RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
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RFE/RL Iran Report
Vol. 8, No. 12, 23 March 2005

A Review of Developments in Iran Prepared by the Regional Specialists
of RFE/RL’s Newsline Team

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HEADLINES:
* PRE-ELECTION POLL RESULTS DISPUTED
* POLICE CHIEF CONTEMPLATES PRESIDENTIAL RUN
* REFORMISTS CONSIDER PRESIDENTIAL OPTIONS
* ‘CONVERGENCE’ IMPORTANT IN IRANIAN POLITICS
* STUDENTS, TEACHERS, WORKERS STAGE PROTESTS
* SCHOLARS VIEW DEMOCRATIC EFFORTS IN IRAN
* RADIO FARDA ON IRAN AND TERRORISM
* IRAN-PAKISTAN-INDIA PIPELINE IMPERILED
* IRAN WANTS STABLE OIL-PRODUCTION QUOTAS
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ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS CONSIDERS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei told members of the Assembly of Experts on 17
March that public participation in the upcoming presidential election
will have a positive impact in the face of efforts by the “arrogant
powers” to “dominate the world,” the Iranian Students News Agency
(ISNA) reported. “The vigilance of the people in electing the
president, who must be pious and devoted to Islamic and revolutionary
values, and must possess stamina and versatility, can have an
important impact on the speed of the implementation of the [20-Year]
Outlook Plan,” he added.
The Assembly of Experts — a popularly elected body of almost
90 clerics that is tasked with selecting and supervising the supreme
leader — held its semiannual meeting on 15-16 March. On the first
day, Ayatollah Ali Meshkini was reelected chairman, ayatollahs
Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Ebrahim Amini, were elected vice
chairmen, and Qorban-Ali Dori-Najafabadi and Ahmad Khatami were
elected secretaries, IRNA reported. The assembly’s final
statement, issued on 16 March, addressed the upcoming presidential
election. “People should vote for an individual who will defend the
ideals of the Islamic revolution and who will give priority to
solving people’s economic problems,” it stated. (Bill Samii)

PREELECTION POLL PREDICTS TWO-ROUND ELECTION. Some 51.3 percent of
the 7,100 people polled by IRNA in East Azerbaijan, Fars, Hormozgan,
Isfahan, Kermanshah, Khorasan, Khuzestan, Mazandaran, Sistan va
Baluchistan, Tehran, and Yazd provinces said they will “definitely”
vote in the June 2005 presidential election, “Iran” newspaper
reported on 13 March. Of those polled, 38.2 percent said they favored
the reformists and 37.4 percent said the president’s political
tendency is irrelevant to them, while 56.6 percent said they did not
care if the president is a cleric. According to the same survey, IRNA
reported on 13 and 14 March, the favorite candidates are Ayatollah
Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, former parliamentary speaker
Hojatoleslam Mehdi Karrubi, and former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar
Velayati. None of the candidates would win an outright 50 percent or
more in the first round, however, which would necessitate a second
round in the election. (Bill Samii)

FORMER PRESIDENT STILL NONCOMMITTAL. Former President Ayatollah
Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani continues to hold off on making a firm
commitment to running in the June 2005 presidential election, saying
on 14 March, “I have complete readiness [to be a candidate] in the
elections, but I believe it is [too] early to make a decision,” IRNA
reported. He predicted that viable candidates will emerge and he will
not need to run for the post he held from 1989-1997. He said on 13
March, however, that “As we are getting closer to the election, I
feel my responsibility is getting heavier,” Mehr News Agency
reported. (Bill Samii)

POLICE CHIEF CONTEMPLATES PRESIDENTIAL RUN. Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf,
the chief of Iran’s national police force, announced on 12 March
that he is considering running in the June 2005 presidential
election, IRNA reported. He identified three areas he would focus on
— the economy, foreign affairs, and “social capital.” Referring to
the economy, he said, “The people’s buying power has not seen
suitable growth; we have even seen stagnation in certain areas.”
Turning to foreign affairs, he said, “Given Iran’s outstanding
geopolitical weight and the role which the country can play at the
regional and global level, we have not properly tapped these
capacities.” And regarding the issue of “social capital,” he said,
“In the area of protecting our social capital, we face challenges
which make us lose our productive role in the fields of science,
politics, economy, and wealth as well as our social identity.”
Qalibaf said he would run if he could fulfill his objectives in these
areas. (Bill Samii)

REFORMISTS CONSIDER PRESIDENTIAL OPTIONS. Islamic Iran Solidarity
Party Deputy Chairman Mohammad-Reza Khabbaz said on 13 March that his
organization has proposed creating a five-member committee to select
the reformist presidential candidate, Mehr News Agency reported.
Khabbaz said the selectors would be President Mohammad Khatami,
former Prime Minister Mir-Hussein Musavi, Militant Clerics
Association members Hojatoleslam Mohammad Asqar Musavi-Khoeniha and
Hojatoleslam Mohammad Musavi-Bojnurdi, and Qom seminarian Ayatollah
Hussein Musavi-Tabrizi.
A prospective reformist presidential candidate, Mardom Salari
Party Secretary-General Mustafa Kavakebian, said in a 10 March speech
in the northeastern city of Khalkhal, “I, as a little man among the
nation’s children, intend to propound the new discourse, meaning
that the elite have been kept outside the bounds of power for 26
years and feel compassion for the system [and] should find their
place within the ranks of those in power,” “Mardom Salari” reported
on 12 March. Kavakebian said 12,000 people in the country have
doctoral degrees, but ministers, ambassadors, and the country’s
senior leaders come from a group of only 2,700 people. He noted that
some officials have seven or eight different positions. Kavakebian
said the government is inefficient, because many of those in
positions of power get there through “nepotism, cliques, and
windfall-seeking.” He said Iran has not fully realized “all aspects
of religious government and Islamic values.” (Bill Samii)

‘CONVERGENCE’ IMPORTANT IN IRANIAN POLITICS. The term
“convergence” has gained currency recently in describing the modern
newsroom, where the most modern technologies, skills, and methods are
employed to relay information in a timely and useful fashion via a
variety of formats. But in Iran, “convergence” (hamgerai) is used as
part of the political discourse.
Conservative commentator Masud Dehnamaki said in an interview
in the 2 March “Farhang-i Ashti” that divisions in the conservative
Coordination Council of the Islamic Revolution Forces could yield new
presidential candidates, but it is important to strive for
“convergence.” Addressing the same issue, columnist Hussein
Safar-Harandi wrote in the 21 February “Kayhan” that the
conservatives’ failure to introduce one presidential candidate
shows that they face “serious obstacles to their convergence.”
Reformists also discuss convergence, with former legislator
Hussein Ansari-Rad saying that free elections, publicly defined
national interests, and citizens’ exercising their rights
represent the convergence of the people and officials, “Farhang-i
Ashti” reported on 1 March. He added, “All kinds of disruption in the
participation of the people in power and in the administration of the
country would jeopardize this convergence.”
“Convergence” is also used in a foreign-policy context, with
Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani saying on 30 January: “Iran believes
one of the effective ways in confronting expansionist ambitions of
the world arrogance and the Zionist regime is to strengthen
convergence and unity among regional countries,” IRNA reported. (Bill
Samii)

STUDENTS, TEACHERS, WORKERS STAGE PROTESTS. The Islamic Association
of Amir-Kabir University announced that its recent sit-in was only an
initial step, “Iran News” reported on 16 March. The association
explained that, by it’s actions, it is protesting “the
antistudent establishments at this university.”
An unspecified number of students participated in the sit-in
at Amir-Kabir University on 12 and 13 March. They were protesting
against the imposition of a “security climate” on universities and
the presence there of “rogue elements,” or militiamen affiliated with
the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), Radio Farda reported on
13 March, citing student Mehdi Hariri. “We are in the second
day…[and] not planning to stop…yet,” Hariri told Radio Farda. He
said the Basij militia active on campuses is intended “to oppose the
real demands” of students. The militias are financed by “outside
powers,” parliament, and “certain other bodies inside universities,”
he told Radio Farda.
The Office for Strengthening Unity, an umbrella student
group, has issued a statement backing the students, and members
recently met with Higher Education Minister Jafar Tofiqi to convey
student grievances, including the increasing difficulty of holding
gatherings inside universities, Radio Farda reported.
Separately, a group of part-time teachers gathered outside
parliament on 13 March to protest their work conditions, iribnews.ir
reported.
In another job action, 200 employees of a refrigerator
factory in Luristan Province demonstrated in front of the governorate
in Khoramabad on 14 March, Radio Farda reported. The workers
complained that since the factory was privatized in 2003 they have
not received their wages or benefits on a regular basis and that five
months have passed since they were last paid. The workers said that
the factory does not get raw materials, so it cannot manufacture
refrigerators. One of the workers, Morad Davudi, urged the government
to pay attention to their demands.
There have been several incidents of labor and student unrest
in Iran in recent weeks (see “RFE/RL Iran Report,” 14 March 2005).
(Vahid Sepehri, Bill Samii)

SCHOLARS VIEW DEMOCRATIC EFFORTS IN IRAN. President George W. Bush
expressed his support for Iranians’ democratic aspirations during
a 16 March news conference in Washington, RFE/RL reported. He said,
“I believe that the Iranian people ought to be allowed to freely
discuss opinions, read a free press, have free votes, and be able to
choose amongst political parties. I believe Iran should adopt
democracy.” Bush has touched on this theme several times since his
inauguration (see “RFE/RL Iran Report,” 6 and 14 February, 1 and 14
March 2005.
A few days earlier, on 10 March, Bush extended the “national
emergency with respect to Iran” because of Iran’s support for
terrorism, its active opposition to the Middle East peace process,
and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, according to the
State Department website () (see “RFE/RL Iran
Report,” 15 March 2004). The national emergency regarding Iran was
declared in Executive Order 12957 of 15 March 1995. It is distinct
from the national emergency declared by President Jimmy Carter on 14
November 1979 by Executive Order 12170, “to deal with the unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and
economy of the United States constituted by the situation in Iran”
(see “RFE/RL Iran Report,” 15 November 2004). Extension of EO 12957
continues the ban on U.S. investment in Iran’s energy sector.
Hoover Institution Research Fellow Abbas Milani asserted at a
15 March symposium in Washington that Iran’s “Democratic
Movement” is very much alive. Milani explained that he was not
talking about the reformist political organizations associated with
President Khatami’s 1997 election, suggesting that they are a
spent force. The real democratic movement, he said, includes women,
who have been forceful defenders of their rights since the 1979
revolution. He noted that women are active in all spheres and in the
early 1980s they rejected the government’s generous offer of
early retirement. The prevalence of NGOs, Milani said, is another
sign of a democratic movement. Milani said the Iranian diaspora can
make a contribution to democratic efforts, and he saw cleavages
within the regime as a hopeful sign.
Another scholar was less sanguine. Speaking at the same
symposium, Hoover Institution fellow Michael McFaul said that Iran
has some things in common with Georgia and Ukraine, which recently
underwent relatively peaceful revolutions. However, McFaul noted that
a number of important factors that existed in these post-Soviet
states are absent in Iran. He said there is no economic crisis in
Iran, and that the Iranian regime is more ruthless than the deposed
governments in Georgia and Ukraine proved to be. He dismissed the
political cleavages as disputes between, for example, hard-liners and
semi-hard-liners, terming them political disputes that do not touch
on fundamental issues about the state or the system. McFaul noted
that Iran does not have an independent media or independent election
monitors to report on episodes of malfeasance. In Georgia and
Ukraine, according to McFaul, there was anger over violations of the
constitution and the public and the media wanted their leaders to
adhere to the constitution. In Iran, the constitution itself is the
problem. McFaul also said Iran does not have a united or mobilized
opposition.
Milani and McFaul, as well as co-panelists Ellen Laipson of
the Henry L. Stimson Center and Larry Diamond of the Hoover
Institution, all said that as much as Iranians dislike their
government, they are very likely to have a sharply nationalistic
reaction if a foreign power attacks Iran.
Tehran, it seems, remains very concerned about the
possibility of U.S. military action. In an article published in a
prestigious U.S. journal (“Middle East Policy,” v. XII, n. 1, Spring
2005; provided courtesy of Blackwell Publishing), Foreign Minister
Kamal Kharrazi warned the United States against interference in
Iranian domestic affairs. Kharrazi writes that “foreign armies cannot
bring democracy,” adding that “the illusion that reform and democracy
can be dictated from outside must be abandoned.” According to
Kharrazi, “foreign interventions…tend to spawn resistance and
undesirable outcomes.” Kharrazi claims that foreign involvement could
undermine a country’s reform process, and adds that such a
process and democratization must be “homegrown and country specific,
rather than imposed from outside.”
In other parts of the article, Kharrazi denies that Iran is
interfering in Iraqi affairs, claims that Iran is a stabilizing force
in the region, and calls for a multilateral regional security
framework. Kharrazi defends Iran’s nuclear ambitions and claims
that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has issued a religious
decree against developing weapons of mass destruction.
The Iranian legislature, in its 9 March session, approved a
special budget for discovering and countering U.S. plots and attempts
to interfere in the country’s domestic affairs, IRNA reported.
The size of the budget was not disclosed. The legislation permits the
cabinet to dispense up to 9 billion rials (approximately $1.14
million) to any foreign country or organization that acts in
accordance with the objectives of the law. The budget can also be
used for informing the public about the American “cultural
onslaught,” filing complaints against the U.S. in international
courts, and filing complaints on behalf of victims of chemical
weapons during the Iran-Iraq War.
“The Los Angeles Times” reported on 4 March that the White
House is trying to determine how to use a $3 million budget to foster
opposition activities in Iran. (Bill Samii)

KHATAMI CONCLUDES THREE-STATE TOUR. President Khatami returned to
Tehran on 13 March — one day after he left Venezuela, the last stop
in a three-country trip, IRNA reported on 13 March (see “RFE/RL Iran
Report,” 14 March 2005). In Venezuela, Iranian and Venezuelan
representatives signed 25 cooperation accords in industry, housing
construction, sea transport, farming, and oil, EFE and
Venezuela’s univision.com reported on 12 March. Khatami
inaugurated a joint-venture tractor construction plant on 12 March in
Ciudad Bolivar, south of Caracas, which should make 5,000 tractors a
year, EFE reported. The two states agreed to build the plant in
December 2003, when President Hugo Chavez went to Tehran, AFP
reported. The two countries are also to build a cement plant, set to
produce one million tons of cement a year from 2006, EFE added. A
statement signed by the presidents backed Iran’s peaceful nuclear
program and bid to enter the WTO, and praised the visit as boosting
the “strategic alliance” of the two states, EFE reported. (Vahid
Sepehri)

TEHRAN CONSIDERS WOLFOWITZ WORLD BANK NOMINATION. An Iranian state
radio analyst using the name “Mr. Fathi” discussed on 17 March the
White House’s nomination of Deputy Defense Secretary Paul
Wolfowitz to head the World Bank. Fathi argued that the nomination
has upset many governments because Wolfowitz is a “neoconservative
who is the planner of America’s attack on Iraq.” Fathi suggested
that Wolfowitz does not have the expertise to head the global
development bank. Fathi acknowledged that Wolfowitz’s time as
ambassador to Indonesia, when that country received loans from the
World Bank, contributed to poverty eradication. The Iranian state
radio analyst cited personnel moves involving Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy Douglas Feith and Undersecretary of State for Arms
Control John Bolton, as well as Condoleezza Rice’s move from
national security adviser to secretary of state, as evidence that
President Bush is increasingly sensitive to the international
community. “By sending the neoconservatives to political and economic
institutions, he wants to make them familiar with international
realities and show them that there is extensive opposition to
American policies in the international scene,” Fathi said. The
Wolfowitz appointment, Fathi said, marks the decline of
neoconservative influence in U.S. defense institutions. (Bill Samii)

RADIO FARDA ON IRAN AND TERRORISM: DIFFICULT U.S., IRAN RELATIONS
MARKED BY MUTUAL DISTRUST (PART 1). Iran has made great strides in
recent years in rebuilding bridges to Europe and Asia after the
tumultuous early years of the Islamic Revolution. Those years saw the
new Islamic regime seeking to export its revolutionary values abroad
and assassinating opponents. The early excesses led many countries to
regard the Islamic Republic as a rogue state and to try to isolate it
politically and economically.
Today, Iran claims its right to again be a full member of the
world community. But doubts linger about how much Iran has moved away
from its use of terrorism as a political tool. Washington, for
example, still considers Iran to be a state sponsor of terrorism and
cites as evidence what it says is Tehran’s continued support of
Middle Eastern terrorist groups, the killings of dissidents in Iran,
and interference in Iraq. Why does Washington view Tehran as part of
an “axis of evil” and as an enemy in the global war on terrorism?
In an effort to find the answers, Radio Farda issued a
four-part series on Iran and terrorism. Part 1 looks at the difficult
historical relationship between the United States and the Islamic
Republic — a relationship both sides say has been marked by
terrorist actions by the other. This series is based on material
prepared by Radio Farda’s Mehdi Khalaji and Ardavan Niknam, with
additional reporting by Parichehr Farzam. This article is also
available on the RFE/RL website:

BF30124D108.html
In Washington’s eyes, 4 November 1979 marked the
beginning of the Islamic Republic’s state sponsorship of
terrorism. That’s when a crowd of militants unopposed by police
stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The well-organized attackers took
52 American members of the staff hostage and held them for 444 days.
By the time the incident ended, in January 1981, the United States
had severed diplomatic ties with Tehran and had attempted —
unsuccessfully — to liberate the hostages in a commando operation.
U.S. President Jimmy Carter announced the failure of the
American commando operation this way: “I share the disappointment of
the American people that this operation was not successful.” The
rescue operation had to be unexpectedly aborted after a helicopter
developed engine trouble in a staging area in the Iranian desert. The
mission ended in the deaths of eight Americans, as two U.S. transport
planes collided.
Gary Sick was the principal White House aide for Iran during
the Islamic Revolution and the hostage crisis. He says those events
continue to shape the tense relationship Tehran and Washington have
today: “A lot of this also goes back to the early days of the
revolution, which was seen not only as a revolution against the Shah
but a revolution against the United States. The concept of ‘Death
to America,’ the ‘Great Satan’ and other such slogans and
words have become very much part of the revolution, particularly
after the mass demonstrations associated with the takeover of the
U.S. embassy. So it is very much part of Iran’s domestic
politics. At the same time, the United States suffered greatly
because of the takeover. And Iran became the U.S.’s
‘Satan.’ They are now part of the axis of evil. Many
politicians have identified them as the sort of permanent bad guys in
the Middle East and that, of course, is increased by the fact that
Israel regards Iran as its number-one enemy. So, between Israel and
the U.S., the rhetoric on the American side is in some cases no less
as dramatic as on the Iranian side. And this has become part of
American domestic politics, too, which immensely complicates any kind
of discussion or any hope for developing better relations.”
For Tehran, the hostage taking also remains a powerful
symbol. But it portrays the event as a just reaction against what it
calls decades of U.S. exploitation of Iran.
As an example, Tehran charges the United States with helping
orchestrate the 1953 coup that toppled the government of Prime
Minister Muhammad Mossadeq after he nationalized Iran’s then
foreign-dominated oil industry. Some U.S. involvement was
subsequently acknowledged by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright in 2000.
Tehran also saw the United States as propping up the
government of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, which was overthrown in the
Islamic Revolution in January 1979. Revolutionary leaders regarded
the Shah’s government as corrupt and ruthless in its use of its
state security organization, SAVAK, to target opponents.
The leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini, made anti-Americanism a principle of the Islamic
Republic’s foreign policy, lashing out at Washington in many of
his speeches: “We are here to prevent America committing evil acts,
to defend ourselves. We do not expect America to do any good to us.
We trample upon America in these matters. We will not let it
interfere with our affairs. Nor will we let any other party interfere
[with] us. And if they want to invade, we will not let their planes
land. We will kill their paratroopers in midair.”
Today, relations between the United States and Iran continue
to be characterized by hostile statements on each side. Occasional
attempts at starting talks to ease tensions have always run aground
due to preconditions set by both sides.
Iran says there can be no talks until the United States first
ends it efforts to isolate Iran through unilateral sanctions.
The United States says there can be no talks until Iran ends
what it charges is its state sponsorship of terrorism and its
rejection of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Washington also wants
Tehran to renounce any efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and
long-range missiles.
U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney put Washington’s position
toward Iran this way in a recent statement: “[Iran] has been a major
source of state-sponsored terrorism, if you will, and [is] devoted to
the effort to destroy the peace process. We find that clearly
something that we can’t accept, and we’ve made clear our
opposition to that, as well as to their efforts to acquire weapons of
mass destruction.”
Iran denies it supports terrorist groups or is seeking to
acquire nuclear weapons.

U.S. ACCUSES IRAN OF EXTENDING ITS SUPPORT FOR MIDEAST TERRORIST
GROUPS (PART 2) To back up its charges that Iran is a state sponsor
of terrorism, the United States cites evidence it says proves that
Tehran provides financial and possibly some weaponry to militant
groups in the Mideast opposed to Israel. These militant groups —
including Lebanon’s Hizballah and radical Palestinian Islamic
groups like Hamas — have previously carried out or continue to carry
out attacks that kill civilians as part of their conflict with the
Jewish state.
Iran does not hide its close relations with Hezbollah, which
include meetings in Damascus or Tehran with leaders of the group. But
it calls the Shi’a Hizballah — which helped force Israeli troops
from southern Lebanon in 2000 — a liberation movement, not a
terrorist group. The Islamic Republic extends the same terminology to
Sunni Palestinian groups like Hamas because they also are fighting to
evict Israel from what Tehran says is Muslim land. Tehran does not
recognize Israel as a state.
Part 2 of RFE/RL and Radio Farda’s four-part series on
Iran and terrorism looks at the evidence cited to substantiate
accusations that Iran supports militant groups in the Middle East.
This also examines more recent U.S. charges that Iran is extending
this same pattern of support to radical groups opposing the U.S.
intervention in Iraq. Both sets of accusations are a central cause of
the tensions that continue to prevent Washington and Tehran from
re-establishing relations 26 years after Iran’s Islamic
Revolution. This series is based on material prepared by Radio
Farda’s Mehdi Khalaji and Ardavan Niknam, with additional
reporting by Parichehr Farzam. This article is also available on the
RFE/RL website:

24CE9C37CDA.html
Immediately after taking power in Iran, the Islamic
Republic’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, called for
exporting the Islamic Revolution to other countries. In one of his
messages, Khomeini said “we will not rest until the slogan,
‘There is but one God and Muhammad is his Prophet,’ echoes
through the whole world.”
He considered Israel — which had good ties with the deposed
Shah and is a close ally of Washington — an enemy in his global
struggle, second only to the United States. The reason was what he
considered Israel’s illegitimate occupation of Muslim land.
The feelings about Israel were expressed in propaganda
campaigns aimed at both domestic and foreign audiences. In Iran, the
last Friday of the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan was proclaimed as
Qods Day. Qods is the Arabic name for Jerusalem. Qods Day was to
remember that the city — Islam’s third holiest after Mecca and
Medina — is under the control of a non-Muslim power.
Ayatollah Khomeini described Qods Day as marking a Muslim
struggle not only against Israel but all “arrogant” powers: “Qods Day
is a day to warn all superpowers that Islam is no more under their
domination through their evil mercenaries.”
When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, the conflict with the
Palestinians spread to include a country with a sizable Shi’a
community. Shi’a Iran responded by supporting the Lebanese
Shi’a Hezbollah as a guerrilla force battling Israel’s
establishment of an occupied “buffer zone” across much of southern
Lebanon.
Hajir Teymourian, a Middle East expert in London, describes
Tehran’s activity this way: “The most important terrorist
organization that Iran helped form was Hizballah, which was set up in
1982 by Iran’s ambassador in Lebanon, Ali Akbar Mohtashami-Pur.
According to journalists, it still receives tens of millions of
dollars of economic and military aid from Iran annually. For 12
years, Hizballah was the major kidnapper of Western citizens in
Lebanon, and caused Iran’s government to be internationally
isolated as a terrorist state — an isolation that still continues —
and inflicted billions of dollars of damages on Iran’s economy. I
think no one doubts that [the militant Islamic groups] Hamas and the
Islamic Jihad are also supported by Iran.”
On the world stage, Tehran always denied that it gave
military support to Hizballah, a group that not only became notorious
for kidnapping Westerners in Lebanon in the 1980s but also for
killing more than 240 U.S. soldiers in a 1983 suicide bombing of
their Beirut barracks. It also hijacked a U.S. commercial airliner in
1985.
But inside Iran, figures such as Hassan Abbasi, a
high-ranking commander of the Revolutionary Guards and head of the
Islamic Republic’s Center for Doctrinal Studies, openly spoke of
the country’s close ties with Hezbollah. He described the
group’s activities as “sacred:” “If something can be done to
terrorize and scare the camp of infidelity and the enemies of God and
the people, such terror is sacred. This terrorism is sacred.
Lebanon’s Hizballah was trained by these very hands. Pay
attention! Do you see these hands? Hizballah, Hamas, and Islamic
Jihad were trained by these very hands.”
Gary Sick was the principle White House aide for Iran during
the Islamic Revolution and is a prominent U.S. expert on the Islamic
Republic. He says factional struggles within the Iranian
establishment have made it hard to know whether the support of
Hizballah comes directly from Iran’s elected government or,
instead, from hard-line organizations like the Revolutionary Guard,
which enjoy considerable independence.
“Obviously, Iran claims absolutely that it does not support
terrorism. But it does, however, make no apologies that it supports
Hizballah, which from the Iranian point of view and from
Hizballah’s point of view is fighting a war of liberation against
Israel. They consider that a legitimate activity. They deny that
they, in fact, train and support terrorist activities. Iran has a
particular problem, and that is that Iran is comprised of two or
three different governments, different groups of people, different
factions, each of which has a certain amount of control over things
that happen. It is possibly very true that people such as President
[Mohammad] Khatami may not, in fact, even know what people in some
parts of the Revolutionary Guards, for instance, are doing with
Hizballah. But, in any case, the government is held responsible. So
Iran has created a problem for itself to some degree by its rhetoric,
very strong rhetoric, which some people say is more
‘Palestinian’ than the [rhetoric of the] Palestinians
themselves.”
Tallal Salman is editor of Lebanon’s “Al-Safir” daily. He
believes Iran not only supports Hizballah but also tries to extend
support to Palestinian militant groups — though it is logistically
more difficult to do so: “Any resistance [movement] has its own
conditions. Lebanon is geographically tied to Syria, and in terms of
military support and training, Iran does have the means to help
Hizballah. But it is much more difficult in Palestine. Iran obviously
gives political support to Palestinian groups, and also other forms
of support that we may not be able to detect. But I believe that even
today, there is an organic connection between Iran, Hizballah, and
Palestinian groups.”
In one sign of support for Palestinian militant groups, Iran
hosted former Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat as one of its first
foreign visitors immediately after the Islamic Revolution. At the
time, many Iranians reportedly named their newborn sons Yasser in
enthusiasm for the Palestinian cause. More recently, in January 2002,
Israel stopped a ship loaded with arms which Arafat eventually
acknowledged was destined for the Palestinian Authority. Both Israel
and the United States said the arms originated in Iran, which Tehran
denied.
But as Arafat pursued on-and-off peace talks with Israel,
Iran’s relations with him cooled. Tehran saw his attempts to
negotiate as falling short of its own policy of fully opposing the
Jewish state.
In recent months, Washington’s concerns over Iran as a
sponsor of terrorism in the Middle East have shifted from the
Arab-Israeli conflict, further east to Iraq.
Kenneth Katzman is a regional expert with the Congressional
Research Service in Washington, D.C. He says the concern for many in
Washington is that Iran is supporting groups in southern Iraq who
might want to form a nondemocratic, strict Islamic government modeled
after Iran.
Iraqi and U.S. officials have accused Iran — as well as
Syria — of interfering in Iraq by permitting groups in their
countries to supply Iraqi insurgents with money and other resources.
U.S. President Bush repeated the charges against both
countries recently. He said: “We will continue to make it clear, to
both Syria and Iran, that — as will other nations in our coalition,
including our friends the Italians — that meddling in the internal
affairs of Iraq is not in their interest.”
Iran and Syria reject charges of interfering in Iraq. Last
month (16 February) the two countries declared that they had formed a
mutual self-defense pact to confront “threats” — an apparent
reference to the United States.
Outside of the Middle East, Iran also appears to have sought
to use its aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Muslims during the
conflict there to secretly train fundamentalist groups.
Analyst Nima Rashedan says much of the evidence of such
activities comes from documents seized by NATO forces in
Bosnia-Herzegovina: “This is a case that happened in a place in
Bosnia. Before the Dayton Accords and the presence of the United
States and NATO in Bosnia, the Islamic Republic had sent groups to
Bosnia, including the Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force, led by
Mohammad Reza Shams Naqdi, and his deputy, Hussein Allahkaram, based
near Sarajevo — another group from the Intelligence Ministry — who
had set up a camp, training fundamentalists close to [Alija]
Izetbegovic’s Democratic Action Party, to establish the
intelligence apparatus of Bosnia. Later, NATO attacked the camp and
arrested a number of people, including Iranian intelligence
officials. The most interesting point was the discovery of documents
that were part of the curriculum for the training of Bosnian
intelligence recruits by Iranians. Among the instructions in the
texts were methods for killing opposition figures and silencing
journalists. That is, the Intelligence Ministry instructed a foreign
organization’s members how to intimidate, hunt, kidnap,
eliminate, and threaten the families and the financial sources of
journalists.”
(Part 3 of Radio Farda and RFE/RL’s series on Iran and
terrorism, which will be in next week’s “RFE/RL Iran Report,”
looks at charges that hard-line elements of the Iranian regime have
used terrorism to silence dissidents at home. Part 4 examines the
continuing impact of the Salman Rushdie affair on Iranian foreign
relations.)

IRAN-PAKISTAN-INDIA PIPELINE IMPERILED. As the owner of the
world’s second-largest proven natural gas reserves, Iran is keen
to exploit this resource as a source of revenue. It is therefore
pursuing gas export deals with a number of countries.
One of the biggest potential customers so far is India, and
negotiations for a pipeline stretching across Pakistan have been
going on since the mid-1990s. A recent flurry of diplomatic visits
suggested that the deal was about to be concluded, but U.S. security
concerns and Indian anger over Iranian business practices are putting
this in doubt.
Iran and India signed an agreement for an overland natural
gas pipeline in 1993, and in 2002 Iran and Pakistan signed an
agreement on a feasibility study for such a pipeline. India-Pakistan
tensions over Kashmir and related security concerns have delayed the
project. In late-February and early-March, diplomats from all three
countries said a deal would be signed soon. Iranian Foreign Minister
Kamal Kharrazi said the pipeline would be 2,700 kilometers long, and
India would buy 7.5 million tons of LNG [liquefied natural gas] a
year for 25 years (see “RFE/RL Iran Report,” 7 March 2005).
On 16 March, however, Indian Petroleum Minister Mani Shankar
Aiyar announced that his country might withdraw from the gas deal.
“We will not buy gas from Iran if we cannot sell it in India,” Press
Trust of India reported him as saying. Aiyar explained that Iran
wants to charge as much for natural gas as it does for LNG [about $4
per million British thermal unit (MBTU)], whereas the main Indian
consumers — the fertilizer and power sectors — are unwilling to pay
more than $3 per MBTU. With the addition of transportation and
transit charges to the Iranian price, Aiyar said, the gas would end
up costing $4.50 per MBTU. Aiyar added that India and Pakistan will
need approximately 200 million standard cubic meters of gas daily,
and Iran should offer a special price for such a large order.
Tehran, furthermore, is insisting on a “take-or-pay”
agreement, in which India must pay for the agreed amount of gas even
if it does not take delivery of it, Press Trust of India reported on
9 March. India reportedly prefers a “supply-or-pay” contract, in
which Iran must deliver gas to the Indian border or pay for the
contracted quantity. Tehran also rejected India’s request for
natural gas that is rich in petrochemicals, preferring instead to
deliver “lean” gas that does not contain butane, ethane, or propane.
It could be a coincidence, but Aiyar’s suggestion that
the deal could fall through comes at the same time that U.S.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is visiting India and Pakistan.
In fact, she referred to the proposed pipeline during a 16 March
press conference in New Delhi, RFE/RL reported. According to Rice,
“We have communicated to the Indian government our concerns about gas
pipeline cooperation between Iran and India. I think our ambassador
has made statements in that regard and so those concerns are well
known to the Indian government.”
The timing of the Indian petroleum minister’s comments
suggest that New Delhi is pressuring Tehran for a better deal, and it
could be taking advantage of Rice’s visit to leverage its
position.

INDIA’S OTHER SUPPLIERS… India is a huge and growing
natural-gas market. According to the U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA;
), natural gas
use in Iran was nearly 25 billion cubic meters in 2002 and is
projected to reach 34 billion cubic meters in 2010 and 45.3 billion
cubic meters in 2015. India produces gas and has worked with outside
partners — including Bechtel, Gaz de France, General Electric,
Total, and Unocal — to increase production, but it is looking to
other countries to fulfill its requirements.
One idea is to connect Bangladesh’s natural gas reserves
with the Indian gas grid. Burma could be a source of natural gas,
too. Two Indian companies — Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC)
and Erstwhile Gas Authority of India, Ltd (GAIL) — own equity in
Burmese natural gas reserves, and Burmese officials have indicated an
interest in running a pipeline to West Bengal in India.
Qatar — with the world’s third-largest natural-gas
reserves (14.4 trillion cubic meters) — is another competitor for
the Indian market. India’s Petronet and Qatar’s Ras Laffan
LNG Company (Rasgas) signed an agreement for the provision of 10.3
billion cubic meters per year of LNG, and deliveries began in January
2004, according to the EIA.
Indian Petroleum Minister Aiyar visited Moscow and Kazakhstan
in late February to discuss energy issues. He reportedly said that
India is willing to pay $2 billion for a 15 percent stake in
Yuganskneftegaz, “The Financial Express” reported on 12 March. He
also said India could invest $25 billion in the entire Russian energy
sector. India’s cabinet recently authorized discussion of the
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan Natural-Gas Pipeline Project (see
“RFE/RL Afghanistan Report,” 25 February 2005). Iran does not, as a
result, have a stranglehold on the Indian market.

…AND IRAN’S OTHER MARKETS. Iran natural-gas reserves are
estimated at 26.6 trillion cubic meters, according to the Energy
Information Administration, but the country only produced about 76.5
billion cubic meters of natural gas in 2002. Most of that gas was
used domestically, although Iran did export some gas to Armenia and
Turkey.
Iran is eager to reach other markets. Iranian Petroleum
Minister Bijan Namdar-Zanganeh and Omani Oil and Gas Minister
Muhammad bin Hamad bin Sayf al-Rumhi on 15 March signed an agreement
on the export to Oman of 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas
annually, beginning in 2006, IRNA reported.
The same day, Zanganeh and Kuwaiti Energy and Oil Minister
Ahmad Fahd al-Ahmad al-Sabah signed a deal for the export to Kuwait
of 10 million cubic meters of natural gas a day, beginning in late
2007, IRNA reported. Zanganeh said the deal with Kuwait is worth more
than $7 billion over 25 years. He went on to say that the legal
documents relating to the deal will be drawn up in a few months.
Earlier in March, the possibility of Ukraine purchasing 15
billion cubic meters of natural gas from Iran every year was
discussed at an Iran-Ukraine energy commission meeting in Kyiv. Two
pipeline routes are being considered —
Iran-Armenia-Georgia-Russia-Ukraine or Iran-Armenia-Georgia-Black
Sea-Ukraine. Other countries that have signed gas-related memoranda,
or at least discussed the topic, with Iran include Austria, Bulgaria,
China, Greece, Italy, and Turkey.
Iran likes to present every meeting as a major accomplishment
by staging the signing of a memorandum of understanding, but these
are not binding contracts. Conclusion of the deal with India is
potentially very important for Iran, because it will curtail some of
its political isolation and will earn it a place in the international
gas market. But Tehran’s pricing policies and Washington’s
opposition may scuttle Iran’s effort to achieve a natural gas
breakout. (Bill Samii)

IRAN WANTS STABLE OIL-PRODUCTION QUOTAS. OPEC announced on 16 March
that it has raised its oil production quota from 27 million barrels
per day to 27.5 million bpd, Reuters reported. If necessary, it will
increase this by another 500,000 bpd. Saudi Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi
explained that his country wants to keep the price in the $40-$50
range.
The Iranian government did not want the production ceiling to
change. Petroleum Minister Namdar-Zanganeh explained on 15 March that
there is an excess supply, prices are relatively high, and “we should
not make a decision that gives the wrong signal to the oil market and
further overheats the market and harms OPEC in the long run,” state
television reported. Namdar-Zanganeh explained that those who want to
increase production believe that real production is 600,000-700,000
barrels per day more than the official figure, state radio reported.
He went on to say nobody is talking about reducing production.
According to the “Financial Times” on 8 March, Iran is
already pumping at full capacity and cannot produce more oil. Only
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have the capacity to produce more oil,
Reuters reported on 16 March.
Iran’s economy depends on oil-export revenues (around 80
percent of total export earnings, 40-50 percent of the government
budget, and 10-20 percent of gross domestic product, according to the
Energy Information Administration), and every $1 increase in the
price of oil increases Iranian revenues by approximately $900 million
per year. The current price for a barrel of oil is above $50, but the
Iranian budget for 2005-06 is based on a $28 price and the price for
2004-05 was around $19.90.
The proposed budget calls for increased oil and gas
production over the next five years, Mahshahr parliamentary
representative Kamal Daneshyari, who heads the legislature’s
Energy Committee, said in the 6 February “Mardom-Salari.” (Bill
Samii)

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Copyright (c) 2005. RFE/RL, Inc. All rights reserved.

The “RFE/RL Iran Report” is a weekly prepared by A. William Samii on
the basis of materials from RFE/RL broadcast services, RFE/RL
Newsline, and other news services.

Direct comments to A. William Samii at samiia@rferl.org.
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From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress