GEORGIANS AFRAID OF THE CHECHENS… FROM RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE
Pavel Simonov, Asim Oku

Axis News
April 12 2006

The Chechen members of the Russian military intelligence are acting
in the Georgian territory. This was declared by a representative of
the leadership of the Ministry of Interior of Georgia, affiliated
with the counterspionage department. AIA has addressed him with the
request to comment on the statement that the Chechen employees of
the Main Intelligence Service

Emblem of GRU (GRU) of the Ministry of Defence of Russia have
been operating outside the Chechen Republic. April 6 the Russian
newspaper Moskovsky komsomolets published a report from the Chechen
Republic, containing interview to the Lieutenant-Colonel Said Magomed
Kakiyev. He is a commander of one of the two battalions of the GRU
in which the majority of servicemen is made by the Chechens. The
battalion headed by Kakiyev, conditionally carries the name of the
“West” that corresponds to a zone of its operative responsibility. It
has been operating mainly in the western part of the Chechen Republic.

The Moskovsky komsomolets’ article basically repeats the previous
stories of the Russian press devoted to Kakiyev. Some original
snatches concern the battalion itself: its equipment, tactics of
special operations, and the tasks carried out by the unit. However
the most interesting points concern the geography of the activities
of Kakiyev’s subordinates. As it was already noted, a zone of their
responsibility is the Western Chechnya. In the north this part of the
republic adjoins to Stavropol Territory, in the West it adjoins two
other North Caucasian republics – Ingushetia and Northern Ossetia,
and in the south rests against the Russian-Georgian border.

Especially, about half of this sector of the border lies within the
zone of the direct responsibility of the battalion “West”. Formally
it is considered that Kakiyev’s subordinates “work” exclusively in
territory of the republic. However the correspondent of the Moskovskij
komsomolets narrates that “the battalion along with the servicemen
of the Ministry of Interior and the FSB operates also outside the
Chechen Republic. But this is not especially advertised…”. The
truth is that two years ago in an interview to the online paper
Utro.ru Kakiyev himself had recognized that his battalion carries
out operations in the neighbouring North Caucasian republics, in
particular in Ingushetia and Daghestan. However, except for these two,
the Chechen Republic adjoins also to Georgia.

Georgian secrets of the GRU

Making comments on the above-stated information, the source in the
Ministry of Interior of Georgia has told that according to the
counter-intelligence of Tbilisi, the Chechen members of the GRU
have indeed participated in secret operations in territory of the
republic. As a rule, they were crossing the border a bit at a time,
under a kind of refugees or the Chechen separatists. Border crossing
was carried out both from the Chechen Republic, and from Daghestan.

Cases when the Chechen scouts passed deep into the Georgian territory
more than on fifty kilometers are also known. Here they were engaged
in gathering of the information on routes of movement and places of
stationing of the Chechen separatists, especially their leaders.

Georgian counter-intelligence has suspicions that the GRU members
have also carried out secret special actions. In particular, it is
an issue of provocation instigation of collisions between various
groups of the Chechen separatists and of liquidation of some of their
activists. To the point, these data were indirectly confirmed in March
2004 with the commander of the battalion “West” Said-Ìagomed Kakiyev.

The assassinated Ruslan Gelayev In an interview to the Russian online
paper Utro.ru he said: “Our unit had to participate in a special action
on annihilation of the gang of Gelayev in Daghestan”. Ruslan Gelayev
was considered as one of the chief commanders of the separatist
movement. He was lost some weeks prior to the publication of the
mentioned above interview of Kakiyev. And it actually took place on
the Georgian border, in the area which does not relate at all to the
zone of the responsibility of the battalion “West”.

The representative of the Ministry of Interior of Georgia recollects
that in the summer-autumn of 2002 Tbilisi was seriously worried about
the Chechen scouts with a view of chances to legitimize intrusion of
the Russian troops in the territory of the republic. As he said, at
that time Moscow considered an feasibility of transfer to Georgia of
several dozens of Chechens from the GRU. Back they should come in the
guise of a kind of separatists. Then under a pretext of destruction of
“congestions of insurgents” in the Georgian territory, the Russian
command expected to lead a large-scale operation of “smooth-out”
of the Chechen settlements in the northeast of the republic.

By the way, in September 2002 the representatives of the highest Moscow
leadership spoke openly about such an opportunity. The then Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Russia Igor Ivanov declared that his country
“reserves the right to itself to pursue terrorists, including in the
territory of Georgia”. And President Vladimir Putin had publicly asked
the Russian General Staff to submit him proposals on the possibility
to strike against the bases of terrorists “directly in the Georgian
territory”. Our interlocutor is convinced that rapproachement of
Tbilisi with Washington in military area, in particular the stay at
that time in Georgia of a significant number of instructors from the
Pentagon, has allowed to avoid such a scenario. “Russians were afraid
of the prospect to collide here with American militaries,” – considers
the representative of the Georgian Ministry of Interior. Concluding
the conversation, he noted that the peak of activity of the Chechen
scouts in the territory of the republic had fallen to the period of
2001-2004. At the same time our source does not exclude that the GRU
is continuing to operate in the north-west of Georgia at present, too.

Enemy number one?

Georgia keeps one of the first places among the CIS countries as
regards the activity of the Russian intelligence services. Last year
the Vice-Speaker of the Georgian parliament Michael Machavariani even
declared, that the Russian agents have been penetrating all power
structures of the republic.

Simon Kiladze Most likely, arrest of the official of the presidential
administration Simon Kiladze a few weeks ago, was intended to support
similar statements. “I am afraid, it is not the last person who can
be found out in the state structures, engaged in similar activities,”
– the head of state Michael Saakashvili has noted. “We have a lot of
information that we have been collecting for a longer time,” said he.

Commenting the current situation in an interview to Russian online
paper Kavkazskij uzel, a representative of the Georgian Ministry
of State Security has told that “the Russian intelligence and
counter-intelligence have been working very energetically in Georgia.”

According to his data, “the approximate number of the Russian
fixed-post spies working in our country reaches 50-75 persons”. And
though in republic have been operating various Russian special
services, including the FSB (since 1999-2000 by the use of the
Department of Coordination of the Operative Information – UKOI), the
attention of Tbilisi is keeping a close watch almost exclusively on
the GRU.

The espionage theme became an integral part of the Georgian-Russian
opposition during the rule of Edward Shevardnadze (1992 – 2003). It
was promoted to no small degree by the unadvertised participation of
the Russian power structures in the Abkhazian conflict (1992-1994).

>From the beginning of 2000, the growth of espionage mania of Tbilisi
regarding Moscow has been observed. The given phenomenon in many
respects is the result of the second Chechen war, that begun autumn
1999, and the change of power in Georgia four years later.

After renewal of military actions in the Chechen Republic, the Russian
leadership has accused Tbilisi of connivance, and even assistance to
the Chechen separatists.

In September 2002 the Chief of the General Staff of Russia Anatoly
Kvashnin compared the government of Georgia to a regime of the Talibs
in Afghanistan, having accused the Georgian power structures in
rendering assistance to the Chechens. Shortly before that, official
representatives of Tbilisi had announced the fact of assault and
battery by the Russian aircraft on the territory of the republic.

Against this background, in September 2002, shown discontent
with cooperation with Georgia in the sphere of security, Vladimir
Putin declared deployment of the GRU units on the border of the two
countries. The then Head of Georgian intelligence Àvtandil Yoseliani
publicly showed his concern on the subject. However in June 2003
the President of Russia has spoken out on the possible appearance of
the GRU members already directly in the Northeast Georgia. Thus he
has officially confirmed the fact of heightened interest of his own
secret services to this area.

In December of the same year an unnamed member of the Georgian
government has warned on the pages of the British paper The Guardian,
about the plans of the GRU “to wreck construction of the Baku –
Tbilisi – Ceyhan pipeline”. According to the source of the English
journalists: “the pipeline can be attacked by the Chechen insurgents
or the ecological saboteurs recruited by the Russian military
intelligence”. Making comments on the article,

Àvtandil Yoseliani Namyk Abbasov, the Minister of National Security of
Azerbaijan, has noted that “it does not follow to seriously perceive
such statements”. At the same time he has recognized the presence of
intelligence data on possible actions of terror against the Baku –
Tbilisi – Ceyhan pipeline.

In August 2004 Nikolay Tabatadze, the Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Georgia, has declared that at one of the Russian army
bases in the North Caucasus about 400 inhabitants of South Ossetia
have been undergoing special training. South Ossetia is an autonomous
republic located within the borders of Georgia, but not submitting
to Tbilisi. The Georgian official also told that Anatoly Sysoyev,
the military adviser of the South Ossetian president, is a GRU colonel.

Tabatadze has noted that the Russian officer arrived to South Ossetia
in June 2004 and since then personally supervises the preparation of
200 more persons directly in territory of the rebellious republic.

Simultaneously, on the background of activization of the efforts
to settle the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, a group of insurgents not
under control of either party emerged in the zone of opposition.

According to Georgy Baramidze, the Minister of Defence of Georgia,
the given group has been “well equipped and trained”. As the main task
of the unknown insurgents the minister named “provocations on kindling
large-scale military actions”. According to Baramidze, the group has
arrived to South Ossetia from the Russian territory. In parallel, the
representatives of the Georgian command have distributed information
that the “third force” in the zone of the conflict consists not from
the Southern Ossetians, but from the servicemen of a GRU division.

Additional information on this occasion has been made public in
November, 2004 by the Head of the Committee on Defense and Security in
the Georgian parliament Givi Targamadze. He told about the delivering
to Georgia of the diversive groups trained by the Russian military
intelligence. According to Òargamadze, this time, their task consisted
in striking the key targets of power supply. The current President
of Georgia Michael Saakashvili has actually confirmed availability of
“data on diversions about to take place”.

Half a year later, in May 2005, Georgian press fed by the local
authorities, has accused the GRU of plans of destabilization of
situation in the Dzhavaheti area in the south of the republic,
inhabited mostly by the Armenians.

Givi Targamadze The same month, during the US President’s visit to
Tbilisi, an assasination attempt on him has been accomplished. Vladimir
Arutyunyan suspected of this crime, was detained in July of the same
year. Then the leader of the Popular Front of Georgia Nodar Natadze
declared that the arrested person “is an agent of the GRU”.

July 25, 2005 Georgian Minister of Interior Vano Merabishvili has
accused the mentioned above Anatoly Sysoyev of the organization
of acts of terror in territory of the country. As the Minister of
Interior put it: “About one and a half year ago under direction of
the GRU colonel a diversive group that have had training preparations
in Russia has been formed.” Actions attributed to the group have
been directed against the state strategic objects, first thing,
concentrating on the system of power supply. Three citizens of South
Ossetia have been detained on charge with direct perpetration of these
diversions. The republican TV has shown a confession of one of them –
Georgy Valiyev. He has told about the combat training at the training
camp in South Ossetia under direction of the Russian instructors.

Vano Merabishvili About 100-115 persons were trained alongside with him
there. Then, in August the same year, 90 of them were sent to the North
Caucasus where they have continued trainings assisted by the Russian
instructors again. According to Valiyev, they had been training the
skills of guerrilla warfare, in particular, mine-laying and blasting
operations. Givi Targamadze, the Head of the Parliamentary Committee
on Defense and Security, has announced in this connection that “in
Georgia the numerous secret-service network operates and diversive
groups are being prepared with the strength up to 120 persons.”

In turn, the Vice-Speaker of the parliament Michael Machavariani
ascertained: “The GRU has its agents at all levels of authority of
Georgia”. As he said: “Old channels of secret service network that
have been used by the KGB in the past, continue to function today,
too”. The Vice-Speaker has emphasized that “when Russia started
already to organize the acts of terror, a secret network within the
power structures is especially dangerous”. It goes without saying
that Moscow has categorically denied all charges of Tbilisi.

According to the Russian Foreign Ministry press release, this country
“has no relation” to the acts of terror in the territory of Georgia.

It was noted that “the persons, whose names were mentioned in the
statement of the Ministry of Interior of Georgia, are not registered
and do not work in any official structures of Russia”.

Representatives of the Russian Defence Ministry have voiced their
position through the mass-media, especially having underlined that
Anatoly Sysoyev “all is not on the list of the GRU”.

Simultaneously sources in the General Staff have called all the
data of the Georgian side “the extreme provocation reflecting the
general unfriendly line of the official Tbilisi towards Moscow”. It
was also said that “the persons specified by Merabishvili have never
served in the Russian army”. Despite of such unequivocal refutations,
officials of the Georgian Ministry of Interior have conveyed their
request to the Russian colleagues to provide information on the
already well-known “GRU colonel”. According to Vano Merabishvili,
the incoming reply said that Anatoly Sysoyev does really exist, but
“granting of the information on him infringes on interests of Russia’s
national security”.

January, 22 this year as a result of diversions pipelines on which
the Russian gas is delivered to Georgia and Armenia have been
damaged. Representatives of the official Tbilisi accused Moscow of
the organization of these actions. The responsibility they have
actually assigned to the Russian military intelligence, having
demanded extradition of “two GRU officers, Anatoly Sysoyev and Roman
Boiko”. They also were accused of the organization of similar actions
that took place in the Georgian territory in 2004. It is curious,
that in this connection, “a source in one of the FSB divisions”
on an internet site Kavkazsky Uzel, has confirmed the presence in
Georgia of the Russian secret-service network. He has also noted,
that in South Ossetia “secret services of almost all countries of
the world, including Russia and Georgia” actively operate. However,
the representative of FSB has accused the Georgian colleagues in
diversions on gas pipelines.

Moscow’s Chechen intelligence

According to the statement of the representative of the Georgian
Ministry of Interior, the Chechen battalion “West” has been the one of
divisions of the Russian military intelligence that has conducted its
operations in the republic. It refers to the most coded structures of
the GRU. In total there are only two such battalions conditionally
called the “West” and the “East”. They have been generated in the
end of 2003, on the basis of two special task companies, operating in
the Mountain grouping structure of the Russian troops in the Chechen
Republic. Both of the battalions are submitted directly to the General
Staff of the army.

Servicemen of the “East”, the same as its commander Sulim Yamadayev,
in the period of 1994-1999 were a part of the armed formations of
the Chechen separatists, and fought against the Russian troops. For
this reason, representatives of Moscow at times have been treating
them with some mistrust and even suspicion.

The battalion “West”, on the contrary, from the Russian point of view,
is considered the most reliable Chechen unit. Its many representatives,
the same as their commander, Lieutenant Colonel Said-Magomed Kakiyev,
still in 1993-1994 belonged to the armed formations of the pro-Russian
opposition opposed to the Chechen president Dzhokhar Dudayev.

Said Magomed Kakiyev Shortly before the beginning of the first war
in republic (December, 1994), Kakiyev even commanded all the forces
of opposition, bulding on the aid of the Russian secret services.

In 1994-1996 a part of the veterans of the battalion “West” acted
on the side of federal army, including within the framework of
power structures of then pro-Russian administration of the Chechen
Republic. After the conclusion of the arrangement on the termination
of the conflict in August 1996 (the Khasavyurt agreements), the
majority of them has left for Russia. They returned home only after
the beginning of the second Chechen war in the autumn of 1999.

Personnel In the Russian mass-media contradictory information on the
strength of the battalion “West” has been disclosed. Most likely, data
that is most approached to reality, is that from 1,000 up to several
thousand people serve in the battalion. In January 2005 Kakiyev has
declared, that the number of persons willing “to get in the battalion
reaches 3144 persons who have fighting experience”. The majority of the
servicemen is made by the Chechens. Their significant part – natives
of the Nadterechny area in the northwest of the Chechen Republic.

Therefrom comes Kakiyev himself. Population of this area traditionally
adhere to the pro-Russian frame of mind and from the beginning of
1990’s negatively perceive the idea of independence of the republic.

Some Caucasian sources note one more rather curious detail regarding
the personnel of the battalion. According to these sources, Kakiyev
and a lot of his nearest fellows are natives of the Chechen kin known
for adherence to those local Suffi orders that from the second half
of the 19th century in every possible way showed the loyalty to the
Russian authority. It explains the emphasized devotion of Kakiyev
and of some his officers. Joining the battalion the beginners from
among Chechens, necessarily should swear fidelity on the Koran. The
commander calls himself “the slave to the Allah” and “the soldier
of an islam”, but also a “fierce opponent of a vakhabism”. Thus,
participation of Kakiyev and his comrades-in-arms on the side of
Moscow is based, among other things, on the ideological antagonism
between the currents of the traditional for the North Caucasus Suffi
currents in Islam and modern Islamic fundamentalism. At the same time,
at online forums visited by the local Muslim youth, in particular from
North Caucasus, Kakiyev and his subordinates are not seldom called as
“national-traitors”.

Tasks and Tactics Talking to a reporter of the Moskovsky komsomolets,

Kakiyev announced that the aim of his battalion is “to annihilate camps
and basis of the militants in the mountainous part of the republic, to
carry out search operations”. Other Russian sources note that this unit
participates in almost all the significant reconnaissance operations
in the Western Chechnya. It is known from Kakiyev’s contacts with
the journalists that his battalion has played a key role in the
elimination of a number of major separatist movement commanders,
particularly Ruslan Gelayev, March 2004.

In the connection of the used tactics, Kakiyev notes: “We do not
move around the republic in large columns. We move forward in small
groups to a particular site of the special operation.” Characteristic
feature of the battalion is its ability to conduct combat operations
for several weeks in the difficult climate and terrain of the Chechen
mountain areas. There is various indirect evidence that in many cases
Kakiyev’s subordinates operate with civilian clothes on or using
the separatists’ equipment. In combination with common appearance
of local population, knowledge of language and traditions, the
battalion’s servicemen qualitatively differ from the representatives
of other Russian units. And necessarily they freely accept shape of
the opponent.

Intelligence and Counter-intelligence

The mentioned above qualities allow the Kakiyev’s subordinates to
effectively collect intelligence among local population. According
to indirect evidence, the command of the battalion has set the
intelligence using its agents going. Information on the location of
separatist units in the mountains and their planned operations is being
obtained in such a way. At the same time Kakiyev is extremely careful
not to allow the enemy agents taking root within his battalion. In
this regard his unit is protected to the best advantage in comparison
with the other Chechen power structures operating on the Russian
authority’s side. As a rule, the new Chechen recruits are accepted to
the battalion at a personal reference of a battalion veteran. Former
supporters of the separatist movement receive flat refusal.

For the same reason Kakiyev avoids close contacts with the other
power structures of the republic consisting of his fellow-tribesmen.

The commander of the battalion is firmly convinced that many of the
former separatists siding with them are, in fact, “double agents”.

Armament According to the Russian regional periodical Yuzhny reporter,
the battalion “West” is equipped with the “most sophisticated weapons
in Russian army”. In its turn, a reporter of Moskovsky komsomolets
tells the following: “Regular armament of the reconnaissance units:
sub-machine-guns, machine-guns, sharp-shooter’s guns, noiseless firing
equipment, night vision devices, everybody has – Stechkin’s handgun
and knives, including knives with a discarding blade.”

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