Moscow News (Russia)
April 14, 2006
KOSOVO PATH A TRAP
By Sergei Markedonov The Institute of Political and Military Analysis
Special to The Moscow News
Russia should propose its own criteria for the recognition of new
states
The status of Kosovo is in the final stages of resolution. According
to U.S. State Department Spokesman Sean McCormack, the U.S.
administration supports the efforts of Marti Ahtisaari, special envoy
of the UN secretary general, aimed to resolve the status of Kosovo
before the end of this year.
The United States and EU countries are categorically opposed to any
parallels being drawn between Albanian separatism in Serbia and the
struggle for independence by ethnic Ossetians and Abkhaz in Georgia,
Armenians in Azerbaijan, or interethnic separatism in Moldova’s
breakaway Transdnestr region. According to Sean McCormack, every
ethno-political conflict in the post-Soviet area has its own unique
specifics that must be taken into account.
Nevertheless, “Kosovization” of the post-Soviet area is well under
way. The hasty resolution of the “Kosovo problem” highlighted the
problem of the self-proclaimed entities in the post-Soviet area.
The Ukrainian blockade of the Transdnestr Moldovan Republic
effectively coincided with a massive diplomatic onslaught by official
Tbilisi against South Ossetia and the latest escalation in the
Georgian-Abkhaz conflict in Abkhazia’s Gali District. Lying behind
the strong-worded statements by Georgian, Moldovan and Ukrainian
leaders is the thinly veiled intention to resolve the problem of
rebellious territories before Kosovo’s independence is
internationally recognized.
As of now Kosovo will become a crucial factor in the domestic and
foreign policy of the “commonwealth of unrecognized states” – a kind
of CIS-2 the Commonwealth of Independent States, the loose alliance
that replaced the Soviet Union . Leaders and ideologues of the
Transdnestr Moldovan Republic, Nagorny Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South
Ossetia keep quoting Vladimir Putin’s statement about the need to
apply a universal approach to resolving ethno-political problems in
the post-Soviet and the post-Yugoslav areas. Vladimir Putin’s thesis
was unquestionably embraced by the Russian expert community.
According to Sergei Karaganov, chairman of the influential Council
for Foreign and Defense Policy, “if Kosovo is recognized as an
independent state, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and the Transdnestr
region will have a right to ask for accession to Russia.”
At first glance, the principle of universalism is logical. If Kosovo
(like Slovenia and Croatia before it) is recognized on the basis of
the principle of ethnic self-determination (“blood right”), why are
the same rights denied to ethnic Armenians in Nagorny Karabakh or to
Ossetians or the Abkhaz?
But the logic of the “universal” approach only goes so far. Kosovo is
not simply a model for the formation of a separatist state, but also
a certain settlement model adopted by the “powers that be” of this
world – Europe and the United States. They predicate the recognition
of Kosovo on the return of refugees – Serbs and Gypsies. But is this
approach applicable to all CIS-2 states? The Kosovo model could be
attractive to South Ossetia since more than 40,000 ethnic Ossetians
ended up as refugees in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. In the
Transdnestr region, there was no “ethnic cleansing” at all. Yet
Abkhazia and Nagorny Karabakh (which so zealously supported the
“Kosovo path”) will reject this principle. For Abkhazia, the return
of Georgian refuges to the republic’s entire territory (not just to
the Gali District), without any preconditions, would drastically
change the ethnic/demographic situation. In that case, the Abkhaz, as
before the 1992-93 war, would once again become an ethnic minority.
For the Nagorny Karabakh Republic, the repatriation of refugees would
mean the elimination of the “security belt” and the appearance of
about 500,000 Azerbaijanis on their territory, as well as near their
borders.
Russian politicians and diplomats, who are striving to prevent the
recognition of Kosovo, should not draw any parallels between the
former Yugoslav autonomy and the CIS-2, but invoke such factors as
the weakness of the province’s state institutions and the threat of
international terrorism and drug trafficking (real problems for
Kosovo).
By proposing its own criteria for the recognition or non-recognition
of newly independent states, Russia could secure freedom to maneuver
both in the Balkans and within the CIS-2. Why do we not recognize
Kosovo? Because there is no viable democracy there: After all, even
the report by Kai Eide, the UN secretary general’s envoy to Kosovo,
talks about personnel policy based on clan affiliation without any
regard to competence. Why does Russia support China (the PRC)?
Because there have been several election cycles there and local
government institutions are developing.
Why is Russia helping South Ossetia and Abkhazia? Because Tbilisi
discriminates against ethnic minorities (not only Abkhaz and
Ossetians, but also Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Kurds, and Assyrians)
and because it has abolished the Adzhar autonomy.
The mastering of political jargon adopted in the West and a
diversified policy would prevent Russia from falling into the trap of
“universalism” with regard to ethnic self-determination. It must not
be forgotten that recognition of “blood right” as the main motive for
revising state borders is fraught with a new “parade of
sovereignties” for the Russian Federation – something that the
“vertical chain of command” would be powerless to stop.MN