Agency WPS
What the Papers Say. Part B (Russia)
April 11, 2005, Monday

THE ARITHMETIC OF THE CIS COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANIZATION

SOURCE: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 11, 2005, p. 10

by Vladimir Mukhin

Last week, the Russian Armed Forces performed a series of military
maneuvers in a number of key CIS regions. April 5 was the date of
command-staff exercises for the CIS Unified Air Defense System, which
has ten official members: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine. Georgia did not
participate in these exercises. Another two countries – Ukraine and
Uzbekistan – participated on a bilateral basis with Russia. Thus, the
combined exercises actually involved only the six countries that are
members of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
The coalition’s aircraft performed more than 60 flights over the
territories of CSTO member states. At the same time, the active phase
of the Border 2005 international exercises took place in Central
Asia; attended by Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, CSTO Secretary
General Nikolai Bordiuzha, and other influential military commanders
and officials from CIS military-political bodies.

The scale of these events is noteworthy. Nevertheless, the orginal
plans for the command-staff exercises and Border 2005 were obviously
cut back in terms of duration, goals, and objectives. Thus, the
flights from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia were linked to the
actions of the CIS Collective Rapid Response Forces (CRRF), which
were training at the Liaur and Eshak-Maidon firing ranges in
Tajikistan. The Border 2005 exercises involved a total of around a
thousand military personnel and 300 items of military hardware.
Kazakhstan was represented by a company of paratroopers and a group
of fighter-bombers; Kyrgyzstan sent a group of special forces
commandos and two Mi-8 helicopters; Russia sent a group of special
forces commandos, the 303rd helicopter squadron, the 670th aviation
group, the 999th aviation base, two Il-76 aircraft, and the 201st
division; Tajikistan sent a unit of paratroopers with supplies.

It’s immediately apparent that Russia’s presence was the most
substantial. This doesn’t seem to be accidental. As the task of
guarding the Afghanistan border is transferred to Tajikistan, the
role of Russia’s 201st mobile artillery division, to be transformed
into the 4th military base, will grow. Moscow intends to entrench its
military presence in Tajikistan. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov,
visiting Tajikistan for the Border 2005 exercises, stated that 250
million rubles is being allocated in 2005 for developing Russia’s 4th
military base in Tajikistan. Over the next two or three years, 1.124
billion rubles will be spent on setting up military infrastructure in
Tajikistan. Note that this is a great deal of money – comparable to
the entire defense budget of Tajikistan, which spends around 1.2
billion rubles on defense each year, or 1.7% of its GDP.

In addition to setting up land-based infrastructure, Moscow and
Dushanbe have agreed to equip an air base near the town of Aini (30
kilometers from Dushanbe). During Ivanov’s visit, Tajikistan issued
an instruction to transfer the Okno optics and electronics complex in
Nurek to Russia. Evidently, Russia is attempting to establish a
substantial, long-term military presence in Tajikistan.

Vladimir Popov, a defense analyst from the Military Sciences Academy:
“In order to reduce costs, Moscow is moving away from the
Tajikistan-Afghanistan border, while simultaneously spending quite a
lot of money on equipping its military base in Tajikistan. This
doesn’t seem entirely logical. The Armed Forces can hardly establish
a reliable shield against drug trafficking, which is now the main
threat to Russia and other CIS countries.”

According to Popov, Russia’s military policy towards its CSTO allies
is understandable, to some extent. Moscow is spending money on
military infrastructure in other countries besides Tajikistan. It
allocates over 100 million rubles a year for the Russia airbase at
Kant in Kyrgyzstan. Almost a billion rubles has been spent on the
military infrastructure for the 102nd military base in Armenia. The
Russia-Belarus Union budget allocates substantial funding for joint
defense efforts. Of course, Moscow understands that it can uphold its
interests in the former Soviet Union by means of considerable
spending. But does this military spending always pay off in political
dividends, and promote Russia’s plans?

The collapse of the Akayev regime in Kyrgyzstan, the “color
revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine, and the failure in Moldova have
substantially undermined Russia’s ability to influence the situation
in a number of regions within the CIS. Kiev already intends to revise
some points in the Sevastopol lease agreement; once again, the
Russian-Ukrainian border in the Azov-Kerch strait is being
questioned. Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin has referred to
Russian peacekeepers as occupation forces; the Georgian parliament is
demanding an immediate withdrawal of Russian military bases from
Georgia.

And here’s one final example. During the command-staff exercises for
the CIS Unified Air Defense System, Georgia forced a slight change in
the planned scenario when it refused to allow a Russian spy plane to
fly over Georgian territory to Armenia.

Of late, Russia has stepped up its military activities in the former
Soviet Union; but these activities need to be appropriate to Russia’s
foreign policy goals. This is axiomatic for any state. Sooner or
later, Russia’s leaders will have to face up to it. Russia appears to
be developing muscles – but for some reason, certain countries still
don’t respect Russia.

Translated by Alexander Dubovoi