Aktan: Privileged partnership
TDN
Thursday, May 19, 2005
OPINIONS
Gunduz AKTAN
In the framework of its Dec. 17 conclusions, the European Union
agreed to open entry talks with Turkey on Oct. 3. It is known that
France and Germany have reached an agreement on this issue. The
German opposition (CDU-CSU) and the ruling parties in France (UMP and
UDF) are in favor of giving Turkey privileged partnership as opposed
to full membership. There is a strong chance the opposition will come
to power in Germany after general elections in the fall of 2006 and
that UMP leader Sarkozy will win the 2007 presidential election in
France.
It is not only the EU that has committed itself to Turkish
membership or, to put it differently, giving Turkey a date for the
start of accession talks. These two countries have made a pledge as a
state to this effect. Backing off on these pledges with the change in
governments would not be compatible with the seriousness of a state.
However, those that oppose our membership give the impression that
they would not hesitate to switch to the privileged partnership
formula.
Quite recently, I had a talk with the chairman of a think tank
who is known for his closeness to President Chirac. I was surprised
to see that he had been extremely well prepared on the issue of
privileged partnership. My understanding of his remarks on this issue
can be summed up in the following manner:
The accession talks would take 15-20 years and the outcome is
uncertain, whereas privileged partnership can be established without
delay. Besides, Turkey does not have to give up full membership.
Parallel talks could be held.
Turkey would become a member of the Defense Ministers Committee
with voting rights on European defense and security matters.
As a privileged partner, Turkey would get nearly as much EU aid
as it would have obtained in the course of the full membership
process.
Turkey would not have to comply with EU standards that would
cause production costs to go up significantly. The cost of these
health, environmental and workplace standards amounts to 3-4 percent
of the GDP, on average, for the EU’s recently admitted 10 members. In
Turkey’s case, that would entail a cost in the $9-12 billion range.
That cost would have to be absorbed by the private sector and would
not create new jobs. In fact, it could even reduce the employment
rate. Due to these costs, during the EU’s latest expansion, whenever
a specific business sector in one of these candidate countries became
the subject of negotiations between the EU and that country, the
sector in question started opposing the country’s EU membership.
Once Turkey and the EU take joint measures to protect Turkey’s
borders the visa requirement for Turks would be eased.
The most attractive aspect of the privileged partnership formula
involves a number of foreign policy issues. Currently, unilateral
concessions are being sought from us on the Cyprus issue (and,
afterwards, on Aegean problems). In fact, this is being stipulated as
a condition. With privileged partnership these issues would be
dropped from the EU agenda. During the process of privileged
partnership talks with Turkey neither Greece nor the Greek Cypriots
would be permitted to exercise veto rights.
Naturally, the Armenian genocide claims would be discarded
offhand and the Kurdish problem would no longer be considered part of
the Copenhagen political criteria.
The problem is whether the Turkish stock market would have an
adverse reaction to the switch from the full membership formula to
the privileged partnership one. And that, too, can be eased thanks to
the cooperation to be made between the two sides.
It is not possible to know to what extent this think tank is
capable of influencing French policies. In other words, it is not
known whether what it says would actually be done. However, it is not
possible to say that the option it has developed is entirely lacking
in seriousness.
Greek/Greek Cypriot greed is preventing resolution of the Cyprus
problem. Papadopoulos insists that Turkey should recognize the Greek
Cypriot administration and withdraw its troops (and the Turkish
settlers) from the island. He insists that the Greek Cypriots should
be permitted to settle in the northern parts of the island without
any restrictions and that Greek Cypriot property should be totally
returned to former owners. This way the “solution” would be
brought about automatically within the EU. The events of the
1963-1974 era would be legitimized. Turkish Cypriots would be reduced
to minority status and they would be quickly removed from the scene.
Greece, meanwhile, wants to legitimize the changes it would bring
about — via faits accomplis — to the status quo in the Aegean.
The French people may reject the Turkish EU accession treaty in a
referendum if Turkey does not recognize the Armenian genocide claims.
Efforts are being made to have Ocalan retried and to provide the
ethnic Kurds with collective minority rights through the new
Accession Partnership Document.
Turkey cannot possibly accept any of these. In fact, it is as if
these issues are being put forward to block Turkey’s path, that is,
to prompt Turkish refusal. If things continue in this manner we will,
at some point in this process, run into some insurmountable
obstacles, anyway.
The question is whether to wait until colliding with these
obstacles or to see what is going to happen and take due measures
now.
Both options are very hard to take, and they both entail a high
cost.
