EurasiaNet Organization
June 28 2005
ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN DIFFER OVER RUSSIAN BASE PULL-OUT
Samvel Matirosyan and Alman Mir Ismail 6/28/05
Armenia and Azerbaijan are reacting differently to the Russian
withdrawal from bases in Georgia. Politicians and pundits in Azerbaijan
view the move as a potential security threat due in large part to
Moscow’s decision to transfer to Armenia a portion of the military
hardware now in Georgia. Armenian experts, meanwhile, downplay the
significance of the transfer, contending that it does not alter the
existing strategic balance.
After years of wrangling, Russian and Georgian officials announced
May 30 that the withdrawal of Russian troops and materiel from the
Caucasus country would be completed by 2008. [For background see the
Eurasia Insight archive]. Russia’s pull-out from its two remaining
bases on Georgian territory – in Batumi and Akhalkalaki — began
June 1 with the dispatch of a 15-car train from Batumi to Armenia,
loaded with ammunition, various equipment and anti-aircraft
weapons. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight
archive]. Political analysts have spent the weeks since the
announcement of the base-withdrawal deal speculating about its
geopolitical ramifications. In particular, many have wondered
whether the Russian move could influence negotiations to end the
Armenian-Azerbaijani struggle over Nagorno-Karabakh. [For background
see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Moscow has mounted diplomatic offensive to dispel the notion that its
actions could rearrange the geopolitical order in the Caucasus. [For
additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. “The
withdrawal of part of Russian arms from Georgia to Armenia will not
change the balance of forces in the Transcaucasus,” Russian Foreign
Minister Sergey Lavrov told journalists on June 14.
Russian defense officials insist that transferred arms and equipment
will be kept in storage at Russia’s 102nd base in Gyumri, in northern
Armenia, stressing that the Armenian military will not have access
to the weaponry. “We are going to closely keep the limits set up
by the [amended 1999] treaty on conventional armaments in Europe,”
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said during a June 6 news
conference, Rosbalt news agency reported. According to Ivanov, most
of the military equipment and cargo now in Georgia will be shipped
back to Russia from Black Sea port city of Batumi.
News of the withdrawal from Georgia initially was applauded in
Azerbaijan, where official at first interpreted the move as a sign
of declining Russian influence in the Caucasus. But approval quickly
transformed into doubt following the announcement that a portion of
the Russian arms and equipment would be shifted to Armenia. On May
23, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry sent a protest note to Moscow,
demanding an explanation for the transfer. “From the point of view
of the law, the transfer of arms from one base to the other is quite
normal. It concerns Armenia and Russia. However, the South Caucasus
requires demilitarization. Therefore, there is no need to keep in the
region tanks and other heavy military equipment. We do not consider
it necessary,” Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov told journalists,
Turan News Agency reported.
Speaking at a June 25 military academy graduation ceremony, President
Ilham Aliyev indicated that the Russian move could help spur a regional
arms race. He said that Azerbaijani defense spending would increase
to $300 million in 2005, up from last year’s level of $175 million,
ANS television reported. “We had to take appropriate measures,” Aliyev
said, referring to the Russian transfer of materiel to Armenia. “We
did so immediately and increased our military spending. Military
spending will continue to increase in the future.”
“Our army should be strong to solve the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict
over [the breakaway region of] Nagorno-Karabakh,” Aliyev added.
Moscow’s statements concerning the transfer do not appear to have
fully reassured the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Alliance members have expressed carefully worded concern about the
pull-out’s impact on the regional balance. “We welcome the withdrawal
of troops. However this step should not affect regional stability
in the South Caucasus,” NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Defense
and Policy Planning John Colton said in Baku on June 27. The defense
alliance plans to raise the issue with Moscow “in the near future,”
the Regnum news service reported Colton as saying.
Many Azerbaijani observers now believe that, in deciding to shift
weaponry from Georgia to Armenia, Russia’s primary intention was to
strengthen Moscow’s own geopolitical position in the region, and not
to bolster Yerevan’s strategic situation vis-a-vis Baku. A June 1
commentary published by the independent daily Zerkalo complained that
“Russia demonstrates its unwillingness to significantly reduce its
military presence in the South Caucasus region, including [along]
the borders with Iran and Turkey.” Nasib Nasibli, a political expert
at the Foundation for Azerbaijan Studies, agreed. “This act by Russia
is aimed at preserving their influence in the Caucasus.”
According to the Russian-Georgian withdrawal agreement, at least 40
units of armored equipment, including 20 tanks, are to be removed
from Georgia by September 1. The Azerbaijan-based Turan news agency
published a report stating that up to 40 Russian tanks could be
moved to Gyumri from Akhalkalaki. If such a report proves accurate,
the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry announced that Baku would consider
implementing “corresponding measures.” Earlier, Azerbaijani officials
stated that they might reconsider the country’s $7 million-per-year
lease of the Gabala radar facility to Russia. [For background see
the Eurasia Insight archive].
Analysts in Yerevan argue that Baku’s concerns are misplaced. “[I]f
we look at the Russian military presence in the South Caucasus. .
.the bases in Armenia practically decide nothing, while the radar.
station in Gabala, located on the territory of Аzerbaijan,
appears to be of great strategic importance,” said Hayk Demoyan,
an regional political expert at the Caucasus Media Institute.
Rather than dwelling on the Russian equipment transfer, Armenia has
tried to concentrate international attention on its expanding ties with
NATO. On June 16, Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanyan presented Armenia’s
Individual Action Partnership Plan (IPAP) to the NATO Council. The
country has since received assurances from US Ambassador to Armenia
Robert Evans that the Russian transfer of arms and equipment will
not preclude further cooperation between Yerevan and NATO.
The press service of the Defense Ministry in Yerevan has denied the
existence of any agreement that would give Armenian military forces
access to the arms and equipment at Russia’s base in Gyumri. The
Defense Ministry also insists that no plans or intentions exist
concerning the potential transfer Russian military personnel to
Armenia from Georgia.
Despite such assurances, the debate continues in Baku over what
constitutes an appropriate response. Azerbaijani analysts suggest
the most likely counter-move would be a strengthening of Baku’s
relationship with NATO. Some point out that on June 6, Turkey — an
Atlantic alliance member and Baku’s closest ally — announced plans
to allocate $2.1 million to help the Azerbaijani military adopt NATO
military standards.
In recent weeks, President Ilham Aliyev’s administration has toned
down its angry rhetoric concerning the equipment-transfer issue. Some
observers suggest that Baku has come to the realization that it
can not stop the transfer. Others say that, with potentially pivotal
parliamentary elections scheduled for November, Aliyev is reluctant to
risk a full-blown dispute with Russia. [For additional information see
the Eurasia Insight archive]. Bilateral ties have been strengthening
since 2000, and Aliyev clearly wants to keep them cordial. “We are
very satisfied with the standard of our relationship, one of strategic
partnership that meets the interests of both Russia and Azerbaijan,”
Aliyev said at an economic conference in St. Petersburg on June 14.
Editor’s Note: Samvel Martirosyan is a Yerevan-based journalist and
political analyst. Alman Mir-Ismail is a freelance political analyst
from Baku.