Is the Erdogan Government Making Concessions?

Zaman, Turkey
May 7 2005

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been pursuing an active
foreign policy since it came to power. It has made new openings that
transcend stereotype policies that were implemented for many years
on European Union (EU), Cyprus and the so-called Armenian genocide
issues. But at this point, it is being asked how much of these
policies protect Turkey’s interests and whether concessions have
always been made under the name of negotiations and new openings.
Turkey’s reform performance on its path to EU membership makes a lot of
circles jealous. Steven A. Cook, in his article entitled,”The Right
Way to Promote Arab Reform,” published in the March-April edition
of the Foreign Affairs magazine, suggests there should be a policy
to encourage reforms in Arab countries. Cook points to Turkey as
the most important and most successful example of this model, and
emphasizes that Turkey has adopted eight reform packages within the
last three years.

Even though the EU reform process did not start with the AKP, the
reform performance the party has displayed with its “conservative
democrat” identity and shuttle diplomacy, has been effective in
bringing good results. But, can we call these reforms “concessions”?
Of course, we can’t. These reforms should be against Turkey’s
interests in order for them to be referred to as concessions. The
reforms, however, are in the areas of human rights, democratization
and expansion of freedom, which are for the betterment of the Turkish
society. Besides, these criteria are valid for all EU members.

The Erdogan government changed the traditional no solution policy
on Cyprus by saying “Yes” to the Annan Plan. And now, it is about to
approve the Aditional Protocol, which means an unofficial recognition
of Southern Cyprus. Has the government made an irreversible concession
on Cyprus by taking these steps? It is impossible to say “yes” to this
question. If Turkey had insisted on the Cyprus no-solution policy and
had rejected the Annan Plan, it would have faced immense international
pressure. But now, diplomacy-wise, Turkey is in its strongest position
ever on the Cyprus issue, since the Peace Operation in 1974. Turkey
can even request that the embargo imposed on the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus (TRNC) be lifted and for pressure to be mounted on
Greek Cyprus.

The letter Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan wrote to President
[Robert] Kocharian of Armenia, that Turkey has no diplomatic
relations with, is a product of a similar active foreign policy.
Erdogan’s letter has given Turkey, which has all along rejected the
genocide allegations, but could not implement courageous policies,
a chance to take a deep breath. Turkey had thought that rejecting the
so-called allegations and decisions so far at state level, would be
enough. There was no solution. The AKP government opened a diplomatic
maneuver area for itself in a manner that even surprised the other
party. The support given by the European Council and US President
[George W. Bush] to the idea of bringing historians together and
establishing a commission, shows that Erdogan’s letter is a success
for Turkey.

AKP has pursued a policy different from the traditional approach on
US-Israel relations and has taken ties to the strategic partnership
level. Turkey pursued a rather original policy, particularly on Iraq,
even defying the United States. But we cannot claim that this policy
has been as successful as the policies on Cyprus, EU or the so-called
Armenian genocide. Turkey even lost the traditional support of the US
on various issues. The Erdogan government could not demonstrate its
active, courageous and dialogue-oriented foreign policy performance
especialy on relations with the United States. Hence, Erdogan, who
realized this mistake, visited Israel this week. He is also preparing
to visit the US. It means that Turkey is trying to thaw the ice.

As a result, the Erdogan government, on traditional crisis issues,
does not prefer a policy of no solution, but rather a reconciliatory
or pro-solution policy. For this reason, it is impossible to define
these policies as “concessions,” and it can also be observed that,
compared to the past, these kinds of policies even strengthen Ankara’s
hand, diplomacy-wise.