A “PARALLEL CIS” IN DEMOCRATIC PACKAGING
By Vladimir Socor

Eurasia Daily Monitor, DC
Jamestown Foundation
Sept 19 2005

Representatives of Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Karabakh
held a conference on “A Parallel CIS” on September 15-16 in Moscow. The
gathering differed from previous ones in that it was overtly sponsored
by officials of Russia’s executive branch of power.

Modest Kolerov, head of the Russian Presidential Administration’s
Directorate for Interregional and External Ties (mainly responsible
for liaison with pro-Moscow groups in Eurasia) and Konstantin Zatulin,
Director of Russia’s government-sponsored CIS Affairs Institute,
were the hosts and keynote speakers.

Perhaps because the unprecedented official involvement could be seen
as provocative enough, the organizers chose to invite low-profile
secessionist personages this time. Participants included a “deputy
minister of foreign affairs” of Transnistria, a counselor to Karabakh’s
president and one to its “ministry of foreign affairs,” the rectors of
“state universities” from all the four territories, and heads of these
territories’ resident missions in Moscow. Several “ministerial”-rank
officials were also listed initially as participants. Abkhazia’s
leader, Sergei Bagapsh, was officially reported as being in Moscow
during the conference, although he was not listed among conference
participants. Conferees also included elements of Kolerov’s usual
clientele of pan-Slavist and pan-Orthodox groups from ex-Soviet-ruled
countries, the Balkans, and the Near East. Some of these were supposed
to provide illustrative examples of unrecognized enclaves striving
for international recognition.

Kolerov’s and Zatulin’s keynote addresses both introduced a novel
theme to Russian policy on conflict resolution. They portrayed
the secessionist territories as well on their way toward becoming
functioning democracies, with representative institutions and
regularly held elections. Kolerov and Zatulin argued that international
recognition would help complete that purported development and would
correspond with “democratically expressed” aspirations in these
territories. The thesis, in a nutshell, is that stabilization through
recognition would promote democracy and guarantee human rights. This
argument seeks to exclude the issue of Russian troops from discussion
at this stage, reserving the Russian “military guarantees” to be
discussed as part of the political settlements. “First democratization,
then negotiations toward political settlement,” Kolerov said. For
his part, Zatulin suggested that the “parallel CIS” of unrecognized
territories was already more effective than the officially existing
CIS and could lay a groundwork for international recognition.

This line of argument corresponds with the Russian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs’ new tactic to seek international recognition of the
secessionist authorities in two stages. The first stage would involve
international monitoring and recognition of elections to secessionist
territories’ legislative bodies as democratically valid. The next
stage would see recognition of the executive authorities that issued
from those elections. Political settlements of the conflicts would
then be negotiated on that basis with Russia’s clients in a far
stronger position than they had been. Moldova and Transnistria are,
at the moment, the first object of this experiment in which Russian
diplomacy seeks Western acquiescence. In a message to the participants
in the conference, Transnistria’s leader, Igor Smirnov, optimistically
stated, “We are drawing closer to recognition with every passing day.”

Kolerov cautioned the secessionist leaderships against the “tactical
mistake” of overemphasizing “historical connections with Russia”
when addressing international public opinion. “Of course, you can
continue to mention that, but it is no longer important for the West.”

Instead, they should use human-rights and democracy arguments in
the quest for recognition, as “no one can ignore such arguments,”
Kolerov advised. At the same time, Kolerov offered a catch-all
definition of “Russia’s compatriots (sootechestvenniki) on either
side of post-Soviet conflicts,” whose rights and interests Russia
“has an obligation to guarantee.” Those compatriots include “all
persons born on the territory of the former Soviet Union or the
Russian Empire,” irrespective of ethnicity, in the recognized states
or the unrecognized ones. This sweeping definition reflects Moscow’s
goal to act as “guarantor” of conflict-settlement and post-conflict
arrangements, overseeing the constitutional setups in what are now
the unrecognized states and the recognized ones as well. Again (and
as usual), Moldova is the first target of this new Russian policy.

The Abkhaz and South Ossetian representatives indicated that the
goal of international recognition is, to them, an intermediate stage
toward accession of these territories to Russia. Transnistria’s
representatives (evidently taking geography into account) spoke more
vaguely of becoming part of some “community” around Russia. Karabakh
representatives only spoke of achieving independence from Azerbaijan.

The leader of Armenia’s Democratic Party, Aram Sarkisian (not to be
confused with the identically named ex-prime minister who is now an
opposition leader) criticized Armenia’s leadership for “distancing
itself from Russia” and defended the population of Armenia and Karabakh
against any such imputations.

Representatives of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of Orthodoxy also
led a discussion on the role of the “national dimension” of Orthodox
churches in consolidating “national identity” in these territories.

This may presage a more active role than has hitherto been the case
for Russian Orthodox clergymen and the Moscow Patriarchy in supporting
secessionist authorities.

(Regnum, Interfax, RIA, September 12-16; Kommersant Daily, September
16)