Gunduz Aktan: Problem-solving
TDN
Thursday, May 5, 2005
OPINIONS
There are those who point out that we have not managed to solve the
Armenian issue and portray this as a failure in our foreign policy.
The same argument has also been made regarding Cyprus. In fact, some
other issues, too, can be cited in this context: our Iraq policy,
our relations with the United States, the EU membership process and
the Aegean problems.
Gunduz AKTAN – There are those who point out that we have not
managed to solve the Armenian issue and portray this as a failure in
our foreign policy. The same argument has also been made regarding
Cyprus. In fact, some other issues, too, can be cited in this context:
our Iraq policy, our relations with the United States, the European
Union membership process and the Aegean problems.
It is true that our foreign policy’s problem-solving capacity is
not high. However, it must not be forgotten that Turkey, in general,
has not been successful when it comes to problem solving. Have we
not been one of the last countries to lower the inflation rate? Don’t
problems continue to exist in such areas as land development, traffic
and taxation?
Obviously the fact that we switched to a democratic system at a
relatively early date has played a certain role in the way these
issues have turned into problems and remained unsolved. Political
parties have preferred not to tackle the kind of problems that cannot
be solved without upsetting the masses, which are already faced
with great difficulties. They have been afraid they would lose the
elections to their rivals. In the end, almost all segments of society
have embraced, more or less, a certain unlawfulness as a way of life.
Problems have become chronic.
A succession of governments that have had no problem-solving
experience in the realm of domestic politics have behaved, when faced
with problems in the foreign relations area, as if they expected
these problems to disappear automatically in time. Furthermore,
foreign policy is an area where, inherently, there are some extra
difficulties. Since each foreign-relations problem is a conflict that
involves a minimum of two parties, their resolution does not depend on
us alone. Our rivals struggle to death to ensure that these conflicts
will not be resolved in our favor. They do not accept a compromise
until they use up their strength and, as a result, conflicts last
longer than a person’s lifespan.
Political conflicts are “zero result” games. In other
words, one’s gain is another’s loss. “Win-win” solutions are hardly
possible. Look, for example, at the crisis that recently broke out
between China and its biggest trade partner and foreign investor
Japan. When the Japanese textbooks failed to reflect Japanese abuse
of the Chinese during the war, that triggered an unprecedented tension
in bilateral relations.
The Taiwan case is another example. The Taiwanese too have made
large-scale investments in mainland China. However, Beijing considers
Taiwan part of China and openly says that it would attack Taiwan if the
latter opted for independence — at the risk of confrontation with the
United States, who is China’s second-biggest economic partner. In other
words, economic interests cannot prevent political conflicts. This
may be distressing, but it is a fact that in the realm of foreign
policy politics supersedes economic considerations.
It is all the more difficult for a country that has multiple
problems to protect its interests when it has a conflict with
a country that has a single problem. While Turkey grapples with
many strategic problems, the Greek Cypriots’ sole goal seems to be
swallowing up the northern part of the island and the Armenians are
making a single-minded effort to make us “admit the genocide.”
Undeniably, our biggest weakness in the realm of foreign policy
stems from our own behavior. Not counting the 1974 intervention in
Cyprus and the 1998 crisis with Syria, Turkish foreign policy has
mainly been defensive over the past 50 years. Turkey has underestimated
its own strength while blowing out of proportion the might of those
confronting it. It has failed to see that nothing can be done in the
realm of foreign policy without taking risks. It has considered it
disgraceful to try to explain itself to the world. It has found it
hard to ask for help from others.
Meanwhile, there are two other major obstacles as well on the
path of Turkish foreign policy. These two factors are interlinked. In
the wake of World War II, Turkey took its place in the Western
world, but the Western countries, finding it hard to overcome their
prejudices rooted in history, still do not consider Turkey to be
“one of them.” This has become clearer in the post-Cold War era,
especially during Turkey’s EU membership process. Would the Armenian
issue have reached today’s proportions if the West had acted fairly?
Meanwhile, many “liberal intellectuals” who have
newspaper columns in Turkey (though, in some other countries they
would be deemed marginal) argue that in order to be “Western”
Turkey should meet each and every demand of the West. Westerners
exploit these intellectuals’ “lack of identity” in the realm of foreign
policy. Therefore, obviously we will not be able to conduct “volume”
or “public opinion” diplomacy on the Armenian issue just as we could
not do that on the Cyprus issue.
For too long Turkey has had too few academics interested in
foreign policy problems. We still do not have a sufficient number
of jurists and historians specializing in genocide, terrorism and
the law of war. Our legal experts and historians prefer to build a
career in more positive aspects of life.
Also, as a nation we want prompt resolution of conflicts. We
cannot harbor hostile feelings towards anybody for long. We support
those that favor a quick solution. We forget that compared to foreign
policy, even a marathon is a “speed race.” And the only way to resolve
conflicts “quickly” is to make too many concessions.
–Boundary_(ID_QxnCzvQrUBLiNjt1NVf9xg)–