SOURCE: Kommersant, May 31, 2005, pp. 1, 10
by Vladimir Novikov, Mikhail Zygar

Agency WPS
What the Papers Say. Part B (Russia)
May 31, 2005, Tuesday

EVERYBODY OUT

Russia and Georgia have finally reached a consensus on the Russian
military bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki. Foreign ministers Sergei
Lavrov and Salome Zurabishvili say that the bases will be out of
Georgia by 2008. Russia has made considerable concessions to Georgia
on this issue, but its troubles are only starting. Withdrawing the
Akhalkalaki base and moving it to Gyumri in Armenia could sour Russia’s
relations with Azerbaijan.

The foreign ministers of Russia and Georgia were expected to reach a
consensus on the military bases in early May, but no breakthrough was
achieved then. The negotiating parties failed to reach agreement,
and President Mikhail Saakashvili of Georgia pointedly ignored
an invitation to Victory Day celebrations in Moscow. Neither
did diplomats fare any better by May 15. Several months ago, the
parliament of Georgia passed a resolution containing an ultimatum,
with the deadline set for May 15 – threatening to outlaw Russian
military bases unless an agreement could be reached by then.

Eventually, Moscow was forced to make considerable concessions. Back
in 2000, Russia claimed that it needed 15 years for the withdrawal.
Two years later, it insisted on 11-12 years; by 2004, it was
demanding seven to eight years. Tbilisi was only prepared to give
Russia three years. Russia and Georgia found some sort of a compromise
yesterday. Their foreign ministers made a joint statement confirming
that the Akhalkalaki base will be the first out of Georgia, followed
by the base in Batumi. “The withdrawal will be completed in 2008,”
Lavrov said.

Gela Charkviani, spokesman for the president of Georgia, said
yesterday that the Russian bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki are no
longer active bases as such; they are already shifting into withdrawal
mode. Withdrawal of heavy military hardware will begin this year. At
least 40 armored vehicles, including at least 20 tanks, will be pulled
out by the end of this year. In 2006, Russia will turn over to Georgia
all military facilities it doesn’t use. The Akhalkalaki base is to
be vacated by the end of 2006, and shut down permanently by October
1, 2007. As for the Batumi base, it is supposed to be closed by the
end of 2008 along with the headquarters of the Russian Army Group in
Tbilisi. Military hardware from the Batumi base will be moved out by
ship, and hardware from the Akhalkalaki base will be moved by road
to Gyumri.

Russia is not supposed to change or add to the weapons and military
hardware at the bases. Rotation of personnel discharged from the
military is permitted. Saakashvili’s staff is already working on the
appropriate statement.

In accordance with what Moscow has insisted on all along, “some
personnel and military hardware and infrastructure at the Batumi base
will be used for the needs of a Russian-Georgian counter-terrorism
center, to be established.”

Even as it moves to clear up a serious problem in relations with
Georgia, the Kremlin has found itself facing another problem, no less
serious, in relations with Azerbaijan. Official Baku has been unnerved
and annoyed by reports that military hardware from Akhalkalaki will
be relocated to Gyumri, Armenia. The government of Azerbaijan is
particularly resentful about the failure of the Russian authorities
to inform Azerbaijan in advance.

The matter promptly deteriorated to the level of official protest
notes. On May 23, the Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan served an
official note to the Russian Embassy in Baku. The sharply-worded
document states that the intended move of the base from Akhalkalaki
to Gyumri would “inflame public opinion in Azerbaijan, run counter to
the interests of regional peace and stability, and generate tension
in the already-problematic conflict resolution process between Armenia
and Azerbaijan.” Baku essentially demanded that Moscow should abandon
its intention to move the base to Armenia.

Clearly, this diplomatic demarche was sanctioned by Azerbaijani
political leadership. According to our sources, the Russian Defense
Ministry is frantically seeking ways of alleviating the friction. For
example, Russia could make some lucrative offers to Azerbaijan – for
example, compensation in the form of cheap Russian military hardware
for the Azerbaijani armed forces. But that could cause problems in
relations with Armenia.

Translated by A. Ignatkin