SABINE FREIZER: THE PEACE PLAN PROPOSED BY INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP IS GOOD BECAUSE IT IS REALISTIC
Haroutiun Khachatrian
Noyan Tapan
Armenians Today
Mar 13 2006
YEREVAN, MARCH 13, NOYAN TAPAN – ARMENIANS TODAY. The International
Crisis Group, a respected organization involved in efforts of
conflict resolution, has recently proposed its suggestions about a
possible way of regulation of the Nagorno Karabakh problem. These
suggestions have had controversial echoes both among Armenians and
Azeris. Sabine Freizer, the Caucasus Project Director of the ICG,
presents the details in an exclusive interview with Noyan Tapan.
“NOYAN TAPAN”: Please remind us briefly the pre-history and current
activities of your organization. Whose was the idea of its creation,
who is involved in its activities, who provides funding?
SABINE FREIZER: The International Crisis Group is an international not
for profit organization based in Brussels, Belgium. The organization
was created in 1995 as an independent body that could combine detailed
field assessment and analysis with political advocacy to try to
resolve or prevent conflict. Its founders were leading international
decision-makers who were shocked by their own governments’ inability
to respond effectively to the conflicts in former-Yugoslavia, Somalia,
Rwanda and other situations that had spiralled out of control in the
early 1990s. They wanted to create an organization that could provide
comprehensive, quick and neutral analysis on conflicts, and recommend
means to respond to them.
Crisis Group receives funding from a variety of sources. The goal is to
have a diverse funding base to insure independence and credibility. In
2004 40% of Crisis Group’s funds came from governments, 43% from
foundations, and 16% from private individuals and corporations. In
2004 the organization raised some million to cover operating costs.
“NT”: You are an organization of experts, which means that your
recommendations should be addressed to policymakers rather than to
the public opinion.
Meanwhile, you often address to wider society, including political
parties and NGOs. Isn’t there a controversy present here?
S.F.: Our recommendations are mainly addressed to policy makers
especially in Washington, New York, Brussels, London, Moscow and
other major capitals. We try to influence their decision-making and
the activities of state and international actors. However especially
in the South Caucasus where international attention is weaker then in
other parts of the globe, we also take the time to share our reports
and recommendations with local policymakers, political actors, NGOs
and others. We believe that it’s important to do this to increase
public knowledge and understanding about conflict in the region from
a relatively neutral standpoint.
“NT”: Continuing the above question, your comments about the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict go beyond the conflict per se to include the
issues of domestic politics such as the problems of elections or
referendum. Why do you think it is proper?
S.F.: We think that its important to look at domestic political
developments in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia because they of course
also affect the potential for conflict resolution. Our focus is on
analysing the conflicts but we sometimes report on local political
issues such as the Fall Azerbaijani parliamentary elections and the
Armenian referendum. We were quite critical in both cases.
“NT”: In recent months, some Armenian media have argued that your
organization is influenced by pro-Turkish lobby. Can you deny these
allegations? And, if so, what is, in your opinion, the reason that
such publications appeared in the Armenian media?
S.F.: We have been accused of being pro-Turkish in Armenia and
pro-Armenian in Azerbaijan. This is very frequent in our work. People
who don’t like what we have to say try to discredit us by linking
us with outside political forces. But Crisis Group is a truly
international organization with staff and funding from across the
globe. We are fully independent and are not politically influenced
by anyone.
Of course I can deny that we are influenced by any kind of pro-Turkish
lobby. In our report in Armenia in 2004 we several times mention
the Genocide including in the Introduction. We also make tough
recommendations to Turkey to open its border with Armenia. It would
be hard for me to imagine a Turkish lobby group who would come out
with these kinds of statements.
“NT”: What are the benefits of the peace plan proposed by ICG for
the Armenian side, including Nagorno Karabakh?
S.F.: The peace plan proposed by ICG is good because it is realistic
in the current situation and meets a significant part of the both
sides key demands.
For the Armenian side it provides security guarantees and the right
to self-determination for the people of Nagorno-Karabakh. For
the Azerbaijani side it offers the return of all internally
displaced persons and return of all its occupied lands around
Nagorno-Karabakh. The plan also calls for assurances of free movement
of people and goods, including the lifting of all blockades and the
reopening of all transport and trade routes closed as a result of the
conflict. For Armenia this would mean the end of its regional isolation
and the opening of its border with Turkey. The plan also grants
Nagorno-Karabakh with an internationally recognized interim status.
“NT”: As for the proposals of your organization about the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict, they are criticized by Armenian politicians for
several reasons:
First: The proposal to hold another referendum in Nagorno Karabakh
whereas a referendum meeting all democracy standards was held there
in 1991.
S.F: A referendum on statehood is not worth much — even if it meets
democratic standards — if its not internationally recognized. For
the past 15 years no state has recognized the 1991 referendum. The
internationally community is not going to recognize the referendum
now. Instead if Nagorno-Karabakh wants to receive international
recognition, and be accepted as an equal amongst other states, it must
hold a referendum, which meets international standards and is observed
by international organizations, first and foremost by the OSCE.
“NT”: Second: Many in Armenia express concern that withdrawal from the
territories around the former NKAO may disrupt the existing balance
(I do not speak about those who prefer to use the term “liberated”
rather than “occupied” for these territories).
S.F.: The Armenian side has a stark choice — to withdraw from the
occupied territories around Nagorno-Karabakh or to remain stationed
on land, which does not belong to it. If it chooses the latter,
Azerbaijan is much more likely to resort to the use of military force
to try to retake control of its land.
Should that happen the international community is unlikely to react
very strongly as UN Security Council Resolutions urge the withdrawal of
occupied territories. Today control of the land is NK’s only security
guarantee. We are proposing that it replaces this guarantee with
much stronger ones: a renunciation of the threat of the use of force
to settle disputes by Azerbaijan, the deployment of international
peacekeeping troops, and the creation of a joint commission including
Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh to address security problems. According
to this formula Azerbaijan will be more much constrained and will
have little ability to strike Nagorno-Karabakh. If it does choose to
do so it will become an international pariah state.
“NT”: Third: Peacekeeping forces (if any) in the Karabakh region
may present a threat to Iran, hence, Teheran will oppose their
installation.
S.F: If the sides — including the OSCE Minsk Group co-chair countries
— agree to the deployment of international peacekeepers I don’t think
that Iran will have much political weight to oppose them. Of course it
will be important to talk to Iran to explain to them the mission and
mandate of any peacekeepers. But I do not think that Iran’s political
concerns should override a compromise decision made by Russia, the US,
the EU, the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides, to deploy peacekeepers.
“NT”: According to your proposals, an intermediate status for
Nagorno Karabakh is to be established before is the final status is
defined. What elements this status can involve?
S.F.: An interim status for NK would provide NK with an internationally
recognized status — not as a state but as an interim entity. It
would be allowed to hold elections, which would be internationally
supervised. Based on this elected officials would be recognized
as representing the people of NK. Other interim measures could be
envisioned such as the granting of the right to have representatives
in international organizations, the right to trade, to issue travel
documents, receive international assistance etc…
After NK obtains interim status it should also accept the return
of displaced Azeris who should have the right to participate in all
elements of political, economic, social and cultural life.
“NT”: This question may look naive, but can you indicate a most
important factor hindering the progress in the settlement of the
Karabakh conflict?
S.F.: Distrust — between the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and
the people of the two countries. Once there is confidence and trust, as
I believe there is between the Foreign Ministers of the two countries,
it is much easier to come to a compromise. The other lacking factor
is absence of understanding for the need to accept compromises. The
sides maintain a maximalist approach. They rather demand all but get
no deal, then demand a bit less but come to an agreement.
“NT”: What future actions can your organization undertake in the
observable future concerning the Nagorno Karabakh conflict?
S.F.: We will continue monitoring and reporting on Nagorno-Karabakh. I
personally will be travelling to Washington DC and New York in
the coming months to meet with decision-makers and make public
presentations on Nagorno-Karabakh.
“NT”: Is the ICG involved in the settlement efforts of other conflicts
in the South Caucasus?
S.F.: Yes, we are also working closely on the South Ossetian and
Abkhaz conflicts.