Turkey’s EU Membership’s Impact on the Caucasus
View: Sedat Laciner
Journal of Turkish Weekly, Turkey
April 19 2005
There are relatively three small countries (Georgia, Azerbaijan,
and Armenia) and three large countries (Russia, Turkey, and Iran)
in the Caucasus. With the collapse of the USSR, Turkey does not have
common boundaries with Russia anymore. Turkey has been one of the
first countries to recognize the newly independent states.
Oil has a special role in the importance of the region. Especially
the Azerbaijani oil makes the region very vital. In addition, in the
transportation of Central Asian oil and natural gas, the Caucasus
is an important route. In the post-Cold War era, it can be said
that three approaches in the region have competed for ascendancy:
the Iranian approach, Russia’ unwillingness to retreat, and Turkey’s
desire for integration with the West.
The Iranian approach is related more with Azerbaijan and wishes for the
establishment of a form of government in this country similar to that
in Iran. As with Georgia and Armenia, Iran stays close to Russia’s
position and endeavors to keep the US and Israel out of the region.
Russia, in addition to its cooperation with Iran, wants to maintain
its influence in the region. From the insurgency in Abkhazia to the
invasion of Karabakh, there is no ethnic conflict in the region in
which Russia has no part. As a matter of fact, both Georgia and
Azerbaijan blame Russia for instigating ethnic secession in the
region. During the tension that mounted in Ossetia in August 2004,
it is no coincidence for Georgian officials to state that “This is a
conflict between Russia and Georgia. War with Russia is imminent.” In
addition, Russia is internally occupied with Chechnya and a bloody war
is going on there for a decade. In short, be it Russia as a state or
some elements in Russia who are fuelling instability in the Caucasus,
or even if this is only a perception, it can be said that Russia will
not act as a locomotive in efforts to consolidate regional stability
and cohesion. In this respect, Georgia and Azerbaijan seek to improve
their relations with Turkey, the US, and NATO and have demonstrated
their intention on various occasions. Expressing their desire to enter
NATO and the EU repeatedly, these countries see Western institutions
as the guarantee for their survival and Turkey as a gateway to
the West. Indeed, relations with Turkey go further back than is
normally thought. During Ottoman times, Georgians and Azerbaijanis
asked the Ottomans for help to ensure their safety against outside
powers and were met with reception. In a sense, today’s convergence
can be viewed as continuity. In the framework of the cooperation in
question, the Turkish military trains the Georgian and Azerbaijani
militaries. Numerous Turkish companies operate in these countries.
Another area that strikes attention is education. In addition to the
thousands of Georgians and Azerbaijanis attending Turkish universities,
relations are further improved with the opening of primary, secondary,
and higher education facilities in these countries by Turkish
private enterprise. The event that perfects these developments is the
Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline. The energy pipeline starting in Azerbaijan,
passing through Georgia and ending in Turkey’s southern shores closely
knits the three countries to each other. This route also connects
the Caucasus to the Mediterranean, that is, to Europe. Lately, the
subject that is paid close attention to is to attach more tightly the
region to the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and Europe by railways,
roads, and seaways and all directions pass through Turkey.
While talking about Turkish-Caucasian relations, the subject of
ethnic ties cannot be overlooked. Today, some 100,000 Armenians and
millions of Georgians and Azerbaijanis live in Turkey. In addition
to Armenians, Georgians and Azerbaijanis who are Turkish citizens,
there are some 100,000 workers are known to be in Turkey, legally
or illegally. Moreover, of the minorities that constitute Georgia’s
populace, a sizeable number lives in Turkey. These groups also maintain
their ties with the Caucasus. This is to such an extent that when
clashes erupt between Georgians and Abkhazians, both groups try to
muster the support of Turkish public opinion. It is a blessing that the
Caucasian groups that are in dispute do not take their problems into
the Turkish political scene. To summarize, Turkey has the dynamics
to maintain the balance among the region’s great powers. This is
not to suggest that there is a Turkish model against Russia and Iran
and one that aims to oust the two countries from the region. On the
contrary, the Turkish model is inclusive as well as supportive of
integration. Turkey’s approach is in conformity not only with Russia’s
and Iran’s aims, but also with those of NATO, the EU, and the US.
Following the approaches of the global and the region’s great powers,
when analyzing the cognition of the region’s relatively small states,
Georgia and Azerbaijan seem to be in close collaboration with Turkey.
The two states also think of NATO and the EU very pleasantly and
desire to become a member in both institutions while both have
fostered close military ties with the US. Most importantly, both
countries hope that Turkey will carry them to the Western system.
During the latest NATO summit that took place in Istanbul in 2004 a
meeting was held between the foreign ministers of Turkey, Armenia,
and Azerbaijan. Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian stated that
Turkey had a sincere intention to improve relations with Armenia and
that the current government was much more eager for that end than
previous governments. Oskanian also said that they welcomed Turkey’s
leadership regarding regional dialogue and underscored Turkey’s role
in the region once again. The three countries’ representatives all
unanimously agreed that the EU and NATO sought a new strategy in
Southern Caucasus and that regional actors had to help this search.
The representatives argued that with the inclusion of Georgia, this
strategy had to be shaped by the region’s countries and be given its
last form by the EU and NATO and that Turkey had a special role in
this strategy and in bringing the region closer to Europe. In short,
Turkey’s EU membership will both hasten the region’s direction towards
Europe and at the same time enable the EU to act as a significant
actor in the region with a strong and applicable vision.