Congressional Quarterly, Inc.
Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony
March 8, 2005 Tuesday
CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
COMMITTEE: SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE: EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN BLACK SEA AREA
TESTIMONY-BY: ZEYNO BARAN, DIRECTOR
AFFILIATION: THE NIXON CENTER
Statement of Zeyno Baran Director, International Security and Energy
Programs The Nixon Center
Committee on Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European
Affairs
March 8, 2005
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, for the
opportunity to appear before you today and share my views on the
progress the countries of the Black Sea have made in their democratic
reform process and on the impediments to further reform these
countries face. I will also present some suggestions on how the
United States can continue to advance its own security interests in
this strategic region. I will not discuss developments in all the
countries of this region, which includes the three South Caucasus
countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), Moldova, Ukraine, new
NATO allies Bulgaria and Romania, and the two big powers, Turkey and
Russia. I will concentrate on four principal issues: I. The recent
revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. Georgia’s November 2003 Rose
Revolution and Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution have inspired people
and countries from throughout the region (especially Moldova) and
around the globe. II. Russian energy monopoly over the European and
Eurasian countries. This is one of the main impediments to the future
success and prosperity of Georgia and Ukraine, as well as to the
democratic future of the Black Sea region as a whole. III. The
dangerous trend in Armenia and especially Azerbaijan. If Azerbaijan
does not hold democratic parliamentary elections in the fall of 2005,
Islamist forces may gain ground. Moreover, if there is no solution to
the Karabakh issue over the next several years, Armenia and
Azerbaijan may once again go to war. IV. The deterioration in the
US-Turkey bilateral relationship. Turkish mistrust of US long-term
objectives in the Black Sea region dramatically hinders American
initiatives in this area. I. Georgia: Inspiration for Change
Mr. Chairman, I was an election observer during the November 2003
parliamentary elections in Georgia and saw firsthand how tens of
thousands of people refused to accept the theft of their votes and
the silencing of their voices. More than anything, the Georgian
people no longer wanted to live in a “failing state”; they feared
that if the post-Communist regime stayed in office any longer, the
damage would be such that they would forever lose the prospect of
reuniting with Europe, where they believed they belonged. The Rose
Revolution was not a movement led or even inspired by the United
States; it was a domestic uprising against a corrupt and weak regime
that was rotting internally and could not deliver on any promises to
restore stability and economic growth and bring Georgia closer to the
transatlantic community. Its internal weakness was exploited by
Russian companies as they took over strategic assets, tying the
country’s economy and future directly to Moscow–just as they had
previously done in Belarus and Armenia. Yet, over the course of a
decade, American assistance was essential, especially to preparing a
cadre of reformers, both inside and outside government. Current
president Mikheil Saakashvili received training and strong support
for his overarching reforms in the judicial sector when he was
minister of justice. Former prime minister and parliamentary speaker
Zurab Zhvania, who recently died in a tragic accident, similarly
benefited from his close work with the American assistance community.
These are just some of the many Georgians who, over this period,
developed personal relations with American leaders, while discovering
that both sides shared the same values and principles. Based on these
experiences, these Georgians took the initiative to move their
country in a positive direction, both while in government and in the
opposition. Following this example, then, I strongly urge that the
United States assist reformers within governments, not just those in
NGOs or in opposition parties.
The Georgian revolutionaries were indeed committed to the ideal of a
democratic revolution, and wanted to share it with their country’s
strategic partner, Ukraine. Soon after the “Rose Revolution” of
November 2003, even before he was inaugurated as president,
Saakashvili made Kyiv his first foreign destination in January 2004.
In fluent Ukrainian, Saakashvili confidently predicted that Ukraine
would become democratic over the next year, while pledging his
support for his friend, Viktor Yushchenko. While few in the West (or
in Russia) noticed, over the next year Georgians and Ukrainians, in
government as well as in civil society, worked together to ensure
Ukraine’s democratic triumph. While many in the West (and in Russia)
looked down on the state of Ukrainian civil society, Georgians knew
that they had helped inspire this European nation and reawaken its
quest to reclaim its place in the West on the basis of the same
shared values and principles. When the Georgian president, prime
minister, and other officials met with their American counterparts
over that period, they urged US support for Ukraine’s democratic
voices. They knew that if Georgia remained the sole island of
democratic
change in the Black Sea region, it would be very tough to succeed,
especially given the Russian pressure. Now Saakashvili and Yushchenko
want to support others who want to move in a pro- democratic
direction by aggregating their voices to obtain more attention from
the EU and the US. This is precisely what happened with the Moldovan
parliamentary elections on Sunday, March 6. Both Saakashvili and
Yushchenko met with President Voronin just ahead of the elections in
order to provide support for a leader who seeks to reintegrate
Moldova into Europe. It is no coincidence that Saakashvili and
Voronin were the only presidents of the former Soviet countries who
did not accept the falsified second-round election results that
declared former Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych as the winner of the
Ukrainian elections in November. Nor is it surprising that they in
turn were also the first to congratulate Yushchenko for his eventual
victory.
But the situation in Moldova is complicated. While Voronin is head of
the Communist Party of Moldova, he has distanced Moldova from Moscow
in recent years in pursuit of Moldova’s European vocation. His
underlying goal may have been to preempt any democratic revolution by
playing Moldova’s European card. In contrast to Georgia and Ukraine,
Moldova is thus pursuing an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary
reform process. But the country’s progress towards democracy is no
less real.
As Saakashvili stated, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova now together
believe that “we can complete democratization’s third wave in Eastern
Europe”.1 Completing this wave means that each country has committed
to fighting crime, corruption, and the influence of clans that has
led these countries to internal weakness and external vulnerability;
it means that each country must consolidate democratic gains and move
closer to the Euro-Atlantic institutions; and it means that each
country needs the continued support of the European Union and the
United States to succeed.
The sustainability of the Georgian and Ukrainian revolutions is
essential for others in the Black Sea region to follow a reformist
trend, whether revolutionary or evolutionary. For this
sustainability, Georgia and Ukraine have submitted their EU action
plans–plans that need to be seriously considered, as the prospect of
eventual EU membership will provide the necessary incentive for both
countries to undertake tough but necessary reforms. The US needs to
support, and to urge its European allies to support, both Georgia and
Ukraine in their EU process as well as in their implementation of the
NATO Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP), which pave the way
for their eventual alliance membership.
Second, the US needs to work closely with its European allies to urge
the resolution of the separatist conflicts in the Georgian regions of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as the Moldovan region of
Transnistria. It is encouraging to see Ukraine and Romania
cooperating on the issue of Transnistria, and to see the
recently-founded New Group of Friends of Georgia (consisting of
Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) taking the
lead in urging Brussels and Washington to pay attention to these
issues. In fact, these former Soviet-bloc states that have now joined
the EU (Bulgaria and Romania are expected to join in 2007) and NATO
have become the most visionary and constructive of America’s European
allies. They are also helping the Europeans to better understand
Russia and are urging the resolution of these frozen conflicts,
without which further democratic reforms are difficult, to say the
least. As long as these conflicts remain, they will be sources of
potential instability and of potential Russian pressure.
Senator Richard Lugar’s resolution on Russian troop withdrawal from
Georgia and Moldova, urging it to implement the 1999 OSCE agreement
to withdraw its troops from these two countries, is extremely timely
and very important as the existence of the Russian military forces
have become a hindrance to peace. One of the four Russian bases in
Georgia has been vacated, the status of the second is in dispute, and
talks are ongoing regarding the remaining two. Yet after six years,
Russian troops still remain in both countries, and discussions on
troop withdrawal are often held in parallel with other political
concessions.
The US also needs to at the high levels engage the EU and NATO to
ensure a new Border Monitoring Mission (BMO) in Georgia to replace
the OSCE mission, which, following the Russian veto, will terminate
in May. The BMO has been critical to the effort to obtain credible
information on Georgia’s borders with the Russian republics of
Chechnya, Daghestan and Ingushetia. Moreover, in the past, it was
thanks to these monitors that the West found out that Russian planes
had bombed Georgian territory. The US needs to help find a mechanism
to replace the BMO; there are several European countries that are
willing to step up to the task, but none wants to take the lead for
fear of drawing Russia’s wrath. Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova are also
eager to revive the GUUAM organization, consisting of Georgia,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova, an effort for which they
need US political support. As GUUAM is perceived in Moscow to be an
alliance against Russian interests, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan at this
point are not interested in reviving it in a political form; they
instead want to increase cooperation in the economic sphere,
especially regarding east-west transportation corridors. While
Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova may prefer to include security and
democratization issues in GUUAM, in order to avoid a breakup of the
organization and to instead utilize it as much as possible, an
initial focus can be energy–an area in which the United States can
be particularly helpful.
II. Russian Energy Monopoly
Mr. Chairman, a very important yet often ignored hindrance to further
reform in Georgia, Ukraine, and the Black Sea region is the effects
of the Russian energy monopoly in Europe and Eurasia. The West
ignored the clear intentions of Anatoly Chubais, head of Russia’s RAO
UES, who declared in September 2003 that “Russian business ought to
be allowed to expand. . .with the aim of creating a liberal empire”
in the former Soviet sphere. In addition to such an expansion of
Russian energy monopolies, over the last year Russia’s largest oil
company Yukos has been dismantled and through Rosneft its assets
consolidated under Kremlin control. When Rosneft merges with Gazprom,
Putin will be in direct control of the world’s largest integrated oil
and gas company.
Putin’s policies indicate a desire to strengthen Russia’s already
strong position in the Eurasian and European energy markets. If
Russian monopoly power increases across the Eurasian region, then
countries will have difficulty resisting Russian political and
economic pressure. Similarly, if Russian market power within the
European gas sector increases, then the Europeans will be even less
willing than they are now to lean on Russia when Moscow’s policies
toward the Eurasian countries undermine the sovereignty and
independence of these states.
Armenia and Belarus are already facing this problem of Russian energy
leverage. Post-revolution Ukraine and Georgia, as well as the Central
Asian and even the Baltic countries, are beginning to grasp the need
to quickly come up with comprehensive energy security plans.
While many of these countries want to ensure their energy security by
diversifying their sources away from Russia, without strong political
support from both the US and the EU, they will not be able to resist
the Russian pressure. Moreover, those individuals and corporations
who currently benefit from non- transparent energy deals with the
Russian firms currently have no incentive to give up their power,
which would make Western support for democratic governance even more
important.
The US needs to be aware that Gazprom wants to control the gas
markets of Georgia, Turkey, and Ukraine to form a strategic ring
around the Black Sea, which would then be under permanent Russian
energy control. Georgia is the gateway through which Caspian gas will
be able to enter to Turkey and then be transported onwards to the
European markets. However, it is also the weakest link in this Black
Sea chain. The difficult economic conditions prevailing in Georgia
have given Gazprom a great opening to try and acquire the title to
the Georgian gas pipelines, thus bolstering its monopoly power. If
Tbilisi unintentionally helps Gazprom in this effort, then Georgia
will only be enhancing the company’s long-term leverage over European
gas consumers, and thus discouraging Europeans from taking a firmer
line with Russia on political issues, such as the frozen conflicts
mentioned earlier.
The US should therefore include Eurasian energy strategy in its
transatlantic dialogue. The US helped Georgia and Azerbaijan with
their energy diversification by supporting the East-West energy
corridor, by which Azerbaijani oil and gas will soon be transported
via Georgia and Turkey to world markets, thus breaking up the Russian
monopoly. Now, the US ought to further extend the East-West corridor
from Central Asia to Europe, a corridor with the Black Sea region at
its heart. While gas is more directly relevant to strategic
considerations in the South Caucasus and European countries, the
situation is similar in the oil sector. Ukraine needs the most help
in this area; it had constructed the Odesa-Brody oil pipeline to
transport Caspian oil to European markets; yet, under Russian
pressure, the Kuchma government last year agreed to its reversal so
that Russian oil could be transported to the Black Sea. While
commercial reasons were presented as justification for the reversal,
it is more likely that it was done in consideration for Russian
political support to the Yanukovych presidential campaign. This is
apparent by the fact that, over the past several months, the Russians
have not put enough oil into the line to make it profitable;
expectations were that it would supply half the amount it originally
pledged for 2005.
The Yushchenko government recently announced–at a joint press
briefing of the Ukrainian and Georgian prime ministers–that
Odesa-Brody would be reversed back to its original direction. On
March 4, the Ukrainian and Polish prime ministers also agreed to the
extension of the pipeline to the Polish city of Plock. In this way,
Poland will also be able to diversify away from Russian oil. Despite
its intentions, Ukraine will be unable to make the reversal happen on
its own; it needs American political support, which can help
facilitate an intergovernmental agreement between Kazakhstan, Ukraine
and Poland that will ensure supplies on one end of the pipeline, and
markets on the other end, thus making it commercially viable.
III. Armenia and Azerbaijan: Time is on Neither Side
Mr. Chairman, I have followed developments in Armenia and Azerbaijan
closely since 1996 and believe that until the Karabakh issue is
resolved it will be very difficult to see real progress in democratic
and economic reform. Both countries’ politics are totally consumed by
this issue and both sides believe time is on their side; as a result,
neither one wants to make a concession– which is a dirty word in
that part of the world. The main losers are the youth of these
countries, who are spending their most productive years waiting.
Azerbaijan is told by the West that it lost Karabakh in the war and
needs to give up this piece of land for the sake of peace and
prosperity and move on with its EU and NATO integration process. This
kind of talk only hardens the nationalists, who believe that with
massive oil and gas revenues starting to flow into the budget over
the next several years, they can strengthen their military, and take
back their land. Given that there are already four UN resolutions
supporting Azerbaijani territorial integrity, if they play the oil
card well, they may have a chance in getting diplomatic support.
Hence, they believe the best strategy for them is to bide their time.
Armenia too believes time is on its side to turn Karabakh’s de- facto
separation from Azerbaijan to de jure acceptance. They do not think
Azerbaijan would risk a war when its oil and gas pipelines may be
attacked and its economy devastated. Armenia also can wait, as its
economy has grown despite having no trade with two of its
neighbors–Azerbaijan and Turkey. While Armenia wants to resume
economic relations with Azerbaijan as a best confidence building
mechanism, Azerbaijan claims that the refusal to have economic
relations is the only peaceful mechanism they have to keep Armenia at
the negotiating table. Azerbaijan’s strategic partner Turkey has also
closed its borders with Armenia, and will also not open them until
the Karabakh issue is resolved.
To change the political and economic conditions on the ground and the
calculations of the two sides, the US needs to get engaged at the
highest levels. In 2002 Presidents Bush and Putin issued a joint
statement on the need to resolve the frozen conflicts of Abkhazia and
Karabakh, but no further steps were taken. The Karabakh process has
been left to the OSCE Minsk group, which cannot deliver a solution,
as the issue requires top level discussions. While it is good to keep
the dialogue going between Armenia and Azerbaijan, failure to deliver
a solution is leading to massive frustration among the people and
hurting the image of the OSCE.
In addition to a committed Bush-Putin discussion, the solution to
Karabakh requires democratic progress in both Armenia and Azerbaijan
so that the governments have legitimacy in the eyes of their people,
which is essential for support for the final agreement. The US
therefore needs to encourage the leaders of these two countries to
embrace the democratization process as essential to regional security
and stability. I will not spend much time on Armenia, as issues
relevant to Armenia are well known here thanks to the work of the
strong Armenian diaspora. I will simply mention that the strength of
the diaspora cuts both ways, as it also limits US ability to
encourage democratic change in this country. The US simply cannot put
the same kind of pressure on President Robert Kocharyan as it was
able to do with President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine; it is
inconceivable to think that Washington would threaten to keep senior
Armenian government officials out of the US in case of a falsified
elections.
Azerbaijan, unlike Armenia, has fewer friends in the US as it does
not have a major diaspora; however, potentially it can be a great
strategic partner. Azerbaijan is the only Muslim country with troops
in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo. It is a secular democracy with a
Shiite majority neighboring Iran. As many Azerbaijanis proudly state,
theirs was the first secular democratic republic in the Muslim world.
Though short-lived, the 1918 republic included opposition parties in
the parliament and allowed women to vote. It is an oil and gas rich
country and if it manages to spend its energy wealth wisely,
Azerbaijan can become a great example for the rest of the oil-rich
Muslim world.
The November parliamentary elections could be a turning point in the
U.S.-Azerbaijan relationship. The Bush Administration has made a
commitment to pro-democracy forces throughout the region to support
their calls for free and fair elections. Many in the opposition and
civil society have been inspired and energized by recent events in
Georgia and Ukraine and expect the US to deliver on its promises of
democracy and freedom. The government, however, is nervous that
opposition will receive support from the US and possibly try to have
a revolution as well. Given that there is no fundamental difference
between President Ilham Aliyev and the leaders of the pro-Western
opposition groups, with a correct engagement strategy, the US can
help move the country in a positive direction.
At the same time, many people are many benefiting from the current
corrupt, clan based system in Azerbaijan and these forces will try
their best to avoid free and fair elections in November, which will
be a turning point for Azerbaijan. In fact, since Aliyev succeeded
his father in the October 2003 presidential elections there has been
crackdown on media and opposition activists; this has led many to
wonder whether Aliyev is not fully in charge of his government or
whether he himself sanctions these policies. The most brutal incident
so far occurred last week, when Elmar Huseinov, the editor in chief
of the Azerbaijani opposition magazine Monitor was shot dead in front
of his home in Baku. Aliyev blamed “internal and external forces”
that want “to deliver damage to Azerbaijan’s international image, to
discredit it before the parliamentary elections and present the
country as an unstable and non-democratic state, where freedom of
speech is violated and acts of terrorism are committed”.2 It is
highly unlikely that Aliyev himself was involved in this murder, and
it is critical for him to make sure the killers of Huseinov are found
and properly punished so that neither his nor his government’s image
is further damaged.
Over the next eight months the US needs to both assure Aliyev that
Washington does not want his ouster, and at the same time be firm in
supporting free and fair elections. As a start, the US, together with
the EU, can ask Azerbaijan to allow the operation of at least one
independent television station, and to let the opposition hold
meetings. In Georgia the so-called Baker Plan, which was delivered by
James Baker to his friend Shevardnadze and the leaders of the
opposition, provided the framework for the critical November 2003
elections. Such an approach can also work in Azerbaijan
The US should also be concerned about the November elections in
Azerbaijan because if the secular parties in and outside the
government loose more ground, the Islamists are likely to fill their
place. As the leader of the opposition Popular Front Party, Ali
Karimli stated in his talk at the Nixon Center on February 15, 2005,
with the secular political opposition’s activities restricted,
Islamists are getting stronger. As Karimli put it, “on Fridays more
than three or four thousand people turn up at services in every
mosque, in a country where I cannot gather fifty people together for
a meeting!” He also mentioned, and as I have observed in my recent
visits, the Islamists are gaining ground because they exploit the
Karabakh issue, arguing that even though Azerbaijani territory is
invaded and there are four UN resolutions about it, “because we are
Muslim, our rights are not respected;” second, the Islamists
highlight the “extreme poverty and the huge inequality between the
average person and the top one or two percent who own everything;”
and third, they take advantage of the fact that “no one seems to
care” about democracy in the country.3 These are all worrisome signs
in a country neighboring Iran, which experienced a similar
development that brought in the Islamic Republic.
IV. Turkey: Growing Mistrust of the US
After decades of NATO alliance and strategic partnership, Turkish-
American relations began deteriorating with the Turkish Parliament’s
refusal to allow US troops to transit Turkey and into Iraq in March
2003, and deteriorated as the war in Iraq unfolded. There had been
ups and downs in the relationship before, but the level of
anti-Americanism in Turkey today is unprecedented. A recent BBC
survey found that about 82 percent of Turks have a negative view of
the Bush administration’s policies and consider today’s America to be
one of the biggest threats in the world.
This Turkish anger is primarily a result of the Iraq war, which many
in Turkey opposed. They initially feared their neighbor turning into
an ethnic and religious war zone. Turkish concerns have focused on
the presence of the several thousand PKK terrorists in Northern Iraq.
The US has promised to eliminate the PKK terrorist threat in Iraq,
but so far has not made a move. After a brutal civil war with its
Kurdish population that lasted a decade and cost over 30,000 lives,
Turks are angered with the US for not taking action against a group
that already began terrorist operations inside Turkey. They are
therefore wondering whether the “global war on terror” is waged only
on groups that threaten the US and excludes groups that threaten only
US allies.
In addition, Turks fear the Kurds in Iraq may eventually establish an
independent state that would also appeal to Turkey’s own Kurds living
in the border areas; such a development could once again lead to
separatism and instability inside Turkey, potentially rekindling
civil war and even undermining Turkey’s territorial integrity. The
fact that the oil-rich city of Kirkuk is gradually coming under
Kurdish control and the Turkmen–their ethnic brethren–living in
Kirkuk are being discriminated against, further causes suspicion and
mistrust towards the US.
Turks now associate Iraq with chaos and damage to their national
interests, while the US hails Iraq as a test case for spreading
democracy and freedom in the world. This has led many Turks to
associate American democracy and reform initiatives in the Middle
East with an expansionist policy that will weaken Turkey, but cloaked
in the rhetoric of “freedom” and “justice”. Fearing further chaos and
change in its southern neighborhood, Turkey has even pulled closer to
Syria and Iran.
This is part of the context for the Turkish reluctance to support US
or European initiatives for democracy in the Black Sea region. Many
in Turkey were skeptical of the Georgian and Ukrainian revolutions,
which they believe were managed by the US. They fear that under the
rubric of “democratic alliance,” the US is creating an anti-Russian
alliance in the Black Sea region, which will lead to instability and
undermine Turkey’s security in this region. Second, when the US talks
about democracy in the Black Sea region, Turkey hears American naval
presence. Turkey is strongly opposed to any foreign military presence
in the Black Sea, which it fears will undermine the Treaty of
Montreaux of 1923, which afforded Turkey rights to regulate the
Turkish Straits.
Retaining some jurisdiction over the Bosporus and Dardanelles remains
one of the highest priorities of Turkish national security policy, as
it has since 1453.
US-Turkish tension is aggravated by a lack of dialog. There have been
few discussions on the Black Sea region at governmental levels; the
first one in several years took place only in the last week of
February when Ambassador Halil Akinci, the Turkish Foreign Ministry’s
Director for Russia, Caucasus and Central Asia visited Washington. In
his meetings Akinci stated that Turkish policy in the Black Sea
region is based on four pillars: “contributing to the consolidation
of state building; supporting political and economic reforms;
promoting the Black Sea states’ integration with the international
community; developing and enhancing bilateral relations on the basis
of equality, mutual interest and respect for sovereignty.”4 Given
that this Turkish vision and the American vision are at the core
complementary, more bilateral discussions need to be held between
diplomats, military and the civil society so that the Turks can
understand these interest are shared. At the same time, the US needs
to understand a much deeper psychological issue is at play, and this
is why Turkey has been moving closer to Russia. The US should not
ignore the psychological hang-ups of former empires like Turkey and
Russia, which still suffer from the 19th/20th century views of
strategic factors and do not share Bush’s vision of advancing
democratic change in pursuit of freedom. Turkey and Russia still pine
over lost lands and fear being surrounded by a West hostile to their
interests. Both oscillate between feelings of insecurity about their
waning influence in global politics, and a sense of strategic
indispensability in Eurasia. Both have in varying degrees resented
growing American presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia, where
they had historic, ethnic and religious ties and a sense of
entitlement. The last thing they want is to see the US also enter the
Black Sea region, which Turkey and Russia feel is their “special zone
of influence” where they are the major powers. Ultimately, both are
status quo powers in terms of foreign policy who oppose change in the
Black Sea region, mainly because in their recent past any change
meant losing territory or influence.
What Turkey now needs more than anything is a carefully balanced
message from the US that Washington appreciates Ankara’s importance
and seeks partnership, but that Turkey’s strategic importance will
not shield it against the consequences of nasty behavior. In the
Black Sea region, this means that Turkey needs to hear that Turkish
and American interests overlap in terms of shared NATO values. But
Turks also need to understand that the unchecked growth of
anti-Americanism is not acceptable. Anti- Americanism has grown in
many countries since the Iraq war, but the tone and the depth of the
anger in Turkey is a result of a number of other factors that have
created a perfect storm. In fact, today Turkey’s secular military,
Islamists, leftists and nationalists–forces that often oppose each
other–have united in their common opposition to the US. Why?
Maybe the best example for understanding what is happening inside
Turkey is a brief look at the best selling fiction in Turkey today,
The Metal Storm. While it is fiction, Turkish and American government
leaders’ real names are used and the context is based on actual
events. The Metal Storm is about a war the US launches against Turkey
in 2007 under the name “Operation Sevres,” which is the much-feared
agreement signed at the end of the World War I whereby the Western
powers hoped to dismantle the Ottoman Empire. In the book Armenians,
Greeks and Kurds are once again portrayed as fifth columns of Turkey
who the West can use to destabilize Turkey.
The American operation against Turkey begins when the Turkish
military enters northern Iraq after the attacks in Kirkuk on non-
Kurds, i.e. Turkmen, have increases significantly. The US does not
diplomatically oppose the Turkish move as it is about to attack
Syria. Moreover, the US has been running a psychological campaign
against Turkey for some time and uses this opportunity to portray the
Turks as the aggressors, even though it is the US that launches a
brutal attack on them. It is interesting to note that the book makes
clear that by that point in 2007, Nicholas Sarkozy has become
France’s President, and afterwards the EU ended talks with Turkey,
which in turn has moved away from the West. The Turkish government
has withdrawn its Ambassador to the US as a result of the Armenian
genocide resolution that passes the US Congress. As part of the
campaign against Turkey, the US was also portraying Turks are wrong
in Cyprus.
Now while for many in the US such scenarios may be far-fetched, to
say the least, in the Turkish context they are quite believable.
Since this book was published a few months ago, there have been
several TV shows in the US where the Turks were portrayed as
terrorists, which was taken as a sign of a psychological operation
against Turkey. Only a few days ago Sarkozy, who is the most likely
candidate to be France’s next president, received a huge applause
when he objected to Turkey’s EU membership. The list goes on. In the
book there are two more reasons for the US to launch a war on Turkey.
The first is to “liberate Istanbul from 500 years of occupation by
the Turks” and let the Evangelical Church construct the biggest ever
church in this city. At secret meeting in Vatican called “The New
Byzantium,” the church decides to re-Christianize Anatolia, which has
many holy Christian sites. Again, while this theory sounds almost
insane, many in Turkey do not understand the role of the Evangelical
church in American politics and fear that President Bush was serious
when he announced the beginning of a new crusade after the attacks of
September 11, 2001. On top of this comes the EU’s religious freedom
reform pressure, which again, is perceived in Turkey as a way to
“Christianize” Turkey. Consequently, those in Turkey promoting
interfaith dialogue have been accused of serving American and Western
interests, not Turkish ones. (This is of course very unfortunate
since Turkish moderate traditions and long history of interfaith
acceptance can be the best antidote against the radicalism prevalent
in many Muslim societies).
A second reason for the US attack in the book is the American desire
to move away from dependence on Middle Eastern oil and the need to
develop new energy sources. Turkey has rich borax, uranium and
thorium mines; it has monopoly in borax, which is mainly used for
space and weapons technology and therefore is a strategic mineral.
While few in the US ever think of these mines, many in Turkey,
starting several years before this novel was published, have feared
an eventual US attack to take over these mines. It is probably not
surprising that in the end of the book, Russia and Germany help
Turkey by taking on a common diplomatic position against the
US–simply because they do not want the US to control these mines and
become even more powerful.
Throughout the book honorable Turkish military and political leaders
wondering how and why the US would attack Turkey after decades of
partnership. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and others
are often portrayed as having difficulty grasping that the US is
indeed attacking Turkey. In several parts, the book states “For a
long time there was speculative news about the US plans on Turkey.
Many people ignored these as fiction because it was considered so
insane;” clearly this language is intended to make the story even
more believable.
I have spent a significant part of my testimony on Metal Storm,
because it is essential in understanding the Turkish mindset today.
What can the US do when many Turks read this book and daily articles
in the press that play on the softest spots in the Turkish psyche to
create a sense of insecurity and fear of US intentions?
The average reader in Turkey has difficulty in separating fact from
fiction and reports indicate many read the book as a prophetic one.
With the EU reform process forcing fundamental changes in Turkey that
exacerbate many people’s sense of insecurity about their future and
sense of certainty, this book has brilliantly captured the mood in
Turkey. It further clouds fact and fiction by hinting at current
issues of contention in US- Turkish relations, including whether the
tragic events of 1915 constitute the “Armenian Genocide,” the
unresolved Cyprus issue, and developments in Iraq.
Getting US-Turkish relations back on track in the Black Sea and
beyond requires the Turkish leadership to put an end to the breed of
wild and destructive speculation portrayed in Metal Storm. Turkish
political leaders need to step back an contemplate whether they truly
believe the United States would contemplate the outlandish actions
concocted by the authors of Metal Storm, who use references to actual
American leaders and a deep familiarity with US military technology
to convey a sense of authority in their writing. Turkish leaders must
then decide whether they must clarify to the Turkish people that wild
speculation about a US plan to dominate Turkey are divorced from
reality. Perhaps this will lead to a genuine debate about the future
of US-Turkish relations, including in the Black Sea. Instead,
Turkey’s civilian and military leaders are silent, allowing thousands
of Turkish readers to misperceive the book’s ruminations as
plausible, if not fact, and causing potentially serious damage to
US-Turkish relations. There is a danger that, as Turkey proceeds with
democratic reforms required to advance its quest for EU accession,
and as the hallowed role of the military decreases in Turkish
politics, Turkish society may compensate these developments with
growing anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism Hopefully, Turkey can
come out of the process much stronger and as a valuable EU member.
In the short term, there are three specific steps the US can take to
try to reverse these negative trends and restore a sense of
partnership in relations with Turkey. First, together with the Iraqi
government, the US needs to find a formula to assuage the Turkish
irritation with the continued PKK presence in Northern Iraq. Until
and unless the PKK issue is resolved, Turkish-US relations cannot
move to a better phase, and Turkey would continue to resist any US
initiatives in the Black Sea region.
Second, given the prevalent Turkish view that the US is running a
campaign against Turkey, it would be very damaging if the “Armenian
Genocide” resolution passed Congress this year. This year is the 90th
anniversary of the tragic 1915 massacre and certainly the Armenian
diaspora groups would like to get recognition. However, such a
resolution would play right into the hands of the growing set of
anti-Americans and ultra-nationalists in Turkey. For the Black Sea
region, it will mostly hurt the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement.
Third, the US needs to continue raising Turkish EU membership as part
of the transatlantic dialogue and insist that Turkey should be
accepted into the EU on the merits. Turkey needs to be assured that
it will not be swapped with Ukraine; this certainty is necessary for
Turks to support Ukraine’s (and Georgia’s) ongoing democracy reforms,
and make the fundamental mental and institutional changes at home.