TURKEY: Is There Religious Freedom In Turkey?

TURKEY: IS THERE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN TURKEY?
By Dr. Otmar Oehring, head of the human rights office of Missio

Forum 18, Norway
Oct 12 2005

The European Union (EU) must make full religious freedom for all a
core demand in the EU membership negotiations with Turkey which have
just begun, argues Otmar Oehring of the German Catholic charity Missio

in this personal commentary for Forum 18 News Service
Dr Oehring also calls for people inside and
outside Turkey who believe in religious freedom for all to honestly
and openly raise the continuing obstructions to the religious life of
Turkey’s Muslim, Christian and other religious communities. He analyses
the limited, complex and changing state of religious freedom in the
country. In particular, he notes that Christians of all confessions,
devout Muslim women, Muslim minorities, and other minority religions
face official obstacles in practicing their faith and (in the case
of non-Muslims) strong social hostility.

Go to any mosque or church in Turkey and you will see people
worshipping. So clearly some religious freedom exists. Yet serious
problems persist. Religious communities are not allowed to organise
themselves as they choose. Individual religious freedom exists up to
a point. For example, you are entitled by law to change your religion
and to have the change recorded on your identity documents, but people
who have done so have faced hostility from fellow-citizens. As soon as
a religious community wants to organise itself, problems arise. This
holds just as much for Muslims as for communities of other faiths.

Although many Turks dislike the term “State Islam”, it has to be
stated that Islam is organised by the state. Sunnis who consider
this an unacceptable innovation are not allowed to organise. Although
Sufi orders exist, some even with a vast membership, they have been
officially forbidden banned since the 1920s.

The main problem religious communities identify is their lack of
legal status as religious communities. In the late Ottoman period
some religious minorities had legal status under the millet system,
but the Islamic community had no separate legal status as the state
was considered to be Islamic. But since the founding of the Turkish
republic, any such status has disappeared. Some Muslims are concerned
about this lack of legal status, especially minority Muslim groups
within the dominant Sunni majority, as well as the Alevis, Shias and
the Sufi orders. But few Muslims are prepared to voice their demands
for legal status openly, for fear of imprisonment, although in recent
years the Alevis have become more vocal. This has led to their gaining
some recognition as associations, though not as religious bodies.

Religious meetings and services without authorisation remain illegal,
though it remains unclear in law what constitutes legal and illegal
worship. The Ottoman millet system recognised some religious
minorities and the 1923 Lausanne Treaty spoke vaguely of religious
minority rights without naming them, but the Turkish authorities
interpret this to exclude communities such as the Roman Catholics,
Syriac Orthodox and Lutherans, even though these communities have
found ways to function. Protestant Christian churches functioning
quietly in non-recognised buildings are generally tolerated, but
Muslims gathering outside an approved mosque are viewed as a threat
to the state and police will raid them.

It is not possible for most Protestant Christian churches to be
recognised as churches under current Turkish law. But in one bizarre
case, a German Christian church was recognised in Antalya, but
only by calling itself a “chapel” not a “church.” Most Evangelical
Protestant churches in Turkey do not meet in private homes, but in
rented facilities such as office buildings or other non-residential
buildings. These can be fairly large.

The Law on Associations – adopted by Parliament in October 2004 –
does not allow the founding of associations with a religious purpose,
so founding a religious discussion group or even a religious freedom
group is impossible, even if some religious communities do try to
register as associations. Some Sufi orders and new Islamic movements
have registered as businesses, even with religious names.

However, the government has changed the building planning laws,
replacing the word “mosque” with “place of worship”. The government
indicated to Protestant churches that individuals cannot ask for
buildings to be designated as a place of worship, but individual
congregations should try to get recognition as a legal personality
first (as a “Dernek” or society) and then try to get their meeting
place designated as a place of worship. At least two Protestant
churches are now trying this route.

There are currently two Protestant churches that are legally recognised
by the Turkish state, one of which is in Istanbul. It was recognised
as a “Vakf” (charitable foundation) several years ago, after a
long court battle, making it a legal entity. Several weeks ago,
they finally had their building officially designated as a place of
worship. The second example is the Protestant church in Diyarbakir,
which has legal recognition as a house of worship under the Ministry
of Culture, as a heritage site.

Religious education remains tightly controlled. In law such education
must be carried out by the state, although in practice Christian
churches – Armenian Apostolic, Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant – have
been able to provide catechetical training to their children on church
premises. The state turns a blind eye to this. But Koranic courses are
different. Officially they should take place only under the guidance of
the state, yet some 6,000 such courses are widely spoken of as existing
clandestinely. Many officials and police officers have good contacts
with them, while many senior officials and parliamentarians have been
members of Sufi orders which officially do not exist or are forbidden.

It is generally impossible to found higher education establishments
for Muslims, Christians and others. The Armenian Apostolic and the
Greek Orthodox seminaries were closed down in the 1970s and the
government has resisted all attempts to reopen them. Protestants
cannot normally establish Bible colleges. However, an Evangelical
Bible college functions in Selcuk; it is not government recognised and
accredited, but it has been providing theological training for several
years. Christian clergy and pastors mostly have to train abroad. Alevi
Muslims do not tend to demand religious colleges, as they are led
not by imams but by elders who are initiated by other elders.

The Law on Construction – which came into force into July 2003 –
makes it possible to “establish” places of worship. But the law –
probably deliberately – does not define if this means “build”, “rent”
or “buy”. Protestant churches face problems trying to build. Any
community wishing to build a place of worship officially can do so in
an area with a minimum number of adherents of their faith – but the
state decides if the community has enough members to get the land it
needs. There is no authoritative definition of how the law should
be interpreted. The Justice Minister said recently that religious
communities intending to establish a place of worship should apply, but
how can religious communities apply if officially they cannot exist?

Government officials do not want to acknowledge that Alevi Muslims
cannot officially establish places of worship. The government is
building Sunni mosques in many Alevi villages, but Alevis will not
go to them. Instead they meet openly for worship in cemevis (meeting
houses), not only in central Anatolia but even in Istanbul. The
government stated in parliament in 2004 that such Alevi cemevis are
not to be considered as places of worship. Although many of them
still function unimpeded, some have been closed down in recent years.

Conversion from one faith to another is possible, even from Islam,
under the law on personal status (though you cannot be listed
officially as an atheist or agnostic). If you convert from Islam
you can change your faith on your identity papers, but being Muslim
on your identity card makes day-to-day life easier. Christians,
Baha’is or Jehovah’s Witnesses are often unable to find employment,
especially in rural areas. So many who have converted from Islam
to another faith prefer to leave their religious designation on
their identity papers unchanged. According to information given by
the Minister of State in charge of Religious Affairs this autumn,
during the last ten years fewer than 400 people officially converted
to Christianity and only about 10 to Judaism.

Islam is controlled by the Presidency of Religious Affairs, or
Diyanet , which
is directed from the Prime Minister’s office. This was deliberately
established not as a government ministry, as Turkey claims to be a
secular state. Some Muslims do object to this state control, especially
those from newer groups, such as the Nurcu movement, the Suleymanci,
followers of Fethullah Gulen, and members of Sufi orders.

Some religious communities can officially invite foreign religious
workers. The Catholics can under the 1923 Lausanne Treaty invite
foreign priests up to a certain number, though even then the
government makes this difficult, asking why the Church needs so many
priests when there are so few Catholics. It is more difficult for
Protestant communities, as officially they do not exist as religious
communities. Foreign religious workers who come to Turkey under
some other guise can face problems, if the government finds out
about them. As long as the state does not have to know about their
activity they can function, but as soon as the state is forced to take
official notice of them, they can face problems. The government knows
about most, if not all, Protestant missionaries, because these made a
conscious decision to be open about what they are doing. Occasionally
they experience some problems but – with occasional exceptions –
the government merely monitors what they do, leaving them otherwise
undisturbed.

All religious communities are under state surveillance, with religious
minorities facing the closest scrutiny. Christian leaders know they
are listened in to and their telephones are tapped. The Ecumenical
Patriarch states that “walls have ears,” even when speaking within
his own Patriarchate in the Fener district of Istanbul. Police visit
individual Christian churches to ask who attends, which foreigners
have visited, what they discussed. They are particularly interested
in which Turkish citizens attend.

Are such visits a threat, or do the intelligence agencies just want
to know what is going on? When the police attend Catholic services
in Ankara, they say they are there to protect Christians. From my
conversations with church members, I’m sure this is not true.

When secularism was proclaimed as a guiding state principle in line
with French laïcite it was sincerely meant. Kemal Ataturk and his
followers aimed to crush Islam. Later on, officials understood that
society was not willing to follow this line. Slowly, Islam returned
to schools and other areas of life. Now Turkey is a Sunni Muslim
state. All those whose mother tongue is Turkish and are Sunni
Muslims are considered Turks. Alevis, Kurds, Christians and all
other minorities are not considered Turks – they are considered
as foreigners.

The furore over headscarves – a genuine concern to devout Muslim women
– was exploited as a political issue by Islamist parties, eager to
demonstrate their opposition to the military authorities which had
banned Islamic dress after the 1980 coup. Had there been no headscarf
ban, there would have been no problem. This point was illustrated by
the case of a non-political devout Muslim, Leyla Sahin. She was barred
from wearing a headscarf in Istanbul University in her fifth year
of medical studies and subsequently successfully completed medical
studies at Vienna University in Austria. This disturbing ban – which
de jure bars devout Muslim women from universities – is currently
under consideration by a Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR). (See for more on
this and other ECHR cases.)

In rural Sunni areas women have always worn headscarves – though not
the type seen in Iran or Saudi Arabia – which some women have tried to
wear in towns. In some cases, supporters of the Refah (Welfare) party
and others have paid women to wear such scarves. Even nationalist
politicians say that if women are free to choose whether to wear a
headscarf or not, many who have worn them for political reasons would
no longer wish to do so.

Societal opposition to minorities of all sorts does impact on
religious freedom. Such social pressure is felt most keenly among
the poor. Members of the urban middle class who convert from Islam to
other faiths can freely practise their new faith. In Izmir a Christian
church exists where many young converts of university background
attend unchallenged. But openly converting to and practising a
non-Islamic faith is often impossible in poor neighbourhoods. In former
Armenian-populated areas of Anatolia – where there are also people of
Syriac descent – many families changed their formal identification to
Muslims, but did not convert in reality. Their attempts to practise
Christianity face enormous obstacles unless they move to Istanbul or
even to Ankara. Back in these towns and villages are no Christian
churches, so anyone wanting to meet for Christian worship could be
dragged off to the police or suffer beatings.

One former Interior Minister stated that Christians should only
conduct missionary activity among such people of Christian descent.

He estimated the numbers of such people at between 800,000 and three
million people.

You have to be very courageous to set up a Protestant church in remote
areas, as pastor Ahmet Guvener found in Diyarbakir. Problems can come
from neighbours and from the authorities. Even if not working hand
in hand, neighbours and officials share the same hostility. They
cannot understand why anyone would convert to Christianity. People
are not upset seeing old Christian churches – Syriac Orthodox and
other Christian churches have always existed in Anatolia – but seeing
a new Protestant church, even when housed in a shop or private flat,
arouses hostility.

Officials vary in their attitudes. The Kemalist bureaucracy follows
Ataturk’s secularist line and is against anything religious. There
is a nationalist, chauvinistic wing of officialdom which believes
that anything not Turkish is a threat to be countered. The security
and intelligence services, including the powerful military, are both
Kemalist and nationalist. Anyone considered not to be Turkish and not
Sunni Muslim faces problems. Even Sunni Muslim Kurds are excluded,
while Alevi Kurds are regarded as even worse.

It is very difficult to imagine that in the next decade or so Turkish
society will change to allow full religious freedom. To take one
example, for the change to be conceivable the chauvinistic content of
primary and secondary school education – constant praise of Ataturk,
Turkey and all things Turkish – will have to change. Unless this
happens, it is very hard to imagine Turkey evolving into an open
society that is truly ready to accept European Union (EU) human rights
requirements. One non-religious illustration of the lack of openness
in Turkish society is the near impossibility of free discussion of
the genocide of 1.5 million Armenians and Assyrians in the last years
of the Ottoman empire, along with continued official denial that the
genocide took place.

Christian churches have welcomed the prospect of Turkish EU accession,
often due to their own communities’ experience and hopes.

If negotiations last for more than a few years some improvements
for religious minorities – including Islamic minorities – might
be possible.

Sadly, there appears to be not enough interest among diplomats in
Ankara from EU member states – or in their foreign ministries back
home – in promoting religious freedom in Turkey. The EU has forced the
Turkish government to change the Law on Foundations. This law governs
inter alia community foundations (cemaat vakiflar) that act as the
owners of the real estate of Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks and Jews,
who are treated by the government as minorities within the meaning
of the Treaty of Lausanne as well as some of the properties of the
Chaldean Catholic, Syrian Catholic and Syrian Orthodox Christians,
who are not treated by the government as minorities within the meaning
of the Treaty of Lausanne. But reforms will have to go much deeper
for Turkey to meet the EU’s stated ‘Copenhagen criteria’ of being “a
stable democracy, respecting human rights, the rule of law, and the
protection of minorities.” The EU must make full religious freedom
for all, including for Muslims, a core demand.

Full religious freedom would bring with it an increase in the
influence of Islam, which some think would endanger the western
orientation of Turkey. Possibly this is the reason that the EU has
not pushed Turkey harder on religious freedom. However, it is unwise
to see the relationship with Turkey through such “war-against-terror
spectacles.” It is vital for the future of Turkey that full religious
freedom be a core demand, so that Turkish democracy can be strengthened
to the point that it can in democratic ways cope with the hostility
of some Islamic groups.

With so little apparent interest in pushing for full religious freedom
from within the EU, local religious communities within Turkey will have
to take the lead. They are starting to challenge the denial of their
rights through the courts. Protestant Christians have been doing this
for almost 10 years, usually with success. The Ecumenical Patriarchate,
however, has failed to regain a former orphanage it ran on an island
near Istanbul through the High Court in Ankara. It is now taking
the case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg,
to which Turkey is subject as a member of the Council of Europe. I
believe this is the right way for such communities to defend their
rights and others are already following. The Alevi Muslims have told
the government that, if they continue to be denied religious education
in state schools to their children according to their own teaching,
they too will go to the ECHR. Denial of legal status to religious
communities is another possible ECHR case.

The most important thing is to put religious freedom on the agenda
and talk openly of the problems with full knowledge of the nuances
and complexities of the situation.

It is important to challenge Turkey’s restrictions on religious freedom
using Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which
Turkey signed in 1954. This article guarantees “freedom of thought,
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his
religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief,
in worship, teaching, practice and observance.”

This should be the basis for all discussion of religious freedom,
not the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, with its highly restrictive approach
to religious freedom.

Turkish religious communities will have to speak more on the importance
of religious freedom to the outside world, though they will have to
be wise in the way they do this. Religious minority leaders are in a
difficult situation: they believe that they have to argue in favour
of negotiations on EU membership, however sceptical they might be
about how ready Turkish society is to make the necessary changes.

Foreign churches and religious communities should be talking to
their own governments, to press them to promote religious freedom in
Turkey. They will have to convince them they are not simply advocating
greater rights for their co-religionists but truly advocate religious
freedom for all in Turkey, including Muslims.

The big question remains: do the Turkish government and people have
the will to allow full religious freedom for all? The Turkish media
speculates that the current government might not be in favour of EU
membership, but is merely using this as a way to introduce domestic
developments to achieve Islamist aims. The suggestion put forward
in the media is that, if democracy develops, the military will be
prevented from mounting a coup and so there will no longer be any
obstacle to Islamist aims.

Whether or not this media speculation reflects reality, all those who
believe in religious freedom in Turkey – both within the country and
abroad – must keep the issue on the domestic and international agenda –
and be honest about the continuing obstructions to religious life of
Turkey’s Muslim, Christian and other religious communities.

(END)

Dr Otmar Oehring, head of the human rights office at Missio
,
a Catholic mission based in the German city of Aachen, contributed
this comment to Forum 18 News Service. Commentaries are personal views
and do not necessarily represent the views of F18News or Forum 18.

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