The Messenger

Thursday, March 17, 2005, #048 (0822)

Caucasus plagued by too many – and too loose – arms

The withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgian territory, the
requirements of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, the attempts
to resolve frozen conflicts in the region, and Georgia’s attempt to build a
modern army all mean that the issues of armaments and their control in the
Caucasus are of great importance.

Armament norms are strictly defined in Caucasus. According to CFE, the three
countries of the Southern Caucasus – Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia – have
equal quotas. Each is permitted 220 tanks, 220 armored cars, 285 artillery
systems above 75 millimeters, 100 fighter aircraft and 50 military
helicopters. The number of military personnel was originally limited to
40,000, but Armenia and Azerbaijan were later able to increase this number.

Despite the official statements with their precise quotas, ever since they
were agreed it has been difficult to hold countries to the agreement.
Russia, in particular, is well in excess of its limitations for the region
and argues that the war in Chechnya and instability in the Southern Caucasus
makes this necessary. It continues to maintain military bases in Georgia and
Armenia and possesses quantities of armaments that exceed the quotas
permitted Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Furthermore, the separatist regimes of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and
Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, all of which possess their own arms that are
beyond the control and scrutiny of international organizations, make the
limitations entirely ineffectual.

According to data, for example, the unrecognized republic of
Nagorno-Karabakh has more armaments than Armenia. Equally, according to the
agreement, Karabakh army personnel must be included in the quota defined for
Azerbaijan, but clearly it would be ludicrous to do so. Azerbaijan has
recently threatened that if the ongoing conflict with Karabakh is not soon
resolved peacefully, it may have to resort to force, but its is clear from
the data that Karabakh is more than capable of defending itself, even
without Armenian help.

Georgia is also too weak militarily to seek to resolve its internal
conflicts through force, and this has caused several Georgian analysts to
call for a strong rearmament program. Given the huge increases in defense
spending since the Rose Revolution, it appears that the government is
hearing their calls for military build-up to back up the country’s peaceful
overtures to the Sukhumi and Tskhinvali regimes.

In the meantime, however, both regimes continue to receive arms from Russia.
It is difficult to imagine that the Georgian military would be strong enough
at any point in the near future to overcome resistance in the breakaway
republics, and perhaps this is a good thing – a guarantee of peaceful
dialogue.

The high number of arms in these regions should be of concern to everybody,
however, as there is no control over the weapons, which can easily pass into
the hands of terrorists. There are a high number of tanks and heavy
artillery, and many ordinary citizens possess automatic weapons. The arrest
of Armenian and Georgian nationals charged with attempts to smuggle arms is
one sign of amount of uncontrolled weapons in the area.

Back in Georgia, the increased defense spending is aimed not only at
providing extra weight to Georgian efforts to resolve the frozen conflicts,
but also to enable the country to integrate into NATO as soon as possible.
This remains a top priority for the government, and it is receiving support
from a number of western countries and institutions, led by the United
States. Membership of NATO is likely to be held up, however, by the
continuing existence of Russian bases on Georgian soil, and unresolved
frozen conflicts.