations in Afghanistan.[8] In addition,
the United States committed millions of dollars for equipment purchases
and training for Kazakhstan’s military and, since the summer of 2003,
has financed the construction of a cooperative military base in the
Caspian port city of Atyrau.[9]

These efforts have been mirrored in the Caucasus. The United States
has assumed a central military role in Georgia, launching the $64
million Georgia Train and Equip Program in May 2002 as a means to
enhance the antiterrorism capabilities of Georgia’s military and
alleviate tensions between Moscow and Tbilisi over the sporadic Chechen
presence in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge. Pentagon officials have also made
overtures to Georgia’s new president, Mikheil Saakashvili, related
to his country’s pro-Western political direction, a move that has
already spurred the start of significant military reforms in Tbilisi.

Similarly, Washington has pledged some $10 million to Azerbaijan
to strengthen its border security, improve its communications
infrastructure, and help its government carry out security operations
aimed at countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction.[10]
The Bush administration also initiated a series of joint military
exercises in the Caspian Sea designed to train Azerbaijan’s naval
fleet to protect the oil-rich nation’s offshore drilling platforms.[11]
At the same time, Pentagon planners have opened talks with Baku about
establishing a major, cooperative military-training program and raised
the possibility of basing U.S. forces in the country.[12]

The United States has even made inroads with Russia’s closest partner
in the Caucasus-Armenia. In April 2004, the Bush administration
codified an agreement on enhanced military cooperation with Yerevan,
and U.S. government officials subsequently opened preliminary
discussions about joint military exercises between the United States
and Armenia, to be held in the near future.[13]

THE ENERGY IMPERATIVE

The Pentagon’s push east, meanwhile, has been matched in Moscow by a
new economic necessity. Russia has become a bona fide energy superpower
rather suddenly, surpassing Saudi Arabia as the world’s leading oil
producer in February 2002. Since then, the Kremlin has translated
its newfound energy clout into an ambitious foreign agenda, pledging
to provide the United States with 10 percent of its oil imports by
the end of the decade[14] and putting Russia on track to become the
fifth-largest oil supplier to the United States, after Canada, Saudi
Arabia, Mexico, and Venezuela.

An unlikely source has called such hopes into question. Since it
began in the summer of 2003, the very public clampdown by the Kremlin
on Russia’s second-largest oil company, Yukos, and its billionaire
former chief executive officer, Mikhail Khodorkovskii, has rocked
the foundations of Putin’s economic plans. Domestic political
considerations may have been the primary motive for the Kremlin’s
offensive (Khodorkovskii had bankrolled two Duma party factions before
the December 2003 parliamentary elections and even intimated that he
himself might eventually run for president), but the economic impact
has been far-reaching.

First, the campaign against Yukos has succeeded in rattling investor
confidence. Given the unpopularity of Russia’s oligarchs, as well
as the growing boldness of Putin’s authoritarian domestic policies,
many fear that the Yukos affair could merely be a prelude to a larger
government offensive designed to eliminate political opposition
and consolidate the Kremlin’s control over vital Russian economic
sectors. In turn, investors have signaled their unease: from a net
inflow of some $4.6 billion in the first half of 2003, investment in
Russia has seen a dramatic reversal, with capital flight topping $5
billion in the first half of 2004.[15]

Second, the Yukos case has shed light on Moscow’s lack of commitment
to economic integration with the West. The crackdown coincided with
serious bids both from ChevronTexaco and ExxonMobil to acquire major
stakes – 25 percent and 50 percent, respectively – in the Russian oil
giant. All this suggests that the Kremlin’s efforts were, at least in
part, timed to head off the expansion of a Western foothold in the
Russian energy sector. Russian officials’ subsequent talk of vastly
increased governmental control over the country’s energy sector has
only reinforced such speculation.

In turn, as funding for energy exploration and infrastructure
development has dried up, Russian officials have begun to recognize the
limits of their energy potential. According to German Gref, Russia’s
economic development and trade minister, Russian oil production has
now basically plateaued, and it is expected to rise less than 5 percent
annually for the next four years or more.[16] For Russia’s president,
whose 2004 State of the Federation address pledged double-digit
increases in the nation’s gross domestic product by the end of the
decade, this reality only adds impetus to expanding control over
Russia’s energy-rich former holdings as a way of making up the deficit.

RUSSIA’S IMPERIAL IMPULSE RETURNS

Moscow’s reemergence in the post-Soviet space has also been driven
by the revival of an old idea: Russia as empire. This concept has
been present in Russian political life for centuries, and the end of
the Cold War did little tomute Russia’s historically expansionist
tendencies. In fact, calls for a Greater Russia, championed by
advocates such as Nobel laureate Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and by
political thinkers including the controversial geopolitician and
Eurasia Movement founder Aleksandr Dugin, reemerged shortly after
the Soviet Union collapsed. Under Putin, however, these impulses are
beginning to be put into practice.

Domestically, the expansion of executive power has made Russia’s
imperial resurgence possible. Through a variety of legislative
and administrative measures, Putin has succeeded in virtually
monopolizing policymaking authority. The outcome of the December 2003
elections effectively eliminated legislative checks on his executive
authority. The pro-Kremlin United Russia Party was the runaway victor
in the parliamentary race, garnering roughly half of all 447 seats in
the Russian lower house (Duma). As a result, the party has assumed
direction of all Duma committees dealing with foreign affairs and
defense, transforming much of the Russian legislature into an enabler
of the Kremlin’s policies.

Simultaneously, key appointments to government posts and periodic
institutional purges have enabled Putin to create a vibrant subculture
of former KGB officers within the Kremlin bureaucracy. These so-called
siloviki today occupy upward of 60 percent of the key decisionmaking
positions within the Russian government and constitute an important
bloc of political support for official presidential policies.[17]
Together, these dynamics have given Putin a sweeping mandate to pursue
his neo-imperial aspirations.

The mechanism for pursuing such policies can be found in the draft
military concept that the Russian Defense Ministry unveiled in October
2003.[18] The so-called Ivanov Doctrine, named after its chief
architect, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, constitutes a dramatic
overhaul of Russian strategic priorities and military practice. Among
the primary threats to Russian security, the document identifies
“the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of
the military security of the Russian Federation or its allies” and
“the introduction of foreign troops (without the agreement of the
Russian Federation and the authorization of the UN Security Council)
onto the territories of states, which are adjacent to and friendly
toward the Russian Federation.” Clearly, both dangers are thinly
veiled references to the recent strategic inroads made by Washington.

In response, the doctrine embraces the use of preemptive military force
as a means not only to address military threats but also to maintain
access to regions of vital economic or financial importance. As such,
it represents a blue-print for the post-September 11 preservation of
Russian influence in the post-Soviet space, a policy that the Kremlin
has wholeheartedly endorsed.

Moscow has not wasted any time translating these principles into policy
in other ways as well. In Uzbekistan, Kremlin officials have managed
to conclude a series of new deals related to arms and the defense
industry, substantially strengthening military ties between Moscow and
Tashkent. Russia has also codified a framework accord that effectively
puts Moscow at the helm of a large portion of Tashkent’s military
policy. Similarly, in October 2003, in a sign of the Kremlin’s new
forward presence in the region, the Russian military opened its first
foreign base since the fall of the Soviet Union in Kant, Kyrgyzstan,
only 20 minutes from that country’s capital.[19]

Russia has also commenced an intense diplomatic offensive toward
Kazakhstan, with Putin’s January 2004 visit resulting in a significant
strengthening of strategic ties between the Kremlin and its former
satellite.[20] Just one month later, Russia and Kazakhstan inaugurated
a joint action plan for security cooperation, which defined bilateral
cooperation between the two countries as well as their respective
roles in regional security structures such as the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization.[21]
Russia has even reinforced its presence in Tajikistan, announcing in
July 2004 that its vaunted 201st Motorized Infantry Division will soon
have a permanent base in the Central Asian state.[22] Additionally,
in early 2004, in a clear coup for the Kremlin, the government of
Tajik president Imomali Rakhmonov granted Moscow military basing
rights in his country “on a free of charge and open-ended basis.”[23]

In the Caucasus, Moscow has embarked on a campaign designed to undercut
Georgia’s emerging role in the region. As part of this effort, the
Kremlin has fomented separatist tendencies within Georgia’s autonomous
regions (most recently in South Ossetia) and is even rumored to be
behind covert efforts to sabotage the emerging Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
energy pipeline. In late 2003, for example, a leading British paper
charged that Russia’s military intelligence organ, the Glavnoye
Razvedovatelnoye Upravlenie (GRU), was allocating funds to bankroll
eco-terrorists or Chechen rebels in attacks on the energy conduit.[24]

Russia’s approach to Azerbaijan has been more subtle. Through a variety
of diplomatic carrots and sticks, ranging from offers of military aid
to the abrupt cessation of gas supplies, Moscow has attempted to woo
Baku away from its West-ward trajectory.

At the same time, Defense Minister Ivanov has taken pains to stress
Moscow’s commitment to a long-term presence in Armenia. These efforts
include signing a new accord on military cooperation between Moscow
and Yerevan in November 2003, giving Russia the use of military
bases in the Caucasus republic, and announcing the Kremlin’s plans
to modernize Armenia’s military forces by expanding training programs
and weapons transfers.[25]

Russia is also broadening its regional presence by other means. It has
outlined plans to increase its armed forces in the Caspian Sea region
and, in a throwback to the gunboat diplomacy of Soviet times, has
launched a series of regional maneuvers of its Caspian fleet.[26] In
early June 2004, Russia also commenced large-scale military exercises,
dubbed “Mobility 2004,” in a clear signal to the countries in its
near abroad that Moscow possesses both the will and the firepower to
project force. Even though the maneuvers took place in the Russian
Far East, the Russian Foreign Ministry made clear that the exercises
were actually intended to demonstrate to neighboring states and to
the United States that “any place is within our reach.”[27]

Moscow’s moves are about much more than simply rolling back
U.S. influence. Russian officials, in the words of Putin himself,
are at least in part “now working to restore what was lost with the
fall of the Soviet Union, but are doing it on a new, modern basis.”[28]

THE CONFLICT TO COME

The friction resulting from all of these developments has brought
Central Asia and the Caucasus to center stage on the Russian and
U.S. strategic agendas. As Putin told an extraordinary session
of the country’s Security Council in July 2004, “We are facing an
alternative – either we’ll achieve a qualitative strengthening of
the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] and create on its basis
an effectively functioning and influential regional organization, or
else we’ll inevitably see the erosion of this geopolitical space.” The
latter, Putin made clear, “should not be allowed to happen.”[29]

The addition of a new regional player has only reinforced Russia’s
sense of siege. With the most recent round of accession in the spring
of 2004, NATO has dramatically widened its scope and reach in Russia’s
near abroad. This expansion has been matched by a rising activism
in the Caspian and Black Sea regions. The Atlantic Alliance is now
angling to become a guarantor of security for countries in Central
Asia and the Caucasus, a fact that NATO formally articulated at its
June 2004 summit in Istanbul with the announcement of plans to put a
“special focus” on engagement in both regions.[30]

It is not surprising that the situation has fanned Russian fears of
Western encroachment. Russian policymakers have begun to worry, with
some justification, that NATO’s new reach might in the future make it
possible for the West to meddle in areas of the Russian Federation
that were previously off limits. The Kremlin is actively moving to
formulate a strategic response. As Yuri Baluyevsky, the new chief
of the Russian General Staff, has written, “A powerful military
stationed at our borders with no declared objective poses a threat
to any non-NATO country…. Sensible leaders would realize this and
prepare to counter the threat.”[31] For its part, the United States
has only strengthened its commitment to engagement with Central Asia
and the Caucasus as part of its plans to realign its global military
posture to address post-Cold War threats more effectively.[32]

The ultimate outcome of the emerging geopolitical tug of war between
Moscow and Washington is still far from certain. Russia and the United
States may yet be able to establish a modus vivendi of sorts in the
post-Soviet space, based on a mutual interest in neutralizing the
threat posed by regional terrorist groups. Indeed, this objective
has been given new urgency in the aftermath of the bloody massacre
of schoolchildren in Beslan, Russia, in early September 2004.

Nevertheless, the recent events in Beslan can just as easily serve as
the harbinger of far greater friction between Russia and the United
States. Russian officials have since unveiled a new counterterrorism
strategy that internalizes the principle of military preemption and
have expressed their right to “eliminate terrorist bases in any region
of the world.”[33] More ominously, Putin has used the tragedy as an
excuse to further centralize government power by altering the process
for the selection of Russia’s 89 regional governors. There is little
doubt either in Washington or in Moscow that such measures are likely
to contribute to a more aggressive Russian presence in the Caucasus
and Central Asia.

Remedial measures, such as a cooperative counterterrorism strategy for
the region or direct U.S. investment designed to revitalize Russia’s
ailing energy infrastructure, could certainly diffuse some of the
pressure at least temporarily, but policymakers in Washington would do
well to recognize the long-term incompatibility of U.S. and Russian
regional priorities. For the Kremlin, remaining the dominant player
in the post-Soviet space is not simply a matter of political prestige;
this role has increasingly become an economic necessity. For the White
House, meanwhile, the continued independence of the fragile regional
republics, not to mention their pro-Western political orientation,
remains critical to the long-term success of the global war against
terrorism.

The dueling strategies of the Russian and U.S. governments will do
more than simply determine the political evolution of Central Asia
and the Caucasus. Given the stakes, they are likely to test the very
limits of the strategic partnership between Moscow and Washington.

Ilan Berman is vice president for policy at the American Foreign
Policy Council in Washington, D.C., where he directs research and
analysis on Central Asia and the Middle East.

NOTES:

1. Elizabeth Wishnick, Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War:
U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia Reassessed (Carlisle, Pa.:
U.S. Army War College, May 2004), pp. 2-4.

2. Council on Foreign Relations,
“Terrorism: Questions & Answers-Uzbekistan,” 2004,
(accessed
October 14, 2004).

3. Wishnick, Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War, p. 2.

4. “Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts],” December 31, 2001,
(accessed
October 14, 2004).

5. National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
September 2002, p. 29, (accessed
October 14, 2004).

6. U.S. Department of Defense, “2002 Annual Report to
the President and the Congress,” Washington, D.C., 2002,
(accessed October
14, 2004).

7. Douglas J. Feith, “Transforming the Global Defense Posture,”
remarks before CSIS, Washington, D.C., December 3, 2003.

8. “Kyrgyz President Meets With U.S. Centcom Commander,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Newsline, July 29, 2004.

9. “Kazakhstan Building Military Base on Caspian With U.S. Help,”
RFE/RL Newsline, October 8, 2003.

10. “United States Signs Agreement With Azerbaijan to Help Ex-Soviet
Republic Strengthen Its Borders,” Associated Press, January 3, 2004;
“Azerbaijan, U.S. Sign Agreement on WMD,” RFE/RL Newsline, January
6, 2004.

11. Sevindzh Abdullayeva and Victor Shulman, “U.S., Azerbaijan Begin
10-Day Naval Exercises,” Itar-TASS News Service, January 26, 2004.

12. “Azerbaijan, U.S. Discuss Military Cooperation,” RFE/RL Newsline,
November 24, 2003.

13. “Armenia, U.S. Discuss Military Cooperation,” RFE/RL Newsline,
April 27, 2004.

14. “Putin Says Russian Oil to Make Up 10% of U.S. Imports in 5-7
Yrs.,” Prime TASS News Service, September 26, 2003.

15. Carola Hoyos and Arkady Ostrovsky, “Russia Fears Dollars 13bn
Capital Flight After Yukos,” Financial Times (London), November 8,
2003; “$5.5Bln Left Russia in First Half of Year,” Moscow Times,
July 5, 2004.

16. “Russia Unable to Increase Oil Production Quickly-Gref,” Interfax,
June 17, 2004.

17. Arkady Ostrovsky, “Putin Oversees Big Rise in Influence of
Security Apparatus,” Financial Times (London), October 31, 2003
(citing Olga Kryshtanovskaia).

18. Russian Ministry of Defense, “Urgent Tasks of the Development
of the Russian Federation Armed Force,” reprinted by the Russian
Information Agency (RIA) Novosti News Service, October 3, 2003.

19. “Russian Base in Kyrgyzstan Seen as Part of ‘Tougher’ Military
Posture,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, October 25, 2003.

20. Viktoria Sokolova, “Putin Visits Kazakhstan-Round-Up,” Itar-TASS
News Service, January 9, 2004; Charles Carlson, “Kazakhstan: Putin
Visit to Focus on Baikonur, CIS, Oil Resources,” RFE/RL, January
9, 2004.

21. “Kazakh, Russian Security Services Sign Cooperation Accord for
2004,” Interfax-Kazakhstan News Service, February 10, 2004.

22. “Russia to Set Up Military Base in Tajikistan in Autumn,” Itar-TASS
News Service, July 12, 2004; “Russia to Get Tajik Base in Fall,”
RFE/RL Newsline, July 13, 2004.

23. Valery Zhukov, “Russian Military Base in Tajikistan Big
Achievement-Armitage,” Itar-TASS News Service, July 17, 2004.

24. Nick Patton Walsh, “Russia Accused of Plot to Sabotage Georgian
Oil Pipeline,” Guardian (London), December 1, 2003.

25. “Russia to Rearm Armenia Base, Defence Minister Says,” RIA Novosti
News Service, November 11, 2003.

26. “Military Balance Needed in Caspian-Kalyuzhny,” Interfax News
Service, April 30, 2004; “Russia Ends Naval Drills in Caspian Sea,
Plans Large-Scale Drills for Summer,” Center TV (Moscow), May 3, 2004.

27. Pavel Baev, “Kremlin Launches Military Exercises in Russian Far
East,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 1, no. 28 (June 10, 2004).

28. “Putin Say CIS Seeks to ‘Restore What Was Lost’ With Soviet
Collapse,” RFE/RL Newsline, June 18, 2004.

29. Igor Torbakov, “Putin Urges Shift in Russia’s CIS Policies,”
Eurasia Daily Monitor 1, no. 60 (July 27, 2004).

30. “Istanbul Summit Communiqu?,” Istanbul, June 28, 2004,
(accessed October 14,
2004).

31. Yuri Baluyevsky, “Cooperation Is Only Path: West Must Finally
Bury Cold War Mindset,” Defense News, June 14, 2004.

32. Pamela Hess, “U.S. Plans Major Global Troop Realignment,” United
Press International, November 25, 2004.

33. Peter Baker, “Russia Says Siege Leader Brutally Killed 3
Followers,” Washington Post, September 9, 2004 (quoting Col. Gen. Yuri
Baluyevsky).

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