Civil Georgia, Georgia
March 15 2005

Beware of Traps in Georgia-Russia Troop Withdrawal Agreement

By Vladimir Socor / 2005-03-15 19:45:36
Re-posted from the Jamestown Foundation web-site

The Georgian Parliament passed a resolution on March 10 that requires
Russia unconditionally to withdraw its forces from Georgia no later
than January 1, 2006 — unless Moscow reaches agreement with Tbilisi
before May 15, 2005, on a “reasonable timeframe” for the troop
withdrawal.

Georgia will be safer if the troop withdrawal timeframe remains as
defined by the parliamentary resolution, without political conditions
or linkages to other issues. Georgia would, however, run serious
risks if it tries negotiating a political agreement with Russia on
troop withdrawal and allow it to become linked to other issues. In
that case, Moscow would again drag out the negotiations while trying
to pressure or lure Tbilisi into signing an agreement filled with
traps and conditionalities.

Based on 14 years of experience in the Baltic states, Moldova, and
Georgia itself, at least six traps can be expected to be laid by
Moscow into the text of a political agreement with Georgia on troop
withdrawal. Those traps would be designed to negate the goal of
military withdrawal, ensuring a military presence instead.

1. Legalization

Whatever “reasonable timeframe” is ultimately agreed for troop
withdrawal — 3 years as Tbilisi hopes, 7 years as Moscow demands, or
a compromise — Russia wants the presence of its troops to be
legalized for the duration. If this is done, Moscow will have an
incentive to prolong the term upon expiry, and will almost certainly
try to pressure Georgia to accept prolongation de facto. The Baltic
states were aware of this risk when they refused to legalize the
presence of Russian troops on their territories for any “temporary”
or “transitional” period. Legalization by Georgia would: a) undermine
the irreplaceable argument of national sovereignty for the ridding
the country of Russian troops; b) enable Russia, under the CFE Treaty
and in other contexts, to cite “host-country consent” by Georgia; c)
weaken international sympathy and support for Georgia’s ultimate goal
of terminating Russia’s military presence; d) retain, instead of
removing, a potential time-bomb of a political-military nature inside
the country; and e) interfere with Georgia’s national goal of
integration with NATO. Like the Baltic states, Georgia must never
legalize Russia’s military presence for any length of time.

2. Re-Labeling

Russia hopes to retain the Batumi and Akhalkalaki bases and its
Tbilisi general headquarters by re-labeling them “anti-terrorist
centers.” Georgians originally came up with this idea in 2004 in
order to re-start the Russian-blocked negotiations and to provide
Moscow with a face-saving way to withdraw the troops. Tbilisi had
envisaged the formation of one joint Georgian-Russian analytical
anti-terrorist center, under Georgian sovereign control and not
located at any existing military base, to be created in the wake of
the garrisons’ departure, and to include several score of Russian
officers, without troops or armaments. Moscow, however, seized
Tbilisi’s goodwill gesture and turned it against Georgia. Last month,
Moscow proposed to rename the existing bases as “anti-terrorist
centers” and even to augment their garrisons; and when Tbilisi
refused, Moscow publicly blamed Tbilisi for blocking the
negotiations. Georgia may have outsmarted itself with that offer in
the first place. With anti-terrorism an international concern for
many years to come — and, sometimes, a cover for any use of coercion
— it is easy to envisage Russia demanding to retain “anti-terrorist
centers” in Georgia into the future, while propagandizing (as it
already does) that Georgia tolerates “international terrorism.”
Moscow has grossly abused Georgia’s face-saving offer. Three years
ago, Russia re-labeled its Gudauta military base as “peacekeeping”
and retains it to this day, in breach of its 1999 commitment to have
closed down that base by 2001. The lesson from all this to Tbilisi is
that it must require the withdrawal of Russian troops unambiguously,
without the risky and time-wasting complications of tinkering with
their labels. The Baltic states were successful because their
position was never less than straightforward.

3. Ratification

Russia will try to require parliamentary or some other type of
ratification of a troop-withdrawal agreement with Georgia. The
experience of Moldova is instructive on this point. In 1994,
then-prime ministers Viktor Chernomyrdin and Andrei Sangheli signed
an intergovernmental agreement on the withdrawal of Russian troops
from Moldova within three years (by October 1997). A Russian-added
codicil stipulated, however, that implementation would be subject to
“the states’ internal procedures,” not further specified. The Kremlin
promptly interpreted this as requiring parliamentary ratification.
Moldova’s parliament quickly ratified the agreement; but Russia’s
Duma never did. Instead, the Russian government for years thereafter
presented additional conditions just for submitting the agreement to
the Duma for debate, and the Duma piled up additional conditions for
examining the document, with still more conditions for ratifying the
agreement, which it never did. Ultimately, the main condition was
Moldova’s acceptance of Transnistria’s separation with Russian troops
in place. Since 1997, Russia has simply ignored the agreement. With
this experience in mind, Tbilisi must insist on an executive
agreement with Russia on troop withdrawal, fully binding from the
inception, and providing for effective international oversight (other
than by the OSCE) of its implementation.

4. Istanbul Formula

Moscow wants to retain the OSCE Istanbul 1999 formula, because it
does not require the closure of the Batumi and Akhalkalaki bases. It
merely stipulated, “during the year 2000 the sides will complete
negotiations regarding the duration and functioning of the Russian
military bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki and the Russian military
facilities within Georgia.” This formula must finally be cast aside
because Moscow has breached it — along with many other points of the
OSCE Istanbul 1999 agreements — constantly and massively throughout
these years. The Istanbul formula was patently inadequate in the
first place because it failed to stipulate the goals of base closure
and troop withdrawal regarding Batumi, Akhalkalaki, and other Russian
military installations. Any new agreement with Russia must precisely
stipulate the binding obligation to close the bases and installations
and withdraw the troops.

5. Georgian Obligations

Russia will try to saddle Georgia with obligations to create proper
conditions for the reduction and withdrawal of Russian troops,
facilitate the functioning of bases and movement of personnel, vouch
for a secure environment in the base areas, and so on. Moscow will
formulate some conditions very broadly in order to abuse them later,
but will also advance some very specific conditions that Georgia
might be unable to fulfill in time or at all. Thus, Russia refused to
hand over Gudauta to Georgia — and has since blocked any meaningful
international inspection — on the excuse that Georgia is unable to
provide security in the area, which happens to be controlled by
Russia’s Abkhaz proteges. In Akhalkalaki, Moscow can well orchestrate
demonstrations by local Armenians in favor of retaining the Russian
base, then claim that it could not and would not act against the will
of the local population. Russia has already played this game for
years in Transnistria as an excuse for keeping its troops in place.
With this in mind, Georgia must not accept any obligations that
Russia or some local clients might prevent Tbilisi from fulfilling.
Tbilisi must also decline to guarantee (if only “temporarily”) the
operation of Russian bases. Such an obligation would deprive Georgia
of leverage later on, in the likely event that Moscow tries yet again
to renege on its troop-withdrawal commitments.

6. Linkages

The Kremlin has managed to tie up the military negotiations with the
negotiations on a new interstate political treaty. As a precondition
to a troop-withdrawal agreement, Moscow now demands that the
political treaty rule out the hosting of third-party troops and
military installations on Georgia’s territory, and generally
constrict Georgia’s independent military cooperation with other
countries. As a further precondition to withdrawal of its troops
(other than the “peacekeepers”), Moscow wants the political treaty to
enshrine a special role for Russia in settling the Abkhazia and South
Ossetia conflicts and protecting the [newly-minted] “Russian
citizens” there. Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims that
such clauses are necessary in order to persuade the Duma to ratify an
interstate treaty with Georgia, if one is signed. This claim is
implausible in view of the Kremlin’s control of a comfortable
majority in the Duma. For its part, Tbilisi must reject any linkages
between a troop-withdrawal agreement and extraneous political issues.
It can simply offer a commitment that Georgian territory would not be
used by a third party against Russia. However, Georgia’s
international security arrangements and internal constitutional setup
do not belong in a bilateral treaty with Russia. Nor should Georgia
legitimize those “peacekeeping” operations as part of an agreement
with Russia.

At this point, Tbilisi can initiate consultations with the three
Baltic states regarding their experience with political and
logistical arrangements for the withdrawal of Russian forces.