Russia needs “national idea” to avert imminent crisis – view
Komsomolskaya Pravda, Moscow 12 Aug 05
A Russian commentator has described the situation in Russia as
stagnation which, if unchecked, could bring about the collapse of the
state. Writing in the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper, Yevgeniy
Anisimov said that the strengthening of the state machine that has
become “tainted with corruption” should not be mistaken for a
strengthening of the state; that the situation in Russia exhibited
“all the prerequisites for a revolution”; and that, if one were to
occur, the consequences would be disastrous – “uprisings and punitive
expeditions; wars fought over regions that are rich in resources”. The
following is excerpted from Yevgeniy Anisimov’s article, published on
12 August, subheadings as published:
We are being drawn ever more deeply into a state of stagnation. Of
course, we could choose not to call it stagnation, we could choose to
call it stability, but in doing so we would be burying our heads in
the sand. Stability signifies calm and regular development while
during a period of stagnation problems are hidden away out of sight,
where they accumulate and mature, ready to break through to the
surface at some future date. Anyone who remembers the Brezhnev era
will have no trouble finding similarities between that period and the
present day.
At that time oil prices were high – now they are also high; back then
people received handouts – that is happening now too; at that time the
authorities resisted the reforms that were imminent and overdue – now
they are doing the same thing. How did this all end in the 1980s? It
ended in a collapse of the system. How might this all end now? It is
scary even to think about it. But we must think about it. If only in
order to be prepared for possible future changes.
Business in uniform
Two extremely strong factors are exerting an influence on the
present-day life of the country: oil prices and an abrupt
strengthening of officialdom. Not a strengthening of the state (it is
actually growing weaker) but of bureaucrats. The strengthening of the
power vertical has turned out to be a double-edged sword: on the one
hand, it has been possible to stop the mayhem wreaked by the oligarchs
and the regional barons, while on the other hand, officials who have
had a taste of power have started to become even more intensely
involved in making money. And the state machine has become tainted
with corruption. Ministerial posts were for sale then and are still
being sold now, foreign law-and-order bodies are hunting former
ministers (foreign law-and-order bodies, not our own!).
The police offers a very clear example of the regeneration of state
bodies.
Previously there were entrepreneurs, there were bandits who
“protected” them and there was a police force that did the absolute
minimum to fight against crime. Then, at some point, a decision was
taken at the very top to eliminate the economic basis of crime – for
this read: replace bandit protection with police protection. And
within just a few years the entire police force turned into an
organization of “turncoats in uniform”: station staff and patrol men
scavenge for crumbs, collecting tribute from outsiders and small
traders; the leadership at district level “protects” the markets; and
one can only guess what the top management gets up to: most probably
it is “protecting” its subordinates.
But now imagine a situation in which there is a genuine requirement
for police intervention – for example, mass disturbances like those
that occurred in Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan. Will the turncoat cops go
against the furious crowd? Hardly. They have a business to run, they
need to make money, they do not need to risk their lives for God knows
what.
Today, alas, the state machine can do NOTHING, in spite of all its
apparent enormous size and power. What is more, this is true at all
levels. Attempts to carry out monetization of benefits demonstrated
this with utmost clarity.
After all, not only is it necessary to replace benefits with money,
one also has to carry out pension reform, to sort out the health care
system and to do the same with education and communal services. Can
the state allow itself to make abrupt moves in even one of these
areas? No it cannot – there would be an outburst of popular
indignation.
And indeed why would officials do this? They now have only one goal –
to last until 2008 in order to ensure themselves a comfortable future,
and they couldn’t care less about anything else. There is not much
time, certainly not enough time to do both with long-term
programmes. And for that reason they have chosen a strategy: take no
sudden actions, do nothing to alarm the people, let everything take
its natural course. In a word – stagnation.
And however strange it may be, this is the best possible strategy at
the present time. If the government cannot make a decent job of
carrying out a monetization of benefits; if the whole of the Far East
rises up in protest over its attempt to prohibit right-hand-drive
vehicles; if students are being driven into the army with one stroke
of the pen – it is better for this government to do nothing at
all. Otherwise it will cause the country to blow apart.
Stagnation cannot last for ever – it is like a boil, a furuncle that
is going to burst at some point with consequences of one kind or
another. Any doctor will tell you that it is better to lance the boil
surgically because otherwise there may be sepsis, an infection of the
blood. Besides, they will not allow us to rot away slowly all on our
own – the resources at our country’s disposal are too great.
This is not a dead bear but a sick bear
We have known for a long time how the United States views
us. Z. Brzezinski has spoken about this with the utmost frankness, and
not long ago former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said that it
is not right for one country to own and dispose of such vast resources
– especially when it does so without skill. But in recent years new
claimants have joined the list: China and the Islamic world. As long
as the Islamists do not unite we can speak of them as no more than a
destabilizing factor that uses other players in its own
interests. China, on the other hand, is a serious matter.
At the present time the Chinese are actively seeking access to new
sources of energy. They are holding talks with Iran; they are prepared
to buy the largest American oil company carrying out development work
in East Asia; they are constant participants in Russian tenders for
field development; and Chinese capital was also involved in the story
of the purchase of Yuganskneftegaz.
China’s rapidly developing industry needs oil, and the Chinese are
prepared to fight for it – even with the Americans.
The Russian leadership has made its position perfectly clear: control
of strategic industries and infrastructure sectors will remain with
the state. The presence of foreign companies in these areas will be
subject to restrictions.
And this includes the oil and gas sector. Quite understandably,
neither the Chinese nor the Americans are happy with this
position. But while the Chinese are counting (and not without reason)
on special terms of cooperation with Russia in the oil and gas sphere,
everything seems to suggest that the Americans are taking a more
decisive stance. If the state authorities do not give us what we need
– why do we need such authorities and why do we need such a state?
Nobody is denying the influence that the United States exerts on the
processes under way in Georgia and Ukraine. Next in line are
Azerbaijan and Russia – the American budget is already allocating
money for the “development of democracy” in these countries.
The goal of the Americans is this: with the assistance of “democratic”
levers to stir up the situation inside the country to such a degree as
to enable a government loyal to them to come to power. If the country
shatters into fragments at the same time, so much the better – it is
easier to reach agreement with the weak rulers of small states. And
they do not need the whole of Russia – only the regions rich in
resources.
The time bomb is already ticking
So what do we have at the present time? Growing discontent on the part
of the people; a state machine that has been eaten away by corruption
and is unable to function; powerful foreign players with a vested
interest in a change of regime. All the prerequisites for a
revolution. The only thing required for an explosion is the detonator.
The detonator could be something like Beslan or Dubrovka – a
large-scale terrorist act in the heart of Russia – or a large-scale
technological catastrophe like the recent power cut in Moscow, but
with more serious consequences.
Imagine the scenario if a disaster of this kind were to occur in
winter. Inside the apartment buildings it is dark and cold; people
come out onto the streets to gather around campfires; vodka appears,
and so do political agitators and agents provocateurs. And if the
crowd embarks on a trail of destruction – who is going to stop it? The
police? Don’t make me laugh, they will find little cracks in which to
hide. What about the army? It will not come out of its barracks,
because the army is also home to a great deal of discontent.
And that will be it, a chain reaction will roll across the country. In
places where the leadership is still able to control the situation
(primarily, in the national republics situated along the Volga River)
a state of emergency will be introduced and all power will pass to the
local elite, which has long dreamed of freeing itself from the yoke of
the federal centre. Then there will be darkness. Uprisings and
punitive expeditions; wars fought over regions that are rich in
resources; bands of robbers?
We are still quite a long way from the point at which the development
of the situation becomes irreversible. But not so far away that we can
simply dismiss the threat. The main uncertainty lies in the fact that
we do not know how full the cup of national patience is. We cannot
trust opinion polls: they sometimes produce results that are
completely contradictory because they are trying to please the
customer. We can only believe that long-suffering nature of the
people will make it possible for us to take steps that lead us away
from the abyss. But which steps?
First, there must be national agreement on a very important issue –
choosing a social order for the country. It is customary to think that
this choice has already been made and that there is no way back. We
will not be going back, that much is clear, but in which direction
should we move forward? Accept privatization or not? Build state
capitalism or normal capitalism based on private ownership by
citizens? Forgive the economic crimes committed in the troubled years
after the start of the reforms? We will certainly obtain answers to
these questions, but there are different ways of doing so: either by
peaceful means, in a time of national discussion resulting in
decisions that are binding upon everyone; or each of the fragments of
a once unified state will have to try and get answers by sweat and
blood.
Second, an ideology must be formulated on the basis of the agreement
that has been reached. The very same national idea that many people
are talking about. Once again it may arise peacefully or it may be
born in the course of bloody clashes between the bearers of different
national ideas. At the moment we have neither idea nor ideology.
Third, the supporters of a newly born ideology must organize
themselves around it. Political leaders must show themselves, leaders
who will initially create structures parallel to the existing state
structures and then dismantle the state apparatus that has been eaten
away by corruption. Something similar has occurred on more than one
occasion in our history: the oprichnina [the radical rule of Ivan IV],
“the fledglings of Peter’s nest” [Peter the Great], Bolshevist
commissars.
Prediction. Which scenario is possible?
Is this a fantasy? An unscientific utopia? I agree. In the present
situation, everything that has been described above is no more than a
mental exercise and empty theorizing. Well, who is going to call into
question his or her own power and property out of sheer goodwill? And
if this is the case we must be prepared for one of three possible
versions of the future.
The pessimistic version: A “coloured revolution”
Opposition to the current regime under the slogans “No to bureaucratic
thieves!”, “No to thieving oligarchs!” and “Give us
democracy!”. Gradually the fight is going beyond the bounds of
peaceful demonstrations and progressing to a stage of strikes and
blockades on railways and other trunk routes. There may be bloody
provocations, and then an explosion is inevitable. Central power is
paralysed and the regions are finding themselves left to their own
devices – a situation of which they are eagerly taking full
advantage. Officially the country is being preserved as a unified
whole, but in reality it is breaking up into pieces under the
protectorates of various foreign states.
The optimistic version: “Tsushima” [reference to the Battle of
Tsushima Strait, fought in 1905 during the Russo-Japanese War].
For the sake of preserving internal stability Russia is drawn into
what it believes will be a “small and triumphant war” and suffers a
crushing defeat that is extremely humiliating for the nation’s sense
of self. The angry people give birth to an accursed national idea and
a bearer who personifies it – a leader from among the military. This
general has the unconditional support of the people and, using what
are de facto dictatorial methods, creates a new state – with a new
ideology, new laws, a new state apparatus and so forth.
The realistic version is “Stagnation”
The current policy of doing nothing continues. Problems are buried
away out of sight, until they come to a head or until some detonator
goes off – then there is an explosion with unpredictable consequences.
So there you are. Only one of these three versions represents a chance
to preserve Russia as a unified state, but I propose that you should
make an independent assessment of how realistic that version
is. [Passage omitted] Postscript: Without an idea, any authority
starts to work for itself This is not the first time that I have
“scared” the readers of Komsomolskaya Pravda with stories of Russia’s
imminent disintegration. In the autumn after the August crisis of 1998
I wrote a series of articles under the general title “Russia will not
live to see winter” – just like that, without a question mark, that is
how confident I was of my prediction. Only one chance remained to
preserve the state – if a “dictator summoned by the people” emerges at
the head of that state. And as early as summer 1999 Vladimir Putin
became first prime minister, and then president. Of course, one cannot
call him a dictator, but he built a power vertical, he destroyed the
Chechen bandit “state”, he subdued the oligarchs and the regional
barons, and political opposition grew quiet under him. And then oil
prices also started to rise. The threat of the country’s
disintegration seemed to have disappeared. But then the threat arose
once again. But from where? And why?
My personal point of view is this: Putin has not yet brought to
completion everything for which the people gave him their support. He
has dealt with some of the oligarchs but there are others, who are
certainly no better, that he has not touched. He has created a
parallel state structure in the regions (federal districts and
presidential plenipotentiaries) but they have acquired no real power
and, little by little, they have become corrupt. State control over
oil and gas seems to have been restored, but the excess profits from
their export have remained in the Stabilization Fund, and have not
been used to generate an economic leap forward. Much was said during
Putin’s first term about making the economy less bureaucratic, but
since his re-election nobody seems to remember it any more. And a
great many other undertakings were abandoned at the half-way
stage. You cannot do everything yourself, but as soon as you transfer
power to somebody else – that’s it, the matter dies.
But the main thing is this: an ideology has still not emerged that the
people would consciously support and upon which Putin could rely when
carrying out his reforms. If there was an ideology there would be
genuine allies, and not members of One Russia. The management of a
state cannot be built on the same principles as the management of a
corporation – even a very large corporation. A state system is much
more complex. Without an idea and without ideals any state power
vertical will very quickly begin to work for itself, it will become
corrupt, and as a result it will cease to function altogether. Then
comes either a change of power or the collapse of the state.