Jamestown Foundation
March 18 2005

SECESSIONIST LEADERS PARADE IN MOSCOW

By Vladimir Socor

Sergei Bagapsh, Eduard Kokoiti, and Arkady Gukasian, leaders
respectively of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Karabakh, spent most of
this week meeting with Russian officials in Moscow. They also held a
publicly reported meeting there among themselves on March 16.
Transnistria leader Igor Smirnov was expected in Moscow for the March
16 meeting, but was advised at the last moment to delay his arrival.
His public appearance in that meeting would have provided Moldovan
President Vladimir Voronin with political ammunition against Russia’s
“centrist” and leftist allies in Chisinau, who intend to unseat
Voronin and force repeat elections when the new parliament convenes
next week.

The three participating leaders made public a decision to convene a
“summit” of the leaders of Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and
Karabakh in April in Sukhumi. They cited “the tense situation around
Transnistria and South Ossetia” as a justification for holding such
meetings at this time. Bagapsh, Kokoiti, and Gukasian also met
separately with the Russian presidential administration, government,
military, and Duma officials without publicity.

Bagapsh, on his first visit to Moscow as leader of Abkhazia,
reiterated the previous Abkhaz leadership’s position that economic
cooperation issues must be resolved between Tbilisi and Sukhumi as a
precondition to discussing any political issues; and that “Abkhazia’s
political status can not and will not be a topic of discussion with
Georgia,” because Abkhazia has already defined its status for itself,
as Bagapsh told a news conference. (Interfax, March 16). Responding
to Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s offer to meet with
Bagapsh in Tbilisi or in Sukhumi, Bagapsh insisted that economic
agreements would have to be prepared in advance for signing at such a
meeting. Such emphasis on concluding economic agreements is a
shortcut toward de facto equality of status between Tbilisi and
Sukhumi while avoiding political negotiations.

Calling for reconstruction of the Abkhazia stretch of the railroad
that runs from Russia via Georgia to Armenia, as envisaged by the
2003 Sochi agreements, Bagapsh ignored the Abkhaz authorities’
commitments under those agreements, which stipulated “synchronizing”
railroad reconstruction with the organized and safe return of
Georgian refugees. Furthermore, he announced that the process of
handing over Russian citizenship to Abkhazia’s population would
continue; and that returning Georgians would have to accept Abkhaz
internal passports, with “dual Georgian-Abkhaz citizenship,” a
possibility to be discussed. Bagapsh himself has “Russian citizenship
and Abkhaz citizenship,” he said.

Abkhazia would “not allow any peacekeeping troops other than Russian
to be deployed;” and, should Georgia exercise its legal right to ask
the Russian “peacekeepers” to leave, an Abkhaz force would instantly
be forward-deployed in their place,” Bagapsh warned. He also invited
Russia to use the Gudauta military base permanently as an
“anti-terrorist center.” (Russia has unilaterally re-designated
Gudauta a base for “peacekeepers.”) During Bagapsh’s Moscow visit,
the Abkhaz authorities announced that their coastal guard vessels had
chased a Georgian cutter out of “Abkhazia’s territorial waters” and
escorted a Turkish cargo ship safely to Sukhumi.

Bagapsh’s hard line is not necessarily his last word. He may have
felt under pressure to please Moscow on his first visit there as
Abkhaz leader — a position he owes to one faction of Russian
intelligence services. While in Moscow he was flanked by his more
hardline deputy and rival, Raul Khajimba, who is the favorite of
another faction in Russia’s intelligence services. Moreover, Bagapsh
was speaking in the wake of the assassination attempt on his ally,
Alexander Ankvab, who is a moderate among Abkhaz leaders.

The Kremlin timed the secessionist leaders’ visit deliberately to
overlap with Georgian-South Ossetian talks, held on March 16-17 in
Moscow in the framework of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) under
Russia’s “mediation.” The timing appeared designed to demonstrate
that Russia can now overtly pursue a duplicitous policy — “mediator”
in conflicts, as well as protector of secessionists — with impunity.

Georgia’s State Minister and representative to the JCC, Giorgi
Khaindrava, was reduced to commenting plaintively about the
secessionist leaders’ meeting, “What can I say about the creation of
a separatist movement? I feel sad that this policy is being persisted
with, and I don’t think that it would be to Russia’s benefit.” He
went on to express concern that the holding of the secessionists’
summit in Sukhumi “could bring the negotiating processes close to
collapse.” Nevertheless, Khaindrava promised not to bring up this
issue in the JCC meeting. Although failure to bring up this issue in
the JCC rewards the Russian “mediators’ ” duplicity, South Ossetian
representative Boris Chochiev repaid Khaindrava’s restraint by
accusing him of “interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign
republics.”

Throughout the week, Russian government officials from Prime Minister
Mikhail Fradkov on down (with German Gref dissenting) warned that the
government is considering imposing economic sanctions on Moldova, in
response to the Duma’s two recent resolutions accusing Moldova of
hostile actions against Transnistria.

Source: Jamestown Foundation, 18 March 2005