The Jamestown Foundation
Friday, March 30, 2005 — Volume 2, Issue 62
EURASIA DAILY MONITOR
IN THIS ISSUE:
*Moscow and Bishkek affirm continued cooperation
*Putin finds reliable ally in Yerevan
*Ukrainian analysts respond to fall of Akayev
*Russian ambassador insults Lithuania, again
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RUSSIA SEEKS CLOSER TIES WITH POST-REVOLUTIONARY KYRGYZSTAN
In the aftermath of the revolution that has swept the Kyrgyz
leadership from power and ushered in another democratic revolution in
the former Soviet Union, Russia has sought to re-affirm its close ties
with Kyrgyzstan. Indeed the Kremlin’s handling of the crisis reveals
that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s closest aides have learned
from the events in Georgia and Ukraine, and they are actively seeking
to avoid the mistakes made by Russian authorities in their conduct of
diplomacy during those tense situations. Putin has therefore reassured
the new Kyrgyz leadership of the durability of bilateral relations,
gained assurances concerning the future of the Russian airbase at
Kant, and successfully carried off a show of acceptance regarding the
new government for international consumption. Privately, Russian
security officials fear the implications of democratic revolution
emerging in the heart of Central Asia.
Kurmanbek Bakiyev, acting president and prime minister, confirmed
Kyrgyzstan’s ongoing commitment to the Russian airbase at Kant, while
also giving similar assurances on the future of the U.S. deployment at
Manas. This has clarified the attitude of the Kyrgyz authorities
towards their international military and security commitments, for the
time being at least. These moves seem to reflect Kyrgyzstan’s
security weakness and dependency upon foreign assistance in dealing
with regional threats.
Bakiyev assured his Russian ally that Bishkek takes seriously its
treaty obligations within the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO), under which the Russian base operates. Interviewed by Trud, he
was emphatic: “We shall adhere to them strictly, and there are even
plans to expand and deepen relations with Russia.” Colonel-General
Anatoly Nogovitsin, deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian air
force, highlighted the durability of the Russian base, commenting on
the positive attitude of the local population towards Russian
servicemen in Kant. Nogovitsin expressed cautious optimism that the
political turmoil in Bishkek will not affect the long-term Russian
deployment in the country: “The agreement under which our pilots are
stationed in the republic will not be reviewed in the near future.”
Although Putin actively engaged all political elements in the Kyrgyz
crisis, and eschewed his earlier propensity to support the political
status quo, as witnessed in his handling of the Ukrainian presidential
crisis, he may well have decided to conceal Russia’s frustration with
the democratic drift taking place in the former Soviet Union. Nikolai
Bordyuzha, CSTO secretary-general, signaled something of the level of
fear currently experienced within Russian security circles surrounding
the Kyrgyz revolution. On March 25 he told Vesti that Kyrgyz President
Askar Akayev had miscalculated and failed to understand the potential
benefits of involving the CSTO in the crisis. But commenting on the
actual swing against Akayev, he said, “Yes, we can possibly expect
outbreaks of destabilization in other states. Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan are just next door. I think something of a kind can emerge
in Kazakhstan as well.”
Kazakhstan has reacted warily to Akayev’s political exodus. President
Nursultan Nazarbayev hastily pointed out that economic weakness,
poverty, and protests in several Kyrgyz districts had dangerously
combined with weakness on the part of the government. He implied that
the Kazakh authorities do not share that same weakness, while he also
denied that political problems exist in Kazakhstan, despite the
difficulties faced by the Kazakhstani opposition (see EDM, March 28).
Nevertheless, Nazarbayev will be concerned that the democratic forces
of Kazakhstan heartily welcomed “the victory of freedom and democracy
in fraternal Kyrgyzstan.” Zharmakhan Tuyakbay, leader of the Fair
Kazakhstan Bloc of Democratic Forces could have been speaking about
his own country when he congratulated the Kyrgyz opposition: “Akayev’s
authoritarian family-clan regime, which had been bogged down in
corruption and the increasing lawlessness that reached its apogee
during the recent elections to the parliament, has collapsed under the
pressure of popular protest.” Uzbekistan has, on the other hand
adopted a friendly and constructive attitude towards the Bakiyev
regime, offering material, financial, and humanitarian aid to assist
in stabilizing the country.
Putin has handled the events in Kyrgyzstan with greater skill than in
previous democratic revolutions on Russia periphery. In the short term
he will seek to assist the authorities in Bishkek to stabilize the
situation and deepen bilateral relations. But now faced with the stark
consequences of revolution in former Soviet Central Asia, and
recognizing the potential for this to ignite throughout the region,
Putin now appears more isolated in adopting his brand of “managed
democracy.” More telling still, he may face the consequences of other
leaders in Central Asia regarding Moscow’s ability to keep them in
power, sheltering them from democratic forces, as undermined by events
in Bishkek. Russia appears powerless to forestall the level of
political change through “popular protest” now sweeping through parts
of the CIS.
(RTR-Russia TV, March 25; RTR Russia TV, March 25; Kazakh Television
First Channel, Astana, March 25; Interfax-Kazakhstan March 25; Uzbek
Television First Channel, March 25; Itar-Tass March 26; Interfax,
March 27)
–Roger N. McDermott
PUTIN VISIT HIGHLIGHTS RUSSIAN INTEREST IN ARMENIA
Russian President Vladimir Putin underlined Armenia’s geopolitical
importance for Russia as he paid a brief working visit to Yerevan on
March 24-25. The visit came against the backdrop of Moscow’s loss of
influence over its “near abroad,” which has been accelerated by a
series of successful anti-government uprisings across the former
Soviet Union.
If Putin sought solace and a vow of loyalty from one of his country’s
few remaining reliable allies, then he can surely consider the trip a
success. Although no concrete agreements were announced after his
talks with Armenian President Robert Kocharian, the two men may have
cut deals that will reinforce Russia’s economic foothold in Armenia.
The official purpose of Putin’s visit was the launch of the Year of
Russia in Armenia. “Dear friends, Russia is cherishing its good
relationship with Armenia and I am sure that there is similar
sentiment in your country,” he told hundreds of Armenian government
officials, politicians, and prominent intellectuals at the opening
ceremony of the event on March 25.
Speaking at a joint news conference with Kocharian earlier in the day,
Putin sounded satisfied with the current state of Russian-Armenian
ties, saying that they are “developing steadily.” Kocharian likewise
noted their “great potential.”
“Alarmed by the spate of “rose,” “orange,” and other revolutions in
the CIS, Russia fears losing its perhaps last reliable bulwark in the
former USSR,” commented the Moscow daily Kommersant. “In essence, the
arrival of the Moscow delegation was meant to demonstrate that among
the former Soviet republics there are those that have not yet been
affected by Western influence,” concurred another leading Russian
paper, Nezavisimaya gazeta.
Indeed, the political and especially military alliance with Russia has
been a key component of Armenia’s national security doctrine ever
since the Soviet collapse. The tiny country, still locked in a bitter
dispute with Azerbaijan over Karabakh, thus has a vital source of
weapons, supplies, and military training. Besides, the presence of
Russian troops in Armenia precludes any military pressure from Turkey,
a staunch ally of Azerbaijan.
Still, Western influence on both Armenian foreign policy and public
opinion, traditionally oriented toward Russia, has visibly grown in
recent years. Armenians have not failed to notice the steady erosion
of Russia’s dominant role in the CIS area. Pro-Western sentiment is
particularly visible among their post-Soviet intellectual elite and
opposition politicians. A growing number of them now advocate
Armenia’s withdrawal from the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty
Organization and accession to NATO.
Official Yerevan finds the idea too radical. But it does seem to be
hedging its bets by stepping up Armenia’s military cooperation with
NATO and the United States in particular. Kocharian, for example,
hardly pleased Moscow late last year when he sent a small unit of
Armenian troops to Iraq despite strong domestic opposition.
Nonetheless, the Armenian leadership still rarely contradicts the
Russians both in bilateral ties and the international arena. Its lack
of independence was underscored by Kocharian’s highly controversial
decision last November to recognize a Kremlin-backed candidate’s
victory in the second round of Ukraine’s presidential election that
was subsequently annulled due to widespread fraud. Armenia and Russia
were the only members of the Council of Europe to accept the outcome
of the rigged ballot.
The most important (and least publicized) issue on the agenda of
Putin’s talks in Yerevan was Russia’s apparent desire to deepen its
already extensive involvement in Armenia’s energy sector. Russia is
the sole supplier of natural gas to Armenia and effectively controls
80% of the country’s power generating facilities. The Armenian
government hopes to reduce this dependence with a new pipeline that is
expected to deliver gas to Armenia from neighboring Iran within two
years.
Work on the Armenian section of the 140-kilometer pipeline started
last November after a decade of negotiations complicated by Russian
opposition to the project. Visiting Yerevan in early March, Georgia’s
Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli reaffirmed his country’s interest in
receiving Iranian gas through that pipeline and even re-exporting it
to other countries in the future.
Russia’s state-run Gazprom monopoly is categorically against that. Its
deputy chairman, Alexander Ryazanov, argued in an interview posted on
regnum.ru on March 21, “The project is economically inexpedient and
will compete with [Russian] gas delivered to Turkey” via the Black
Sea. Ryazanov also revealed that Gazprom wants an exclusive right to
use Iranian gas pumped to Armenia.
Another Russian energy giant, Unified Energy Systems (UES), is
reportedly seeking to buy Armenia’s electricity distribution network,
which is currently owned by a British-registered company. Armenian
Energy Minister Armen Movsisian publicly voiced on March 3 his
opposition to such a takeover. UES already owns Armenia’s largest
power plant and a cascade of hydro-electric plants near Yerevan. In
addition, it was granted financial control of the Metsamor nuclear
plant in 2003.
Ryazanov and UES’s deputy chief executive, Andrei Rapoport, met
Kocharian in Yerevan one week before Putin’s visit. Details of the
meeting are still unknown. Information about Putin’s and Kocharian’s
conversation on the matter is also very scant. The Armenian leader
said only that they discussed “interesting and serious projects” in
the energy sector. The result of that discussion should clarify the
future course of the Russian-Armenian relationship.
(Haykakan zhamanak, March 26; Kommersant, Nezavisimaya gazeta, March
25; RFE/RL Armenia Report, March 14, 21)
–Emil Danielyan
SERBIA, GEORGIA, UKRAINE, KYRGYZSTAN: UKRAINE DEBATES NEXT REVOLUTION
Last week’s violent revolution in Kyrgyzstan was different from the
peaceful transformations in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine. At the same
time, this fact has not stopped debates in Ukraine and the West over
whether further “dominos” are likely to fall in the Commonwealth of
Independent States.
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk congratulated the Kyrgyz
opposition on their “victory” (Ukrainian Channel 5, March 24). “There
is no doubt that it is difficult to imagine such processes taking
place without a well-organized opposition and popular support,” he
noted. Comparing Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, and Georgia to Ukraine, Tarasyuk
believes that Ukraine’s revolution was different in that, “The
protests went on for a long time, they were large-scale, and they were
not violent.”
Ukrainian readers of the popular Ukrayinska pravda Internet newspaper
see Belarus and Russia as the most likely sites of the next popular
revolutions (Ukrayinska pravda, March 29). Among readers of the
Ukrainian- and Russian-language versions of Ukrayinska pravda, 28% and
34%, respectively, believe that Belarus is next.
Channel 5 debated the issue of Belarus on March 26, a TV channel
established by the current secretary of the National Security and
Defense Council, Petro Poroshenko. Since the Orange Revolution,
Channel 5 has dramatically increased its ratings from the 13th
most-viewed channel to third place.
Belarus is set to hold its next presidential election in October
2006. President Alexander Lukashenka plans to run for a third term,
after he organized a referendum last fall that changed the
constitution to permit this. If Lukashenka’s plans to create a
presidency-for-life do not lead to a revolution in Belarus, then
likely nothing will.
But is Belarus ripe for revolution? The opposition’s talk of putting
half a million people on the streets on March 25 should be contrasted
with the 2,000 who actually turned up (EDM, March 28). Even the
anti-Leonid Kuchma protests in Ukraine in 2000-2003 attracted rallies
of 20,000-50,000.
Channel 5 is pessimistic about whether Belarus will fall next. At the
same time, the Belarusian opposition is seeking to emulate Ukraine’s
revolution, and Belarusian and Georgian flags were the most
conspicuous non-Ukrainian flags present during the Orange
Revolution. “The opposition plans to act out the Ukrainian scenario
and put forward a single candidate,” Channel 5 explained (March 26).
Nevertheless, the Belarusian regime remains fully authoritarian,
making it difficult for the opposition to organize as a serious threat
to Lukashenka. What distinguishes all four revolutions — Serbia,
Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan — is that they took place in
semi-authoritarian regimes that still permitted some limited space for
the opposition, civil society, and independent media.
If further revolutions can only take place in semi-authoritarian
regimes in the CIS, it limits the number of possibilities to only
Moldova, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Graeme Herd, an analyst at the
Conflict Studies Research Centre, based at Britain’s Defense Academy,
predicted in a January study that Ukraine’s Orange Revolution would
increase the likelihood that CIS ruling elites would move their
regimes towards greater authoritarianism, making it unlikely future
revolutions would take place (da.mod.uk/csrc).
Belarus also lacks a single candidate around which the opposition
could unite. Currently there are 10 politicians who seek to be the
united opposition candidate. Lukashenka will exploit this division
(Channel 5, March 26).
Readers of the Ukrainian and Russian editions of Ukrayinska pravda
readers believe that Russia could succumb to a popular
revolution. Ironically, readers of the Russian edition were more
pessimistic (17%) than readers of the Ukrainian edition (24%). Perhaps
readers of the Ukrainian edition were simply engaged in wishful
thinking?
Since Vladimir Putin was elected to a second term of office in March
2004, Russia has increasingly moved towards a fully autocratic
system. The opposition is finding it more and more difficult to find
space for their activities, and the pro-Western opposition has been
increasingly marginalized.
The ability of the opposition to rely on independent media outlets
proved crucial in the four revolutions to date. In Russia the media
situation has so dramatically deteriorated that opposition and
independent journalists are now moving to Ukraine. Savik Shuster, a
controversial Russian TV host who was hounded out of Russia’s NTV, is
set to launch a discussion show on Ukrainian television, and observed,
“Ukraine today is freer than other CIS countries” (Rossiiskaya gazeta,
March 23).
Shuster predicted that other Russian opposition journalists would
follow him to Ukraine. Olga Romanova, a host on Russia’s Ren TV, also
predicted that moving to Ukraine might be “the only way out”
(Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 24).
One prominent figure in Russia’s opposition, Boris Nemtsov, has been
appointed an adviser to Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko. Former
Russian prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov, an ally of Nemtsov, is
seeking to become Russia’s answer to Yushchenko and the united
opposition’s candidate for the 2008 presidential elections. That race
will be similar to Ukraine’s 2004 elections in that it will also be a
potential succession crisis when Putin finishes his second term.
Ukrainian political commentators agree with Ukrayinska pravda readers
that Belarus and Russia are the next potential CIS dominos. Moldova,
Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan are also mentioned (Ukrayinska pravda,
March 29).
Ukrainian pundits have also pointed to various factors that assisted
earlier revolutions. These include infringing the rights of small and
medium businessmen, the role of young people, anti-oligarch
sentiments, reaction against extensive foreign intervention, and the
availability of modern communications such as cell phones and the
Internet.
The Kyrgyz revolution, following so closely the Ukrainian one, has led
to another debate in Ukraine about the viability of the CIS in its
present form. Russia’s recent unauthorized military incursion into the
Crimea (see EDM, March 29), and Russia’s territorial demands on Tuzla
Island in 2003 have only served to accelerate this debate.
Two groupings are again re-emerging in the CIS, one led by Ukraine and
Georgia and another by Russia. During Kuchma’s second term as
president of Ukraine (1999-2004), Russia gained the upper hand as
Kuchma lost interest in the GUUAM group (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan,
Azerbaijan, Moldova). But, Russia’s position is now becoming
increasingly weaker in Eurasia.
As Tarasyuk told Channel 5 (March 24), the CIS does not have a “future
in the form in which it currently exists.” Yushchenko agrees, and is
calling for radical reform of the CIS (Ukrayinska pravda, March
25). These reforms are likely to weaken Russia’s position in the CIS
and Eurasia even further.
–Taras Kuzio
WHEN ETIQUETTE IS AN ALIEN CONCEPT
“Etiquette” is a loan word in Russian, as in other languages, but the
practice does not seem to have been borrowed along with the word by
some Russian diplomats, particularly when assigned to the Baltic
states. On March 29, Russia’s ambassador to Lithuania, Boris Tsepov,
refused to attend President Valdas Adamkus’ reception for the
diplomatic corps on the occasion of the first anniversary of the
Baltic states’ accession to NATO (ELTA, March 30). Five days earlier,
Tsepov’s interview with the Vilnius daily Respublika stunned a
Lithuanian public already accustomed to Russian diplomats’ breaches of
etiquette.
“This is not a country, but a place of assembly for brawl-lovers who
are running around trying to find some compromising material on each
other,” Tsepov declared. “Many decisions are followed by scandals and
a bad atmosphere. There is always someone who has eavesdropped on
others or informs on someone else. Then they all sit there, dirty and
happy that no one else has managed to stay clean.”
Tsepov to went on to imply that Moscow might resort to orchestrating a
propaganda campaign against Lithuania: “Russians don’t have much
information about Lithuania. If they knew what was going on here,
their attitude would change, and not necessarily for the
better. Current developments in Lithuania are far from worthy of
applause. The Russian people would be disappointed to learn that the
anti-Russian ingredient is ever-present here.”
Finally, the ambassador hinted at Russia’s leverage as the sole
supplier of oil and gas: “[Lithuanians] should express appreciation to
Russia for those energy supplies. Instead, they say that dependence on
Russian energy endangers the national security. If so, Russia could
sell that energy elsewhere” (Respublika, March 24, as cited by BNS and
ELTA, March 24, 25).
Only two weeks previously, Tsepov had demanded that Lithuania’s
leading daily, Lietuvos Rytas, publish an open letter in which he
alleged that the paper served “political forces that are ferocious
advocates of Russophobia and of international confrontation.” “You and
the likes of you have not learned and will not learn to be honorable
citizens of the civilized international community,” and will find no
place in “united Europe,” the open letter said (see EDM, March
16). Its timing was closely related to Lithuania’s national day (March
11, the 15th anniversary of the restoration of state independence) and
the first anniversary of the country’s accession to NATO (March 29).
Lithuanian officials reacted to Tsepov’s latest outburst (as they did
to previous ones from the Russian embassy) with dignified
restraint. President Adamkus commented that respect toward the country
of accreditation is a basic diplomatic requirement; his adviser on
foreign policy, Edminas Bagdonas, that any ambassador should observe
the etiquette; Prime Minister Algirdas Brazauskas, that he would not
stoop to polemics; Deputy Prime Minister Viktoras Uspaskikh (a native
of Russia), that a diplomat is supposed to represent his own country,
rather than judge the host country publicly; and the parliamentary
foreign relations commission chairman, Justinas Karosas, that
instructing the host country what to do is unusual and undiplomatic
(BNS, ELTA, March 24, 25). Senior officials in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs wondered aloud whether Tsepov’s outbursts are spontaneous or
delivered on instructions as part of a harder line in Moscow.
Personal style and etiquette aside, Tsepov is almost certainly
expressing Moscow’s displeasure with three ongoing developments:
First, the decision of Adamkus (along with his Estonian counterpart
Arnold Ruutel) to stay away from Moscow’s May 9 anniversary
celebrations of the Soviet victory in the Second World War (Tsepov
tried to downplay this issue in his Respublika interview). Second, the
Lithuanian government and parliamentary officials’ recent cautionary
statements about Russian diplomats on the prowl for classified
information. And, third, the Lithuanian government’s efforts —
following the destruction of the Yukos oil company in Russia — to
reduce dependence on Russian oil supplies and to avoid an outright
takeover of the Mazeikiai oil-processing and transport complex by
Russia’s state-connected oil companies.
–Vladimir Socor
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The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation,
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