Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
April 15, 2005, Friday

DIVORCE COMPLETE: WHAT NEXT?

SOURCE: Trud, April 13, 2005, EV

by Professor Alexei Malashenko, Carnegie Moscow Center

There are two attitudes to the CIS: it’s either a “civilized” form of
divorce for the former Soviet Union, or a creative form of
establishing something different. If the CIS is viewed as a form of
divorce – a system which has divorced former Soviet republics
relatively painlessly, with minimal conflicts and no wars – then I
think the CIS has fulfilled its function. Our divorce is complete.

What is the current state of the CIS? As a system for coordinating
mutual political efforts, it barely functions at all. The meetings of
CIS presidents have essentially turned into a kind of formal and
informal club. They discuss problems and express opinions, but they
are all perfectly well aware that this is just a curious form of
social gatherings for heads of state and their close associates.
Indeed, how can there be any political coordination when there is a
conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, for example? There is
tension in Russian-Georgian relations. Russia’s relations with
Moldova are deteriorating. Russian-Ukrainian relations are strained
as well. Turkmenistan has practically dropped out of the CIS, in
terms of political and economic participation. None of the member
states know their political goals, so the CIS as such does not
address these goals.

As regards economic cooperation, hundreds of decisions have been
approved – but only 30 to 40 of them have been implemented. To put
the problem in a nutshell, the economic interests of the post-Soviet
states are fairly contradictory. The chances of establishing a Common
Economic Area (EEP) seem slim. Essentially, this project will only
result in closer relations between Russia and Kazakhstan, and hence
closer relations between Russia and Kyrgyzstan (if its new government
is relatively pro-Russian). That’s about all. The remaining contacts
are on a bilateral basis.

The most recent attempt to provide some sort of common axis for
economic relations between post-Soviet states was made two years ago.
Anatoly Chubais started talking about a “liberal empire” and real
cooperation among many industry sectors, under Russia’s aegis, across
the CIS. To some extent, he was right; but it’s impossible to argue
that such an alliance could become the dominant economic factor.

There is a great deal of talk about the CIS being useful in security
matters. But there’s no clear definition of security here: does it
mean security against external threats, or fighting terrorism, or
countering internal destabilizing forces? There is the CIS Collective
Security Treaty, but of late this has been reduced to bilateral
cooperation only, and is gradually becoming irrelevant.

Here’s another factor that has a negative impact on the CIS: the
emergence of new, alternative organizations. How they emerge is
another question entirely; but interest in these organizations is
constantly growing. There’s the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), which has proved fairly effective – unfortunately, this
effectiveness is due to the presence of China, not Russia. There is
renewed discussion of the somewhat vague GUUAM organization, made up
of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. A few years
ago, this was presented as an alternative to the CIS, but then it
rapidly retreated into the shadows, and was apparently forgotten. But
now, in the wake of new developments in Georgia, Ukraine, and
Moldova, this idea is starting to be revived – and I get the
impression that there are plenty of politicians and business leaders
in those countries who want to revive GUUAM. Naturally, the West
would also have a hand in that.

To some extent, Moscow’s own policies are working against the CIS.
Moscow still can’t determine its own role in the former Soviet Union.
On the one hand, it’s obviously attempting to interfere in the
internal affairs of its neighbor-states. On the other hand, there are
the declarations that we’re not interfering at all – let them do as
they please. Russia’s own internal problems play a significant role
in this. It would be an advantage for the CIS to have a leader-nation
that is strong, wealthy, and prepared to offer material assistance.
But our neighbor-states don’t experience a rush of enthusiasm when
they look at what is happening in Russia itself: from the Kremlin’s
efforts to build a hierarchy of governance, to an economy mostly
dependent on high oil prices. Russia is the largest, most powerful,
and most problem-filled state in the CIS. Ten years of war in
Chechnya have shown how difficult it is for Moscow to solve its own
security problems. Obviously, this doesn’t make the CIS any more
authoritative.

In Russia, it has been said recently that the CIS might serve as a
framework for a unified humanitarian and cultural expanse. That’s
debatable. The organization and its subdivisions must have some sort
of positive, concrete activity – but at present this is not the case.
I get the impression that the CIS is doomed, and Russia needs to find
some qualitatively different ways of organizing the former Soviet
Union, based on national interests. If Russia can succeed in solving
its own economic and political problems, it could gain an entirely
lawful right to leadership.

Translated by Grigory Malyutin