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[Turkey’s aspiration to be “European but different” must not include
continued Armenian Genocide denial]
Turkey and the European Union
Now make Turkey’s case
Oct 6th 2005
>From The Economist print edition
On being European and different
AFTER two days and a night of unseemly horse-trading between Turks,
Austrians and other Europeans, Britain’s foreign secretary, Jack Straw,
made bold claims for the deal he brokered this week. The start of entry
talks between the European Union and Turkey, he said, marked an
“historic day for Europe and the whole of the international community”.
His bleary-eyed triumphalism may yet prove premature. But the reverse of
what he said is certainly true. It would have been an historic disaster
if, 42 years after promising the Turks the possibility of entry, and ten
months after giving a definite date for talks to begin, the Union had
slammed the door in Turkey’s face. That outcome would have been
dreadful, both in its direct consequences and because of the
opportunities lost.
Among the short-term results, Turkey’s impressive but still fragile
programme of economic and political reform could have slowed or worse.
Those Turks-starting with Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister-who
have invested in a European future would have been left horribly
exposed. Worse, Muslims in Turkey and elsewhere would have concluded
that Europeans bore a grudge against them because of their faith alone.
This would have encouraged all those, from Osama bin Laden to the
western world’s religious far-right, who long for a clash between Islam
and the historically Christian world.
It is also true that a chance now exists to achieve something vastly
desirable. All sides will benefit hugely if what is best in Europe,
including its tolerant, liberal-democratic tradition, can finally come
together with what is best in Turkey-including the dynamism of a
demographically young nation that makes Europe’s heartland seem sluggish
by comparison.
But reaching that goal will require hard work and political courage. It
will also need a prudent openness to the possibility that somewhere in
the process, one or other party (and it could well be the Turkish side)
will conclude that the price is too high. That would be disappointing
but not necessarily terrible-as long as the EU expects of Turkey only
the same as it would of any other applicant.
In Turkey, people’s enthusiasm for a European future has already waned
in the face of the “rudeness” of potential partners such as France and
Austria. How can it be, many Turks ask, that people in those countries
do not see the obvious benefits of having them as members? If the Turks
are to find their way to Europe, they will need to grow thicker skins.
For European politicians, the queasiness of many citizens about
embracing another large, impoverished country is a hard, irreducible
fact. In several European countries, far-right parties are doing well by
playing on fears of Muslim immigration. The response of the EU’s leaders
to these realities may yet be statesmanlike, or opportunistic. But it is
politics, not technicalities, that will finally decide Turkey’s fate.
And the politics will be tough. All the arguments against incorporating
the Turks seem obvious and, to some politicians, tempting. The case for
keeping the doors open has to be reasoned through more carefully. The
onus is on politicians to convince voters that making western Europe a
sort of up-market gated community would be worse than useless: it would
not protect existing job-holders, or keep desperate labour migrants out,
or stem Europe’s relative decline in the world economy. If politicians
are responsible, they will also point out that trying to toughen the
rules unreasonably for Turkey will not make that country go away, or
reduce its importance, or slow the pace at which it is changing: it will
simply increase the chances that Turkey will evolve in an unhappy
direction, towards Muslim fundamentalism or militaristic nationalism.
The right sort of scepticism
At the same time, politicians should accept that one ground for
Turco-scepticism is, in its own terms, perfectly sound. To the delight
of some and the dismay of others, Turkey’s presence will make it harder
for any country or axis to play a dominant role in Europe. With 15% of
the total population, the Turks will hardly take over the Union
themselves; but their membership will deny preponderance to others.
So France’s ex-president, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, is right to say
that an EU including Turkey will be a looser grouping than some people
desire. The Turks may well wreck things for any state or pair of states
which still hope the EU as a whole will act as a mouthpiece for their
own political, or geopolitical, ideas; or that the Union will turn into
a super-state with one or two of its current members in charge.
But in fact, those dreams have been dashed already, and it was not the
Turks, or even the party-pooping Brits, who destroyed them. Among the
many messages delivered by French and Dutch voters when they rejected
the Euro-constitution, one was certainly this: that there are still some
fundamental questions-such as how to mix efficiency with fairness, or
tolerance with responsibility-that cannot be settled by pan-European
edict alone. And many would rather see a somewhat looser EU than have
choices they abhor imposed on them from above.
So as politicians consider the arguments in favour of embracing Turkey,
they might try this one: the Turks’ aspiration to be “European but
different” may yet give heart to people in other parts of the EU who are
willing to participate in the Union, and abide by commonly-agreed rules,
but not to sacrifice their own nations’ distinctiveness. Such people are
quite numerous, and Europe is the stronger for it.