Agency WPS
What the Papers Say. Part A (Russia)
February 21, 2005, Monday
A COLLECTIVE FAREWELL TO ARMS
SOURCE: Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, No. 6, February 18, 2005, p. 2
by Vladimir Mukhin
The CIS collective defense system has started falling apart rapidly.
The first evidence that this system is falling apart is the upcoming
closure of the headquarters for coordination of CIS military
cooperation (SHKVS). According to informed sources at the Russian
Defense Ministry, after lengthy and intensive consultations Russia
has finally agreed with Astana’s proposal to disband this
super-national body. The structure that has somehow tried to regulate
military relations among the CIS countries throughout post-Soviet
history is being shut down.
Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, vice-president of the Geopolitical
Studies Academy, confirmed that such a decision would probably be
made at the summit of CIS heads of state in August 2005 in Kazan.
Ivashov initially set up the SHKVS, and headed the secretariat of the
CIS council of defense ministers (SMO) and main department of
international military cooperation at the Russian Defense Ministry
for a long time. Ivashov considers this step “very wrong and harmful,
significantly weakening Russia’s positions in the former Soviet
Union.” Until recently, Russia was averse to disbanding of the SHKVS
and even at the meeting of the SMO held in November 2004 initiated
support of the staff on the part of other CIS republics, first of
all, Central Asian republics and Armenia. Now there is a 180-degree
turn. Why?
To some extent this question is answered by leaders of various
structures of the CIS and defense ministers of the former Soviet
republics. General Secretary of the CIS Nikolai Bordyuzha presumes,
“There is no common Eurasian security space now. It remains
fragmentary and diluted and internally contradictory to some extent
because its separate elements are not simply harmonious but even
compete against each other.” According to Bordyuzha, to avoid this
“It is necessary to limit the areas of influence in the issues of
provision of collective security among the integration structures
operating in the region, namely CIS, Shanghai Organization of
Cooperation, EvrAzES, Organization of the Collective Security Treaty
and others.” This means that Bordyuzha diplomatically does not speak
about disbanding of military structures in the framework of the CIS
(SHKVS and SMO) but obviously points at Organization of the
Collective Security Treaty (ODKB) subordinated to him. According to
Bordyuzha, ODKB could become a “locomotive of integration processes
in the CIS.” Defense Minister of Kazakhstan Mukhtar Altynbaev is
harsher on this matter. Like Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev he
believes that “instead of the inefficient SHKVS and SMO a security
council of the CIS countries should be established and work in the
framework of the Commonwealth.” This idea was already partially
supported by Defense Minister of Belarus Leonid Maltsev. Maltsev
proposes disbanding of SHKVS and preserving of the SMO secretariat.
In any case, ODKB includes only 6 of the 12 former Soviet republics
(Baltic republics are excluded). Let us presume that they will be
“locomotives of integration” but what can the rest do? The security
council of the CIS countries will be unable to become a “locomotive”
too if it is created because there have been and there are no
military integration processes in the post-Soviet space.
We need to say that the CIS as a traditional form from republics of
the USSR to the post-Soviet sovereign countries is slowly dying. At
this point military collective relations are not an exception. The
countries are forming their military relations not according to the
patterns established in the 1990s but according to their national
interests. This is obviously an objective process. This is an
illusion that the military staff of ODKB is more efficient than
SHKVS. For example, already now in the framework of ODKB there is a
nucleus of countries united by their own coalition forces in Central
Asia. There is a united group of forces of Russia and Belarus in the
west of the CIS and Russia and Armenia in the south. All these groups
have their own staffs and only with difficulties it is possible to
unite them under the flag of ODKB. Along with this, the recent tenth
anniversary of establishment of the united air defense system of the
CIS showed that many post-Soviet countries had common interests in
defense of their airspace. Of course, ODKB member states form the
backbone of these countries but among them there is already
competition and there are problems. Thus, Kyrgyzstan being an ODKB
member is obviously lagging behind the integration processes in the
framework of establishment of the united air defense system.
Commander of air defense of Kyrgyzstan Colonel Vladimir Valyaev was
not even present at the solemn meeting of the member states of the
united air defense system dedicated to discussion of the plans for
2005. However, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, which are not ODKB members,
demonstrated their interest in this even.
Kazakhstan is active as usual. It proposed organization of the air
defense exercises not only on the Russian testing range like it had
happened before but also at its Sary-Shagan testing range. Ukraine
already accepted this proposal having terminated agreements with
Moscow on organization of military exercises in Ashuluk (Astrakhan
Region). Ukraine is currently preparing an intergovernmental
agreement on military exercises on the Kazakh testing range. Thus,
there is an obvious military technology cooperation between Astana
and Moscow, allies in the ODKB. Astana is obviously wining because
its testing range is much bigger and is more attractive from the
financial point of view. This circumstance is another evidence of the
fact that military relations are built not according to the patterns
of ODKB and SHKVS but according to interests of military structures
of the CIS countries.
Moscow traditionally supplies armament and services to member states
of the united air defense system of the CIS countries at its domestic
prices and undertakes arrangement of military infrastructure
(airdromes, testing ranges, staffs), training of personnel and so on.
In exchange Russia receives only unhealthy competition of military
testing ranges, “semi-hostile” blocs (like GUUAM), purchase of
armament and hardware and training of officers of air forces of the
CIS countries in NATO countries (Ukraine is going to do this and
Georgia is already doing this).
Vladimir Popov from the Academy of Military Sciences says:
“Collective staffs and collective defense bodies have exhausted their
capacities in their current form, also because Russia has not finally
determined its principles and its ideology in relations with other
CIS countries.”
According to the analyst, the SHKVS has exhausted its capacities. Its
personnel numbers were halved in 2004. The 55 remaining officers are
very ineffective. All the same, this does not mean that the staff
should be disbanded. Its members could do theoretical work, work out
concepts, identify threats and plan joint events in the interests of
Moscow. It was the SHKVS that worked out the documents determining
the contents of such notions as collective defense and security of
the CIS.
The SHKVS is also located in Moscow. The capital of Russia provides
the base for work, solves everyday problems of officers from the CIS
countries, pays additionally for communication, for electricity and
so on. And it is said that he who pays the piper calls the tune.
Military-political structures in the CIS
ODKB – CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization. Established on
May 15, 1992, by six CIS countries (Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, Tajikistan). The treaty implies military
political cooperation of the member states and assistance, including
military assistance, in case of aggression against any of them.
SMO – Council of Defense Ministers. Established on February 14, 1992.
This is a body of the council of the heads of states for the issues
of military policy of the CIS member states. Activities of the SMO
are coordinated by the secretariat headed by Lieutenant General
Alexander Sinaisky.
SHKVS – Staff for Coordination of Military Cooperation of the CIS
countries. This is an interstate permanent working body of SMO and is
intended for assistance to development of comprehensive military
cooperation of the CIS countries and coordination of implementation
of the decisions of the council of the heads of the states, council
of the heads of the governments and SMO in this area. The head of
staff is Army General Vladimir Yakovlev (former commander of the
Strategic Missile Forces of Russia).
United air defense system of the CIS. It includes 10 CIS member
states that have signed a special agreement in 1995, but only
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia have
active cooperation in this area.
Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Established on April 26, 1996, by
Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan
joined the “Shanghai five” later.
EvrAzES – Euro-Asian Economic Cooperation. This is an organization
established in 2000, including Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Russia and Tajikistan. Moldova and Ukraine have observer status.
Translated by Pavel Pushkin