Global Politician, NY
June 26 2005

Russia and Turkey in South Caucasus: A Geostrategic Armistice
Prof. Ruben Safrastyan, Ph.D. – 6/26/2005

Two meetings of the Russian president V. Putin and Turkish Prime
Minister R.T. Erdogan, held in the end of the last year and in the
beginning of this year, as well as the wide spectrum of problems
discussed and contents of the signed documents, marked the start of
the a new phase in the Russian-Turkish relations. Experts spoke about
that start in several recent years, and this phase can be
characterized as the starting period of the real strategic process.

Answers to the questions about the depth of that process, its
direction and how it will affect the situation in the region, are of
vital importance for Armenia. In our memory the remembrance about how
in 1920 the Kemalist Turkey and Bolshevik Russia, uniting their
efforts against the common enemy – the Entente, came to a secret
agreement and at the expense of Armenia put an end to the century-old
confrontation, in particular, in the Caucasus. As a result, the
`Sovietized ‘ Armenia had to sign the Kars treaty of 1921, which
defined the distorted borders of the present Republic of Armenia.

The anxiety, expressed by some representatives of the Armenian
political elite, that some rapprochement between Turkey and Russia,
may have its negative impact on Armenia at present as well, and in
particular, weakening its positions in the settlement process of the
Karabakh conflict, are well-grounded just by the reason, that the
historical precedent had already happened. These fears may be proved
or denied only as a result of an impartial and comprehensive
analysis.

The period of instability and confrontation

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and Turkey found
themselves in absolutely new geopolitical conditions, while:
-for the first time in several centuries (with the exception of
1918-1920) they have no land frontier, and the South Caucasus is
nothing but a buffer zone;
-for the first time in several decades they do not belong to two
opposing military and political blocs;
– Russia, rapidly losing its military and economic potential, the
ideological axis and political willpower, is unable to keep the
regions, belonging to former USSR, including the South Caucasus and
Central Asia, in the sphere of its geopolitical influence any longer.

The present situation produced some vacuum in the mentioned regions,
which was use by Turkey. First relying on the ideological and
political grounds of Pan-Turkism, Turkey started to rapidly spread
its influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Its actually
pan-Turkist goals were presented by Turkey as a need for spreading
the `Turkish model’ of development in the Muslim republics of the
former Soviet Union. Such policy was supported by the West, mainly by
the USA, because it dad fears that those newly independent states may
be influenced by the politicized radical Islam. In addition, the
approaches, typical to the period of the Cold War, were still strong
in the USA, we, welcoming Turkey’s diverse engagement the processes
on the territory of the former USSR, counterbalancing the Russian
influence.

In the first of half of 1990s, the Russian-Turkish relations were
quite unstable and tense from time to time, explained by their strong
geostrategic confrontation. Turkey used all possibilities, except
military, for spreading its influence not only in the South Caucasus
and Central Asia, but also in the North Caucasus and the regions of
Russia, populated predominantly by the Turkic-speaking peoples.

Russia was trying to concentrate its efforts and stop the increasing
Turkish influence. Being unable to resist as required at that time,
Russia focused its attention to the conflicts, broken out in the
South Caucasus, using them as an instrument for preserving its
influence in that region.

>From this point of view, the Karabakh conflict is remarkable, being a
culmination of the Russian-Turkish confrontation in the South
Caucasus. Turkey helped the Azerbaijani side, and Russia – to the
Armenian one. No surprise, that the conflict between the two
countries in that case was the most aggravated in the last decades of
the Russian-Turkish relations. In 1992-1993, Turkey threatened to use
force against Armenia, which followed by a swift and hard
counteraction by Russia, which openly declared its readiness to use
nuclear weapon against Turkey. Both states in that period not only
were strategic opponents, but also took the counter-partner as a
bearer of the military threat. In this sense, it is worth mentioning
the statement by the Chief of the Headquarters of the Turkish troops,
made in 1994, that Russia is the only state, posing a military threat
to Turkey.

The victory of Armenians in the military phase of the Karabakh, and
the firmness of Russia were the main factors to prevent increasing
positions of Turkey in the South Caucasus. Although Turkey
established itself in the geopolitical region and became an important
factor there, Russia, in spite of serious losses, Russia has managed
to partially preserve its influence in the region and not so big
military bases. The last circumstance, apart military, had a
geopolitical importance, which allowed to establish some balance of
powers between Russia and Turkey in the South Caucasus.

Stabilization

In the second half of the 1990s, the geopolitical situation in the
zone of the South Caucasus, was mostly characterized by the problems,
related to the Caspian energy resources. The level of the US
involvement in the region had been increasing, and Turkey in the new
conditions tried to get maximum, cooperating with the United States,
which was also interested in decreasing Russian influence in the
region. Such approach was materialized in the idea by President
Suleyman Demirel to create the `Stability pact of the South
Caucasus,’ in which the US was supposed to have the role of the most
important regional factor.

In the Russian-Turkish relations of that period, direction to their
stabilization was dominant. Rapid development of the trade and
industrial relations, which had been also visible in previous years,
started to turn into a geostrategic factor and play a stabilizing
role to some extent, which was also by such phenomena as billions in
the `shuttle trade,’ significant Turkish investments in Russia, in
particular, in the construction and public catering An unprecedented
growth took place in such a `traditional’ sphere of trade relations
between the two states as the Russian gas supply to Turkey thanks to
the multi-million `The Blue Stream’ deal, envisaging direct gas
supply to Turkey. So its dependence on the Russian gas had been
increasing.

The strategy of the Turkish regional policy, preserving its
anti-Russian direction, however, lost its aggressiveness of previous
years. For the political elite of the country, the lacking efficiency
of the political line, based on the pan-Turkist ideas, became
obvious. Not having necessary economic potential and being unable to
compete with the other external forces, Turkey had to give up its
pretentious plans in the Central Asia, which alleviated its
competition with Russia in that region.

In the South Caucasus, the Russian-Turkish confrontation developed in
the context of the ways of transportation of the Caspian oil. At the
same time Turkey tried to counterbalance the Russian military
presence in Armenia by developing the military cooperation with
Georgia. As for Russia, trying to counterbalance Turkey’s involvement
in the Chechen conflict, it started to ue the Kurdish factor to exert
pressure on Turkey. However, all these processes did not have any
substantial impact on the balance of powers, which had been
established in the second half of 1990s in the Russian-Turkish
relations, and in the South Caucasus, as a whole.

New geostrategic processes

The period of autumn 2001 – spring 2002 was critical for the whole
region, and for the Russian-Turkish relations, in particular. Two
geopolitical processes have been going on just since then, as a
reaction to the terrorist attack against the USA in September 2001.

The start of the first one was caused by a diplomatic document, which
remained unnoticed even by many experts. It was the Russian-Turkish
`Agreement on Cooperation in Eurasia,’ signed in New York in November
2001. It envisaged periodical consultations between the Foreign
Ministries of the both states for some coordination of the regional
policy. Actually, two regional powers reacted on then just emerging
intentions of the only superpower – the United States, to spread the
scope of its influence in the Eurasian continent under the pretext of
the struggle against the Islamic terrorism.

The above-mentioned US intentions materialized in spring 2002, when
the dislocation of the US advisers in Georgia. The Russian reaction
was quite stormy and very negative. The Turkish reaction was also
negative, but less exposed. Actually, the Americans chose not to
apply for Turkish assistance, and to have their own, though symbolic,
military presence in the South Caucasus. So the new US strategy was
started in the South Caucasian region, aimed at rapidly changing the
balance of powers that have been established here in the recent
years. The `Rose revolution’ in Georgia comes to prove that.

The reciprocal visits of the Russian and Turkish leaders, mentioned
just in the beginning of this article, which were considered as an
evidence of the Russian-Turkish rapprochement, took place in these
new realities. However, from the geostrategic view, the process,
going on here, is different – two powerful regional forces, old
geostrategic opponents, which remains intact up to the present, on
the basis of mutual consent are trying to alleviate or stop their
competition to resist the third force – the United States with their
unprecedented activity in the region. Actually, Russia and Turkey are
trying to preserve the status quo in the region, meanwhile the USA
wish to break it.

This new situation supposes a new quality of the bilateral relations,
for which an appropriate diplomatic wording has been found and fixed
in official documents – `multifaceted cooperation.’ We think that
within the geostrategic analysis, it would be correct to characterize
the current stage of the Russian-Turkish relations as a `geostrategic
armistice.’ In their verbal statements, Russian and Turkish officials
note that these new realities are an interim stage on the way to the
`strategic cooperation.’ it seems that both parties are trying to
create an impression that they have allegedly overcome all
contradictions, but it is not so. In particular, in spite of all
attempts to reach some mutual consent in the Chechen and Kurdish
questions (Russians passed to Turks some intelligence information
about Chechen terrorist organizations,
operating in Turkey, expecting that the authorities would suppress
their
activity; and Turks demand from Russia to ban the PKK, etc), there is
no news
about any positive results.

Some ideological and political concepts of Eurasianship and
`strategic depth’ there appeared as an ideological ground for the
outlining rapprochement in the Russian-Turkish relations. The
apologist of the first idea is the Russian geopolitician A. Dugin,
frequently visiting Turkey in the recent time; and the second concept
belongs to the foreign policy advisor of the Prime-Minister
R.T.Erdoghan, Professor A. Davudoglu.

Conclusion

So the geopolitical situation of the South Caucasus in the recent
years has entered the second phase of the post-Soviet era, which is
characterized by the above-mentioned new trends. Certain geostrategic
changes are also taking place in the Russian-Turkish relations, and
their main sense is in the striving of the both parties to preserve
the balance of powers, established between them in the South
Caucasus. This means that Russia and Turkey will try to keep what
they have already had. For Russia, it is its military presence in
Armenia and by that in the entire South Caucasus, meaning that
Russian will never make any concession to Turkey, for example, in the
Karabakh issue, will not endanger its allied relations with Armenia.
In any case, in this stage of the `geostrategic
armistice’ with Turkey.

Prof. Ruben Safrastyan, Ph.D. is a Professor of International
Relations at Acharyan University in Yerevan, Armenia. He’s also the
Director of the Department of Turkish Studies at Institute of
Oriental Studies, Armenian National Academy of Sciences. In the past,
he served as a Counselor of the Armenian Embassy in Germany and was
the Deputy Director of the Department of Political Analysis for the
Office of the President of Armenia.