Wednesday, August 10, 2005 — Volume 2, Issue 156
IN THIS ISSUE:
*Talks on Abkhaz railroad falter over refugee issue
*Georgian opposition to field single candidate in by-elections
*Astana sees border demarcation as security and ethnic problem
*Yushchenko backers shown to be younger, regionally concentrated
————————————————————————
ABKHAZ DERAIL RAILROAD TALKS
Abkhaz leaders have derailed the tripartite talks on rehabilitating
the railroad between Russia and Georgia in Abkhazia that were
scheduled to begin in Sukhumi on August 9. The group of nine Georgian
railroad experts had to return to Tbilisi after the Abkhaz authorities
unexpectedly refused entry to two members of the group, on the grounds
that they are internally displaced persons who fled Abkhazia during
the 1992-93 war (Interfax, Apsynpress, Imedi TV, August 9).
Sukhumi’s peculiar argument seems intended to break the linkage
between the restoration of the railroad and the safe return of
Georgian refugees to their homes, beginning with the Gali
district. That linkage has formed the basis of negotiations for
several years in several formats, including the tripartite “Sochi
process” conducted since 2003 among the Russian, Georgian, and Abkhaz
sides. Russia is keen to restore the railroad in order to obtain a
strategic link through Georgia with Armenia. The Abkhaz are just as
keen to be linked by rail with Russia, but are unwilling to accept a
mass return of refugees, and now apparently seek to de-couple the two
issues.
Although the railroad talks are formally tripartite, the Abkhaz
authorities hardly have experts of their own. They want the meeting to
proceed without Georgians if necessary and to start technical
inspection of the railroad with the Russian experts, who are in
Sukhumi already. The Sukhumi meeting and a detailed plan for
inspection had been approved at tripartite talks among expert groups
on July 19, and the intention was confirmed during a session of
Georgian and Abkhaz negotiators on August 4 at the UN Mission (UNOMIG)
office in Tbilisi, in the presence of ambassadors of the “Friends of
Georgia” group of countries.
The Tbilisi meeting was an unusually promising one, in that it was
free from polemics and the Abkhaz representatives matched the
Georgians’ civility. The Abkhaz side clearly appreciated Tbilisi’s
willingness to discuss an agreement on mutual assurances for
non-resumption of hostilities. Because this issue is now a part of the
agenda, the Abkhaz self-styled “deputy ministers” of defense and state
security obtained seats at the negotiating table opposite the Georgian
delegation, in the presence of great powers’ ambassadors.
The negotiators also discussed the restoration of the railroad, linked
to return of refugees; and they agreed in principle to conduct a
reliable count of Georgians refugees from Abkhazia, including those
who managed to return to the Gali district and those who wish to
return there. The Abkhaz delegation leader, “minister of foreign
affairs” Sergei Shamba, declared after the meeting, “There is hope and
we look into the future with optimism.” More emphatically, Georgia’s
State Minister for Conflict Settlement Giorgi Khaindrava remarked,
“The freeze is over, the climate is warming up ….We must
continue on the path of peace, understanding and mutual
forgiveness. It is us [Georgia] who must do this first.” He held out
the prospect of a bilateral meeting between Georgian President Mikheil
Saakashvili and Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh, if the talks advance on
the interrelated issues discussed at that meeting (Rustavi-2 TV, Imedi
TV, Interfax, August 4, 5),
The improved atmospherics notwithstanding, a number of negative
signals followed. Shamba declared that any organized return of
refugees would exclude some categories of Georgians and is in any case
a distant prospect. While Georgia regards a reliable numerical count
as a step toward an early start of the organized return, Shamba’s
statements suggest an intent to use the count (and making up some
categories within that count) for stonewalling the refugees’
return. On the morrow of the Tbilisi meeting, Bagapsh challenged
Saakashvili to recognize Abkhazia’s secession from Georgia, as a
precondition to allowing Georgian refugees to return to Gali. This
position implicitly de-couples the issue of the refugees’ return from
that of reconstructing the railroad, which the Abkhaz now seem to want
to obtain without a quid-pro-quo (Interfax, Rustavi-2 TV, Imedi TV,
August 5).
Abkhaz “prime minister” Alexander Ankvab spent the first week of
August in Moscow, holding talks with Russian government officials and
private firms on investment projects in Abkhazia. Upon returning,
Ankvab listed the projects as rebuilding the highway from the Russian
border on the Psou River to Sukhumi by two Russian construction
companies, building a timber-processing mill, and organizing wholesale
export of Abkhaz fruit to Russia. No reference is made to Georgia as
lawful sovereign and owner of some of the assets under discussion, or
to the Russia-Georgia legal border on the Psou (Interfax, Apsynpress,
August 9).
The railroad talks and inspection may well proceed after the August 9
postponement, but Tbilisi will have to make certain that this process
remains politically linked to the issue of return of refugees, and is
not turned by the Abkhaz side into a mere technical operation divorced
from the negotiating process of resolving the conflict. Meanwhile,
Tbilisi made the right choice in seeking to engage the Abkhaz
directly, outside the formally structured negotiations, through the
informal bilateral contacts in which the chief Georgian negotiator,
Irakli Alasania, has clearly earned the Abkhaz side’s respect.
–Vladimir Socor
ANTI-SAAKASHVILI OPPOSITION STRIKES ELECTION DEAL
The month-long negotiations among Georgia’s opposition parties about
fielding common candidates in the forthcoming parliamentary
by-elections on October 1 have produced an agreement. On August 5,
leaders of the Conservative, Labor, Tavisupleba (Freedom), and the New
Right parties signed a memorandum about holding preliminary primaries
to reveal the strongest single candidate. Each party will name a
candidate for each race and the winner will represent the united
opposition in the Batumi, Kobuleti, Shuakhevi (Ajaria), Tkibuli
(western Georgia) and Isani (Tbilisi district) single-mandate
constituencies. On August 8, the four-party coalition created a
special election commission to manage the primaries.
New Right will have three candidates in the primaries, while the
Conservatives will field four. Tavisupleba, chaired by Constantine
Gamsakhurdia (son of Georgia’s late president Zviad Gamsakhurdia),
will have two nominees. Gamsakhurdia junior did not attend the signing
ceremony, and he sent an authorized representative to sign the
memorandum in his absence. The Labor Party has not registered any
candidates, which is surprising because Labor claims to have the
biggest constituency among the opposition parties. “This is a very
important moment, as this is the first instance of political parties
holding primaries in Georgia,” Koba Davitashvili, the leader of the
Conservative Party, declared at the signing ceremony. The Conservative
Party had proposed the idea of holding primaries.
The memorandum signatories said the primaries would demonstrate
“civilized cooperation between opponents” in response to “brazen steps
taken by the authorities.” “Today we are opening a completely new
page in Georgian politics. We are setting the precedent of winners
being decided through civilized cooperation,” said New Right leader
David Gamkrelidze.
The four parties, however, emphasized that the memorandum does not
mean the creation of an electoral bloc, and they made clear the
conditions of their cooperation, including solidarity in support of a
fair and democratic electoral process and the freedom for each to
“express different views on various issues.”
Although the four stated that the coalition “will remain open to the
Georgian public and political forces, so that this format continues to
expand in the future,” the opposition National-Democratic Party has
been excluded from membership because of its low
popularity. Davitashvili later explained that the coalition is open to
the political forces that made a strong showing in the latest
elections. “Our goal is not to make a collection of parties, but the
creation of a truly strong political union able to win elections,” he
added. The NDP expressed its regret over the coalition’s stance and
said that allowing more opposition parties into the primaries would
have helped in selecting the best candidates. The NDP is likely to run
in the by-elections independently. Meanwhile, the opposition public
movement “People’s Forum,” which opposed the idea of primaries,
nevertheless announced it is open to “constructive cooperation” with
the four-party coalition during the by-elections.
The moderately opposition Republican Party, a participant in the
preliminary negotiations about the coalition, quit the coalition
because it favored selecting the common candidates through opinion
polls, instead of primaries. On August 5, Republican Party leader
Davit Usupashvili told a news conference that his party would not
participate in the by-elections because of artificial obstacles
created by the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), which has rejected
the party’s registration. CEC chair Gia Kavtaradze, however, said the
only reason for the rejection was that the Republican Party had not
indicated in its application the exact authority assigned to the
party’s representative in the CEC. He accused the Republican Party of
not wanting to participate in the by-elections and inventing absurd
reasons to justify its decision. The withdrawal of the Republican
Party, which was able to install strong candidates in Ajaria and
Tbilisi, has significantly weakened the opposition’s position.
The authorities responded to the new opposition front calmly and even
ironically. “I do not think that they will create problems for our
candidates,” said Mikheil Machavariani, deputy chair of parliament, in
commenting on the opposition’s memorandum. He dismissed the
allegations by the opposition parties about financing pro-governmental
candidates’ campaigns through state funds. He said that it is actually
the opposition who is using donations of “suspicious origin.”
Meanwhile, some Georgian television stations showed Deputy Interior
Minister Bidzina Bregadze, the ruling National Movement’s would-be
candidate in the Isani district, meeting with the district’s
prospective voters.
Despite proclaimed intentions to democratize the elections, what
probably united the opposition parties was a common lack of electoral
resources. The coalition of four must now withstand the government’s
possible efforts to destroy the alliance through various backstage
schemes.
Taking into account the powerful “administrative resources” behind
government-supported candidates, the opposition can justly claim
considerable success if its common candidates win by-elections in just
two of the five constituencies.
(TV Rustavi-2, Civil Georgia, Caucasus Press, GHN, Prime News, August
5; Caucasus Press, August 8; Resonance, Akhali Taoba, August 6)
–Zaal Anjaparidze
KAZAKH FOREIGN MINISTRY REFUTES ARGUMENTS ABOUT TERRITORIAL
CONCESSIONS
Kazakhstan’s border delimitation process has always been an issue
shrouded in mystery, even for residents of the border areas. The
authorities have previously accused journalists in South Kazakhstan of
issuing inaccurate reports that damage relations with
Uzbekistan. Therefore, journalists hungry for first-hand information
were excited by an unexpected Foreign Ministry press conference on
July 23.
But Foreign Ministry spokesman Murat Atanov prefaced his comments on
the current state of border delimitation with pointed attacks on “some
policymakers” who, in his words, make groundless insinuations that the
government is selling out Kazakhstan’s national interests by making
territorial concessions to neighboring states. Expressing the Foreign
Ministry’s official line, Atanov added that authors of such
“irresponsible” statements capitalize on the difficulties of the
border talks to score political points. “We cannot have what does not
belong to us,” Atanov declared, alluding to 420-square kilometer patch
of land ceded to China after difficult bargaining (Panorama, July 29).
The Foreign Ministry spokesman had good reason to be irritated by
persistent allegations of concessions made to Russia, China, and
Uzbekistan at the border talks. The Azat Party of National Patriots
and other political forces have become fixated on this issue. Even
Serikbolsyn Abdildin, the leader of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan
and an advocate of integration with Russia, lamented the loss of the
Imashev gas fields in western Kazakhstan to Russia. In northern
Kostanay region, the border village of Ogneupornoye was handed over to
Russia in exchange for 520 hectares of arable land, based on the
rationale that nearly 80% of the residents held Russian passports. The
deal sparked protests from Kazakh nationalists, inflamed by
unconfirmed rumors of scuffles between Kazakhs repatriated from
Uzbekistan and local Russians in Kostanay region (Sayasat.kz, August
4).
The Foreign Ministry’s denial of territorial concessions to neighbor
countries amid a host of contradicting facts seems to be aimed at
domestic as well as international audiences. Astana hopes to ease the
interethnic tension between Slavs and the indigenous population,
particularly in the predominantly Russian-populated northern regions,
triggered by media reports of unequal bargaining. The northern border
regions are increasingly becoming the main area for resettling the
growing number of ethnic Kazakhs emigrating from Uzbekistan.
Furthermore, the elimination of border disputes will help strengthen
Kazakhstan’s ties to its partners in the CIS Collective Security
Treatment Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO). Bigaly Turarbekov, an advisor to the Kazkah
foreign minister, stressed the international significance of the
border settlement, which, as he put it, would “contribute to
confidence-building among SCO member states” (Panorama, July 29).
The pro-presidential political parties and nationalist movements
remain divided over the border issue. The leader of the Civic Party,
Azat Peruashev, thinks that the concessions of a few square kilometers
of land are not a great loss if Kazakhstan is to gain international
recognition of its borders (Novoye Pokolenie, July 29).
Despite this high-flown rhetoric, there are many hurdles and
uncertainties to overcome before the border settlement is
finalized. The demarcation of Kazakh-Uzbek border, according to
Atanov, is expected to take at least two years. The delimitation of
the border with Kyrgyzstan is vaguely postponed to the “nearest
future.” Slightly more than 650 frontier markers, (of a planned 1,500
stakes) have been erected along the border with Uzbekistan. But the
most difficult part of the work will undoubtedly be the evacuation of
some 370 Kazakh families left on Uzbek territory after border
delimitation. The government has allocated 1.5 billion tenge to
resettle them in Kazakhstan. The border demarcation occurs at a time
of heightening tension and mutual animosity between Astana and
Tashkent, but the Kazakh Foreign Ministry sees no political
ramifications from the frequent shootings on Kazakh-Uzbek border
(Ekspress-K, July 23).
Kazakhstan also has uneasy relations with Russian border
authorities. Russia takes measures to stem the flow of illegal
migrants and drug traffickers from Afghanistan and Central Asia, but
these efforts clash with its stated desire to leave the border with
Kazakhstan open in line with its policy of “integration” and in
defiance of internationally accepted norms of border control. Russia
has been pleased by the words of President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who
on many occasions has assured the Russian population of his country
that there would be no frontier poles along the Russian-Kazakh border
and that a simple delimitation procedure would be sufficient. “We have
nothing to quarrel over, that is an example of good-neighborly
relations,” according to Sergei Kopeiko of the Russian Embassy in
Astana (Liter, February 5). But everybody in Astana and Moscow
understands very well that a poorly guarded border will cause serious
security problems for both sides, and that maintaining security in
this situation is nothing more than an illusion of mutual trust.
Another potential point of contention between Kazakhstan and Russia is
the delimitation of the territorial waters of the Caspian Sea. Recent
efforts by Russian President Vladimir Putin to mobilize all littoral
Caspian states against terrorism may create an impression of military
and political integration, but in no way will it help settle the
looming territorial disputes in the Caspian region.
–Marat Yermukanov
NEW DATA CREATES DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF ORANGE REVOLUTIONARIES, VOTERS
Democratic Initiatives, a well-established, Kyiv-based sociological
think tank, has just published a new study, Politchnyi portret
(no. 32, 2005). Democratic Initiatives was one of four Ukrainian
sociological organizations involved in organizing exit polls during
the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election.
Politychnyi portret reveals that 18.4% of Ukraine’s population (about
5.5 million people) participated in the Orange Revolution. Of winner
Viktor Yushchenko’s voters, 34% participated, while only 9% of Viktor
Yanukovych voters took part in protest rallies. Yanukovych, even
though he had the backing of the more populous eastern Ukraine, failed
to organize a counter-Orange Revolution. As Politychnyi portret
(p. 59) concluded, Yushchenko voters were far “more energized.”
During the 2004 election, polls revealed that 33% of Yushchenko voters
and only 13% of Yanukovych voters were ready to participate in
sanctioned rallies. This Yushchenko edge was also evident in voter
participation in boycotts, strikes, and hunger strikes. Only 17% of
Yushchenko voters refused to participate in protests, but the
equivalent for Yanukovych voters was 41%.
Most Orange Revolutionaries traveled to Kyiv voluntarily, although a
small number of hard-core activists were paid travel expenses. This
was not the case for Yanukovych voters, who were dispatched to Kyiv in
an organized operation. One indicator of the manufactured Yanukovych
faction was the dried military meals that the Ministry of Defense
illegally “sold” at a cost of 300,000 hryvni (,000) to the Yanukovych
voters who journeyed to Kyiv (Ukrayinska pravda, May 13). “While
‘orange’ supporters came on their own, the “‘blue-whites’ are
brought in,” one commentator pointed out (Zerkalo Nedeli/Tyzhnia,
November 27, 2004).
Two factors explain this difference between Orange Yushchenko and
Blue-White Yanukovych voters.
First, civil society is far weaker and far more “managed” in eastern
Ukraine, which voted largely for Yanukovych, than in western and
central Ukraine, which voted for Yushchenko. Only 10% of Yanukovych
voters, compared to 30% of Yushchenko voters, believe citizens should
take action to protect their rights (International Foundation for
Electoral Systems, April 2005).
Based on their own views of how civil society is “managed” in their
hometowns, Donetsk residents and eastern Ukrainians refused to believe
that the Orange Revolution protestors were in Kyiv voluntarily. They
cynically believed that if Donetsk residents were paid to attend
“popular” rallies, why should Yushchenko rallies be organized any
differently?
Following this logic, if the protestors were not paid, then the Orange
Revolution must be a U.S.-backed conspiracy (Zerkalo Nedeli/Tyzhnia,
December 4-10, 2004).
When asked why the Orange Revolution took place, Yushchenko voters
pointed to election fraud (59%), the need to uphold democratic values
(36%), opposition to the authorities (30%), and the need to support
Yushchenko’s candidacy (30%). Yanukovych voters had very different
views. A striking 45% believed the crowds attended rallies because
they were paid, only 25% thought people actually turned out to support
Yushchenko’s candidacy (Politychnyi portret, p. 62).
The picture was very different among Yanukovych voters. Of those who
took part in rallies, 38% believed that being paid was the reason. Of
Yanukovych voters who did not take part in rallies, nearly half (48%)
were convinced that participants were being paid to participate
(Politychnyi portret, p. 63).
Second, fewer Yanukovych voters traveled to Kyiv than did Yushchenko
voters because of demographic differences. Yushchenko voters tend to
be younger and better educated, precisely the groups who are more
mobile and active in civil society. Younger people would also be more
able to withstand the winter cold in Kyiv. Yanukovych voters in
contrast, tend to be between 50-70 old and with lower levels of
education, thus representing two less-mobile social groups.
The 2004 election also revealed the fallacy of two very common Western
beliefs about Ukraine.
First is the view that most documented violence was committed by
Yanukovych voters against Yushchenko supporters. But when thousands of
Yanukovych voters were paid to travel to Kyiv, there was not a single
recorded incidence of violence. Instead, backers of both candidates
freely mingled and discussed the election results.
Back in Donetsk, anybody wearing Orange symbols was beaten and had
their symbols ripped off. Violence against Yushchenko supporters was
organized, systematic, and brutal, while the victims refrained from
responding in kind, upholding principles of non-violent action
(razom.org.ua and yuschenko.com.ua, December 12, 2004; UNIAN, December
15, 2004).
Second is the view that western Ukrainians are aggressively
nationalistic. After decades of Soviet propaganda and the
anti-Yushchenko campaign of 2004, eastern Ukrainians remain convinced
that any violence in the election must have been organized by
Yushchenko “nationalists.” They refused to believe that in reality,
Yanukovych voters were behind all of the violence.
The Orange Revolution succeeded because western Ukraine provided
participants while eastern Ukrainians remained passive. Some 45% of
the Orange Revolution protestors were from western Ukraine, especially
from the three Galician oblasts: Ivano-Frankivsk (69%), Lviv (46%),
and Ternopil oblast (35%).
A striking 35% of western Ukrainians took part in the Orange
Revolution, and 23% of west-central Ukrainians. Besides western
Ukrainians, more than one-third of the residents of Kyiv participated,
a figure close to that of Galicia. These figures were far lower in
eastern (15%), east-central (9%), and southern Ukraine (8%)
respectively.
These studies by Democratic Initiatives and IFES point to a close
interconnection between national identity and civil society in
Ukraine, with eastern Ukraine dominated by passivity and a “managed”
civil society. The 2004 election also showed that violence came from
eastern, not western, Ukrainians.
–Taras Kuzio
————————————————————————
The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation,
is edited by Ann E. Robertson. The opinions expressed in it are those
of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent those of
the Jamestown Foundation. If you have any questions regarding the
content of EDM, or if you think that you have received this email in
error, please respond to pubs@jamestown.org.
Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of EDM is strictly
prohibited by law.
The Jamestown Foundation
4516 43rd Street, NW
Washington, DC 20016
202-483-8888 (phone)
202-483-8337 (fax)
Copyright (c) 1983-2005 The Jamestown Foundation.