Russian military spending in CIS not adequately recouped politically – paper
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow
11 Apr 05
Russia is attempting to consolidate its positions in Tajikistan in
earnest and for the long term, a Russian paper has said. The newspaper
recalled the Russian armed forces’ involvement in recent CIS military
training exercises in Tajikistan, saying Russia appeared “the most
imposing”. Russian Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov, who attended the
Rubezh-2005 exercises, said that R250 million would be allocated for
the development of the Russian military base in the republic in 2005,
and in the next two or three years the funding of activities in the
development of the military infrastructure in the republic will amount
to R1.124bn. However, it is unclear whether Russia’s “military
assertiveness” can secure a foreign policy in this republic, the paper
said. The following is the text of Vladimir Mukhin report entitled
“Collective Security Treaty Organization Arithmetic: Military Spending
Far Exceeds the Political Dividends” published by Russian newspaper
Nezavisimaya Gazeta on 11 April:
Last week Russia’s armed forces conducted a series of military
manoeuvres in a number of key regions of the CIS. A command-staff
training exercise of the Commonwealth’s Joint Air-Defence System,
which is formally composed of 10 states: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine, was held on
5 April. Turkmenistan and Georgia did not take part in the
command-staff training exercise. Two other countries – Ukraine and
Uzbekistan – operated at the manoeuvres with Russia on a bilateral
basis. The joint drill was thus only for the six countries
constituting the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(ODKB). Combat aircraft of the coalition made more than 60 flights
over the territory of the ODKB countries. The active phase of the
Rubezh-2005 international manoeuvres, which were attended in person by
RF Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov and ODKB General Secretary Nikolay
Bordyuzha and also other influential military commanders and
government officials from collective military-political arms of the
CIS, took place in Central Asia simultaneously.
The scale of the activities is noticeable. The concept of the
command-staff exercise and the Rubezh-2005 exercises was linked in
terms of time, purposes, and objectives here, evidently. The training
sorties of planes from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia were
connected with the operations of the Collective Rapid-Deployment
Forces, which were training at the Lyaur and Eshak-Maydon proving
grounds in Tajikistan. Approximately 1,000 servicemen and 300 pieces
of military equipment were engaged in the Rubezh-2005 exercises
altogether. Taking part in the exercises were an assault-landing
company and a flight of fighter-bomber aviation from Kazakhstan; a
group of a special subunit and two Mi-8 helicopters from Kyrgyzstan; a
special detachment, the 303d Separate Helicopter Squadron, the 670th
Aviation Group, the 999th Air Base, two Il-76 planes, and the 201st
Division from Russia; an assault-landing subunit with reinforcement
and support assets from Tajikistan.
One is struck immediately by the fact that Russia appeared the most
imposing at the exercises in Tajikistan. And this was no accident,
evidently. The role of Russia’s 201st Motorized-Rifle Division, which
will be transformed into the 4th Military Base, will grow in
connection with the transfer of protection of the border with
Afghanistan to the Tajikistanis. Moscow intends to substantially
consolidate its positions in this country in the very near future. RF
Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov, who attended the Rubezh-2005 exercises
in Tajikistan, said that R250m would be allocated for the development
of the 4th Russian Military Base in Tajikistan in 2005. And in the
next two or three years the funding of activities in the development
of the military infrastructure in the republic will amount to
R1.124bn. We would note that this is a very large amount of money,
comparable to the military budget of Tajikistan, which spends on
defence annually about R1.2bn, which constitutes 1.7 per cent of this
country’s GDP.
Aside from the development of the ground infrastructure, agreement has
been reached between Moscow and Dushanbe on the installation of an air
base in the Ayni locality (30 kilometres from Dushanbe). An instrument
transferring to the Russian side the Okno opto-electronic complex
located in Nurek was signed during Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov’s
visit to Tajikistan. It is obvious that Russia is attempting to
consolidate its positions in Tajikistan in earnest and for the long
term. But it is unclear as yet whether Russia’s military assertiveness
can secure a foreign policy in this republic that is just as assertive
and in keeping with the criteria of security.
“In order to reduce costs, Moscow is leaving the Tajik-Afghan border
and at the same time investing substantial funds in the development of
its military base in Tajikistan. This is somehow not all that
logical. The military can hardly form a secure barrier against drug
trafficking. And this is currently the principal threat to Russia and
the CIS,” military expert Vladimir Popov, member of the Academy of
Military Sciences, told Nezavisimaya Gazeta.
The expert believes that the military policy of the Russian Federation
in relation to the post-Soviet states that are ODKB allies is to a
certain extent understandable. Moscow is investing money in the
development of the military infrastructure not only in
Tajikistan. More than R100m are being allocated annually for the
functioning of the Russian base in Kant in Kyrgyzstan. Almost R1bn
were spent on the development of the military infrastructure of the
102d Military Base in Armenia. Sizable funds have been allocated for
joint defence in the union budget of Russia and Belarus. Of course,
Moscow understands that it may secure its interests on the post-Soviet
territory thanks to substantial material outlays. But are military
outlays always recovered in political dividends and do they carry
Russia’s plans into effect?
The collapse of the Akayev regime, the “colour revolutions” in Georgia
and Ukraine, and the Moldavian “brush-off” have considerably
undermined Russia’s capacity for influencing the situation in a number
of regions on the territory of the CIS. Kiev intends at this time to
reconsider certain results of the treaty on the lease of Sevastopol,
and a noise is being raised once again about the Russo-Ukrainian
border in the Azov-Kerch Strait. Moldavian President Vladimir Voronin
calls Russia’s peacekeepers occupiers, and the Georgian parliament is
demanding the immediate withdrawal of the RF military bases from the
country.
And the latest instance. In the course of the CIS Joint Air Defence
command-staff training exercise the plan of the exercises was adjusted
by Georgia, which did not let a Russian reconnaissance plane through
to the territory of Armenia. Although, according to the comments of
Vladimir Mikhaylov, RF Air Force commander in chief, this did not
prevent the accomplishment of all the assignments set the air-defence
forces and assets of Armenia and Russia in the Transcaucasus, it still
leaves an unpleasant aftertaste with the military, evidently.
Russia’s military assertiveness on the post-Soviet territory, which
has increased as of late, should be consonant with its foreign policy
aims. This is axiomatic for the state. It will sooner or later have to
be grasped by the country’s present leaders. Russia is gaining muscle,
seemingly, but for some reason or other some countries do not respect
it, all the same.