THE EU AND TURKEY: PARTNERS OR GLADIATORS?
by Sylvie Goulard

Cafe Babel, France
Oct 3 2005

With negotiations over Turkey’s accession to the EU beginning, Europe
is still utterly confused as to which attitude to adopt towards the
Turkish government. And it is the island of Cyprus that finds itself
at the heart of the argument.

For decades, the conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus
has been a major impediment for the improvement of relations between
Turkey and the EU. When Cyprus applied to join the EU in July 1990, the
Community saw this as a chance for peace. It assumed that the Southern
Greek-Cypriot Republic was acting out the will of the entire island.

Negotiations began in 1998 in the hope of encouraging a process of
political reunification. However, the bet was lost and a divided island
joined the EU on May 1 2004. Both the rejection of the Annan plan (a
United Nations proposal to bring about the reunification of Cyprus)
by the Greek side and the persistence of fervent Turkish nationalism
have hampered efforts to overcome the partition.

Maybe it was a chance worth taking since there are a few previous
examples of when the will to overlook political reality has triumphed
over unfavourable circumstances. For example, from 1945, and in spite
of the Cold War, the Allies kept alive the idea that Germany was whole,
which proved to be helpful during reunification in 1990.

Similarly, the fact that the USSR refused to recognise the Baltic
States’ annexation greatly facilitated their independence in the
1990s. The path to reconciliation and peace are not always the
straightest. Sometimes the bends can lead right back to the start
instead of driving the process forward.

Diplomatic subterfuges

During the 2004 European Council on December 17, the twenty-five heads
of state did not expressly ask Turkey to recognise the Republic of
Cyprus that had by then joined. It was instead decided that they
should have recourse to one of those detours that diplomats know
best in order for Turks to save face within their own borders. The
convoluted formula which allows this to take place deserves to be
quoted in full: “The European Council welcomed Turkey’s decision to
sign the Protocol regarding the adaptation of the Ankara Agreement
[customs union], taking account of the accession of the ten new member
states. In this light, it welcomed the declaration of Turkey that ‘the
Turkish Government confirms that it is ready to sign the Protocol on
the adaptation of the Ankara Agreement prior to the actual start of
accession negotiations and after reaching agreement on and finalising
the adaptations which are necessary in view of the current membership
of the European Union.'”

In other words, even though Cyprus was not explicitly cited but alluded
to twice, Turkey agreed to extend the agreement previously governing
their relations with the EU to the island. This takes into account
all potential implications for the free passage of boats, aircraft
and merchandise. However, shortly after this was announced, Turkey
made it explicit that this was not an acknowledgement of Cyprus. A
controversial move in view of such carefully chosen words.

The French authorities were quick to react. According to Prime Minister
Dominic de Villepin, it was “inconceivable” to negotiate willingly
with a country that refused to acknowledge the existence of one of
the member states. Unfortunately, by late August, President Chirac
had gone back on this statement at the conference of ambassadors,
insisting on the opening of negotiations.

As for the British EU presidency, it allowed the insulting statement to
pass and went as far as supporting Turkey’s decision. Two months later,
the presidency was still looking for an appropriate reaction to give to
the Cypriots and other “smaller” countries. It remains, however, hard
to conjure a compromise that will sanction Turkey without jeopardising
negotiations. No European still dares to suggest the required solution:
that of renegotiating the adhesion in terms of a Turkish turnaround.

European Turnaround

Once more, the EU will give in. This attitude is deplorable. It is
conceivable that Europeans should make the necessary efforts to help
the Turkish government overcome various difficult situations it may
face. But it is dangerous to compromise on such a fundamental point
when the uncompromising Turkish government refuses to look beyond
its nationalist and narrow purpose. By publicly stating that it
refuses to acknowledge the existence of one of the EU member states
whilst aspiring to integrate into the very same organisation, Turkey
demonstrates a serious misunderstanding of the very nature of the EU.

Indeed, the EU is not a circus arena in which gladiators frenziedly
fight each other but a space of cooperation in which members listen
to and respect each other.

The upsurge of Turkish nationalism in Spring 2005, as well as the
threats against the author Orhan Pamuk (whose only crime was to make
the truth known about the Armenian genocide and the resurgence of
upheaval in Kurdistan) have muddied the positive image the Commission
had offered in its October 2004 report. To make matters worse, since
the decision of the European Council in December 2004, two founding
countries have rejected the Constitutional Treaty thereby exposing
the vulnerability of the EU. Negotiations may be opening, but it is
obvious that the heart is no longer in it.

Sylvie Goulard – Paris – 3.10.2005 | Translation : Abla Kandalaft

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