The Jamestown Foundation
Tuesday, March 1, 2005 — Volume 2, Issue 41
EURASIA DAILY MONITOR
IN THIS ISSUE:
*Yushchenko proposes reviving GUAM
*Russia stands by as EU considers lifting Tiananmen embargo
*Will Tbilisi sell its pipelines to Gazprom?
*Kazakhstan proposes Union of Central Asian states
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KYIV-TBILISI-CHISINAU TRIANGLE: COMMON APPROACH TO COMMON PROBLEMS
Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko is holding meetings in Kyiv
today (March 1) with Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin and Georgian
Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli. Their agenda includes energy supply,
border security, anti-smuggling efforts, and revitalizing the GUAM
(Georgia-Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldova) group of countries. Tomorrow
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili will arrive in Chisinau for a
working visit that includes meetings with President Voronin and
opposition Christian-Democrat People’s Party leader Iurie Rosca.
Saakashvili and Voronin are scheduled to sign a “Chisinau Declaration
on the Supremacy of Democratic Values” and a “Declaration on the
‘Black Holes’ in Europe.” The first document, a follow-up to the
Yushchenko-Saakashvili “Carpathian Declaration” signed in January in
Ukraine, commits Moldova alongside Georgia to “recognizing
representative democracy to be the most effective model of sound, good
governance.” It goes on to express the common belief that “only
Democracy can guarantee true state-building through strengthening
civil society and its institutions . . . in the countries that have
emerged from totalitarian dictatorship and foreign rule.”
Clearly alluding to the Russian government’s ongoing campaign to lift
its Moldovan “centrist” allies to power in the upcoming general
elections, the declaration asserts, “No external forces can prevent
the freedom-loving peoples from voting . . . in accordance with their
beliefs. No outside force should be allowed to impose its will on the
people, no one should be allowed to influence the outcome of the
elections and try to change the political course of the country
through economic blackmail and all kinds of illegal operations.”
Thus far, no Western institution, government, embassy in Chisinau, or
Western election observers have commented on Moscow’s and Tiraspol’s
massive political and media offensive to manipulate Moldova’s
elections. There are growing indications that Russian and
Transnistrian intelligence services plan to infiltrate and hijack any
post-election street demonstrations. This is why the joint
Georgian-Moldovan declaration is “asking the democratic world to
shield us from illegal interference from the enemies of freedom and
forces trying to impose any kind of imperialistic policies. Taking
into consideration that Moldova has insisted that the largest possible
number of election observers from Western democracies should come to
the country, we trust these observers to impartially monitor the
elections.”
Advancing from rule by Moscow-supported corrupt clans to real
statehood is a further challenge to both countries. Thus, “We trust
that the new government of Moldova will come to power as a result of
free and fair elections, not through external threats of economic
sanctions and the attempts of corrupt clans to return to power with
support from yesterday’s masters.”
The “Declaration on the ‘Black Holes’ in Europe” reflects Georgia’s
and Moldova’s analogous problems in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South
Ossetia. The document anticipates joint political efforts in facing
“threats to international peace and security stemming from armed
separatism” and “resolving the externally inspired protracted
conflicts in both our countries.” It reminds the international
community that the secessionist enclaves, “openly supported from the
outside, have become crime zones,” posing region-wide threats to
stability. They also threaten national identities: “in Transnistria,
the use of the Moldovan language is sharply restricted, schools are
persecuted, the Latin alphabet banished; and in the Gali region of
Abkhazia, teachers are prohibited from teaching their students in
their native Georgian language.”
The document observes that the “presence and direct involvement of
Russian military forces in Georgia and in Moldova has become the main
catalyst of these conflicts. Therefore, the speedy removal of the
Russian forces represents the common interest of our countries and
that of the entire region . . . This is not only our local problem,
but a problem for the entire Europe.” Successful political resolution
of these conflicts would “enable our countries to become integrated
into Wider Europe, to deepen our cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic
community.”
Consequently, Georgia and Moldova will “undertake joint diplomatic
steps in international forums” on these issues. Far from viewing the
populations in these territories as enemies, Tbilisi and Chisinau
appeal to them “to rejoin us in the framework of democratic states and
of peaceful Europe. Joining Europe is Georgia’s and Moldova’s
uppermost goal. Let all of us join Europe together.”
–Vladimir Socor
MOSCOW OFFERS MUTED RESPONSE TO POSSIBLE END OF EU ARMS EMBARGO
AGAINST CHINA
Despite U.S. opposition, the European Union is proceeding with plans
to lift the arms embargo against China by June 2005. The ban had been
imposed following the June 1989 crackdown on democracy protestors in
Tiananmen Square. Beijing is looking for alternative sources for the
arms it currently buys from Russia, as there has been friction between
the two sides over Moscow’s reluctance to sell its most advanced
technology to China.
Dropping the embargo could accelerate China’s military buildup,
undermine stability in the Pacific, and endanger Russian
interests. Although Russia could rightfully be concerned about the
proposed EU policy change, Moscow’s response remains muted.
So far, Moscow has made no official comment on the EU plans to end the
arms embargo against China. Traditionally, Russian officials are
reluctant to comment on issues of arms trade.
However, the official Russian media views the Tiananmen embargo issue
in terms of geopolitical relations between the United States and the
EU, while lifting the embargo is considered to be detrimental to
U.S. policies concerning Taiwan (Rossiiskaya gazeta, February
26). There is concern that China’s ongoing military buildup could
entail military action against Taiwan to force unification, a
development with unpredictable repercussions for the entire
Asia-Pacific region.
Most of China’s arms imports now come from Russia. Beijing and Moscow
are already acting as strategic partners that seek to counter
U.S. influence, especially in resource-rich Central
Asia. Subsequently, Russian official mouthpieces tend to dismiss
concerns that revoking the EU arms embargo could exacerbate the
ongoing shift in the balance of power across the region.
Last week, the official Voice of Russia radio highlighted a statement
by a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman that said lifting the EU arms
embargo against China would not affect anyone’s interests and would
not undermine stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Dropping the
European embargo is unlikely to produce a sudden growth in China’s
military might, according to the radio’s commentary (Voice of Russia,
February 22).
Russian official media outlets have highlighted the geopolitical angle
of the Tiananmen embargo issue. During U.S. President George W. Bush’s
recent European tour, the U.S. leader and his European counterparts
agreed on all issues, except plans to lift the arms embargo against
China (Izvestiya, February 24). But so far, differences on the China
issue have not affected a move towards reconciliation between the
United States and Europe (Kommersant-Vlast, February 28).
In contrast, non-official Russian publications have assessed the
situation in blunt terms, expressing concerns that the sale of EU arms
to China would mean that European weapons could be used against
Russia. “China no longer wants Russian weapons,” the GlobalRus.ru
website noted in a comment entitled “Farewell to Russian Arms.”
Some Russian analysts believe that China also has an eye towards
dominating Northeast Asia, a plan that would be facilitated with
European weapons. Specifically, Russian arms exports allowed China to
build up its air and naval forces, while Beijing presumably eyes the
EU aid to beef up its land forces. China does not want to depend on
Russia to equip its land forces, which could be used against Russia
potentially (GlobalRus.ru, February 18).
Meanwhile, the Europeans, notably the French, are pushing to lift the
embargo not out of pure financial considerations, but in an attempt to
balance America’s global power (GlobalRus.ru, February 18).
Another potential cause for concern in Moscow is that EU arms will
compete with Russian arms producers in terms of quality. The Chinese
have procured Russian fighters, diesel submarines, destroyers, and
surface-to-air missiles, but they need state-of-the-art
communications, computers, plus surveillance and reconnaissance
systems to make that military hardware more effective (Lenta.ru,
February 22). Therefore, it is understood that Russian arms exports to
China are set to face formidable European competition.
Apart from bilateral arrangements, Moscow also has a multi-lateral
vehicle for security interaction with Beijing: the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), a six-member group that includes
Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The
SCO represents the first time China has committed itself to a regional
collective security agreement.
Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, as well as Armenia and
Belarus, are also members of an alliance of former Soviet republics
known as the Collective Security Treaty Organization, or the
CSTO. Within the framework of the CSTO, Moscow has pledged to supply
weapons to other member states at Russia’s domestic prices, which are
significantly lower than international rates. It is understood that a
similar initiative for the SCO could eventually give Russia a
competitive edge over future EU arms exports to China.
Surprisingly, Russia advocates closer ties between the SCO and the
West. Last week, for example, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
called for cooperation between the SCO and NATO. “The CSTO has already
initiated [efforts] to establish interaction with NATO,” Lavrov told a
press conference following the February 25 SCO ministerial meeting in
Astana, Kazakhstan (Interfax, February 25). The meeting also
reportedly highlighted plans to sign a nuclear-free zone treaty for
Central Asia later this year, but made no mention of other security
arrangements, including arms trade.
Although affecting Russia’s interests, the embargo issue largely
remains a problem for U.S.-EU-China relations. During his European
tour in February 2005, President George W. Bush said there was “deep
concern” in the United States that lifting the European Union’s arms
embargo against China would change the balance of relations between
China and Taiwan. Also in February, the U.S. House of Representatives
passed a resolution (411-3) that condemned the European Union’s plans.
Nonetheless, French President Chirac announced after talks with
President Bush that Europe was about to remove “the last obstacles” to
its relations with China. On February 22, the Chinese Foreign Ministry
indicated that lifting the “erroneous and outdated measure” would help
develop China-EU relations.
–Sergei Blagov
SPECULATION ON PIPELINE SALE TO GAZPROM DETRIMENTAL TO GEORGIA’S
INTERESTS
A flurry of statements by Georgian officials in recent days suggests
that Tbilisi is once again considering the high-risk proposition of
selling the country’s gas transportation system to Russia’s monopoly
Gazprom. The idea is deeply controversial in Georgia’s decision-making
circles. The individuals pushing for such a sale appear oblivious to
three considerations that should remain uppermost to Georgian
decision-makers. The first, overarching priority must be national
security. Second, the country’s energy supply sources must be
diversified– in this case by guaranteeing a large market share for
the BP-led gas export project from Shah-Deniz in Azerbaijan, via
Georgia to Turkey. Finally, the third priority is Georgia’s
credibility in the United States, which regards the proposed sale to
Gazprom as detrimental to the U.S. goal of strengthening Georgia’s
political independence.
At a February 22 news conference, State Minister for Economic Reforms
Kakha Bendukidze professed to “not understand why we should be
threatened if those gas pipelines, through which Georgia receives gas
from Russia, are sold to Russia, which then takes care of the pipeline
system.” Implicitly acknowledging, however, that the U.S.-backed BP
pipeline project would be affected adversely, Bendukidze countered by
challenging the BP-led consortium to bid against Gazprom for acquiring
Georgia’s Soviet-era pipeline system (Imedi Television, Civil Georgia,
February 22). Bendukidze could not have been unaware of the fact that
BP had long made clear that it has no commercial interest in acquiring
Georgia’s old pipelines, but only in building its own pipeline. The BP
office in Tbilisi lost no time reaffirming that the company “has no
interest in taking part in this privatization process and does not
intend to purchase anything” in the old pipeline system (Civil
Georgia, February 24).
On February 24, Bendukidze declared that any sale of pipelines to
Gazprom would include a clause to guarantee supplies to Georgia. He
also held out the prospect of Gazprom expanding the capacity of the
trunk line to Turkey in order to export more Russian gas to that
country. The two Soviet-era lines run via Georgia to Turkey and to
Armenia, respectively. Their combined throughput capacity is said to
have fallen from 16 billion cubic meters annually pre-1991 to 8
billion cubic meters annually at present, requiring an estimated $200
million to repair (Reuters, February 24).
A guarantee clause in a sale contract could, however, only guarantee
overwhelming market share for Gazprom in Georgia, to the detriment of
alternative supply sources such as Azerbaijan. Gazprom’s guarantees
would offer no protection from threats to interrupt supplies on
technical or force majeure pretexts, as an instrument of Russian
political leverage on Georgia. Meanwhile, pumping Gazprom gas to
Turkey via Georgia would increase Turkey’s already risky dependence on
Russian gas. It would, moreover, preempt in Gazprom’s favor the
Turkish market niches that are now reserved for Shah-Deniz gas to be
piped via Georgia.
Reacting to the political fallout in Georgia from Bendukidze’s
remarks, Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli reassured the public that no
decision has been made or even officially examined by the cabinet of
ministers. Noghaideli also pledged that the Parliament would be part
of any decision on this issue (Imedi Television, Civil Georgia,
February 23). Selling the trunk pipelines to Gazprom would require
changes to existing Georgian legislation that prohibits the sale of
strategic assets such as transportation pipelines. Parliament Chair
Nino Burjanadze is on record as strongly opposing, on
national-security grounds, any sale of the trunk lines to Gazprom
(Rezonansi, January 31).
Steven Mann, the top U.S. official responsible for Caspian energy
issues, cautioned Georgia publicly on February 24 against selling the
trunk pipelines to Gazprom. Noting that the U.S. has been working for
years to strengthen Georgia’s independence and to help diversify the
country’s energy supply sources, Mann pointed out that the proposed
sale to Gazprom would run counter to this U.S. policy, and also reduce
the commercial potential in Georgia of BP’s Shah-Deniz project, which
would however go ahead regardless (Civil Georgia, February 24). Mann
has issued several cautionary statements of this kind ever since
former president Eduard Shevardnadze and former energy minister Davit
Mirtshkulava (now in jail on corruption charges) entered into talks on
this issue in 2003 with Gazprom.
In an interview with the Italian newspaper La Stampa, cited by
Georgian media on February 22, President Mikheil Saakashvili confirmed
that talks on selling trunk pipelines to Gazprom are in
progress. Declining to go into details, the president only remarked,
“The gas is Russian after all” (Imedi Radio, Civil Georgia, February
22). This remark as cited seems implicitly to acknowledge that selling
trunk pipelines to Gazprom may well result in preserving an
overwhelming market share for Gazprom in Georgia. However, Saakashvili
returned to the matter during the cabinet of ministers’ special
session on energy issues on February 25, in the conclusion of which he
reassured the public, “The Georgian government would not do anything
that would make the country dependent on some monopolistic
scheme. Currently there is no decision being prepared on this issue
. . . No one should be able to blackmail us by saying, ‘If you do
something, you will find your power cut’ ” (Georgian Television
Channel One, February 25).
The president possesses the political and moral authority to put an
end to speculation on a sale to Gazprom that would be detrimental to
Georgia’s national interests on so many counts.
–Vladimir Socor
KARIMOV TOYS WITH NAZARBAYEV’S CALL FOR INTEGRATION In his annual
message to the nation, delivered on February 18, Kazakhstan President
Nursultan Nazarbayev made yet another well-calculated move to polish
his personal image as an ardent supporter of Central Asian
integration. “I propose creating a Union of Central Asian states,” he
announced. Indulging in an extensive retelling of history, Nazarbayev
said that the ancient Silk Route symbolized not only the link between
West and East, but also the unity of the Central Asian peoples.
Nazarbayev said that the states of the region face a choice: either
remain a supplier of raw materials for the rest of the world “in
anticipation of the advent of the next empire” or move towards an
integrated Central Asian region. The Kazakh leader called upon Central
Asian nations “to be worthy of our common great ancestors who would
always see us together. It is time for us to open a new, indispensable
way for the next generation of nations enjoying equal rights”
(Ekspress-K, February 19).
While Nazarbayev’s integration zeal was predictably applauded at home,
foreign audiences, including the Central Asian neighbors targeted by
the message, largely remained lukewarm to the idea. Officials in the
Foreign Ministry of Uzbekistan, who were quoted by the Ferghana.ru
website as having downplayed the integration initiative as “another
call for show, unfounded and far from reality.” According to the same
source, Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry dismissed Nazarbayev’s
integration call as an attempt to “deflect the attention of the people
from regional problems or boost his image as an active supporter of
Central Asian cooperation” (Ferghana.ru, February 22).
This unfriendly comment triggered a wave of diplomatic indignation in
Kazakhstan. In an interview with the government newspaper
Kazakhstanskaya pravda, Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev hastened
to announce that the Central Asian union proposed by Nazarbayev should
not be construed as an insidious scheme to create a single state
dominated by one nation. As he explained further, Nazarbayev had in
mind the “development of integration and coordination of policies on
economic reforms through creating a free-trade zone, a customs union,
a common market of resources, goods, capital, and labor, and a
currency union.”
Tokayev went on to enumerate a laundry list of further arguments in
favor of the Central Asian union, such as human trafficking, illegal
migration, proliferation of conventional weapons, and shortage of
water resources in the region. Tokayev, clearly trying to dispel any
mistrust toward Kazakhstan’s integration proposal, added that the
proposed Central Asian union would be modeled on the European Union in
order to guarantee the equal rights of its members (Kazakhstanskaya
pravda, February 23).
In commenting on the Central Asian union concept, Tokayev was more
explicit than Nazarbayev, who had broadly outlined his integration
design and vaguely linked the need to create a union of Central Asian
states to the threat of globalization and growing military and
economic rivalry between superpowers for the resources of the
region. Nazarbayev did not directly say that the would-be union should
integrate Turkic-speaking states, but he referred to the Agreement on
Eternal Friendship between Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan and
also noted “common cultural and historical roots, language, and
religion” as a solid foundation for the integration.
Obviously, Nazarbayev did not expect his message to produce a hostile
response in Uzbekistan. Shortly after the reports on Ferghana.ru, he
had a telephone conversation with his Uzbek counterpart, Islam
Karimov, who reassured him that Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry did not
have anything to do with the information spread “by some news
agencies.” Proclaiming Uzbekistan’s willingness to cooperate with its
neighbor, Karimov expressed his country’s readiness to help Kazakhstan
to avert flooding in the Syrdarya river basin by diverting discharge
water from the overfilled Shardara reservoir in south Kazakhstan to
the Arnasay lowlands in Uzbekistan (Interfax Kazakhstan, February 23).
Uzbekistan’s newly appointed Foreign Minister, Elyor Ganiev, had to
quell the diplomatic row when he arrived in Astana to attend a session
of the Council of Foreign Ministers of members of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization on February 25. Ganiev reiterated Karimov’s
view that the information disseminated in the media does not reflect
the position of official Tashkent, which sees President Nazarbayev’s
initiative on creating a union of Central Asian states as a genuine
intention to deepen the integration in the region (Vesti.uz, February
28).
Some experts in Kazakhstan note that the idea of Central Asian
regional integration, as proposed by Nazarbayev, essentially boils
down to a revival of the pan-Turkism put forward nearly a century ago
by Mustafa Shokay, a controversial Kazakh intellectual, who lived in
exile in France and died in Germany during World War II. But whatever
the conceptual roots of the integration idea, everyone in Central Asia
could derive benefits from such a union.
Yet such hopes are tinged with strong doubts. Kazakhstan has seen many
integration agreements, pledges of friendship, and alliances in the
past, but none of them ever fully materialized (Zhas Qazaq, February
25).
–Marat Yermukanov
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