NEWFOUND U.S. INTEREST IN AZERBAIJAN PROMISES MORE HEADACHES FOR BAKU
By Taleh Ziyadov
aleh+Ziyadov
Wednesday, March 22, 2006
On March 13-14, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried and U.S. Special Negotiator for Eurasian
Conflicts and U.S. Minsk Group co-chair Ambassador Steven Mann visited
Azerbaijan for a two-day official trip.
During their visit, the U.S. officials held talks with President Ilham
Aliyev, Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov, and Minister for Economic
Development Heydar Babayev. They also met with local journalists,
civil society representatives, and a leader from the main opposition
party.
Fried said that the goal of his trip was to examine the situation in
the region after the unsuccessful Rambouillet summit, when President
Aliyev and Armenian President Robert Kocharian failed to agree on a
“framework document” covering the key principles of a Karabakh peace
process (BakuToday.Net, March 17). He added that there were other
discussion topics pertaining to the future of the region, including
energy security and the Iranian nuclear program (Zerkalo.az, March
15).
Fried and Mann also toured Georgia and Armenia before stopping in
Turkey. In Ankara, Fried met with Turkish officials and discussed the
possibility of opening the Turkish-Armenian border (New Anatolian,
March 18). Ankara, however, responded that it would keep the border
shut until Armenia ends its occupation of Azerbaijan and removes the
anti-Turkish clauses from the Armenian Constitution (Zaman.com, March
18).
While in Azerbaijan, U.S. officials discouraged Azerbaijan and
Armenia from using military rhetoric and urged Baku and Yerevan to
prepare their respective societies for peace, not war. After
reiterating their hopes fora possible breakthrough in the peace talks
in 2006 and describing the idea of a new war as “catastrophic,”
U.S. officials also were reminded of the friendly economic and
political relations between the United States and Azerbaijan
(Zerkalo.az, March 15).
“At present Azerbaijan adheres to a clear and strong position
reflecting the national interests of the country. Nevertheless, the
approach doesn’t hinder the continuation of constructive
negotiations,” noted Fried (Today.az, March 14).
Even after the disappointing results in Rambouillet, U.S. co-chair
Steven Mann was still optimistic. “I think both presidents take the
peace process seriously and the communities of both countries support
the idea of a peace agreement. No one wants [a new] war,” remarked
Mann following the failed negotiations in France last month (Today.az,
February 22).
In Azerbaijan, however, local media interpreted the diplomats’
statements in Baku as an attempt to put pressure on Azerbaijan, so
that Baku would agree to a peace deal that is not in Azerbaijan’s
national interest.
Referring to an anonymous diplomatic source, the independent daily
Zerkalo reported that, during their visit, the Washington emissaries
had tried to convince President Aliyev to agree to the principles of
the OSCE Minsk Group’s recently failed proposal and wanted assurances
that Baku would support a possible U.S.-led coalition against Iran
(Zerkalo, March 21).
Other experts in Azerbaijan also pointed out the Iranian question and
have raised skepticism about the sudden U.S. interest in speeding up
the resolution of the Karabakh conflict. In an interview with
Nezavisimaya gazeta, Azerbaijani political scientist Anar Safikhanov
declared that there is something else behind U.S. interest in
Azerbaijan.
“The main reason why international mediators, especially Washington,
hurry with the resolution of the Karabakh conflict is the
deteriorating situation around the Iranian nuclear program. The United
States wants peace and stability in the nearby South Caucasus region,
so that it could move ahead with its plans to further isolate
`intractable’ Iran,” stated Safikhanov (NG.ru, March 13).
“The U.S. considers the South Caucasus, especially Azerbaijan, an
arena that could be used for isolation of Tehran or as `lily pad’ base
in casethe U.S. would launch a military attack against Iran,”
concluded Safikhanov (NG.ru, March 13).
While asked about a possible U.S. military attack on Iran, Fried
responded, “We do not think about [the military option] and hope that
the international community would convince Tehran to quit its nuclear
program” (Regnum.ru, March 14).
Moreover, the Zerkalo article speculated about Moscow’s role in the
peace process and stated that Azerbaijan should not count on Russia’s
help in balancing U.S. pressure. Moscow has been interested in the
status quo in the Karabakh conflict as a mechanism for preserving its
own influence in the South Caucasus. This time, however, “Russia
decided to abandon its `reliably ally and regional outpost’ [Armenia]
and its `strategic partner’ [Azerbaijan] in favor of the U.S.,”
according to the article (Zerkalo, March 21).
Indeed, as a result of Washington’s newfound interest in the South
Caucasus, particularly Azerbaijan, official Baku may find itself in a
difficult predicament. On the one hand, Azerbaijan will have to
balance the U.S. pressure for speeding up the Karabakh peace process
with its own demand for resolution of the conflict within the
framework of its territorial integrity. On the other hand, Baku should
walk a fine line in responding to U.S. demands for closer military and
security cooperation with the United States, while at the same time
not offending neighboring Russia and Iran.
The Azerbaijani government will not sign an agreement that could
jeopardize its territorial integrity either today or in the
future. Thus, for the time being, Azerbaijan is likely to play along
in improving military-to-military relations with the United States, in
hope that this could alleviate the U.S. pressure on issues concerning
the unfavorable parts of the Karabakh peace proposal.
Published by _The JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION_ ()
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress