Global Politician, NY
May 23 2005
The Concept of Eurasia and Turkey’s Regional Strategies
Prof. Ruben Safrastyan, Ph.D. – 5/24/2005
The concept of Eurasia has occupied an important place in political
discussions in Turkey since the beginning of the 90s of the last
century. It is perceived as one of the main concepts reflecting
Turkey’s geopolitical strategy, international relations and national
security. The regional policy of Turkey is also partly influenced by
this concept.
Definitions of Eurasia
The term Eurasia in the political and ideological discourse of
contemporary Turkey has rather a politicized interpretation than a
scientific definition. Some political scholars and researchers
consider Eurasia as a region settled mainly with Turkic peoples,
including Turkey, the Balkans and part of the Caucasus, the former
Soviet republics of Central Asia, the region of Volga in Russia, and
Northern Afghanistan. Such approaches, which are nothing but
“modernized” editions of the pan-Turkist ideology, were widely spread
in various circles of Turkish elite, especially in the beginning of
1990s.
However, the definition based on this ethnic-and-linguistic
principle, lost its priority in the middle of 1990s, and at present
it is less disseminated than the other versions of “Eurasia”, based
exclusively on geographical or political conceptions. For example,
the web site of Turkish Foreign Ministry presents a geographical
definition of Eurasia as “a large landscape, stretching from Europe
to Central Asia.”1 The current Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul
describes Eurasia as a “continent consisting of Europe and Asia.”2 In
fact, it is an attempt to avoid possible accusations in politicizing
the concept.
The definitions given by the representatives of various wings of
Turkish political elite are more detailed and politicized. For
instance, former president Suleyman Demirel considers the Balkans,
Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq as
parts of this region.3 Former Vice-Premier Minister and Chairmen of
pan-Turkist Party of Nationalist Action (PNA) Devlet Bahceli includes
the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East into Eurasia.4
Nevertheless, our numerous meetings with Turkish diplomats for more
then ten years allow us to conclude that in its everyday activity the
Turkish diplomacy prefers not to rely on the official conception of
Ministry of Foreign Affairs or statements of some politicians or
scientists, but uses the very pragmatic, from their point of view,
version limiting Eurasia with the eight newly independent states of
the South Caucasus and Central Asia. It is worth mentioning that
Suleyman Demirel, during his tenure as Prime Minister, had the same
opinion. For instance, in November of 1992 he stated: “With the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, Eurasia was born…”5 Many Turkish
politicians share the same approach.
The problem of definition of Eurasian borders in the Turkish
discourse, which raises just an abstract interest at first sight, has
great importance for revealing the motives of Turkish foreign policy
nowadays.
Eurasian Geopolitical Theories in Turkey
The concept of Eurasia, which is one of the central concepts of
geopolitics, has been studied in Turkey quite recently as a result of
tangible changes in the regional geopolitical environment. Using the
Western classical geopolitical approaches regarding Eurasia (from H.
J. Mackinder and N. J. Spykman up to Z. Brzezinski), Turkish
theorists tried to work out their own concepts. They are operating
with such core notions of classical geopolitics, as Heartland, Inner
Crescent or Outer Crescent.6 But in the meantime, their conclusions
are very different from the Western ones.
The most remarkable and complete geopolitical concept in this sense
was recently worked out by Ramazan Ozey (Professor of Marmara
University). It is entitled “The Theory of Center Domination by
Turks.” The main elements of Ozey’s concept can be summarized in the
following way: Anatolia is the “World Fortress” (Dunya kalesi in
Turkish, or the Heartland in classical sense), and the ruler-country
in Anatolia, Turkey, possessing this acropolis, has an opportunity to
take control over the regions of the “Internal circle” (Ic Cember in
Turkish, compare with Mackinder’s Inner Crescent). According to the
Turkish scientist, they are the Balkans and Eurasia. Turkey will
govern the world (Dis Cember in Turkish, meaning Outer Crescent in
Mackinder’s concept) sooner or later, the author says in conclusion.
7
Thus, Ozey legalizes Turkey’s domination in Balkans and Eurasia
considering it a natural result of that country’s geography. Then, he
considers Turkey’s domination in Eurasia not an end in itself, but a
method of achieving a bigger result – the World Domination.
Other publications by Turkish experts in geopolitics are not so frank
and far-reaching, though majority of them support the ideas of
Turkey’s domination or priority in Eurasia applying “softer”
wordings. Thus, for example, Mustafa Yilmaz (Professor of Hacettepe
University) also describes Turkey as a “natural acropolis” situated
in the middle of the Balkans, Caucuses and the Middle East, which
allows it to apply a number of alternative economic, political and
military approaches.8
To emphasize the priority of Turkey proceeding from the “natural”
geopolitical conditions, another idea of “Central Empire” was put
into scientific and political circulation in 1990s. According to one
of supporters of this approach, Oral Sander, Turkey, yielding to a
number of other countries by its power and being influenced by “world
developments,” at the same time, influences these developments due to
its position of a “Central Empire.”9
Eurasia in Political Discourse
In 1990s the Turkish left wing and right-wing thinkers and
politicians, as well as representatives of a number of pro-Islamic
and pan-Turkist political forces, elaborated a model of Turkey’s
Eurasian policy, to become a complete alternative to the
“traditionally” pro-Western foreign political strategy. This approach
is based on the idea of cooperation of the most important powers of
Eurasia, Turkey, Iran and Russia, against the “Western imperialism.”
Its authors condemn Turkey’s foreign policy for its subordination to
the West and ignoration of the country’s basic interests.
In particular, it has become known recently that one of the country’s
prominent right-wing political figures, Husnu Dogan, even makes steps
towards establishment of “Avrasya” (Eurasia) party.10 Another
supporter of the above view, veteran of the Turkish Socialist
Movement Dogu Perincek, gave one of his books a very symbolic title:
“Eurasia’s choice – independent foreign policy for Turkey”.11
Nowadays, the political and intellectual elite of Turkey remains
mainly adherent to the strategic preference of Ataturk. The
representatives of this wing are pragmatic and well aware that Turkey
is not ready to become the politically dominating power in Eurasia
without the support of the West, either economically or politically.
That is why, they consider the Eurasian direction of Turkey’s foreign
policy subordinated to Turkey-West relations and try to coordinate
their policy with the goals of the West, and, in particular, of the
USA. At the same time, they consider the extension of Turkey’s
influence in the Eurasian region as an important trump card in
bargaining with the West on such issues as Turkey’ admission to the
European Union or the Cyprus problem.
The study of geopolitical and geostrategical opinions of the modern
Turkish high-ranking influential military concerning Eurasia shows
that their approaches are shifting from hard-line Kemalist
pro-Western orientation to diversified ones. They have much in common
with the views of the aforementioned Western-orientated political
elite. Even official military documents now speak of Turkey as a
“country of Eurasia”, committed “to retain and enhance the ties with
both the West and the East.”12 In 1998, Minister of Defense Hikmet
Sami Turk, making his speech at the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, stressed the following: “Turkey has not only turned its
face to the West, but also enjoys traditional ties with the Islamic
World. She takes her roots from Central Asia, The Middle East,
Anatolia and Europe. In short, Turkey is a Eurasian country.”13
The military traditionally consider Eurasia and, first of all, the
South Caucasus, as an unstable region threatening Turkey’s security.
They are convinced that Russia’s influence and military presence in
that region is the main source of danger. Thus, it is obvious, that
the attention of the military is mainly focused on the three
countries of the South Caucasus. 14 At the same time, they, alongside
with many Turkish politicians, think, that “Turkey is in the middle
of the world.” 15
Within the last two-three years, among the Turkish high-ranking
military appeared a group protesting against integration into
European Union. Its members consider Eurasia as an important
geopolitical privilege for Turkey and not as a source of instability.
Despite their pro-Western orientation, in that region they predict a
strong competition with the European countries, especially with
Germany. 16
In 1999-2002, the period of the previous coalition government headed
by Bulent Ecevit, the Foreign Ministry was controlled by the
Democratic Left-wing Party (DLP), so the views of the party’s leaders
require a special attention. On the whole, they supported the
pro-Western strategy of the Turkish foreign policy, though with some
reservations. For example, in 1995, DLP leader Bulent Ecevit insisted
on the “region-oriented foreign policy.” He thought that the use of
the European and Asian elements would enable setting up the integrity
of the countries situated in the Eurasian super-region, certainly
headed by Turkey. He even uses the term “Eurasiation” (Avrupalasma in
Turkish) – to signify the process of integration between Europe and
Asia. According to him, Turkey is occupying the central place in this
process.17
Foreign Minister of that period Ismail Cem, also the DLP
representative, did not avoid rather openly speaking about
prospective Eurasian plans in public. Thus, once he stated: “We
shall, undoubtedly, join the European Union, but our perspective of
vision is broader. Our goal is to become the decision-making center
in Eurasia.”18
The program of the Justice and Development Party’s (JDP) Government,
which replaced Ecevit’s coalition, points out that the goal of
expanding relations with Russia is based on the aspiration for
“cautiously expanding Eurasia’s prospect.” Meanwhile, before coming
to power, this pro-Islamic party noted in its program that it would
try to expand the “Eurasian direction” of the Turkish foreign
policy19. The latest steps of the JDP Government display the trend of
strengthening the impact of the Eurasian concept on the Turkish
foreign policy. The Foreign Ministry acts within the new framework
redefining the priorities of the Turkish foreign policy in accordance
with the Eurasian concept, which is indicated in the JDP’s program
and considered to be more suitable to the changing regional and
global realities. The Ministry is establishing a new balance between
national interests and those realities and is trying to improve
relations with the neighboring countries.
Different interpretations of Eurasian concept are also present in
official documents of other Turkish political parties. In particular,
the Program of the Social-Democratic People Party (SPP), which had
been playing an important role in the Turkish politics in the first
half of 1990s, describes the “Wide Eurasian” region as a “territory
of our life, our power, apple of the eye” for Turkey.20 Recently
founded Party of New Turkey (PNT) considers Turkey as “The Power
Center” of emerging “Eurasian Entirety”.21
The concept of Eurasia is widely spread also among different circles
of contemporary Turkish society. There are many research centers,
think tanks, NGO’s, foundations, and periodicals, the titles of which
include the word “Avrasya” (Eurasia). Most of them are interested in
advocating Eurasian trend in Turkish political, economical and
cultural life. Only one example: a non-governmental Association of
Cultural and Societal Development of Eurasia stands for strengthening
various relations between Europe, Turkey and other Eurasian
countries, especially, with the Central European ones. Its leaders
are supporters of using the Eurasian direction of Turkey’s foreign
policy as a trump card in the EU accession negotiations. According to
this NGO’s program documents, Turkey has to play “major role” in
Eurasia.22
Conclusion
The above examined theoretical approaches and opinions concerning
Eurasia and the place and role of Turkey, that are widely spread in
the modern Turkey’s public and political life, testify that not only
political elite of the country, but also military and scientific
ones, as well as the segments of emerging civic society share the
idea of Turkey’s domination in that region, bringing different
reasons and bases.
These concepts come from both – left and right wings of the political
spectrum are serving as a theoretical substantiation for the Turkish
foreign policy, one of the most important long-term objectives of
which is becoming a dominating power in the region of Eurasia.
——————————————————————————–
SOURCES
1 See Turkish Foreign Policy. – In:
2 Abdullah Gul. Walking the Tight Rope: Managing Turkey’s Foreign
Relations. Talk given to the Eurasia Summit 2003 “Energy, Economic
Development and Regional Security”, New York, September 24, 2003. –
In:
3 Turkish Daily News, July 8 2003.
4 MHP’nin 6. Kongresi… Bahçeli’nin konu_mas1. In: Arsiv Belgeler,
BelgeNet ().
5 Prime Minister Suleyman Demirels 12th press conference, Ankara.
In: Turkish Review, 1992, Vol.: 6, August, p. 89.
6 On these notions in the western interpretation see the brilliant
article of Donald W. Meinig from the University of Utah (US):
Heartland and Rimland in Eurasian History. The Western Political
Quarterly, 1956, Vol.: 9, No.: 3, p. 553-569.
7 See in his book: Ramazan Ozey. Jeopolitik ve Jeostratejik Acidan
Turkiye. Istanbul: Marifet Yayinlari, 1998, p. 57-59.
8 Mustafa Yilmaz. Turkiyenin Jeo-Stratejisi Ac1s1ndan Gunumuz
Olaylar1n1n Degerlendirilmesi. Ucuncu 1000E Girerken Turkiye:
Kutlu Dogum Sempozyumu 1999. Yayina Hazirlayan: Omer Turan. Ankara,
2000, s. 72.
9 Oral Sander. Turkish Foreign Policy: Forces of Continuity and
Change. – Turkish Review, 1993, Vol.: 7, winter, p. 45-46.
10 Turkish Probe, 12 May 2002.
11 Dogu Perincek. Avrasya Secenegi: Turkiye Icin Bagimsiz Dis
Politika. Istanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari, 1996.
12 Ministry of National Defense: White Paper-Defense 1998. Ankara:
Ministry of National Defense, 1998, p. 5.
13 Hikmet Sami Turk. Turkish Defense Policy. – In: The Washington
Institute For Near East Policy, Wednesday, March 3, 1999
().
14 For the “traditional” approaches of top Turkish military
officials, see Degisen Stratejilerin Odaginda Turkiye. Istanbul: AD
Yayincilik, 1996, written by Necip Torumtay, retired Chief of the
General Staff.
15 Sadi Erguvenc. Turkey’s Strategic Importance in Military
Dimension: A Regional Balance Holder. – In: Turkey at the Threshold
of the 21st Century: Global Encounters and/vs Regional Alternatives.
Ed. By: Mustafa Aydin. Ankara, 1998, p.63.
16 See Kaan Ogut. Avraysa Stratejileri Uzerine. – In: Aydinlanma
1923, Sayi: 21 (). These conclusions were
confirmed by Colonel Nazmi Cizmeci in a lecture during the 1998
workshop entitled “The Importance of Turkey vis-à-vis the Caucasus,
Middle Asia, and Eurasia.”
17 Avrasya Dergisi, II ().
18 See Kaan Ogut, Avraysa Stratejileri Üzerine, in: Aydinlanma 1923,
Sayi: 21 (on-line version). Cem means, surely, the official
definition of Eurasia.
19 See the Section 6 (Foreign Policy) of the Party Program of AKP in:
(in Turkish).
20 Sosyaldemokrat Halk Partisi’nin (SHP) program1, 2002. In:
Partiler ve Programlar, BelgeNet ().
21 Yeni Türkiye Partisi’nin (YTP) program1. In: Ibid.
22 See the WWW site of above mentioned NGO:
Prof. Ruben Safrastyan, Ph.D. is a Professor of International
Relations at Acharyan University in Yerevan, Armenia. He’s also the
Director of the Department of Turkish Studies at Institute of
Oriental Studies, Armenian National Academy of Sciences. In the past,
he served as a Counselor of the Armenian Embassy in Germany and was
the Deputy Director of the Department of Political Analysis for the
Office of the President of Armenia.