PUBLIC MOOD IN AZERBAIJAN POINTS TO A NEW WAR
By Taleh Ziyadov
Eurasia Daily Monitor, DC
The Jamestown Foundation
Oct 4 2005
On September 26-27, OSCE Minsk co-chairs Bernard Fassier (France),
Yuri Merzlyakov (Russia), and Steven Mann (the United States) met in
Vienna to discuss further steps in the Karabakh peace process.
Before the meeting, Azerbaijan’s foreign minister, Elmar Mammadyarov,
declared, “The peace process has not yet exhausted itself,” but he
also added “there is a need for a parallel increase in the military
expenditures of Azerbaijan.”
Meanwhile, Merzlyakov, the Russian co-chair, expressed his concern
about the fact that both Azerbaijan and Armenia have increased their
military budgets and said, “Bellicose statements and calls for using
military force in solving the Karabakh problem do not contribute to
a resolution of the conflict.”
Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov reacted to Merzlyakov’s
speech on Monday, September 26. “The increase in [Azerbaijan’s]
military budget is normal and it is in the country’s national
interest,” he declared. “This is Azerbaijan’s internal affair [and]
the [military] budget will be raised as much as needed.”
Azerbaijan has doubled its military budget to $300 million in 2005
and is expected to double again in 2006, as new oil and gas export
profits arrive.
Referring to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s
possible involvement in the peace process, Merzlyakov commented,
“PACE may contribute to mobilizing public opinion in the two countries
to achieve the compromise needed for conflict resolution.”
However, Merzlyakov’s desire to boost public support for potential
agreement may be too little, too late.
For years, the OSCE Minsk co-chairs disregarded the potential domestic
reaction in Azerbaijan and Armenia to an agreement reached without
public input. A recent report by the International Crisis Group (ICG)
titled, “Nagorno-Karabakh: Viewing the Conflict from the Ground,”
outlines the potentially ominous outcomes of this neglect.
“Whatever progress is occurring around the negotiations table,
on the ground a resumption of war still seems all too possible,”
reads one of the conclusions in the report. “We are tired of ten
years of peaceful negotiations that lead us nowhere [and] brought
us nothing,” says one Azerbaijani refugee, voicing his frustration
about unfulfilled promises.
The ICG team reports that some 13% of all Azerbaijanis surveyed
“unconditionally supported a military solution, while 53.3%s
supported such a solution if peaceful means failed. However, 84.2% of
[internally displaced persons (IDPs)] respondents called for the use
of force.” According to the report, “The majority of the public [in
Azerbaijan] demands unconditional return of all occupied territories
including Nagorno-Karabakh and places little hope in a negotiated
settlement and peaceful outcome.”
The survey illustrates that it is not only the Azerbaijani government
calling for a military solution in case the negotiations fail, but
also a large portion of the general public and IDPs in Azerbaijan
believe that the military option may be the only available alternative
to change the current status quo.
As a result of the war, some 800,000 Azerbaijanis became refugees and
IDPs; most are from the districts surrounding Karabakh. Armenia still
occupies these districts as a buffer zone. The ICG report argues that
before any of these districts could be returned, Azerbaijan should give
“strong military and political security guarantees.”
Ironically, a component of hard security — a buffer zone used against
a possible offensive — directly affects the very livelihood of
the IDPs, who in turn have an indirect affect on their government’s
position in the negotiations, by making it even more hardline. In
other words, by continuous occupation of the districts surrounding
Karabakh, Armenia increases the potential for the use of force on
Azerbaijan’s side.
Speaking at the Ministry of Defense on September 16, Azerbaijani
President Ilham Aliev declared, “Azerbaijan is a country in a state of
war. Our lands are under occupation. The country has pursued a peaceful
policy for many years. But the conflict has not been resolved. Then
what should Azerbaijan resort to? That is why the reinforcement of
our military potential is quite natural.”
Furthermore, “Increasing our country’s military budget is our sovereign
right and this should not trouble anyone. This is our internal affair
and we will pursue this path as long as we deem it necessary. I have
set the task: our military budget should reach the entire budget of
Armenia, or even exceed it,” Aliev concluded.
Yet, the ICG report suggests that there is still a window of
opportunity. “Moderate civil society actors and average Azeris and
Armenians could play a key role in ‘developing a new language of
dialogue’… to help deconstruct the inherited history of myth and
symbol that fuels confrontation’.” Although “IDP populations [are]
the greatest victims of the war,” says the report, they are also the
ones that are “the most open to coexistence.”
“The majority of Nagorno-Karabakh population, current and former,
remembers common life before the war. The memories of the past, while
including tremendous pain, also encompass warm memories of shared
life in a multiethnic Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan, ‘where life
was good’.”
Nonetheless, as Azerbaijan and Armenia continue to increase their
military expenditures and public opinion in Azerbaijan, especially
among IDPs, turns against the OSCE-sponsored mediation process, no
one can rule out the possibility of a new war between the two states
in the near future.