“Russia’s Future Foreign Policy: Pragmatism in Motion”
Power and Interest News Report (PINR)
May 4 2005
Russia’s recent geopolitical moves have distinguished themselves
from the earlier attempts to regain the influence once exercised
by its predecessor states, the U.S.S.R. Once Russia emerged from
the ruins of a former superpower, its initial policies were directed
towards consolidating influence in the previous Soviet regions. These
moves were natural for a state that enjoyed and exercised unrivaled
political, military and economic predominance as the lead republic
within the U.S.S.R. Given the role Russia assumed on the global stage
following 1991, its initial post-superpower drive was to emerge as
the dominant power in the former Soviet Union, and as one of the
world’s foremost geopolitical players.
As the reality of the 1990s and early 2000s played itself out, Russia
was successfully checked on its borders by international and internal
pressures within some former Soviet states. While Russia may appear
to be on the “defensive” following a series of popular revolts that
brought to power governments that took an openly pro-European and
pro-American geopolitical stance, Moscow’s “waning” influence in
the former Soviet regions should not be construed as the country’s
weakness vis-Ã -vis its former sphere of influence. Even with the
growing pressure for democratic reforms on the heels of Georgia,
Ukrainian and Kyrgyz popular uprisings that brought down governments
that were at least partially influenced by Moscow’s policies, Russia
is still the region’s predominant economic power, a fact that is
often underreported in numerous analyses on the former Soviet Union.
Moscow’s economic role in Georgia, Armenia, eastern Ukraine and in
much of Central Asia gives it tremendous leverage even as it seems
to officially “retreat” in the face of mounting popular pressure for
reform and democratization. Additionally, the presence of millions of
ethnic Russians in the former Soviet republics presents Moscow with
yet another “international” advantage, even as it seems that for the
moment this advantage is not used efficiently, if at all. Even as the
current Russian military exhibits signs of inadequacy, the economic
and ethnic factors are not lost on the Kremlin’s decision makers as
they draft their country’s future moves in the world’s ever-changing
geopolitical environment.
Future Pragmatic Moves
Russia sought to reemerge as a successor superpower following the
collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Its geostrategic
maneuvering were somewhat natural for a state that once rivaled the
United States on equal terms in practically every political, economic,
social, military and technological aspect around the world. However,
the harsh economic reality brought on by the demise of the Soviet
empire made the attempts to once again “catch up” to the United States
incredibly costly and unsustainable. Moreover, the loss of superpower
status was incredibly painful to the general Russian population that
still regards their country as one of the greatest powers on the globe.
Russian President Vladimir Putin recently alluded to the demise of the
U.S.S.R. as a catastrophe for the Russian people in his April speech
to the country. As Russia retreated from the numerous international
commitments of its predecessor state, it sought to recreate them to
a certain degree in its “near abroad,” or former Soviet states. This
policy led to open or covert interference in the internal affairs
of these countries, such as Georgia and Ukraine. Given the growing
U.S. and international presence in some of these states, Russia was
effectively “checked” in its efforts, at least for the near future.
Its foreign policy in the 1990s and early 2000s attempted to at least
partially assume the mantle once held by the Soviet Union, but its
greatly diminished political, economic and military status relegated
it to the role of the lesser powers, rather than “the one” power
capable of challenging the United States. Russia is still tremendously
important to the world’s major affairs, but its former Soviet clout is
effectively replaced by that of the United States, European Union and
China in areas such as the Middle East, Eastern Europe, South Asia,
Africa and Latin America. Yet, even in such conditions, Russia may
find itself in an increasingly more advantageous position in the
near future that would make it one of the world’s major players —
at a lesser cost than that paid for by the Soviet Union.
The U.S.S.R. paid a tremendous price for its position as one of the
world’s only two superpowers. Unlike the United States, the U.S.S.R.
saw no real economic or military gains for its global presence, while
its international obligations extracted massive social and economic
costs on the country. Its attempts to court or keep in check its major
and potential allies ultimately did not prevent the collapse of the
Western world, nor diminished the West’s global influence. On the
other hand, the coming geopolitical rearrangements expected to take
place in the next 10-15 years will yield massive benefits for Russia,
and present it with a number of advantageous options. Rather than
attempting to dominate world affairs the way the U.S.S.R. once did,
Russia can exercise an increasingly pragmatic foreign policy designed
to extract the greatest advantage out of the numerous opportunities
presented to it on the world scene.
Russia sees a multipolar world as the best opportunity to advance its
interests and safeguard “world peace.” This policy is enshrined in its
military doctrine, and Russian policymakers have openly stated on a
number of occasions that their country seeks to establish a multipolar
environment that would diminish, at least partially, the position of
geopolitical dominance currently held by the United States. In the last
seven years, its moves towards China and other states have been viewed
as manifestations of such policy. If the main predictions outlined
in numerous policy papers come true, Russia will be able to choose
from a variety of possible allies necessary to reach superpower status.
For example, the U.S. National Security Council’s “Project 2020”
analysis points to the rising influence of China and India in world
affairs in the next 15 years. Assuming the European Union will be
able to overcome its current divisions and emerge as a more unified
entity, its global presence will also be felt on all five continents.
Already, many Middle Eastern states look to Russia as a possible
counterbalance to America’s influence.
Russia will remain a major global player in the near future for
two main reason: its abundant natural resources will assume greater
importance to the world’s major developed economies, and its military
research and development will continually earn it a top place as one
of the top producers and suppliers of hardware around the world. Its
economic strength is still under question — even if major improvements
take place in the Russian economy, it will still be a fraction
of China’s and even a smaller fraction of the U.S.’ and Europe’s
economies for the next several decades. Its stabilized economy,
while still capable of attracting much needed foreign investment,
will be behind major growth in Europe, China and India.
Nonetheless, Russia’s pragmatic foreign policy is being outlined
today. In an interview with Israeli television prior to his
historical visit to the country in late April 2005, Putin was asked
if Russia would seek to establish itself as a superpower on the par
with the U.S.S.R. Putin replied that the costs associated with such
status-seeking moves will outweigh the benefits, and that Russia today
is already a great state, with major presence in Europe and Asia, in
both the “northern” and “southern” tier countries. At the same time,
Putin defended his country’s effort to have productive relations with
states like Syria and Iran, seen by the U.S. and Europe as having a
destabilizing influence on the Middle East — even as Russia courts
Israel at the same time. Specifically, Putin stated that since Iran
is a large country located on Russia’s periphery, therefore it would
be counterproductive to adopt a hostile or competitive attitude with
it. The same attitude is currently applied to China, as the Asian
rising power is seen more as an economic and strategic partner rather
than as a possible threat.
Assuming that today’s geopolitical patterns hold true for the next 15
years, Russia will find itself in a political environment that will at
least partially resemble multipolarity. China’s and India’s improved
economies will give the two states greater international clout,
prompting the United States to adjust its foreign policy to reflect
the appearance of two more powers on the world scene. The U.S. will
not likely diminish in its hegemonic status; however, major policy
centers like the Center for Strategic and International Studies in
Washington predict that it will have more difficulties in advancing
its policies around the world. It is also predicted that the European
Union will possibly emerge as a more unified political entity with as
much desire to advance its interests as the United States, China and
India. In this environment, Russia will have several options it would
be capable of pursuing. [See: “Testing the Currents of Multipolarity”]
Sino-Russian Competition
If China emerges as a possible “threat” to Russia given its
increasing need for natural resources, advanced technology and an
increasingly mature global influence, Russia will attempt to seek
partners in checking China’s influence, albeit in a more careful
style than the Soviet Union’s openly hostile policies of the 1970s.
Russia’s population is expected to decline in the next two decades,
while China’s is expected to rise. Given the already sparse population
in Russia’s Far East — a resource-rich area — this disparity
between this economically weak portion of the Russian Federation and
economically dynamic Chinese territories directly to the south means
a certain amount of friction may emerge between the two states that
today enjoy cordial relations. Russia would then not be the only
country seeking to contain China’s influence — Japan would also be
high on that list.
While today Japan is viewed as the world’s second largest economy,
it is expected to cede that status to China in the next two decades.
Japan relies on the import of natural resources vital to its economy
— as China does today and will do so in the future. The rising
competition with a much more powerful Asian neighbor may prompt
Japan to look for possible “allies in principle,” so as not to engage
Beijing openly as an adversary.
Russia is well suited to play that role, as it currently enjoys
growing economic connections with Tokyo. The United States is already
interested in preventing the rise of China as its possible competitor
in Asia, and is Japan’s major ally. Tokyo enjoys strong economic,
military and political connections with Washington, a relationship that
is expected to continue for the next several decades. Thus, if both
Japan and Russia would be interested in containing China’s influence,
the United States could become a third partner in this new alliance.
Sino-Russian Cooperation
On the other hand, if Russia chooses to throw its hat in China’s
corner following a natural progression of their relationship, it will
find itself in an increasingly dichotomous role as a major partner to
one of the world’s great powers. On the one hand, Russia will assure
its territorial integrity and increased economic cooperation with
one of the world’s largest economies. On the other hand, it might
find its own economy harnessed to growing Chinese needs. Nonetheless,
as a strategic and economic partner to China, Russia will be capable
of exercising tremendous leverage on the world scene as the country
closest to Beijing — much as today’s Japan is viewed as one of
Washington’s most reliable partners, and is therefore courted by many
states wishing to exert their influence with the United States.
Today, more than 60 percent of all Russians think that China is a
partner and is expected to be such in the near future. As a major
Chinese ally, Russia’s geopolitical clout vis-Ã -vis the United
States and Europe may increase, but stands the danger of being
supplanted by the eventual emergence of China as an economic and
military superpower. While both sides to the discussion on China’s
future status point to various internal and international reasons that
may aide or deter China’s rise, they point to Russia’s increasingly
important role in the “Sino-Russian alliance.”
Such an alliance would be capable of diluting — though not diminishing
— the influence currently exercised by the United States around the
world, creating a major competing economic and military entity. If, for
example, Russia’s economy would begin to suffer due to international or
domestic unrest, its decision makers, wary of the strong U.S. role in
the Russian economy in the 1990s, may decide to stay closer to China
as a counterbalance to Washington. The alliance with Beijing could
catapult Moscow back to world superpower status, though the eventual
political and economic beneficiary of this relationship may be China.
Relations with the European Union
The European Union, apart from possibly emerging as one of the main
power centers, may itself undergo a transformation in the next two
decades. Its core population is expected to decline and age, prompting
an urgent need for fresh workforce. Lately, and into the near future,
immigration has been growing in importance for Europe’s economy,
and is expected to become even more vital as more Europeans retire
expecting benefits that have long been a staple of Europe’s generous
social programs.
More importantly, Muslims from North Africa, Southeastern Europe,
Turkey and the Middle East have formed the bulk of that immigration
and, consequently, a growing percentage of the European population.
Already, Muslims form ten percent of the French population. This
phenomenon is not new in itself, as millions of Turkish immigrants
came to Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, but it is made more prevalent
by the declining birthrates among Europeans aged 25-45.
Russia has been experiencing a similar trend — with its current
birthrates and aging populace, it too will come to rely on immigration
to sustain its economy. Much of that immigration will come from
its own near abroad, and, to a lesser extent, from other countries
such as China. Muslims now form nearly 14 percent of the Russian
population and the percentage is expected to increase. Thus, the
European Union and the Russian Federation may find themselves in
a very similar situation in the coming decades, and may cooperate
more closely on issues such as the economy and immigration. Russia
is already one of the key trading partners of the European Union,
and that relationship is expected to continue.
However, if the current trends hold, both entities will have
increasing Muslim populations and the need for a more cooperative
strategy toward certain states in North Africa and the Middle East.
Given Russia’s well-established position in the Middle East, as well
as European foreign policy towards Muslim states in general, Russia
can find itself a beneficiary of a trilateral relationship between
itself, Europe and a collection of several Muslim states that will
become increasingly important to the economy and foreign policy of
the new Europe. For example, it is expected that Turkey might finally
accede to the European Union in the near future, and given Russia’s
constructive relationship with Ankara, might facilitate the formation
of this “alliance of need.”
There are certain policies that might disrupt the strengthening of this
relationship — such as the strong U.S. presence in the Middle East,
or the growth of N.A.T.O. and the European Union to encompass more
former Soviet states such as Ukraine. Nonetheless, Russia’s historical
ties to Europe and Moscow’s own view of itself as a European power
will allow it to forge domestic and foreign policies to compensate
for the “loss of prestige,” as its former sphere of influence might
be incorporated into an emergent political order.
Importance of the Military in Russian Foreign Policy
Russia considers military strength to be an important determinant of
its ability to become a powerful state. While it is not expected to
regain the global military reach once exercised by the Soviet Union,
its military is expected to reform and modernize. Military exports
form a significant part of Russia’s military strength, and Moscow
will adopt a further pragmatic approach to weapons exports that will
allow it to gain more contracts and hard currency. Putin stressed as
much to Israeli television when he defended Russia’s military sales
to Syria and Iran, while potentially even courting Israel’s powerful
military market.
Russia’s relationship with another rising power, India, might evolve
among the ties associated with military exports. India is currently one
of the biggest buyers of Russian military hardware, and its purchases
are allowing it to field one of the largest and most technologically
advanced armies in the world. Even as India is establishing peaceful
relations with Pakistan and is courting Beijing’s favors, it still
desires to emerge as a powerful state on its own terms.
Consequently, even the warming of relations with Islamabad and Beijing
will cause New Delhi to keep a watchful eye on its neighbors. Russia
can aid India’s rise as a regional power, a possible counterbalance
to China’s economic and political prowess, as well as a probable
partner to check U.S. influence. That policy can be complicated
by Washington’s own overtures towards India, as the two countries
are increasing their political and economic contacts. Nonetheless,
Russia stands ready to invest more into its bilateral relationship
with India, given its recent Cold War ties to New Delhi.
Relations with the Muslim World
A true wild card will be Russia’s relationship with the Muslim world
of North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. There is currently
no single state besides Iran that can absorb the bulk of the benefits
of its bilateral relationship with Moscow. Russia is also used to
dealing with authoritarian, one-party states. Given the current
trends in the Middle East, certain political and social changes are
expected in the coming years that may alter Russia’s approach to
these countries. These changes will also determine the level of U.S.
influence in the region. If the current “democratization” trend
continues, America’s role is expected to increase. Soviet authority
in that region has been declining since the 1980s, and Russia’s weak
international position in the 1990s solidified that trend.
However, Moscow is expected to maintain a pragmatic approach to the
region, courting stronger and more stable regimes, while acting as
the possible supporter of weaker ones in order to keep a place at the
international negotiation table. Putin’s current approach to Israel,
Iran and Syria signifies this trend — Moscow will allow Washington
to take the initiative and pay for its successes and mistakes,
and then step in as an ally, a counterbalance, or even a possible
competitor. Since extensive involvement in the region today involves
investment and political clout — rather than Cold War style arms
transfers and economic “gifts” in exchange for influence — Russia is
expected to play a smaller role than that occupied by the Soviet Union.
Still, considering the enormous investment by the U.S.S.R. in the
Muslim world during the 1950s through 1980s, Russia is well poised to
assume at least part of that tremendous burden, and to be considered an
important player in the region. It is already courted by major Islamic
multinational organizations, given its own rising Muslim population.
Conclusion
What is surprising about Russia’s current situation in the former
Soviet Union is the speed with which several key states overthrew
their governments that at least nominally enjoyed cordial relations
with Moscow. This trend is also expected to continue, especially given
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s comments that Belarus, one
of the last authoritarian states in Eastern Europe, should undergo
a profound political change. Still, even with America’s physical
presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and an increasing interest
in these regions’ energy sources by China and India, Russia may yet
play a powerful broker in its formerly controlled territories. The
presence of millions of Russian nationals in these states, as well
as the former Soviet states’ economic reliance on Russia as their
largest trading partner, will assure Russia’s strong role at least
for the next several decades.
Moscow has been closely observing U.S. hegemonic practices since
1991, and has extracted several important lessons. The level of
influence exercised by the United States throughout the world is
costly and problematic, even if it yields important short-term
results. Superpower status also has its limitations, as the U.S.
invasion of Iraq demonstrated both the scope and ability of its
armed forces and initial political pressure, as well as the need for
extensive alliances in the medium and long run. The said invasion
also showcased Russia’s ability to launch at least a partially
successful challenge to the United States in tandem with France,
Germany and China. Thus, Russian foreign policy can be expected
to utilize extensive alliance-building, covering as many “bases”
as possible without damaging its international credibility.
It would be difficult for Russia to rise once again as a global
superpower in the absence of an ideology capable of polarizing the
international community into two camps, thus aiding alliances and
constructing independent economic and political spheres of influence.
The world in the coming decades will still be dominated by the United
States, but will undergo a transformation, as more countries will
assume greater economic and political clout.
Therefore, Russia will seek to build “alliances of convenience” with
these countries — whether they be China, India, the European Union,
or even Indonesia or Brazil — in order to extend its influence around
the world. This is premised on the fact that Russia’s foreign policy
will follow Putin’s doctrines, for he is expected to step down in
2008. Much can take place after that year if his successors will not
be able to sustain the country on a track launched by him when he
took office in 2000.
Nonetheless, Russia can be expected to continue its policy of
“superpower on the cheap” — that is, building credible alliances to
share the costs of global influence, instead of paying these costs
themselves, as the Soviet Union did in the Cold War. This approach
can potentially allow it to increase its global influence and status
without extensively damaging its domestic and international standing.
Russia may even end up as an ally of the United States if the right
opportunity presents itself. Its foreign policy could stay as one of
well-calculated pragmatism, making it a very important international
player in the coming decades.
Report Drafted By: Yevgeny Bendersky
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